
BEYOND ANY PARTICULARITY: HEGEL'S UNIVERSALISTIC RETHINKING OF PROTESTANT SACRAMENTOLOGY

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This paper explores Hegel's sacramentology within his system and in view of its determinants among which the Kantian reinterpretation of the sacraments was especially influential. The study demonstrates that the Right Hegelianism as represented by Marheineke tempered the universalistic potential of Hegel's sacramentology in order to accommodate his legacy to the ecclesiastical prerequisite of that time. Divergent hermeneutical presuppositions of the Reformation theology and of the Hegelianism were elucidated and analysed in terms of their impact upon sacramentology.

KEYWORDS: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Kantianism, sacramentology, Socinianism

A SIGNIFICANCE OF HEGELIAN SACRAMENTOLOGY FOR THE FAR EAST

FOR A LONG time Hegel's philosophy of religion had been considered beneficial to the Protestant theology practised solely within the Western philosophical and theological tradition. Nonetheless, it is obvious that a universalistic orientation, which is an indelible part of the Hegelian system, could profit the Protestant theology cultivated in a specific and multi-religious context of the Far East.

In this respect, Christianity might be perceived as a relatively new religion alien to the indigenous traditions. Therefore, a philosophical reinterpretation of the rituals characteristic of the Protestant Christianity (*i.e.*, baptism and the Lord's Supper) could provide an intellectual legitimisation thereof, welding diverse theological tendencies present in the post-denominational edifice of the modern Asian theologies and even transcending the criterion of faith.

The idea of interpreting the phenomenon of religion in philosophical terms propounded by Hegel may contribute to the public theology based not on the category of a supermundane revelation but on human *rational* endeavour.

HEGEL'S SACRAMENTOLOGY WITHIN HIS SYSTEM

As in August 1801 Hegel submitted his habilitation theses¹, which were underlying his future system, no one (perhaps except his friend Schelling²) could envisage a whirlwind both of philosophy and of theology that was to come on account of a native of Stuttgart. Actually, Hegel's habilitation paper³ was written in Latin, treated of astronomy, and passed rather unnoticed. Around 1813 a new system was brought to fruition⁴ and new philosophical foundations, which had a long-lasting impact upon the Protestant theology (predominantly of the German-speaking world), were laid down. Over time the Hegelian legacy was instilled into the humanities worldwide.⁵

Hegel rethought and universalised sacramentology, which in the Protestant tradition is construed as the theological reflexion upon two ordinances namely baptism and the Lord's Supper. For him the *sola Scriptura* principle became untenable due to the

Enlightenment criticism of the Bible though he himself did not deem it warranted providing that his own system was built on axiomatic premises which could not be verified either empirically or logically as the Enlightenment methodology requested.⁶ Since the Reformation tenets were suspended, Hegel drew an outline of a new sacramentology in line with the laws of dialectics, which he claimed not to invent but rather to discover and to expound as inherent and embedded in the ontological and epistemological root of the universe that is a constant flux of being according to the triple schema.

Definitely, sacramentology was not material to Hegel's philosophy of religion⁷ and was set forth once while he discussed how the Spirit realises itself as the religious community (*Gemeinde*).⁸ Nevertheless, the Hegelian concept of baptism and of the Lord's Supper, which was to a degree indebted to the Kantian reinterpretation of these ordinances, paved the way for a new understanding of the sacraments. In the present paper, Marheineke's ecclesiastical accommodation of Hegel's thought is studied too because it unearths doctrinal concerns of his contemporaries officiating within the Protestant State Church of Germany.

Hegel did not refer to sacramentology in the most systematic exposition of his mature philosophy⁹ because in his opinion the sacraments were only auxiliary means of edification which might be utilised by the religious community that was defined as those who comprehend the dialectic texture of the universe. This community identified as God's kingdom embraces people irrespective of their religious affiliation.¹⁰ Whether one belongs thereto or not is of no avail for three reasons.

Firstly, for Hegel every human being as the subjective Spirit is doomed to the continual existence, which transcends his or her death. This eschatological existence has nothing to do with the resurrection of flesh or with the last judgment depicted in the Scripture but is the perfect, pure, and timeless self-consciousness culminating in the eternal now.

Secondly, in Hegel's view sin is an inevitable consequence of human nature disposed to know itself and the world around. Prior to the symbolical fall into sin, human was mortal and unconscious like an animal.¹¹ Thanks to the fall, human became cognisant of good and evil and therefore immortal as the subjective Spirit. In Hegel's system sin corresponds to the alienation of the nature

(to wit the world) from the idea (namely the Absolute) and therefore is necessary as a part of the dialectical process which automatically provides for the cancellation of the said alienation (called the reconciliation).

Thirdly, Hegel expected no after-world to arise because he reduced all aspects of time to the present moment and confined all reality to the unfading splendour of the existing universe.

KANT'S REINTERPRETATION OF THE SACRAMENTS

It seems that the Kantian reinterpretation of the sacraments¹² originated from the Socinian school of theology,¹³ which is considered a prominent forerunner of European rationalism and Enlightenment.¹⁴ Since the Socinianism was outlawed and ruthlessly persecuted throughout Europe, Kant would never admit it.

For Kant baptism incorporates the baptised one into a denomination, but it neither forgives sins nor confers grace. The idea that baptism is capable of blotting out human transgressions and of renewing human existence in God's sight was described by Kant as a delusion (*Wahn*). He did not comment explicitly on the infant baptism but rather mentioned that the said incorporation takes place either by the public confession of faith in case of an adult or by the pledge of witnesses (*i.e.*, godparents) who commit themselves to care for a future religious instruction of the baptised infant. Consequently, the infant baptism propagates a visible church by incorporating the offspring of its members.

Similarly, the Socinianism defined baptism as a rite of initiation but solemnly renounced the infant baptism. Furthermore, baptism was entirely disconnected from the remission of sins and the regeneration. Socinus interpreted baptism as one of the initiation ceremonies typical of major religions. He did not recognise baptism as a permanent and necessary institution but rather as an evanescent and arbitrary religious custom meant to display a confession of faith.¹⁵ Thus, baptism might coincide with joining a church body.

Kant circumscribed the Lord's Supper in merely ethical terms. In his view the Lord's Supper preserves, renews, continues and propagates a sense of moral community among the participants. This happens as the participants celebrate the equality of their

privileges and of their moral benefits, which is embodied in this common commemorative meal. Accordingly, the Lord's Supper contributes to a worldwide expansion of the universal moral community by surmounting self-centeredness and by calling to a selfless love. Kant denied that the Lord's Supper forgives sins or bestows grace (*Gnadenmittel*) as the Socinians did.

HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF BAPTISM

Hegel did not discuss various concepts of baptism but rather offered his own explanation. In his system, the sacraments by themselves do not appertain to the activity of the Spirit that eternally becomes as it knows itself by the dialectical forms, which it assumes. One of these forms is the religious community to which the sacraments belong. In Hegel's opinion this community is distinguished from other (*i.e.*, non-religious) communities by the knowledge (*Bewusstsein*) that the Spirit (the synthesis) reconciles in itself the thesis (the idea) and the antithesis (the world). As the Spirit the primordial idea (equal to the Absolute) brings itself to completion. This idea, which is composed of the infinity and the finitude, and which simultaneously conceals in itself all reality and is concealed in all reality, is predestined to evolve.

Hegel relinquished the Scripture as a reliable source of religious knowledge and maintained that the existing religion (to wit Christianity) could at best function as a sort of "philosophy for the poor" who are ill-equipped to the impeccable truth unveiled by the pure philosophy. Therefore, in his circumscription of baptism, Hegel intentionally did not refer to any biblical passages. Unlike Kant, Hegel approached baptism only from the perspective of infants as its recipients.

Thus, as a child is born within a visible church, that is to Christian parents, although this child is still unconscious (*bewusstlos*) of the true nature of the universe, he/she is determined (*bestimmt*) to take hold of the unmarred truth. Hegel asserted that the child is potentially the subjective Spirit. Accordingly, the child is considered the Spirit on account of his / her aptitude (*Fähigkeit*) to become the real Spirit in the future. Over time the child accomplishes himself/herself as the Spirit and ultimately attains the fount of being and non-being which are identical in dialectical terms. The determination of the child to the truth is announced

by means of baptism, which initiates its recipient into the church.

Since Hegel contended that all people regardless of their creeds share the same eschatological destiny, he had to demonstrate a specificity of Christianity as compared to other religions. For Hegel, the church is unique as the community of those who comprehend that the Absolute reconciled itself to itself and dispelled evil which he interpreted as a misapprehension of the world's status.¹⁶

In Hegel's view baptism proves that the baptised child belongs to the church, not to a hostile world (*eine feindliche Welt*). The latter statement sounds strange granted that for Hegel the world is the other face of the Absolute and the status of the world is secured by the laws of dialectics. Consequently, the world is the mirror in which the idea admires itself. The principal message of the Hegelian philosophy of religion is that the Absolute is no more a pure transcendence (*Jenseits*) for it negates itself by becoming its own opposite that is the world. It transpires that for Hegel the universe is the flesh of God, the visible dimension of the original idea. However, in Hegel's system the world may be hostile or even deceitful if its ontological position is misconceived namely if it is taken on its own as isolated from the idea from which the universe springs by virtue of negation.

Speaking of baptism, Hegel alluded to the regeneration but did not attribute it to baptism as such. For him the regeneration is necessary because human spontaneously does not know his/her ontological derivation, does not realise the deepest root of existence and non-existence. Thus, human must learn that he/she is the subjective Spirit, the Spirit's effluence. By this self-knowledge human regenerates himself/herself and the Spirit subjectively begets itself as human. In Hegel's opinion, since baptism symbolises the incorporation into the spiritual community which ought to enshrine the dialectical flow of being, it edifies and prepares the child to capture his/her position in the dialectical chain of perpetual becoming as an afflatus of the Absolute.

HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF THE LORD'S SUPPER

For Hegel, the church demonstrates the connection between God and human by means of the Lord's Supper though it is diversely interpreted by various confessions. In his opinion God's presence

is consciously appropriated in the Lord's Supper which is about the mystic union of the participant with the Absolute, about the inward experience of God. Through the Lord's Supper the participant acquires the knowledge of the cosmic reconciliation in a sensual and immediate way. Thus, the Spirit enters him/her and dwells in him/her.

According to Hegel Christ is a symbol of the most profound unity of the infinity and the finitude, and the Lord's Supper regularly displays His suffering and death. Therefore, it can be regarded as a symbolical enactment of these concepts. Hegel did not identify Jesus' incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection as historical events but rather assigned them to abstract phases of timeless becoming (self-transfiguration) of the idea because the Hegelian Christ ultimately fuses the finitude and the infinity, the tangible and the intangible.

Consequently, Christ's incarnation conforms to the transition of the primordial idea to the world, which takes place by the negation. In Hegel's system, the operation of negation is peculiar because notwithstanding its name (*Aufhebung*), the negation does not abolish a previous element but rather transforms it into a new entity, retaining the old one. Thus, in an odyssey of being nothing is irreversibly lost. While the primordial idea, tantamount to the Absolute, negates itself, it externalises itself so that it might become external to itself and distinct from itself as the world.

Then, the world is negated by which the threefold Spirit emerges and the externalised being internalises itself namely returns to unity with itself. Jesus' crucifixion and resurrection appertain to this transition, which is the negation of negation. The primordial idea, which initiates the spurt of the dialectical momentum, and the Spirit, that is the embodiment and fulfilment of all dialectical impetus, are the same, albeit the world bursts forth by virtue of the negation to endure forever.

Hegel termed the Lord's Supper as the eternal sacrifice in the sense that it pictures the eternal identity of all phases of the dialectical process because all elements thereof are different masks of the same oneness. In other words, the Lord's Supper symbolically instructs human that he/she is the subjective Spirit and therefore a form of the Absolute, to be precise, the negation of its negation.

HEGEL'S PRESENTATION OF DOMINANT VIEWS ON THE LORD'S SUPPER

Hegel distinguished three dominant views on the Lord's Supper: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed. Hegel's presentation of these concepts is his original interpretation of them and does not give an account of official and normative doctrinal definitions. Moreover, he ignored the sacramentological diversity of the Swiss Reformation which cannot just be denominated as "Reformed" because the Zwinglian circumscription of the sacraments and the Calvinistic approach to sacramentology are divergent. Hegel himself did not conceal that he recognised the Lutheran concept of the Lord's Supper as "the best" of various theological propositions but still less complete than his philosophical circumscription of the Lord's Supper.

According to Hegel, the Catholic theology claims that by virtue of the sacerdotal consecration, God becomes a bread so that the Absolute begins to exist empirically as an inanimate thing. Thus, since in the Catholic concept of the Lord's Supper God becomes what is external, the Catholicism as such is focused on an external aspect of religion. Finally, Hegel pointed out that the Catholic principle of externality is concomitant with the Catholic heteronomy, which means that by Catholic standards an individual should not search the truth on his / her own but rather should accept unconsciously what is given by the church authorities (*i.e.*, externally) to be believed.

In fact, a developed Catholic sacramentology is not teaching that there is any empirical alteration owing to the consecration because in Aristotelian terms, the substance is changed but the accidents, which encompass all sensual properties, are left untouched. Therefore, the Catholic theology does not consider the transubstantiation as an empirical process except alleged eucharistic miracles, which purport to corroborate the said doctrine yet are occasionally reported.¹⁷

For Hegel the Lutheran exposition of the Lord's Supper presumes that the Lord's Supper is not about the external, ordinary elements but rather about God's presence, which is experienced spiritually by faith. Thus, as the sensual elements (*i.e.*, bread and wine) are consumed and devoured, the participants are reminded of God's presence, accessible only to the spiritual cognition (namely to faith) apart from any externality. Actually,

the Wittenberg Reformation never articulated such views on the Lord's Supper. In the 16th century the Lutheran concept of the Lord's Supper was founded on a specific interpretation of the words of institution.¹⁸

Hegel's presentation of the Reformed doctrine is deficient because it imposes a fictitious homogeneity on the Reformed tradition and it does not comply with Calvin's explanation of the Lord's Supper. In Hegel's opinion, the "Reformed" theology reduced the Lord's Supper to a vivid remembrance of the past events, which is deprived of the spiritual, divine presence. Thus, the "Reformed" understanding of the Lord's Supper is captive of the "bare common sense" (*der blosse Verstand*) and the moralism, which are for him characteristic of the Enlightenment. Historically, a link between the "Reformed" sacramentology and the Enlightenment postulated by Hegel is unwarranted. For Hegel "reason" (*Vernunft*) and "common sense" (*Verstand*) are not synonymous. It transpires that God is mirrored in human reason which is the immersion in and the cognition of the infinite,¹⁹ whereas a common sense only extends to the finitude.²⁰ Therefore, commenting on the Enlightenment, Hegel preferred to speak of "der blosse Verstand," not of "die blosse Vernunft" as Kant did.²¹

A UNIVERSALISTIC ASPECT OF HEGELIAN SACRAMENTOLOGY

The Hegelian philosophy of religion is utterly universalistic because it does not rely on any textual revelation, which must *eo ipso* be particular, but rather on human reason in the speculative sense of the term. Admittedly, Hegel referred to the revelation (*Offenbarung*) but he used this notion in the most general way to denote what is unfolded as the primordial idea, which perennially explicates itself. Unlike traditional epistemological theories, he did not posit that human knows himself/herself and the universe primarily for his/her own benefit. Since to exist means to know itself, the Absolute exists and evolves only by knowing itself which happens by means of its dialectical forms. Consequently, to linger on the idea must mediate itself and must be submerged in the dialectical transition. Simply, the Absolute is not given, but it rather creates itself. Thus, as human reason penetrates the reality, the Spirit gets to know itself because both human and the reality

are the emanation of the same Spirit. Pursuant to the Hegelian paradigm the sensual realm is not a shade of the rational one but rather the very embodiment and climax thereof.

Although Hegelianism is an axiomatic system, of which tenets cannot be verified either experimentally or logically (in mathematical terms), its universalistic capacity is evident. Following in Kant's footsteps, Hegel sought such a non-religious interpretation of the sacraments, which could evade any criticism and gain a universal recognition. For that reason, Hegel dissociated himself from the *sola Scriptura* principle which was underlying the Reformation theology till the age of Enlightenment.

MARHEINEKE'S ECCLESIASTICAL ACCOMMODATION OF HEGEL'S LEGACY

Hegel's thought left an imprint on the Protestant theologians of the German-speaking world. Those who attempted to accommodate his legacy to the ecclesiastical standards of that time (*e.g.*, Baumgarten-Crusius,²² Gabler,²³ Marheineke²⁴) were styled right or old Hegelians, whereas those who decided to experiment and to advance Hegel's paradigm on their own (*e.g.*, Feuerbach²⁵) were called left or young Hegelians. In fact, Feuerbach could envisage practising the philosophy of religion transcending a demise of traditional theism, and he proposed to construe theologising as sheer operation upon the symbolic forms distinctive of the phenomenon of religion.²⁶

Although Marheineke acclaimed Hegel's philosophy, he did not dare to engraft the authentic Hegelianism in the Protestant theology but rather settled for its accommodation to the ecclesiastical expectations. In contradistinction to Hegel, Marheineke did not suppose that the Enlightenment criticism of the biblical accounts (particularly of the miracles recorded therein) entitles human reason to be the sole source of theological knowledge. Furthermore, Marheineke reclaimed certain biblical and patristic concepts which were inherited by the Reformation but defied by Hegel.

In response to the Enlightenment challenge Marheineke avowed that contemporary theology ought to rely on three convergent sources that is on the Scripture, on the doctrinal settlement of a specific church (*i.e.*, denomination) and on human

reason. Contrary to the Reformation hermeneutics, Marheineke raised the status of a church body, declaring that the ancient church established the biblical canon (*canon ecclesiasticus*). From the Protestant point of view, it was a theological revolution albeit in the 18th century German scholars paid heed to a complex historical origin of the biblical canon.²⁷ Although in his eschatology Marheineke advocated the concept of apocatastasis (*i.e.*, the restoration of the universe to the original condition thereof) to the detriment of the concept of eternal damnation, in his ecclesiology he sustained the statement “*extra ecclesiam nulla salus*” (outside the church there is no salvation), assuming that the aforementioned church is visible²⁸ which is illustrative of his inconsistency.

Due to historical research the Lutheran orthodoxy and the Reformed orthodoxy were aware that in antiquity, no ecumenical council enumerated the canonical books and that the lists of them found in the church fathers and in the documents of the regional councils vary. Moreover, certain fathers did not hesitate to cite or to refer to the New Testament apocrypha.²⁹ In the imperial church, a consensus about the canon of the New Testament was finally reached, but some oriental churches (such as Armenian Apostolic Church or Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church) retained books, which are nowadays commonly classified as apocryphal. Therefore, the Protestant orthodoxy hammered out the concept of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit.³⁰ Accordingly, it was believed that the Holy Spirit convinces human that the Bible is God’s Word as he/she reads it or listens to it. Thus, a biblical book establishes its own canonicity and its divine authority by the testimony which the Holy Spirit bears within the recipient’s heart (the self-authentication).

Marheineke ascertained that the Bible is true but only as to its core which is grasped by the ecclesiastical creeds. He argued that since the Scripture and the church confessions were conditioned by various historical, cultural and social factors, it is necessary to reinterpret them in light of the contemporary context, which is being accomplished by human reason. Consequently, the church not only brought forth the Bible in the past but also safeguards its position and decides which books belong to the Scripture. The church also differentiates the divine content of the Bible from fallible human utterances found in the Scripture. Thus, the church discerns the genuine tenets of Christianity. In addition, human

reason liberates such a biblical-ecclesiastical doctrine from its past context so that it might be reinterpreted and reinstated.

In his sacramentology Marheineke appealed to the concept of means of grace and even linked baptism to the regeneration, the illumination and the remission of sins. However, as compared to the Reformation theology Marheineke's sacramentology is influenced by the rationalism both of the Enlightenment and of Hegelianism. His doctrine of the Lord's Supper essentially does not differ from Hegel's. Additionally, a pietistic idea that baptism must be validated by the confirmation surfaces in Marheineke's baptismal theology.

CONCLUSION

Sacramentology does not function as an isolated branch of theology or of the philosophy of religion but is sanctioned by a particular comprehension of human condition (anthropology) and of the divine justice (soteriology). In the 16th century, Lutheranism and Calvinism conceded that the total hereditary spiritual depravity of human incurs God's wrath and eternal condemnation so that God-man Christ must suffer what humankind ought to suffer on account of its sin. Thus, God hands out the complete and free gift of salvation by the means which the Lord himself established for this purpose. Lutheran theology asserted that these means forgive sins and confer salvation as they are used already here and now, whereas Calvinistic theology maintained that these means promise and ensure the remission of sins and salvation which are to be actualised in the future namely in heaven.

Hegelianism and its predecessors (the Socinian school of theology and Kantianism) did not consent to the above premises. The Socinianism and Kantianism recognised human condition (especially the moral one) as deficient but did not accept the idea of the total hereditary corruption of human will towards God and its eschatological consequences. For Hegel sin was a necessary step which humankind had to take, pursuing the self-consciousness. Furthermore, all that is real is rational and all that is rational is real.³¹ Accordingly, sin and redemption are determined by the immutable and absolute laws of dialectics. The positive (or less negative) anthropology renders the concept of the substitution (*satisfactio vicaria*) null which results in a new understanding of

the sacraments.

In the humanities, particularly in theology, the hermeneutics is critical to any argumentation. The Lutheran and the Calvinistic theology of the 16th century presupposed the divine and sole authority of the Scripture in connexion with the verbal inspiration thereof. That's why their concept of the sacraments arose from the exegetical discussions about the words of institution. On the contrary, the Socinian tradition, Kantianism and Hegelianism did not adhere to the *sola Scriptura* principle yet for different reasons.

Hegel's rethinking of Protestant sacramentology was original, radical and universalistic albeit he utilised earlier insights of Kant whose reinterpretation of the sacraments appears indebted to Socinianism—the harbinger of the Enlightenment. For that reason, the Protestant custodians of the Hegelian heritage (cf. Marheineke) preferred to soothe his sacramentology at the expense of its intentional universalism. Undoubtedly, on a speculative and rationalistic basis, Hegel endeavoured to find out a universal significance of the sacraments extending beyond any particularity.

END NOTES

- ¹ Karl Rosenkranz, "Habitationsdisputation am 27. August 1801," in *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1844), 156-159.
- ² Schelling immediately captured the relevance of Hegel's redefinition of idea (the 6th habilitation thesis) and already in 1802-1803 he restated it in German. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Philosophie der Kunst," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. I/5 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1859), 455 [§ 53].
- ³ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum* (Jena: Typis Prageri, 1801).
- ⁴ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Phänomenologie des Geistes," in *Werke*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1832). Idem, "Philosophische Enzyklopädie," in *Werke*, vol. 18 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1840), 146-205. Idem, "Religionslehre," in *Werke*, vol. 18 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1840), 74-76.
- ⁵ Cf. a partial bibliography: Kurt Steinhauer, ed., *Hegel Bibliography: Background Material on the International Reception of Hegel within the Context of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1-2/2 (München: Saur, 1980-1998). Frederick C. Beiser, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Montserrat Herrero, ed., *G. W. F. Hegel Contemporary Readings: The Presence of*

Hegel's Philosophy in the Current Philosophical Debates (Hildesheim and New York: Olms, 2011). Hans Küng, *Menschwerdung Gottes: Eine Einführung in Hegels theologisches Denken als Prolegomena zu einer künftigen Christologie* (Freiburg: Herder, 1970). Robert Stern, ed., *G. W. F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, vol. 1-4 (London: Routledge, 1993).

- ⁶ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 11 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1832), 3-44 [Einleitung].
- ⁷ Martin J. De Nys, *Hegel and Theology* (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2009), passim. Cyril O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 242-244. James Yerkes, *The Christology of Hegel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 129; 150-151.
- ⁸ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," in *Werke*, vol. 12 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1832), 268-275 [III, III, 2].
- ⁹ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse," in *Werke*, vol. 6-7 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1842-1845).
- ¹⁰ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Philosophische Enzyklopädie," in *Werke*, vol. 18 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1840), 204 [§ 207].
- ¹¹ The statement, that human was originally created mortal and morally unconscious, was anticipated by the Socinianism. Faustus Socinus, "Praelectiones theologicae," in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: [sine nomine], [post] 1656), 537 [I]. Ibidem, 539-540 [III].
- ¹² Immanuel Kant, "Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 6 (Leipzig: Inselverlag, 1921), 623 [IV, II, Allgemeine Anmerkung]. Ibidem, 630-631 [IV, II, Allgemeine Anmerkung, 3-4].
- ¹³ Johann Crell, Jonas Schlichting and Martin Ruarus, ed., *Catechesis ecclesiarum Polonicarum* (Amsterdam: Per Eulogetum Philalethem, 1684), 221-243 [V, III-IV]. To evade a legal prosecution, the printer's name (Eulogetus Philalethes) was fictitious. Actually, the book was printed by Christopher Pezold. Thomas Rees, "Historical Introduction," in *The Racovian Catechism*, ed. and trans. Thomas Rees (London: Longman, 1818), lxxxiii.
- ¹⁴ Andreas Wissowatius, *Religio rationalis* ([sine loco]: [sine nomine], 1685).
- ¹⁵ Faustus Socinus, "De Ecclesia," in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: [sine nomine], [post] 1656), 350-351 [De baptismo]. Idem, "Ad superiorem Simonis Ronenbergii epistolam responsio," in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: [sine nomine], [post] 1656), 429-431. Thomas Rees, ed. and trans., *The Racovian Catechism* (London: Longman, 1818), 249-252 (n. "d") [V, III].

- ¹⁶ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Religionslehre," in *Werke*, vol. 18 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1840), 76 [§ 78].
- ¹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, vol. 7 (Paris: Bloud and Barral, [sine anno]), 62-65 [III, LXXVI, VII-VIII].
- ¹⁸ According to the Lutheran interpretation of *verba testamenti*, Christ's body and blood are present in the bread and wine respectively only within the Lord's Supper defined as the proclamation of the words of institution, distribution and reception of the elements. On the one hand, this presence was said to be objective in the sense that it does not depend on the faith of those who participate (cf. 1 Corinthians 11:27-29) but is solely grounded upon God's Word. This claim presupposes that God's Word actualises what it announces namely and creates the reality which it proclaims. On the other hand, the aforementioned presence was believed to be non-empirical and since it could not be detected or verified by human senses, it was termed as spiritual. Certainly, the Wittenberg Reformation did not relate a physical consumption of the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper to any process of spiritualisation. In other words, Christ's presence in the Lord's Supper was supposed to be unrelated to the fact that the bread and wine are received and digested.
- ¹⁹ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Religionslehre," in *Werke*, vol. 18 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1840), 75 [§ 74].
- ²⁰ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie," in *Werke*, vol. 13 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1833), 96 [Einleitung, B, 2, b].
- ²¹ Immanuel Kant, "Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 6 (Leipzig: Inselverlag, 1921).
- ²² Ludwig Friedrich Otto Baumgarten-Crusius, *De philosophiae Hegelianaee usu in re theologica* (Jena: Bran, 1826).
- ²³ Georg Andreas Gabler, *De verae philosophiae erga religionem Christianam pietate* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1836).
- ²⁴ Philipp Marheineke, *Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1827).
- ²⁵ Ludwig Feuerbach, *De ratione una universali infinita* (Erlangen: [sine nomine], 1828).
- ²⁶ Ludwig Feuerbach, "Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft (1843)," in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Wigand, 1846), 269-346.
- ²⁷ Johann Salomo Semler, *Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Kanons*, vol. 1-3 (Halle: Hemmerde, 1771-1773).
- ²⁸ Philipp Marheineke, *Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft*

(Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1827), 342-343 [§ 536].

- ²⁹ For instance Jerome. Hieronymus Stridonensis, "Commentarius in Evangelium Matthaei," in *Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina*, vol. 26, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris: Migne, 1845), 78 [Matthew 12,13].
- ³⁰ "The Westminster Confession of Faith (1647)," in *The Creeds of Christendom with a History and Critical Notes*, vol. 3, ed. Philip Schaff (New York: Harper, 1882), 602-603 [I, IV-V].
- ³¹ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts," in *Werke*, vol. 8 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1833), 17 [Vorrede]. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik*, ed. Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz (Erfurt: Keyser, 1821), 34 [1, Vom principio rationis sufficientis]: "Quidquid est, est rationatum."