Michael Hawkins

Imperialism and Notions of Indigenous Inadequacy in the Philippines

This paper explores how American imperialism has dictated the Philippines' colonial legacy through carefully constructed notions of indigenous inadequacy. Arbitrary standards of "modernity", "nation-state", and "citizenship" allegedly justified the United States' civilizing colonial mission in the Philippines. Though both Americans and Filipinos spoke fondly of progress and equality, the fluid nature of these standards created social, civic, and economic gaps between the metropole and the colony that could never be actually transcended. The shifting notions of modernity ensured the perpetual "inadequacy" of Filipinos relative to their imperial US overlords. This phenomenon continues today. The term "developing nation" provides a good example. What is it these nations are developing towards? What else, but the continually shifting standards of "citizenship" and "nation-state" that ultimately define modernity? The unfortunate reality is that such nations will never "develop" because they have been forced to internalize notions of inadequacy which are supported and perpetuated by the shifting realities of "modernity". In this sense, US rule has proven to be the most detrimental era of Philippine colonial history.

INTRODUCTION: COLONIAL TENURES AND IMPERIAL LEGACIES

Considering the vast chronological span of the Philippines' colonial history, it is often difficult to ascertain or detangle the ultimate effects of the islands' colonial legacy. Spain's nearly three-and-a-half centuries of imperial rule in the archipelago looms large and resolute in terms of sustained and penetrable imperial impact. The syncretic resilience of the islands' various indigenous traditions also commands attention when establishing the parameters of Philippine history. By comparison, the American period can appear somewhat fleeting and much less consequential in terms of duration and fundamental cultural influence. Consequently, in the early 1970s Philippine scholar Norman Owen suggested that it might be necessary to "reassess our periodization of Philippine history, perhaps even to discard the 'American period' as a useful frame of reference." Owen argued that

despite the semblance and rhetoric of change under U.S. rule, American imperial impact was in fact extremely superficial and perhaps non-existent. At the center of Owen's assertion was the firm conviction that the United States had ultimately failed to de-Hispanize or de-Filipinize the Filipinos. According to Owen, the various cultural, political, and philosophical inheritances of U.S. colonialism were merely empty vessels, which eventually filled with the same old socio-political patterns and cultural impulses that predated American rule. In lieu of this apparently shallow imperial experience, Owen recommended that scholars abandon examinations of American imperialism as a defining episode in Philippine history. Instead, he urged scholars to "look more closely at the amalgam of Hispanic and Filipino values" that transcended and marginalized U.S. rule.[1]

Though few scholars would advocate discarding the American period as a field of study, there is a significant segment of Philippine historiography that agrees in large part with Owen's underlying assumptions about U.S. rule in the islands. Glenn May and Stanley Karnow, for example, insist that the United States' democratic experiment in the Philippines was a failure precisely because it failed to root out indigenous tendencies. Both authors underscore the detrimental persistence of "complicated and often baffling ... kinship ties," which prevented American influence from significantly altering Filipino society and politics.[2] The perseverance of this elite-dominated patron-client social system prompted May to conclude that, despite U.S. policy makers' best efforts, "the Philippines remained fundamentally Filipino."[3] This sentiment runs commonly throughout much of the literature. A number of significant scholars, both American and Filipino[4], firmly believe that the United States' acquiescence to indigenous elites and their supposedly distorted socio-political tendencies ultimately resulted in a profoundly superficial colonial experience.

While it is certainly true that the US colonial regime in the Philippines failed in many of its initiatives for societal change, this fact alone does not indicate minimal imperial impact. When assessing the ultimate effects of imperialism in the Philippines one cannot rely entirely on the relative length of colonial intervals, nor can one rely on the simple identification of persistent cultural legacies among native populations. Rather, scholars must judge imperial impact in terms of that which perpetuates the colonial relationship and continually places the Philippines in a series of positional relationships to the West that reinforce imperially-imposed ideas of indigenous inadequacy. It is not that the American regime failed because they allowed or supported indigenous socio-cultural patterns and patron-client based politics, but that they created a philosophical and institutional colonial heritage that demeaned these indigenous patterns as inadequate and incompatible with a supposedly static and monolithic "modernity," which itself was being continually redefined in the metropole. This legacy has defined the Philippines' position in the modern world, and ensured its perpetual status as a "developing country" relative to externally imposed standards. In this sense the American colonial period was the most detrimental in Philippine history.

COLONIAL HIERARCHIES, MODERNITY, AND NOTIONS OF INDIGENOUS INADEQUACY

Colonial encounters are almost without exception framed within constructed notions of superiority and inferiority. The extent to which each participant internalizes, is *forced* to internalize, or has *already* internalized these constructs determines to a large extent the outcome of the remainder of the imperial relationship. The justifications required to rationalize the perpetual subjugation and exploitation of vast groups of people require the construction and maintenance of unequal binaries, which serve to institutionalize notions of continuous indigenous inadequacy.

During the Philippines' first imperial experience, Spain was able to accomplish a swift and lasting conquest[5] of the islands' lowland populations with limited resources largely due to its advantage in this realm. As the Spaniards began to pursue organized and sustained contact with Filipino natives in the sixteenth-century, they were poised to seize the initiative for classification of both "Spaniard" and "indio" within their respective social, racial, and religious categories. Spanish Agustinian Fathers in New Spain spoke confidently of the Filipino's degeneracy and "long subservience to evil," despite their utter ignorance of the islands or their inhabitance.[6] Royal officials who were both observers and participants at the critical point of encounter, such as Antonio de Morga, argued without doubt that Spanish imperialism was justified by an inadequate indigenous society which was "weighed down by blind tyrannies and barbarous cruelties, on which the enemy of the human race had so long reared them for himself."[7]

This hierarchy of categories subsequently set the social and psychological parameters of colonial rule. The system was solidified by exclusive access to the knowledge and keys necessary to understand and transcend such categories. Native Filipinos were at a crippling disadvantage. The Spaniards were strange and had no contextual significance to them, hence rendering them initially unknowable. The Filipinos therefore required time and experience to interpret the strange new beings. Spaniards, on the other hand, had the advantage of pre-determined notions of classification and required little interpretation to formulate and carry out the initiatives necessary to seize control of the encounter.

By the time the natives gained enough experience to interpret the invaders, the parameters of colonial rule were already set firmly in place due to the necessities of adaptation and survival. Negotiating the imperial encounter within this framework required indigenous peoples (especially elites) to at least partially buy into a superior/inferior binary in order to retain as much power as possible. In his book, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society Under Early Spanish Rule*, Vicente Rafael asserts that conversion, the ultimate means and symbol of Spanish conquest, was, at least in large part, actually a form of colonial adaptation and resistance for the indigenous Filipinos. Rafael explains the strategy as follows, "They

[Tagalogs] give in to colonial authority, but they do not give up . . . they are able to dodge the priest's message only to the extent that they are able to acknowledge words and things Spanish at the horizon of their own thoughts."[8] Hence, conversion was the most direct method to gain access to the meanings and functions of the new indiscernible symbols of power that threatened Tagalog society. However, while conversion provided the Filipinos certain avenues to empowerment, it ultimately required that they internalize the implicit and inherent notions of inferiority associated with conversion. As Rafael writes, "Conversion . . . translated Tagalog into a new language ... the Spaniards' efforts to translate Christian doctrine into the native vernacular transformed the vernacular and in time the consciousness of it speakers."[9]

Terms such as "pagan," "convert," and "indio" clearly constructed and set forth the socio-racial credentials necessary to institute a superior/inferior binary. This constructed binary has shaped the Filipinos' historic and modern identities, and is still an identifiable legacy of Spanish rule. Filipino historian Reynaldo Ileto makes the following observation: "Indio [Filipino] identification with the church-center was real, and much of it continues today . . . Our models of Filipino behavior are still built upon either/or oppositions: convert or apostate, collaborator or resister, indigenous or foreign, genuine or false, and so forth."[10]

While Spanish imperialism established the foundational framework and colonial precedence for perceived indigenous inadequacy in the Philippines, the phenomenon was accelerated and enhanced under US colonial rule. When the United Stated seized the Philippines at the dawning of the twentieth-century, its imperial philosophy was guided by standards of "modernity," "nation state," and "citizenship." Imperialist nations like the United States prided themselves on the modernity and effectiveness of their political institutions as evidenced by economic success and military might. With the growing disparity between societies perceived as "modern" and "archaic," due to the rapid rise of industrialization and global capitalist market systems, it became incumbent upon nations such as the United States to pick up the "white man's burden" and spread civilization to those peoples who fell below Western standards of modernity. As one American imperialist writes, "History which up to modern times is the story of the white man has now become the record of the fortunes of all races. For good or ill, all mankind has been drawn together into a common life and movement."[11] Hence, all colonial histories are, as subaltern historian Dipesh Chakrabarty states, made to "look like yet another episode in the universal (and in their [the imperialists] view, the ultimately victorious) march of citizenship, of the nation-state, and of themes of human emancipation spelled out in the course of the European Enlightenment and after".[12] Indigenous agency was dismissed as native peoples were inevitably swept into the grand narrative of Western history.

US imperialism in the Philippines was oriented somewhat differently from that of Spain; however, binaries based on constructed racial, cultural, and religious social credentials persisted, and continued to serve as a basis for im-

perial rule with increasingly destructive results. When these perceived social credentials were placed contextually within the shifting and accelerating standards of modernity, the categories of "superior" and "inferior" were enhanced by relative comparison to a new world system based on notions of "citizenship" and "nation-state," which the Filipinos supposedly lacked. This new state of affairs allowed the United States to duplicate with greater advantage the dynamics of Spain's earlier imperial encounter with the Filipinos.

The United States not only ascribed to, but helped to construct notions of civic, cultural, and economic modernity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Social Darwinistic theories scientifically validated the United States' cultural and racial categorization of indigenous peoples. During Senate committee hearings on "Affairs in the Philippine Islands" in 1902, future Director of Education in the Philippines, David Prescott Barrows, matter-of-factly testified of the following:

> The Filipino has got beyond the tribal stage. There is a stage in the social development of a race when large bodies can be governed through tribal adherence. But the Filipino is beyond that . . . . The Filipino has no tribal allegiance, no chieftains, no custom of adherence to that kind of thing upon which to fall back. The only political experience he has is that of the management of these little municipalities, his little locality; and for all we can see, if we should retire the islands would simply break up into little bits of groups. A little leader would start up here, and another there, and another here, and the people would fall back in their political grade.[13]

For Barrows the entire Filipino race was completely comprehensible. Imperialism was justified by the pan-optic socio-scientific view of modernity. After brief observation, Filipinos were simply placed within a broad hierarchical spectrum of social evolution. Valuative judgments were then assessed according to imposed standards of civility and modernity. As Barrows later opined, "Native life, conducted on barbaric ideas, seems to me to have too many hideous features and to be productive of too much misery to the innocent members of barbarous communities to merit much commendation."[14] For the Americans, the world and the United States' place in it was both internalized and expressed within a carefully constructed and allegedly scientifically justified imperial philosophy. Thus, at the point of imperial encounter with the Filipinos, the United States, like Spain, was armed with pre-determined notions of classification that enabled it to seize control of the encounter.

For the Filipinos' part, Spain had kept the islands isolated from the outside world for more than three centuries. The rising tides of modernity from the eighteenth-century on went largely unnoticed by the vast majority of Filipinos. As historian Austin Craig has stated, "The Filipinos in the last half of the nineteenth century were not Orientals but medieval Europeans."[15] Even the much touted *illustrados*[16] both perceived and contextualized their glimpses of modernity within a uniquely archaic Spanish framework. The United States' expectations of "civilization" differed sharply from those of Spain. This conse-

quently placed the Filipinos back to square one of their imperial experience. Yet, under US rule the social and political chasms that dictated the scope and breadth of superior/inferior binaries could not be theoretically transcended as easily as they could have under Spanish rule.

Under Spain, Filipinos were expected to learn the proper submission to God and King. In theory, if an indio could truly become a devout Catholic and forsake his or her pagan beliefs then the other aspects of imperial "citizenship" would follow after. Of course other factors such as race and class inhibited the actual political and cultural acceptance of Filipinos, but ostensibly the standards of Spanish enfranchisement were relatively static, and therefore discernibly achievable. Under the US rule however, Filipinos were expected to learn the relevance and functions of "citizenship," "nation-state," and "self-government." Unlike Spanish standards of religious conversion, US notions of modernity were constantly evolving at an ever accelerating pace. Though both Americans and Filipinos spoke fondly of progress and equality, the fluid nature of "modernity" created social, civic, and economic gaps between the metropole and the colony that could never be actually transcended. These shifting notions of modernity ensured the perpetual "inadequacy" of Filipinos relative to their imperial US overlords. This phenomenon continues today. The term "developing nation" provides a good example. What is it these nations are developing toward? What else, but the continually shifting standards of "citizenship" and "nation-state" that ultimately define modernity? The unfortunate reality is that such nations will never "develop" because they have been forced to internalize notions of inadequacy that are supported and perpetuated by the shifting realities of "modernity."

In this sense, US rule has proven to be the most detrimental era of Philippine colonial history. Granted, US colonialists probably did not consciously and consistently pursue policies designed specifically to engender a perpetual sense of indigenous inadequacy among Filipinos per se. And certainly they had no direct control over the developing world-wide standards of modernity at the time. Nevertheless, American legitimacy in the islands hinged on at least tacitly constructed notions of native inadequacy. Hence, one of the great paradoxes of US colonialism was that its civilizing mission and the means for accomplishing that mission were inherently incompatible. The United States was attempting to create a functional, modern nation-state within the confines of colonial rule. This necessarily required the United States to suppress those aspects of "nation-state" that would threaten its supremacy. The United States' imperial occupation was supposedly justified by the Philippines' apparent lack of qualifiable characteristics that defined a modern nation-state. Yet the United States' expressed mission in the islands was to bequeath these characteristics to the Filipinos, thus inevitably undermining the legitimacy of US rule. While this did not pose an irreconcilable ideological contradiction for American imperialists in their broad views of socio-racial evolution, it did produce severe incongruities in US policy at the point of encounter, which immediately defeated any altruistic attempts to civilize and modernize Filipinos. This para-

dox permeated nearly every aspect of US colonial rule, and severely compromised any perceived Filipino gains towards achieving the already arbitrary standards of modernity.

Though this paradox is expressed in multiple ways, its profound inhibiting impact on the most crucial aspects of the Philippines' national development are particularly noteworthy. Examples of these incongruities are plentiful; however the three discussed below illustrate particularly well the inherently contradictory nature of US policy at the point of encounter.

Filipinos were often criticized for their archaic submission to authoritarian rule. US imperialists used this perceived native characteristic to justify the socio-political assessments of Filipino evolution that legitimated imperial rule. American Civil Governor William Howard Taft observed in 1902 that "the Filipino mind educated by the Spanish mind, regard[s] the executive as the government. The distinction between the legislative and the executive is something that is quite difficult to have the Filipino understand in a practical way."[17] This alleged political immaturity led another imperialist to conclude that "at least 6,000,000 of the [Filipino] people are but children" who were inclined "to war among themselves or fall an easy prey to designing demagogues."[18] The illogicality of this imperial situation, however, was that American colonialism itself was clearly authoritarian, and perpetuated Filipino submission to an ultimately undemocratic political system. Imperialists side-stepped this apparent contradiction by claiming that paternal rule was only a temporary necessity which allowed Filipinos the opportunity to "sit at our feet and learn those lessons of self-government",[19] and to "develop those moral sinews and ... technical efficiency which are vital to the stability and prosperity of a modern state."[20] The likelihood that the US imperialists' goals were based on benevolent notions of Filipino progression is irrelevant to the fact that the Filipinos' political and social culture was still being constructed and dictated from a distinctly authoritarian source.

Notions of indigenous passivity were also used to justify American imperialism. The Philippines' centuries long submission to Spain indicated an acute inability for national self-determination. Yet, Americans accused those Filipinos who rejected passivity in favor of active resistance against US occupation of betraying the fledgling Filipino nation-state. Filipino revolutionary, Apolinario Mabini, rejected US overtures for collaboration in distinctly modern nationalist terms when he wrote that,

> the laws of war that authorize the big nations [to use] the powerful elements of combat in their struggle against a weak nation which lacks of them, are the same ones that counsel the weak said system, more so when it means the defense of her home and liberties ... and in this extreme case [the Philippine-American War] those same laws implacabl[y] order ... the defense by all means and even death, of her threatened honor and natural rights, lest she merit being branded as uncivilized and incapable of comprehending the responsibilities of self-government.[21]

Mabini's logic and language clearly conform to American standards of national modernity. However, the United States simply could not afford to have its imperial ideological legitimacy challenged at such a critically early point in the colonial encounter. To preserve colonial rule the United States had to continue constructing imperial binaries rooted in ideas of indigenous inadequacy, even if it meant embracing stark contradictions between US professed aims and actual realities in the islands. US General J.F. Bell attempted to negate Mabini's claims of Filipino national legitimacy by appealing to the natives' unquestionable socio-political inferiority:

> The logic of the situation, therefore, places the fate of the Filipino people in their own hands and makes that by the acceptance of peace the culture of the arts of civilization may gradually conquer their own destiny. Force [against the United States] as a factor is not only criminal by itself under the circumstances, but is daily precipitating the natives of the archipelago towards the ever deeper attitude of semi-civilization, completely incapable of appreciating and understanding the responsibilities of civil government. They can only manifest their aptitude in this manner by surrendering the arms and ceasing to force the United States to any impossible concession [i.e. Philippine independence] for now.[22]

Governor Taft also referred to the Filipino insurgency as "a crime against civilization" and "a crime against the Filipino people."[23] For US imperialists, the Filipinos' struggle for independence had to be differentiated (and therefore invalidated) from the United States' own historic struggle against an unjust colonial power. American imperialists argued that although Mabini and other Filipino patriots were able to mimic the rhetoric and motions of modernity, their actions and sentiments ultimately lacked authenticity because of socio-racial categorization.

Finally, most American imperialists felt that Filipinos were unsuited for self-government because of their fragmented society. The Philippines was, and is, composed of multiple ethno-linguistic groups that often find themselves at odds with each other. Both Governor Taft and General Hughes criticized Philippine President Emilio Aguinaldo for not incorporating Visayans into his Tagalog-controlled revolutionary government at Malolos. Both men insinuated that this lack of equal representation negated Filipino claims of national unity and democratic government.[24] Yet, General Hughes, in the very same testimony before Congress admitted:

> I found that the feeling between the Visayans and the Tagalo[g]s, who had gone down there under direction of Aguinaldo ... was not good. I made it my business to foster that feeling just as much as possible, telling the Visayans that they were making a great mistake in encouraging the Tagalo[g]s, who were of a different class of people, to come in and take possession of their island, because they would dominate the whole island if allowed to stay there.[25]

General Hughes' actions illustrate the paradox of America's colonial mission in the Philippines particularly well. US rule was legitimated by various perceived indigenous inadequacies that had to be perpetuated to both vali-

date imperial ideology, and ensure native submission. Dividing Filipinos along ethnic lines guaranteed both.

Ultimately, American imperialism has, and continues to dictate the Philippines' colonial legacy. Though Spain left an indelible cultural impression on the Filipinos by implementing Catholicism, the United States' imperial endeavor definitively ensured a state of perpetual "colonialism" in the Philippines. After establishing constructed notions of indigenous inadequacy at the point of encounter, the United States went on to create institutions and "programs deemed appropriate for backward and inferior peoples."[26] The United States crafted for Filipinos the legitimizing institutional mechanisms of modernity and nation-state, but judged, and continues to judge, them according to the standards of corresponding institutions in the metropole, which are themselves evolving through various challenges and crises. Even modern Filipino nationalists are inescapably handcuffed to their imperial past. The Filipino nation is a product of that which they despise. Any efforts to create authentic national symbols or ideologies are inevitably undercut by institutionalized comparative adherence to imperially imposed standards of social, civic, and economic modernity. Hence, though colonialism itself was detrimental to the Philippines, post-coloniality may be the greatest challenge of all.

CONCLUSIONS: BREAKING COLONIAL TIES

Though the arguments articulated above may indicate a somewhat bleak outlook, this paper is not suggesting that there is no hope at all for Philippine development or that the nation's imperial legacy is utterly inescapable. Rather, this study proposes the possibility that perhaps Western dictated standards of modernity are not the correct path to national fulfillment in the Philippines. Over the past several decades many Asian nations such as China, Singapore, and much of Muslim Southeast Asia have argued in favor of "Asian values" or an "indigenous alternative" to Western modernity.[27] These activists have cast critical eyes on the heretofore universally accepted values of the European enlightenment, and questioned the legitimacy of secular, humanistic, and individualistic principles that have marginalized indigenous philosophical and cultural traditions. Though it would certainly be incorrect to reify and circumscribe Filipinos within a supposedly static cultural schema, it would also be incorrect to assume that there is only one path to modernization, or that modernization itself is a homogenous and static teleological endpoint.

This is not to say that Filipinos should discard their present political system or attempt to purge every supposed remnant of their colonial past (indeed it is often extremely difficult to ascertain exactly what constitutes a "Western" remnant). Rather, Filipinos should initiate a fundamental paradigm shift away from notions of indigenous inadequacy and look for ways to adapt their present institutions and civic systems to the islands' rich and diverse cultural heterogeneity. Why must Filipinos "overcome" or "discard" their own socio-

cultural patterns and indigenous tendencies to conform to relatively recently imposed systems of governance and social interaction? The colonial relationship persists because of civic, institutional, and philosophical ties that demand comparative adherence to similar institutions, processes, and ideas in a distant metropole. Severing the colonial relationship ultimately consists of internalizing the validity and adequacy of things indigenous while provincializing the Western ideal as the supposed apex or culmination of national development.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Michael Hawkins is a Ph.D. student and Foreign Languages and Area Studies Fellow in the Department of History at Northern Illinois University. His academic interests revolve around nationalism, imperialism, and Muslim integration in the Philippines during the American colonial period.

NOTES

[1] Norman G. Owen, "Introduction: Philippine Society and American Colonialism," in *Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines Under American Rule.* ed. by Norman G. Owen (Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, Number 3, 1971): 9.

[2] Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989): 20.

[3] Glenn A. May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980). 17, 180. For further examples of the alleged injurious effects of the Filipinos' patron-client social system on the Philippine nation see, Glenn A. May, "Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War," *Pacific Historical Review,* 52, (Nov., 1983): 351-377.

[4] Though there are many more, the following examples, in addition to those cited above, offer a limited representation of this particular strain of thought in the Philippines' historical literature: Lewis M. *Simmons, Worth Dying For* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987).; Francisco Nemenzo, "The Left and the Traditional Opposition," in *The Philippines After Marcos.* Ed. by R.J. May & Francisco Nemenzo (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).; Michael Cullinane, "Implementing the 'New Order': The Structure and Supervision of Local Government During the Taft Era," in *Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines Under American Rule.* Ed. by Norman G. Owen (Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, Number 3, 1971): 13-77.; Frank Jesista, Jr., "Conflict in the Philippine Legislature: The Commission and the Assembly from 1907 to 1913," in *Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines Under American Rule.* Ed. by Norman G. Owen (Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, Number 3, 1971): 77-103.

[5] In his book, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700.* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959). John Phelan estimates that conversion of lowland Filipinos was completed after only two generations under Spanish rule, with the exception of Muslim populations in the south.

[6] "Letter Patent to Father Urdaneta and His Fellow Agustinians From Their Superiors," February 25, 1564, in *The Christianization of the Philippines,* Compiled and Translated by Rafael Lopez, O.S.A., and Alfonso Felix, Jr. (Manila: Historical Conservation Society and University of San Agustin, 1965), 255.

[7] Dr. Antonio de Morga, *History of the Philippine Islands From Their Discovery by Magellan in 1521 to the Beginning of the XVII Century; With Descriptions of Japan, China and Adjacent Countries.* Translated, edited and annotated by E.H. Blair and

J.A. Robertson. (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1907), 36-37.

[8] Vicente L. Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society Under Early Spanish Rule.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 213.

[9] Ibid. xx, 213.

[10] Reynaldo Clemena Ileto, "Rural Life in a Time of Revolution," in *Filipinos and their Revolution. Event, Discourse, and Historiography.* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998), 81.

[11] David Prescott Barrows to Professor Frederick Starr, 26 April 1907, in Barrows Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

[12] Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History," in *Provincializing Europe: Post-Colonial Thought and Historical Difference.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 39.

[13] *Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippine of the United States Senate.* 57th Congress, 1st Session. Doc. No. 331, Part 1 (Washington: Government printing Office, 1902), 719.

[14] Barrows to Starr, 26 April 1907.

[15] Austin Craig, *Lineage, Life and Labors of Jose Rizal.* (Manila: Philippine Education Company, 1913), cited in Austin Coates, *Rizal: Filipino Nationalist and Patriot* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1992), 4.

[16] This term literally means "the enlightened ones." It refers to a group of middle class Filipinos educated in Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth-century, and who later went on to produce and champion nationalist independence movements against Spain.

[17] *Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate,* 58.

[18] A. Lester Hazlett, "A View of the Moral Conditions Existing in the Philippines," *Affairs in the Philippine Islands. Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate.* 1742-1743.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Edward Price Bell to Manual Quezon, 12 December 1927, in the Manual Quezon Papers, Founders Library, Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, Illinois.

[21] Apolinario Mabini to General J.F. Bell, 31 August, 1900 in *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini.* Compiled and edited by Alfredo S. Veloso. (Quezon City: Asvel Publishing Co., 1964), 305.

[22] General J.F. Bell to Apolinario Mabini,' 28 August, 1900 in *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini.* 301.

[23] *Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate,* 58.

[24] Ibid. 329, 388, 526.

[25] Ibid. 533.

[26] Glenn Anthony May, *Social Engineering.* 179.

[27] For a very interesting discussion on this topic see, *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social, and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century.* Ed. by K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005).

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