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# Solidarity, Resistance, and Transformation: Intellectual Struggles in an Era of Diaspora and Empire[1]*

This essay explores the struggles that confront intellectuals and other producers of knowledge in an era of massive transnational, transborder movement of peoples in Diaspora, at a time characterized by overt or subtle forms of neo-colonial domination. The paper assembles a vast array of readings and examines a host of themes not so much to understand the experiences of those who are in Diaspora as to locate the place and define the role of intellectuals in grappling with strangeness and turbulence brought about by the experience of exile and the continuing process of imperial suppressions. Proceeding from a postcolonial perspective, the paper identifies five instances, called *ruptures*, of the continuing process of resistance and reconstruction that intellectuals have used to challenge influential master discourses as well as the grand narratives of modernity. At the same time, the paper exposes the inherent contradiction involved in such projects. This paradoxical situation includes practices, conceptions, and actions which are, unwittingly, complicit with the imperial enterprise and mask—even perpetuate— unequal economic and cultural relations. Called *repetition* in this paper, this situation simply reproduces the inequalities of imperial power relations at the level of the production, reproduction, and re-presentation of knowledge.

The essay sees the challenge of the intellectual as one fraught not just with struggle but also with hope, with resistance but also in solidarity with those sharing a similar fate in order to transform a fragmented, at once alien and alienating world into a "radically-inclusive community." While recognizing the ambivalent, complex, and processual nature of both diasporic experience and imperial relations, the paper concludes that what is important is not how difference can be overcome, but rather how and under what conditions it is possible for people not only to live together, but to live together well.

"In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and the Word was God... And the Word became flesh..."

**Jn 1.1ff**, NRSV.

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"The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But, for man, the root is man himself... As philosophy finds its material weapon in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its spiritual weapon in philosophy... The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart the proletariat. Philosophy cannot realize itself without the transcendence [*Aufhebung*] of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization [*Verwirklichung*] of philosophy."

**Karl Marx**
Introduction to
*A Contribution to the Critique of*
*Hegel's Philosophy of Right*[2]

"What has WTO got to do with your being a domestic helper?" Almost indignantly she replies: "Don't you know that I am a product of this WTO? I never dreamed I would end up a domestic helper in Hong Kong. I had to leave my family because the salary I earned back home would not allow me and my family to live decently. I've been here for more than six years now. I want to return home but I can not. No job awaits me there... each time I try to start saving (part of my salary), the price of oil at home rises. I am stuck. I am a stock... Turning to a migrant advocate, she said, *"Di ba, Ate? Para akong toilet paper sa tindahan? Kung mabili ka, okay. Kung hindi, diyan ka lang. At pag nabili ka naman, pagkagamit sa iyo, tapon ka na lang. Hindi ka naman kinukupkop.* [Is it not true, Big Sister that I am like a roll of toilet paper in a store? If I am not sold, I remain on the shelf; if someone buys me, I get used up and thrown away afterwards. I am not cared for...]"

**Cynthia Caridad R. Abdon**
*The GATS and Migrant Workers' Rights:*
*Impacts on and Alternatives from Women*[3]

## INTRODUCTION

## A DIALOGUE BEYOND THE GUSTATORY PLEASURE OF *TAPSILOG!*

"I t worries me," a pre-publication reviewer of this essay writes, "when an Asian scholar speaking of struggle and hope to an Asian audience, uses as the foundations of his essay, Western philosophy, a predominantly male phalanx of references, and words, words, words. At the beginning [of the essay], one is seduced with a promise of the stick-to-the-ribs goodness of critical lyricism but is left betrayed... I crave the solid taste of *tapsilog*, or if not that, a bowl of steaming rice topped with *ginisang mongo*. The piece is so wordy, and patient as I

am, I have no patience for it, and I wonder if the students will go beyond the introduction. If this is being a theologian, I will have nothing to do with theology. Whatever joy might have gone into it, has been sucked away; whatever courage is emasculated."[4]

While I do not share the dismissive, not to mention cavalier, attitude which this reviewer seems to have toward this essay by suggesting that *tapsilog* is more appetizing (or desirable) than, say, "a western omelette," I begin this essay again where the reviewer starts precisely because it is this perspective and its effects that I am addressing in this essay. In fact, one would have hoped that if this reviewer could have graciously extended his patience and carefully read beyond the essay's introduction he or she might have discovered that my audience was not, in the first instance, Filipinos or Asians "uncontaminated by the 'west'," but rather, Filipinos/Asians-in-Diaspora, who, not unlike me, have been happily or unhappily, "contaminated" by the contexts in which they find themselves; and that the "words, words, words" of which the reviewer is so clearly contemptuous, are precisely *not* reality as such, but, representations of that reality—vehicles and/or markers that mediate our experiences of multiple realities that both simultaneously intersect and collide.[5] If the essay is too congested for the reviewer's taste, it just might be because reality itself is overflowing with meanings too complex to be comprehended while one is enjoying one's "Filipino" breakfast.

Not only does the Filipino restaurant *Sinugba* in Daly City, California serve its own version of *tapsilog* in the same way that the Manila Hotel's Café *IlangIlang* serves its own, but surely, the statement about one's craving for "the solid taste of *tapsilog,* or if not that, a bowl of steaming rice topped with *ginisang mongo,*" is not the same as the craving itself—and if so, such an assertion fares no better than the craving for a "western omelette." Mere assertion of preference however justifiable does not constitute genuine critique—unless, of course, one understands critique only as a verbal *Arnis de Mano* rather than as a shared enterprise whose goal is to transform the world—and even that is much more dignified than one's mere assertion of craving for *tapsilog.*

Even more important than the reviewer's auto-referential, almost auto-erotic gustatory desire for *tapsilog,* a careful reading might have revealed both the essay's refusal to carelessly privilege a particular location from which all truth is measured, and its uncompromising affirmation of the positional differences that permeate such multiple locations. It also could have established *on the basis of these differences* a

shared recognition of the hermeneutical significance of one's particular location and positionality as conditions for dialogue and mutuality even with those who have been rendered strangers—not to mention perceived adversaries, by the lovers of *tapsilog* or *ginisang mongo*—in the land of their birth, either by choice or by political, economic, and cultural circumstances.

This essay, then, is an invitation to explore some of the struggles intellectuals and other producers of knowledge face in an era of Diaspora and empire in the hope that the exploration might lead to the creation of radically-inclusive communities that widen the arenas of struggle and deepen the hope that energizes them. Unlike other explorations, however, this one begins with the recognition of *shared* "fallibility," because the very nature of struggle can no longer afford the careless, if not irresponsible, illusion that infallibility guarantees the efficacy of struggle; and the nature of hope requires that careful attention be given both to its sources and to the common dangers and opportunities that seek to enclose it.[6]

So, let me begin the dialogue again.

## THE FIRST RUPTURE AND REPETITION:
## LOCATION, POSITIONALITY AND CRITIQUE

The intellectual production, reproduction, and representation in which I am engaged, as much as it may desire the sublime, if not the pleasure of *tapsilog*, is still the discourse of a privileged male *flaneur*, if not *bricoleur*, however personally innocent, even if he aspires towards a Gramscian "organic intellectual." Because *all* intellectual work is a passage through privilege, it is fraught with both dangers and possibilities: dangers because we are a species marked, not only by reason, or by freedom, but also by error; possibilities because the history of thought, read as a critical philosophy appreciative of "fallibility," can become a "history of trials, an open-ended history of multiple visions and revisions, some more enduring than others."[7]

A recognition of location, not to mention positionality and maneuver, is not only good for the soul, it is also methodologically decisive for the production and reproduction of knowledge as a passage to transformation—the creation of the fundamentally new which is also fundamentally better in the context of conflict and collaboration, continuity and change, and the creation of justice.[8] Here, there is a great need to begin with an affirmation of self-critical accountability—even humility—because "every declared rupture is

an undeclared repetition."[9] In fact, it may be that

The work of an intellectual is not to shape other's political will; it is, through the analysis that he carries out in his field, to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb peoples' mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions and on the basis of this re-problematization... to participate in the formation of a political will (in which he has his role as a citizen to play).[10]

Let me suggest that the discourses on hope and struggle that we professional theologians often draw from the world of the "everyday-life" (our individual practice) when brought together in journals such as this one (our intellectual production, reproduction, and representation) becomes profoundly embedded in an intellectual idealism which is the dominant, if often taken for granted, perspective in most institutions of higher education. By "intellectual idealism" I mean, the surrender of the real to the concept, or in Christian theological language, mistaking the attributes of God for the Being of God. In this perspective, knowledge is transformed into abstract representations of the real—which is not to assert they are untrue—only that these representations are of a different order of reality not to be confused with that which we claim they represent.

In a different, though not unrelated context, Jacques Derrida has argued that this intellectual idealism, often believed to be autonomous from the ensemble of relations in which it is implicated, is rooted, in the *principle of reason* and articulated as a grand narrative, which, in the world of modernity, has led to the eclipse of the gentler, more human passions of life, and therefore has become destructive of humanity and nature.[11]

Invariably, this grand narrative produces "meticulous rituals of power"[12] that are globally circulated and which reproduce the narrative itself, constituting thereby the political, economic, cultural, and social terrain known as modernity. By "modernity," I mean, taking Richard K. Ashley's lead, the "multifaceted historical narrative rooted in the Enlightenment, dominant in Western society, expressed in rationalist theory, and centering on the progressive unfolding of universalizing reason and social harmony via science, technology, law, and the state."[13] Where Ashley assists us in identifying the contours of this multifaceted historical narrative, Anthony Giddens provides a useful *institutional* cartography of modernity, arguing in *The Consequences of Modernity* that there are four institutional dimensions of modernity: capitalism, i.e., capital accumulation in the context of

competitive labor and product markets; industrialism, i.e., the transformation of nature or the development of the 'created environment'; surveillance, i.e., the control of information and social supervision; and, military power, i.e., the control of the means of violence in the context of the industrialization of war.[14]

To be sure, the strong *Ilustrado* (read as "Enlightenment" and therefore, "modern") tradition of Philippine history under Spain and its deep and wide colonial and neo-colonial tradition under the US articulated modernity in a multiplicity of ways. Thus, on the one hand, some nationalists like Renato Constantino have indirectly pointed to the narrative of "Philippine modernity," in terms of the almost total "mis-education of the Filipino;"[15] on the other hand, populist historians like Reynaldo Ileto have suggested otherwise, noting that the revolution of the *Ilustrado* in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was only one of many revolutions, and that there also was a significant, if insurgent "non-modern," populist revolutionary tradition, to which Filipino people turned in terms of resistance[16] to modernity itself. The point, of course, is that while modernity cannot be the only principle of analysis for Philippine society, its embeddedness in Philippine history cannot be evaded.

In this context, another pre-publication reviewer of this essay suggests that the essay's analysis of modernity is "misplaced insofar as institutions of higher learning in this country are concerned... For the most part," the reviewer argues, "even our best schools today are sites of training for soldiery to the system of public structures and cultural practices that have yet to be critically examined." [17] In fact, the reviewer continues,

the project of modernity never got started [in the Philippines] ... reason is precisely what our institutions lack; or that postmodern critiques of this flavor are precisely the kind of colonial mimicry practiced by those who understand more of the Other and dangerously lose sight of the Self. [18]

The insight, despite its unfortunate gratuitous warning about "colonial mimicry," is important to note. For it points precisely to the multiple and variegated meanings of modernity, especially as they have been articulated in the Philippine context. However, the fact that institutions may indeed be lacking in reason does not mean they have no *commitment* to the principle of reason; and the fact that these institutions are thoroughly implicated in the "system of public structures and cultural practices that have yet to be critically examined" only suggests even more profoundly that modernity, even a Filipinized

modernity, is the institutional, if not normative, ground of "mainstream" Philippine society today. For these public structures are not unlike the structures of modernity articulated by Anthony Giddens above. Indeed, these public structures and cultural practices bear the undeniable imprint of multiple modernities—contested, perhaps, but modernity nonetheless.[19]

Still, the burden of this essay is not about reason *as such*, but about the intellectual idealism that not only lurks in the deep recesses of a particular form of *modern* reason-cum-rationality, but which has also been erroneously conflated with reason itself. The failure to recognize the fundamental distinction between, for example, practical and speculative reason, and the *principle* of reason (intellectual idealism) is one of the historical effects of modernity. More important to note of this intellectual idealism that resides in the narrative of modernity is its logocentric disposition, i.e., the tendency to regard all thought, feeling, and action as grounded in some fundamental identity, principle of interpretation or necessary thinking substance which is itself regarded as unproblematic, ahistorical, and hence, in no need of critical accounting. Crucial to this logocentric disposition, as Ashley points out, is that the principle of interpretation and practice is conceived as existing in itself, as a foundation or origin of history's making, not a contingent effect of political practices within history.[20] Such a disposition has become a principle of articulation, if not a playground for domination (and emancipation) which creates and re-creates human life in its own image of modernity.[21]

Such a grand narrative has not gone unchallenged.[22] Several historically-significant examples may be noted here: i) Paulo Freire developed a pedagogy for liberation that repudiates modern educational practices for being sites of domination;[23] ii) Gustavo Gutierrez turns theology on its head by re-articulating it as a "second step:" "critical reflection on the praxis of Christians in the light of the Gospel;"[24] iii) more recently, women like Elisabeth Grosz, Allison Jaggar, and Kwok Pui Lan have struggled with their male and malecentric counterparts, challenging not only the gendered production, reproduction, and representation of knowledge, but also insisting that only when the "woman question" is articulated as a constitutive fundamental problematique for epistemology, ontology, and politics can the possibility of new and better knowledge and being arise.[25]

These historically-significant examples are, in fact, ruptures in the modernist narrative previously noted. While these challenges

originate from different perspectives and have divergent destinations, they intersect, at least, at one critical point, the significance of which, by its being self-evident has often been seriously underestimated. With Régis Debray, they insist on both the rigorous and compassionate elucidation of their academic and conceptual assertions and the testing of these assertions against concrete, sensuous reality.[26] However, it is also at this same intersection, that the dangers of repetition arise, especially at the level of the production, reproduction, and re-presentation of knowledge. It is not enough, for example, to assert the importance or desirability of struggle and hope as a necessary orienting principle for theology and politics; it is also necessary to uncover the ways in which they may function as "empty signifiers" on which particular aspirations for transformation are inscribed, and whether and in what ways, in fact, as "empty signifiers" they allow the migration of patriarchal, war-mongering, chauvinistic ideologies and sensibilities associated with some aspects of many Asian cultures on to the new signifiers of hope and struggle.[27]

## THE SECOND RUPTURE AND REPETITION: US-LED EMPIRE IN A POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 WORLD

Conventional wisdom would have us believe that the discourses of struggle and hope, particularly, of social and civil society movements in the so-called West or global North, were ruptured by what we now simply call "9/11." Recall that the last quarter of the 20th century was marked by the real possibility of world peace: from *perestroika*, in the Soviet Union, to the "Peace Dividend" in the US, to the apparent collapse of détente, the Berlin Wall, and to apartheid in South Africa—historic events which peoples' movements helped bring into fruition. Remember the optimism of "political solutions" migrating into the armed struggles of revolutionary movements. Note as well, the successes of the UN Summits, and the emergence of "global civil society" especially what has now come to be known as the World Social Forums: from Porto Alegre to Mumbai to Caracas, Bamako, Karachi and Nairobi.

There is much truth to this wisdom that still remains to be fully excavated. Indeed, 9/11 by itself was a profound rupture—not only a breach of security, but a breach of understanding, of civilizational proportions. The events following 9/11 that continue to reverberate to this day hint only at such a breach: the invasion of Afghanistan, the occupation of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and the "pre-

emptive" US-led, global war on terrorism, are ruptures along the pathways to peace heralded in the last quarter of the 20th century. In the US, for example, principled pacifists are re-evaluating the political, if not philosophical adequacy or efficacy of pacifism in a world of globalized terrorism. Even a Richard Falk, known for his consistent critique of US hegemony, was prepared to bracket this critique in the face of the need for some kind of post-9/11 proportional response to the threat of terrorism. Only after the US-led war against global terrorism was unmasked as a US-led strategy for saving the empire in the occupation of Iraq and the lies about weapons of mass destruction, did he return to his critique that yet again, the US was primarily interested in the re-inscription of its hegemony in the post, post-Cold War era.

Six years later, such re-inscriptions are found in the US Patriot Act and its re-incarnations in other similar laws enacted by other states (in the Philippines it is the Human Security Act), in the redundant, if unproven security measures undertaken at ports of entry world wide, and, in the US today, the hundreds of millions of dollars spent—and will be spent—on such interesting border measures as building a fence—a Maginot Line or Berlin wall of sorts—between the US and Mexico to keep so-called undocumented aliens outside of the US, while at the same time criminalizing US citizens for employing or harboring undocumented workers as nannies, farm workers, and domestic workers. One way to read the compulsive expansionism, the impatience with the UN and other multilateral frameworks of foreign policy, and the politics of perpetual war of neoconservatives like Elliot Abrams, Richard L. Armitage, John Bolton, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and R. James Woolsey[28] —is as a refusal to surrender state and individual sovereignty as the cornerstone of modern *liberal* politics—the same principle that has migrated through Hobbes and Locke and that has given rise, if Giorgio Agamben is to be believed, to the Nazi concentration camp as the metaphor for sovereignty in our time.[29] Indeed, one way to understand the unmitigated "extra-judicial" killings in the Philippines and the continued defiance of the current Philippine government in the face of criticisms from a wide range of international, multilateral organizations including Amnesty International and the UN,[30] about such egregious human rights violations is the logical outcome of the same US neoconservative adherence to the principle of sovereignty so deeply embedded in Philippine politics which is rooted in the modern liberal tradition from Thomas Hobbes to John Locke.[31] Such sovereignties have deepened

and widened the marginalization of peoples of the planet and have radicalized the struggles for justice and peace. Indeed, marginalization today conjures images not only of exclusion but of incarceration; and struggles of hope, not unlike the trajectories of migration, move between the local and the global. To these issues I will return later in this essay.

In fact, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the invasion and occupation of Iraq, an extensive debate has emerged over the prospects and conditions for organizing opposition to the various currents of US policy that advocate imperial rule. These currents share essential ends but differ on the means to achieving and consolidating a system of US hegemony. What is notable is the extent to which military power and the role of the state has come to the fore, a decade after the state's eulogy was being delivered worldwide. [32] Prior to 9/11, an emerging focus was on globalization as the dominant form of imperial rule (often framed as globalization with adjectives: neoliberal, corporate, imperialist). [33]

Still the reality of a US empire, if not a US-*led* empire, refuses to go away. [34]

Every empire, whatever their *raison d'etre*, is fundamentally an articulation of power. Following William Connolly, this essay argues that the West at its imperial best, the US being a clear example, arrogates to itself the power and privilege of the interrogator, consistently negating or demeaning the role of other peoples in civilizational, socio-cultural, political and economic history, while claiming this history as an exclusively Western possession. [35] At the same time the West is very quick to hyperbolize and render pathological the imperial powers, practices and ambitions of others: All that is good, it is argued, is of Western origin and all that is wrong is part of the larger tragic human condition which is external to the West. [36] Here the logocentric predispositions of modernity noted previously have migrated to "empire:" "I think, therefore I am" becomes "I conquer, therefore I am" and finally "I am, therefore I am."

In fact, US conquest and empire are nothing less than an undeclared repetition of what Richard Slotkin has documented as the US mythology of moral regeneration through violence. [37] Ironically, the desire to regenerate itself rests on an incarcerative model of life that first locks down the space for thinking, feeling, and acting; and, second, stops, freezes, and *overwhelms* time. Once space, time, and place are colonized—incarcerated, if not executed, as we saw in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, or the

institutionalization of Homeland Security in the US legitimized by "The USA Patriot Act of 2001," and now, the obsessive drive to bring Iraq out of barbarism into civilization while refusing to bring New Orleans out of the ravages of Hurricane Katrina—once this happens— the moral/ethical and political life comes to an end. For ethics and politics require open space, and moving time, i.e., history—human beings actively engaged in the creation and recreation of their everyday lives.

## THE THIRD RUPTURE AND REPETITION:
## DIASPORA, GLOBAL CAPITAL, AND STRANGENESS

In his analysis of modern international politics and global capitalism, Michael Dillon notes

Our age is one in which…the very activities of their own states—combined regimes of sovereignty and governmentality—together with the global capitalism of states and the environmental degradation of many populous regions of the planet have made many millions of people radically endangered strangers in their own homes a well as criminalized or anathemized strangers in the places to which they have been forced to flee. The modern age's response to the strangeness of others, indeed, the scale of its politically instrumental, deliberate, juridical, and governmental manufacture of estrangement, necessarily calls into question, therefore, its very ethical and political foundations and accomplishments—particularly those of the state and of the international state system.[38]

In the Philippine context, this estrangement is clearly demonstrated by the migration of Filipinos, today numbering almost ten million, to other parts of the planet.[39] Such migration is characterized by dispersal, displacement, and dislocation.[40] Perhaps, the most innovative of all metaphors deployed for such fundamental transformations has been that of turbulence, suggesting by its use not mere motion, activity, or movement, but disruptive, unpredictable, volatile speed. Of migration, Nikos Papastergiadis notes:

The flows of migration across the globe are not explicable by any general theory. In the absence of structured patterns of global migration, with direct causes and effects, turbulence is the best formulation for the mobile processes of complex self-organization that are now occurring. These movements may appear chaotic, but there is a logic and order within them…As Manuel de Landa noted, 'a turbulent flow is made out of a hierarchy of eddies and vortices inside more eddies and vortices…'[41]

Moreover, the experience of "Diaspora" is not only about the dispersal, displacement, and dislocation of those "outside" the

homeland. In fact, Diaspora, dissolves, not only the boundaries of "inside" and "outside" (as geopolitical, geostrategic, and territorial construals of state and society tend to require), but also their epistemological and ontological foundations. To speak of a Filipino Diaspora today is to speak of a specific human condition at the substantive, methodological, metatheoretical, and political/ institutional levels. This has produced new forms of belonging and identity not to mention novel understandings of contemporary politics and culture. They evoke and provoke images of "border crossings" as well as invasions, of estrangements as well as of hybridities. They reveal global de-territorializing trajectories as well as local re-territorializing surges or insurgencies, especially under the conditions of transnational capital.[42] They underscore contradictions and antagonisms, while intensifying the asymmetries, of political, economic, cultural structures and processes."[43] In fact, the historical example of "Diaspora" in this essay is a fundamental rupture in at least three areas important to any theory and practice of politics. First, it raises a critical question about the nature of the social totality of which we are a part. Political, epistemological, and disciplinary boundaries are constantly being negotiated and re-negotiated especially in terms of the long held correspondence among nation, culture, identity and place.

Second, the reality of "Diaspora" also raises a question not only about subjecthood, but also about subjectivity. This is the question of "the Subject": not only who the subject is, but also what being a subject entails.[44] The plurality of subjects and subjectivities pre-supposed by a "Diaspora" directs us not only to the question "What is to be done?" but also to the questions of "who we are, what we hope for, and where we go?" — in short, "What does it mean to be a people under the conditions of Diaspora?" By posing the issue as a question of community, it places the normative and ethical task at the heart of the struggles for transformation, and in the context of both hope and hopelessness.

Third, the reality of a "Diaspora" identifies the locus of struggle and hope at the intersection of self, other, and world. Starting from the perspective of "Diaspora" situates the question of hope within a relational, and therefore, political, whole. Of no small methodological significance, locating the question at the heart of a peoples' cultural practices — defined broadly as those concrete, sensuous realities embodied in rhetorical forms, gestures, procedures, modes, shapes, genres of everyday life: discursive formations and/or strategies, if you

will, which are radically contingent arenas of imagination, strategy, and creative maneuver[45]—not only challenges the narrow confines of conventional understandings of struggle and hope, but also foregrounds their most comprehensive point of departure: a peoples' pluralistic, and therefore, always and already contradictory, antagonistic and agonistic histories which, are expressed in their stories, songs, poetry, arts; embodied in their political struggles; and, articulated in their economic institutions. Another way of stating the point is to suggest that "Diaspora" ruptures the pretensions of modernity's appetite for intellectual idealism as the foundation for human thought and action, and re-positions them as articulations of the non-necessity of the present order. In other words, struggle becomes the constitutive ground for hope which transforms the past and present into creatures of the future.

If rupture is the defining character of "Diaspora," then strangeness or the Stranger, the Other, is its religio-moral challenge. For, indeed, "Diaspora," as a creature of both modernity and postmodernity,[46] radicalizes the experience of the Stranger or of Otherness in our time; and the existence of the Stranger in our midst raises for us the problems, prospects, and possibilities of fundamentally new and better forms of knowledge and being. Strangeness, not to mention marginalization, it seems, is the condition of possibility for community. It is its constitutive outside. At the same time, if the Stranger is the constitutive *outside*, then, its constitutive *inside* is hospitality. Because hospitality—the inclusion of the Stranger into a community not originally his or her own—is that which "arrives at the borders, in the initial surprise of contact with an other, a stranger, a foreigner"[47] it ruptures the boundaries that seek to contain migration and immigration in the name of state sovereignty, if not national integrity. Indeed, in the Biblical tradition, the existence of the Stranger is always accompanied by the challenge of hospitality towards the Stranger. Who the Stranger is, is the socio-analytical question; *how* we treat the stranger in our midst (hospitality) is the ethical demand.

The danger of repetition lies in the fact that both the Stranger and the giver of hospitality are not immune to the desire or temptation for "sameness" or uniformity, even as the long experience of the condition of strangeness and hospitality often breeds certain fetishes for such strangeness and hospitality, not to mention desires for the exotic. Moreover, hospitality does not always aspire towards genuine compassion, i.e., unconditional plenitude. In other words, hospitality itself, when implicated in the perpetuation of power and privilege

always casts its long shadow on the struggle for a "genuine" hospitality that seeks to offer both the Stranger and the giver of hospitality the opportunity to live well together in the context of their shared differences. Indeed, the very structure of hospitality often must posit the existence of strangers "in need of hospitality" dictating, therefore the legitimation of structures and processes that exclude before they include. Such exclusionary logics of, for example, race, gender, class, migrate on to the structures of "hospitality" without being overcome or transformed. Put differently, one must be open to the possibility that strangeness and hospitality (i.e., Diaspora) are necessary though insufficient conditions for the creation and nurture of radically-inclusive communities of struggle and hope. To move forward one must gesture toward resistance and solidarity.

## THE FOURTH RUPTURE AND REPETITION:
## (GLOBAL) SOLIDARITY—A US-PHILIPPINE EXAMPLE

The *experience* of Diaspora, global capitalism, and strangeness is fundamentally one of difference within a shared but oftentimes unrecognized spatio-temporal horizon. For this reason, solidarity *beyond* hospitality becomes fundamentally important for struggle and hope, where solidarity is another name for "radical inclusion," i.e., the possibility of all persons with their glorious differences are seen as *possible* fellow sojourners who realize that their destinies are inextricably-woven to their capacities for living together in the one planet that is their common heritage. For while the human condition arises out of "difference" and returns to difference, its normative, if not necessary challenge is not how the difference can be overcome, but rather how and under what conditions it is possible for us not only to live together, but to live together well.[48]

It is quite clear, however, that the concept and practice of solidarity that we inherited, say from the French Revolution onward was understood largely as a normative practice shaped by the metaphor of "solidity," that is, to be "in solidarity" meant being "the same," identical, unified, with the Other. Philosophically put, one might say, the project of solidarity was about the theoretical and practical resolution of the "one and the many" in favor of the One (whatever that One was perceived to be). However, it is precisely the "effect" of Diaspora, not to mention the challenges of postmodernity or postcoloniality, if not globalization, that renders the metaphor of solidity problematic—for "all that is solid melts into air."[49] Thus,

solidarity either becomes a pathway to an open future (in other words, a genuine rupture) or it deteriorates into a fortress to which one must retreat in order to prevail over what is perceived as regrettable plurality that accompanies Diaspora, and the consequent "loss of solidity" in human life (in other words, a regrettable repetition).[50]

The example of Philippine solidarity work in the US post-1992 may be illustrative of the conditions of possibility for both resistance and solidarity in the context of the Diaspora and the fact of the latter's "unavoidable plurality." It is not that plurality did not exist before 1992. In fact, the revolutionary struggles in the Philippines, and the solidarity movement to which it gave birth in the US and elsewhere have always been a plural movement — even if it aspired, then, to only one name — and the political and organizational, if not ideological struggle within the revolutionary movement, which came to a head in the early 1990s, revolved around the question of how this plurality was to be comprehended. Philosophically put, one might say, the revolutionary project was about the theoretical and practical resolution of "the one and the many."[51] Solidarity, then, was defined as unity and identity with that revolutionary project.

Many of us were seduced, if not ambushed, by the so-called "end of the Cold War" and the "triumph of capitalism." Not only did we see, quite clearly, and appropriately at that time, how this temporary, if misconceived, victory of capitalism — brought about by the transformation of capital from within itself, and the almost total discrediting of the socialist project, at least as it was embodied in the "actually-existing" socialist states, that accompanied it — threatened the solidarity work in the US and elsewhere, but we also devoted most of our energies to addressing such a threat. In fact, and in retrospect, the issue was much deeper — and, in my view, misunderstood.

The desire, then, for "one name," to write here in a poetic manner, did not allow us to see what was happening all along: the plurality of struggles, even then, was already undermining our own understandings of these very struggles and the trajectories that they were creating. To put the matter in a slightly different vein, we were slow to realize that the methodological and epistemological implications for solidarity work in the US of the so-called "end of the Cold War" — exemplified in the fall of the Berlin Wall in the 1980s, as well as in the emergence of a post, post-Cold War era marked by the premature, if totally inaccurate, "triumph of the West" — was the impossibility of a singular theoretical and practical "analysis" adequate to the realities of that period of human history and beyond. In other

words, the so-called "end of the Cold War" was not about the triumph of capitalism and the demise of socialism as such; nor was it about the inadequacy of the revolutionary project or the failures of the solidarity movement that accompanied it. It was, in fact, about the emergence, and the fundamental importance of the plurality of struggles for liberation and change.

The argument here is not about the desirability of plurality as such; it is about the *significance* of (unavoidable) plurality for the very nature of the revolutionary project, and the solidarity work that accompanies it. Not only does plurality force us to look at a multiplicity of strategies and tactics for the revolutionary project. That is so obvious as to be banal. Rather, plurality, in retrospect, was not a mere philosophical catch phrase of "postmodern, post-structuralist" public intellectuals. They were, in fact, linguistic and discursive articulations of what was occurring, not only in the world, but in the Philippines, as well, and, even, I daresay, or especially in the struggles of the peoples of the Philippines, not to mention of the revolutionary movement. Once "the center could not hold," under the onslaught of these plural movements, once, the so-called "grand narrative" of modernity was questioned, and, along with it, the dominance, not only of "the West" but also of analyses emanating from the West and adopted in the "non-West," the certainty of a unitary political project was also placed under question. Plurality, in other words, underscored the limits of modernity and all its sisters and brothers—revolutionary and otherwise.

Even more critical, I believe, is the fact that, once the multiplicity of struggles for liberation in the Philippines was established, ironically, opened up by the revolutionary movement's commitment to the widest and most comprehensive struggle, exemplified by, and presupposed in the political structure of a "national democratic front"—and, in my view, the success of the revolutionary work of the 1970s and 1980s was precisely this—then it was only a matter of time before that "center," indeed, any "center" would collapse. Parenthetically, I must emphasize that the fact that the "center could not hold" in no way undermined the "correctness," of the revolutionary struggle. Nor should such a suggestion be construed as making such an assertion. It only meant that the struggles of those in the US committed to solidarity with the Filipino peoples— as the phrase was often formulated—were too profound, too complex, and the revolutionary movement all too human, for any one framework or perspective to encompass. If one deploys the language of democracy, one might say, the democratic impulse so deeply embedded in the

"movement" almost inevitably led to the opening to a multiplicity of struggles and continues to keep it open.

From another vantage point, one could also say, that the complexities of a postmodern, postcolonial, world simply demanded of the revolutionary struggle—itself a creature of the emancipatory impulse of modernity—and those in solidarity with it, a wider, more comprehensive sensibility. Here, the significance of plurality shows itself more fully. That is to say, plurality is a "limit situation." Its very structure of difference and particularity reveals the ideological, political, and organizational limits that we need to take seriously. Happily, these limits are not only about a "lack," they are also about possibility. In other words, the limits which some of us in the US came face-to-face with in the 1980s and the 1990s, limits that sometimes took the form of "mistakes" or even "inadequacies" (intellectual, analytical, political, ideological, financial, organizational, personal) are not only the origins of possibility and opportunity, but also the conditions of possibility for multiple forms of solidarity. Had we paid fuller attention to plurality, we might have discovered our limits early on—and in that discovery, developed a much richer understanding not only of what solidarity means but also what it entails.

This loss, which is both danger and possibility, rupture and repetition, raises a number of issues not only for the future of solidarity, but also for the existence of efficacious struggle and hope among the dispersed and the marginalized of our world. I believe there is not one but many futures for solidarity and therefore for struggle and hope—in particular, of solidarity as a fundamental question of identification, inclusion, and strategic practice in these struggles. These issues are: i) the character and location of the political, i.e., the nature of the social totality, ii) whose "solidarity" is being assumed and under what conditions, i.e., the question of the subject and of subjectivity, and iii) the languages (or discourses) of solidarity itself.

The first cluster of issues is tied to the location of the "political;" and, that precisely because this is so, it is today no longer possible to simply assume that the state (or the system of states) and "civil society" are the primary if not the exclusive, loci of politics, and, that the "political" which has always been more than government, governance, or the state and civil society, needs to be re-thought in order that the questions of solidarity can be re-thought as well.

The second cluster of issues is tied to the reality that it is today no longer possible to simply assume that demands worthy of solidarity are mainly those that have political (understood as "statist" or counter

statist) consequences or "pay-offs," but, rather, are about the demands for recognition (including survival) by those who have been historically mis-recognized, indeed, excluded from "solidarity" efforts: because their demands were not immediately "political;" and that, any notion of solidarity must include these demands as part of its self-understanding.

The third cluster of issues insists that it is no longer possible to make facile assertions, as modern epistemologies and ontologies do, about the separation, say of knowledge and power, reason and desire, fact and value, language and institutions; that, in fact, what appears to be abstract, in reality, are articulations of actual relations of ruling—beyond the fact that they may also be *mere* ideological legitimations of certain ruling elites. Thus, there is a need to attend today to the very language, that is, the discursive formations and strategies, of solidarity itself—as part of the task of re-thinking the political and revolutionary project. The point, of course, is not only that language is not innocent, nor that the one who speaks, and whose language is spoken, shapes the political agenda; but also, that language produces an effect.

## THE FIFTH AND FINAL RUPTURE:
## RESISTANCE AND TRUTH—HOW CAN THE VICTIM SPEAK?

The fifth and final rupture and repetition returns us to the conversation with which I began: back to the intellectual production, reproduction, and representation of intellectuals such as ourselves. I am profoundly skeptical about the capacity of our modern institutions of academic and professional education to exercise a truly consistent transformative role in the societies that still value these institutions of higher education and its intellectuals as sites of legitimation and meaning, especially when these institutions insist on their commitment to the principle of reason and if they refuse, or are unable, not only to render this principle transparent and therefore open to transformation, but also—and this is directly related to the commitment to the principle of reason—if they hesitate to open themselves to other *raisons d'être*, other destinations that might lead into a friendlier, gentler, happier future.

Yet, I do not believe that modern universities—and those public institutions that both derive and provide them with legitimacy—will wither away; or that one should work for their demise. For these institutions in their medieval and modern forms have always represented society: its "scenography, its views, conflicts, contradictions, its play and its differences, and also its desire for

organic union in a total body."[52] It will not do, therefore, to disqualify these modern institutions of higher education and their intellectuals from playing a religio-moral role in society. In fact, these institutions— such as we know them—are more necessary than ever, precisely because they are already implicated in society: on the one hand, as sites and practices "of training for soldiery to the system of public structures and cultural practices that have yet to be critically examined,"[53] and on the other hand, as a contested *topos* for thinking, feeling, and indeed, acting, where perspectives, commitments, values, about the good, the true, and the beautiful contend. As both intersection and *topos*, they are religio-moral events that require articulation in order that choices can be made about the future, particularly a future of struggle and hope.

What are some of these practices that require articulation, precisely because they are ruptures in the logics of location and critique, Diaspora, and empire?

First, there is the practice of deliberation. Deliberation cannot be reduced to mere speech.[54] It encompasses the whole range of participative practices that pre-suppose a recognition and affirmation not only of the plurality of human life, celebrating difference as constitutive of community, but also of meaningful and direct participation in the governance of the community—at whatever level governance is called for.

Here, "community" is less the aggregation of groups based exclusively on racial, gender or class identities or solidarities, and more the *sites* where human beings, if not citizens, recognize and affirm their mutual obligations and relationships while simultaneously accepting norms of tolerance and radical inclusion. These practices are retrieving the meaning and significance of popular participation, which have been largely eclipsed by the logic of modernity.[55] Retrieval, of course, is not retreat or mere repetition, nor simply imitation (*Mimesis*), but appropriation (*Ereignis*), which is an historical event of mediation.[56]

Second, there is the practice of creating, nurturing, and defending what Hannah Arendt called "the common," that is, the *res publica*.[57] The common is the space for difference carved out by deliberating communities as they seek meaningful consensus. By being committed to the retrieval and preservation of the common, particularly a global common, one casts suspicion on the logocentric and totalizing pretensions of the modernist narrative and undermines its hegemony. It also redefines the common beyond the conventional

notions of territoriality, recognizing not only our shared context or our profound pluralistic existence, but also of our *human specie identity*. By identity I do not mean some kind of universal *gattungswesen*, but rather, a kind of radically inclusive, if "contaminated" cosmopolitanism that is more than formal representations of ethnic, gender, or class identities.[58] For diversity is not primarily about "representation" or even "identity." Rather it is about (plural) "locations," and (multiple) identifications—not some colorful polycentric liberal multiculturalism but a "radical multiculturalism" that, in the words of Gayatri Spivak, "thinks of 'culture' as the name of a[n emergent] complex strategic situation in a particular society."[59] Once shifted on to this "ground," the critical question becomes, "How *should* struggle and hope look like given our multiple locations and identifications?"

Third, there is the practice of utopia. We are reminded, "Where there is no vision, the people perish…" (Proverbs 29: 18, *NIV*) This vision, is not a description of the future, rather, it is an orientation in the present, a point of entry, a beginning, a departure, but not a final solution or goal. This is not a deficiency, however. Such a practice celebrates the simple fact of our historicality that is always in the process of being created and re-created towards the common goal of deliberating communities. While this orientation is mediated through the limits of these institutions of higher education, and of the communities that constitute these institutions, this unavoidable, if necessary, limitation, can be transformed into a practical critique of universalizing hegemonies, that, in the language of Michel Foucault, makes transgressions possible, making it *imaginable* to undermine, subvert, put into question, those dominative practices—particularly of pseudo-universals and false dichotomies—which discipline present-day political, economic, cultural and social experience.[60] Limitations are transformed into sites of resistance and solidarity. The practice of utopia, which is rooted in the *human imagination*,[61] is the reality of hope.

If there is any inspiration for theology and pedagogy that may be derived from the politics organized around the notion of "global civil society" in the 1980s, or the World Social Forums that call to "Globalize Struggle, Globalize Hope!" it is the possibility of creating communities and strategies that cut across political, economic, religious, and gender lines, that challenge the narrow confines of conventional and territorially-defined institutional thought and practice. There is no need to romanticize the politics arising out of the contestation between "state" and "civil society" [62] to see that the

significance of these movements lies not only in their capacity to articulate different understandings and practices of politics and ideology, nor simply in their keeping open the political space open for transformation, but also as sites in which deliberation occurs on the character of that space—what it means, for whom is it space, which spaces are important. They are, therefore, in the best sense, historical blocs, counterhegemonies, in the struggle for cultural transformation.[63]

More than the multiplicity of subjects and subject positions is at stake here, however.[64] For one's space, time, and place is of fundamental significance to the question, not only of politics and ethics, but, also to transformation.[65] Pluralism, even a normative pluralism, has no inherent virtue or efficacy. Who the subjects are, what they hope for, how they get there, are decisive to any transformative practice. This, to my mind, is what the discourses that go under the sign of postcolonialism, understood broadly as "oppositionality which colonialism brings into being,"[66] are addressing, as when Gayatri Spivak asks, "Can the subaltern speak?"[67] At the same time, this oppositionality is profoundly challenged by the radicalization of the subaltern into multiple forms of victimization especially in the age of Empire. Under these conditions, the victim, as Jacques Derrida points out, is one who cannot even protest... who cannot even present himself or herself as such... he or she is totally excluded... annihilated by history..."[68]

Intellectuals such as ourselves are tirelessly and relentlessly reminded that, in this context, struggle and hope are inextricably related to the singular (and therefore multiple) opposition to all forms of domination by concrete "subjects of history" who struggle both against "turn[ing] the Other into the Same" and challenge those who would deny Otherness—and who, in their inability to struggle, forces those who can to struggle with and for them.[69] The danger of repetition here lies in yielding to the temptation of becoming the "native informant" as a marker of authenticity, at the same time that we conflate the fact of our being the world's privileged, however personally innocent *flaneurs*, with the reality of the forced migrations of workers in the streets of our global cities, following the scent of global capital.

Critical to this "oppositional challenge" is an affirmation of the necessary, though insufficient, role which transgression plays in any ethical practice.[70] In her essay "A New Type of Intellectual: The Dissident," Julia Kristeva argues that it is only in becoming a stranger to one's own country, language, sex, and identity that one avoids

"sinking into the mire of common sense."[71] "Writing," she adds, "is impossible without some kind of exile... [which is] already itself a form of dissidence..."[72] At the heart of dissent—as exile and sites of difference and contestation—is both the recognition of limits and the practice of transgression of those limits. Borrowing from Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, one might therefore suggest that ethics-in-Diaspora is about

The questioning and transgression of limits, not the assertion of boundaries and frameworks; a readiness to question how meaning and order are imposed, not the search for a source of meaning and order already in place; the unrelenting and meticulous analysis of the workings of power in modern global life, not the longing for a sovereign figure...that promises deliverance from power; the struggle for freedom, not a religious desire to produce some territorial domicile of self-evident being that men of innocent faith can call home."[73]

Finally, there is the practice of truthfulness, of institutions of higher education striving to be sites of truth in church, society, and world. Despite their multistranded embeddedness in modernity's "meticulous rituals of power," such public institutions and the intellectuals that inhabit them, by intention and design, could challenge the practices of thought and action generated by the grand narrative of modernity, or other historical narratives including sexism, racism, classism. They can seek to articulate different understandings of the world in which they are situated, provide alternative readings of political, economic, cultural, and religious life—without pretending or aspiring to be legislators for church, society, and world.

Truth, however, is always inextricably related to thought, to the past, present, and future (temporality), and to location (spatiality) and positionality (strategy). Martin Heidegger observed that the unfolding of truth, which involves both concealment and unconcealment, was inseparable from thought itself. Not simply consciousness, even critical consciousness, thought requires situating one's self as a *topos* through which the truth of Being is brought forth and appropriated.[74] However, thought also requires, Jacques Derrida notes, and Martin Heidegger admits, both the principle of reason and what is beyond the principle of reason, the *arkhe* and an-*archy*, which is the opening, the clearing that sets history before the future where fragmentary space and time are brought together.[75] Thus, thought presses beyond the principle of reason, though it does not repudiate it, and refuses to surrender to the everyday, the conventional, and the traditional.

Here I return to the place of location and critique. What may be, in the last analysis, the appropriate though by no means the only role of intellectuals such as ourselves as we engage in the discourses of struggle and hope, is the care [*Sorge*] and *responsibility for the practice of thought*, that is, the nurture, preservation, and defense of truth that is always and already "ahead of ourselves,"[76] and which, therefore, becomes the opening for the "fundamentally new which is also fundamentally better." Here, struggle and hope are brought together as thought: as provocation (struggle and resistance), invocation (the desire and response to hope), and invitation (the call of that which lies ahead).[77] In the words of Jacques Derrida, the "...provocation [that] brings together in the same instant the desire for memory and exposure to the future, the fidelity of a guardian faithful enough to want to keep even the chance of a future...the singular responsibility of what he does not have and of what is not yet..."[78]

Finally, the role of the intellectual, suggested by this essay, is situated between the first (Foucault) and fifth (Heidegger) ruptures and repetitions. Here, thought is not synonymous with abstraction or (mere) speculation, as some of this essay's critics imply; it is not even a matter of seeing or hearing. Rather, it is as Martin Heidegger put it, being placed in that "opening"—the *Augenblick*—where truth might come forth. Intellectuals do not produce the truth. They can only respond to the call of truth by pressing towards its place of concealment and unconcealment. In fact, it is not about being the *avant garde*, at least, not in that old Marxist formulation noted at the beginning of this essay—that would be a repetition of a once powerful emancipatory rupture. The call is to be responsible primarily for ourselves (in the way Michel Foucault suggests) and not colonize the right or responsibility of citizenship and humanity that appropriately belongs to others. The role of the intellectual is not to "invite fellow citizens to a vision available *only* to those who live the life of the mind" [italics mine]. Rather, it is to enter into a common space of conversation with fellow citizens, from one's own perspective, recognizing that these fellow citizens have their own perspectives, and in that dialogical engagement—or even struggle—one may find a way together to a future which everyone has a part in creating, in seeing, and in living out.

In the end, *tapsilog*, instead of being the occasion for the assertion of an incommensurable preference becomes an invitation to the creation and nurture of a possible radically-inclusive community.[79]

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**Prof. Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, Ph.D.** is currently Vice President for Academic Affairs and Academic Dean and Professor of Theology and Culture at New York Theological Seminary. On August 20, 2008 Dr. Ruiz will leave New York for Pittsburgh to join the professional staff of the Association of Theological Schools in the US and Canada (ATS) as one of four Directors for Accreditation and Institutional Evaluation.

## ENDNOTES

[1] This is a revised version of an essay prepared for the Congress of Asian Theologians (V), "Sharing Hope for a New World: Summons to Asian Theology at the beginning of the 21st Century," Hong Kong, 20-26 August 2006, and published as Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, "Diaspora, Empire, Solidarity: Hope and the (Marginalized) Subaltern as rupture(s) and repetition(s)," *CTC Bulletin* 23, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 39-59. My thanks go to Edna Pugeda, Jerry Reisig, and the three pre-publication reviewers for their very helpful comments on the earlier drafts of this essay.

[2] [on-line] (*Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, February, 1844, accessed 9 December 2007); available from http://www.marxists.org/ archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm#32; Internet.

[3] Panel presentation at the Ecumenical Women's Forum on Life-Promoting Trade, 12-14 December 2005, Hong Kong.

[4] "Blind Review I" of Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, "Diaspora, Empire, Solidarity: Hope, Struggle, and the Intellectual as ruptures(s) and repetition(s)," received on July 17, 2007 (hereinafter, Ruiz, "The Essay"). *Tapsilog* is a Filipino dish combining *tapa* (cured beef slices), fried garlic rice ("*sinangag*"), and fried egg ("it*log*")— thus the term *tap-si-log*—and served generally during breakfast. Interestingly, *tapsilog* itself is a linguistic innovation that presupposes difference—even at the point of its original creation—which, once created mediates an organic reality that is irreducible to its original parts. *Tapsilog* turns out to be a "mirror of nature," just as language mirrors the construction of reality. *Tapa, sinangag,* and *itlog* will never be the same again.

[5] My deepest reservations with this essentializing—and therefore idealist—discursive strategy is its easy, if uncritical, and ironic slide into the assumption that, despite its recognition of the contingent and socially-constructed character of identities (rupture), it can *still* posit not only an historically- and empirically-identifiable *essentialised* Asian and/or Filipino, and argue as if "the West and the Rest" are non-relational, mutually exclusive constructions (repetition). Can one really have one's *tapsilog* and eat it too? See fn. 19.

[6] Another pre-publication reviewer of this essay observes: "The scope and diversity of the topics discussed in such a short piece—modernity, capitalism, 9/11, migration, imperialism, gender theory, education, otherness, globalization—fail to give full flavor to each and every thread to pass for a more or less coherent *bricolage*." "Blind Review II" of Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, "Essay," received on July 17, 2007. In fact, this essay is not about uncovering the full *individual* "flavors" of the themes enumerated by the reviewer. Rather, it is about *assembling* these different or seemingly unrelated themes in order to form a *cartography* of the

ruptured and repetitious experiences of those who are in Diaspora in order to more adequately address them. Here, a "more or less coherent *bricolage*" cannot be achieved because the uniqueness of the individual flavors can only be comprehended as part of a larger, resolutely heterogeneous *dispositif*. See fn. 19.

[7] James D. Faubion, ed., *Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, Essential Works of Foucault*, vol. 2 (New York: The New Press, 1998), 476.

[8] Manfred Halpern, "Choosing Between Ways of Life and Death and Between Forms of Democracy: An Archetypal Analysis," *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance* 12, no. 2 (Winter 1987): 5-35.

[9] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 333.

[10] Michel Foucault, "The Concern for Truth," in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*, ed. L. D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 265. Of the act of criticism, Spivak writes, "… a caution, a vigilance, a persistent taking of distance always out of step with total involvement, a desire for permanent parabasis is all that responsible academic criticism can aspire to. Any bigger claim within the academic enclosure is a trick." Spivak, fn. 7, p. 362.

[11] Jacques Derrida, "The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils," *Diacritics* 13, no. 3 (Spring 1983): 3-20.

[12] See, for example, William G. Staples, *The Culture of Surveillance: Discipline and Social Control in the United States* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

[13] Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, "Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (Spring 1990): 412.

[14] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 55-78.

[15] Renato Constantino, "The Mis-education of the Filipino," *The Weekly Graphic*, 8 June 1966. See also, Renato Constantino, *Neocolonial Identity and Counter-Consciousness: Essays in Cultural Decolonization* (London: Merlin Press, 1979).

[16] Reynaldo Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979). Cf. Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, "Nationalisms in Southeast Asia: Cartographies of Struggle," in *Encyclopaedia of Nationalism*, 2000 ed.

[17] Blind Review II, fn. 4.

[18] Ibid.

[19] One need only examine, for example, Philippine political, economic, military, and educational institutions to begin to catch a glimpse of how deeply rooted they are in the logics of modernity—Thomas Hobbes and John Locke being the fundamental competing metaphors within modernity. See Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, "Towards a Transformative Politics: A Quest for Authentic Political Subjecthood" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1985).

[20] Ashley and Walker, fn. 11.

[21] Elsewhere I have argued that articulation and inscription are not mutually exclusive. Thus, the principle of reason is not only articulated as speculative thought but is also *inscribed* on structures, processes and "volatile bodies" where both the human and political body are "inscribed surface of events" that are "malleable and alterable" by gender, appropriate behaviour, and standards of, for example, femininity and masculinity. It is, in my language, a "practice" or a *dispositif*. Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, "In Pursuit of the Body Politic: Ethics, Spirituality, and Diaspora," in *Re-Framing the International: Law, Culture, Politics*, eds., Richard Falk, Lester Edwin J. Ruiz and R.B.J. Walker (New York: Routledge, 2002), 163-186. A *dispositif*, according to Michel Foucault is a "a resolutely heterogeneous assemblage, containing discourses, institutions, architectural buildings [*amenagements architecturaux*], reglementary decisions, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, philanthropic propositions... said as well as non-said [*du dit aussi bien que du non-dit*]..." [Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed., Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 194-195]. For Gilles Deleuze a *dispositif* is "a tangle, a multilinear ensemble. It is composed of lines, each having a different nature. And the lines in the apparatus do not outline or surround systems which are each homogeneous in their own right, object, subject, language, and so on, but follow directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing together and then distancing themselves from one another. Each line is broken and subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subject to drifting. Visible objects, affirmations which can be formulated, forces exercised and subjects in position are line vectors and tensors. Thus the three major aspects which Foucault successively distinguished, Knowledge, Power and Subjectivity are by no means contours given once and for all, but series of variables which supplant one another." [Gilles Deleuze, "What is a *dispositif?*" in *Michel Foucault Philosopher*, ed., Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 1992), 159-168.]

[22] See Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition* (Theory & History of Literature), trans., G. Bennington and B. Massumi (London: Manchester University Press, 1984).

[23] Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans., Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Crossroads Publishing Company, 1972).

[24] Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation*, trans., John Eagleson (New York: Orbis Books, 1988).

[25] Elisabeth Grosz, "Notes towards a corporeal feminism," *Australian Feminist Studies* 5 (1987): 2. See also Elisabeth Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism* (St. Leonard's, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1994); Allison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology," in *Feminisms*, eds. Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 13-384; Kwok Pui Lan, *Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005).

[26] Régis Debray, *Critique of Political Reason* (London: Verso, 1983), 1. There are other examples. See, John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1916); Ivan Illich, *De-Schooling Society* (London: Marion Boyars Publishers, 1999); Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, fn. 21; Jim Merod, *The Political Responsibility of the Critic* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989); Alvin Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class: A Frame of References, Theses, Conjectures, Arguments, and an Historical Perspective on the Class Contest of the Modern Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Donald Macedo, ed., *Chomsky on Mis-Education* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2004).

[27] One might look, for example, at the notion of salvation in Christianity which grounds many claims to liberation. One could ask rhetorically, does not a male savior in a patriarchal society reinforce the domination

of men over women even though it may gesture towards liberation? Indeed, at the heart of this notion is a binary construction of savior and victim and the implicit hierarchy that is established between the culture of the savior—cast as that which is righteous, moral and ethically- superior—and the culture of the victim characterized as unrighteous, immoral, and inferior. Liberation (as the "empty signifier") may, indeed, offer some kind of hope for the "poor and the oppressed," yet by accepting uncritically its unreconstructed binary articulation (of savior and victim), it merely legitimizes the relations of domination and hierarchy between actually-existing "saviors" and "victims." My thanks go to a third pre-publication reviewer of the essay for impressing this point on me.

²⁸ See, for example, Gary Dorrien, *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

²⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans., Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

³⁰ See Philip Alston, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum, Mission to the Philippines," Advanced Edited Version [on-line] (accessed 6 December 2007); available from http://www.inquirer.net/verbatim/A-HRC8-Philippines_Advance.pdf; Internet. See also, Amnesty International, "Philippines: Political Killings, Human Rights and the Peace Process," AI: ASA 35/006/2006, 15 August 2006.

³¹ See Ruiz, "Towards a Transformative Politics," fn. 17; See also Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, "Sovereignty as Transformative Practice," in *Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community*, eds., Saul H. Mendlovitz and R.B. J. Walker (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 79-96.

³² The academic literature on this is extensive. See for example, Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (London: Verso, 2003); David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (London: Oxford University Press, 2003); *Debating Empire*, eds., Gopal Balakrishnan and Stanley Aronowitz (London: Verso, 2003); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000)); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire* and *Multitude* offer one analysis that is notable for its extensive popular consumption as much as its message of a decentered system of imperial rule challenged by a rather amorphous formation they called "multitude."

³³ The term "global capitalism" used throughout this essay is intended to be imprecise. My concern is less with a substantive definition of capitalism—clearly an impossibility given the plural forms of capitalism today—and more with specifying a region of discursive practices characterized by the globalizing trajectories of *modern* capitalism. In fact, it might be argued that "transnational capitalism" could very well be the more useful term to describe the many capitalisms at the beginning of this century. By "globalization" I refer to those processes of profound structural transformation that have gained some level of autonomy at the global level, which sustain the movements and flows of capital, people, goods, information, ideas, and images, and which are altering the conditions under which communities and identities are enacted. See Michael Featherstone, ed., *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (London: Sage, 1990). Cf. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, ed., *Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994); Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and its Discontents* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998); Richard Falk, *Predatory Globalization: A Critique* (London: Polity Press, 1999); Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Creation of the World or Globalization*, trans., Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of New York, 2007), 2ff.

³⁴ See generally, Paul A. Passavant and Jodi Dean, eds., *Empire's New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri* (New York: Routledge, 2004). See especially Ernesto Laclau, "Can Immanence Explain Empire?" in Passavant

and Dean, Ibid., 21-30. Cf. Mark Taylor, *Religion, Politics, and the Christian Right: Post 9/11 Powers in American Empire* (Philadelphia: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2005); Sharon Welch, *After Empire: The Art and Ethos of Enduring Peace* (Philadelphia: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2004). My own view of "empire" has religio-moral sensibilities. See, for example, Charles Amjad-Ali and Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, "Betrayed by a Kiss: Evangelicals and the US Empire—The Consequences of a Theological and Political Paradox," Unpubl. Mss.

[35] William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 61.

[36] Rudyard Kipling's famous poem: "White Man's Burden: The United States & the Philippine Islands, 1899," with its binary of the morally superior colonizer and the unenlightened colonized is emblematic. Its initial publication in the February 1899 issue of *McClure's Magazine* coincided with the beginning of the Philippine-American War, as well as the US Senate's ratification of the treaty that placed Puerto Rico, Guam, Cuba, and the Philippines under US control. It is reported that Theodore Roosevelt sent it to his friend, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, commenting that it was "rather poor poetry, but good sense from the expansion point of view." Not everyone was as favorably impressed as Roosevelt. "The racialized notion of the 'White Man's burden' became a euphemism for imperialism, and many anti-imperialists couched their opposition in reaction to the phrase." "The White Man's Burden: Kipling's Hymn to U.S. Imperialism," [on-line] (accessed 7 December 2007); available from http://historymatters.gmu.edu/ d/5478/. Internet.

[37] Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000).

[38] Michael Dillon, "Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the 'New World Order' to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order" *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance* 20, no. 3 (Spring 1995): 323-368.

[39] Historically, Filipinos were always a "migrant" people: the "original" inhabitants of the islands later called Las Islas Filipinas were nomadic; the first "settlers" were "boat people" from the Malayo-Polynesian region. Under Spanish colonialism, the "natives" migrated to Europe, especially to Spain; under US colonialism, to the US. In the late 19th century and throughout the 20th century, migration and immigration to the US, despite a painful Philippine-US war, was virtually unbroken. In fact, Filipinos, whether prominent or not, were part of the warp-and-woof of American life: Filipinos in the Hawaiian pineapple and sugar cane plantations, Filipinos claiming World War II veterans benefits promised by the US government in return for their role in the USAFFE, Filipinos going to the US to study, Filipinos joining the US military, Filipino nurses, Filipinos in exile in the US. While information on overseas Filipinos is difficult to ascertain, estimates published in December 2006 by the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), an agency of the Philippine Government's Department of Foreign Affairs, from CFO, DFA, and the POEA sources covering 192 countries and territories, place the total number of overseas Filipinos at 8.23 million, of which 3.55 million are permanent (immigrants or legal permanent residents), 3.8 million are temporary (OFWs), and 874,792 are irregular (without proper documentation). Of this number, 89,798 are in Africa, 1.2 million are in East/South Asia, 1.83 million in West Asia, 888,260 in Europe, 3.57 million in the Americas, and 339,963 in Oceania. In addition, there are approximately 274,497 sea-based workers. Commission on Filipinos Overseas, "Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos, as of December 2006," [on-line] (accessed 15 December 2007); available from http://www.cfo.gov.ph/ statistics.htm; Internet. The total estimated population of the Philippines as of July 2007 was 91 million. Central Intelligence Agency, "Philippines," The World Fact Book, [on-line] (accessed 15 December 2007); available from https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/ the-world-factbook/print/rp.html; Internet.

⁴⁰ Epifanio San Juan, "Fragments from a Filipino Exile's Journal," *Amerasia Journal* 23, no. 2 (Winter 1997): 1-25. See also Jonathan Okamura, *Imagining the Filipino American Diaspora: Transnational Relations, Identities, and Communities* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998); Oscar Campomanes, "The New Empire's Forgetful and Forgotten Citizens: Unrepresentability and Unassimilability in Filipino-American Postcolonialities," *Critical Mass* 2, no. 2 (Winter 1995): 145-200. Cf. Epifanio San Juan, Jr., "Configuring the Filipino Diaspora in the United States," *Diaspora* 3, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 117-133; Epifanio San Juan, *From Exile to Diaspora: Versions of the Filipino Experience in the United States* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998).

⁴¹ Nikos Papastergiadis, *The Turbulence of Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization, and Hybridity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 3-21.

⁴² Ibid., passim.

⁴³ Nevzat Soguk, *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

⁴⁴ Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jan-Luc Nancy, eds., *Who Comes after the Subject?* (New York: Routledge, 1991).

⁴⁵ Michael Ryan, *Politics and Culture: Working Hypotheses for a Post Revolutionary Society* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

⁴⁶ The modern-postmodern divide is a profoundly contested one. By placing them in proximity, as I do in this essay, I want to suggest that these structures of meaning are best understood in both their continuities and discontinuities of method, cultural form, and political practice. Thus, I understand modernity and postmodernity less as periodizations and more as "conditions," "sensibilities," and "practices." My own orientation, sensibility, and location are probably more congenial with the theory and practice of postcoloniality than with modernity or postmodernity. See, for example, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds., *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

⁴⁷ This I take to be the philosophical significance of Jacques Derrida's January 1996 Paris lectures on "Foreigner Question" and "Step of Hospitality/No Hospitality," published in Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, *Of Hospitality*, trans., Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

⁴⁸ Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, "After Grand Theory: Musings on Dialogue, Diversity, and World Formation," in Shin Chiba, et al., eds., *Towards a Grand Theory of Peace* (Forthcoming, Summer 2008).

⁴⁹ Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988).

⁵⁰ This is the philosophical burden of my essay entitled, "All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Future(s) of Philippine Solidarity Work in the US," prepared for the Bayanihan International Solidarity Conference, Bahay ng Alumni, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, 24-26 August 2001, and published in the proceedings of that conference.

⁵¹ I want to suggest that 1992 was a "watershed" for solidarity work in the US, not only in relation to the Philippines, but in relation to other countries, e.g., South Africa, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Indeed, it would be interesting to compare the experience of solidarity work in the US for movements in these countries during the period of the 1980s. I suspect the Philippine experience bore many similarities to

these others. Additionally, see my essay entitled, "All that is Solid Melts into Air," fn. 47.

[52] Derrida, fn. 8, p. 19.

[53] Blind Review II, fn. 4.

[54] Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, vol 1, trans., Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985).

[55] See, Roberto Unger, *Knowledge and Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1975); C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962); See, also Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso, 2007).

[56] See Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* 2nd rev. ed., trans., Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroads, 1989); Paul Ricoeur, *From Text to Action*, trans., Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1991).

[57] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). See also, Mordechai Gordon, ed., *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002).

[58] Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).

[59] Spivak, fn. 7, p. 334.

[60] See also, bell hooks, *Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 1994).

[61] See Ricoeur, fn. 54, especially, 227-328.

[62] Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Boston: MIT Press, 1994). Cf. Laclau, fn. 53.

[63] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* ed., and trans., Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971). See also, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics,* 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2001).

[64] Cadava, Connor, and Nancy, fn. 42; Simon Critchley and Peter Dews, eds., *Deconstructing Subjectivities* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996).

[65] Halpern, fn. 6.

[66] Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, fn. 44, p. 117.

[67] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds., Nelson, Cary and Lawrence Grossberg (London: Macmillan, 1988).

[68] "One of the meanings of what is called a victim (a victim of anything or anyone whatsoever)," Derrida writes, "is precisely to be erased in its meaning as victim. The absolute victim is a victim who cannot even

protest. One cannot even identify the victim as victim. He or she cannot even present himself or herself as such. He or she is totally excluded or covered over by language, annihilated by history, a victim one cannot identify.... But there is also the unreadability that stems from the violence of foreclosure, exclusion, all of history being a conflictual field of forces in which it is a matter of making unreadable, excluding, of positing by excluding, of imposing a dominant force by excluding, that is to say, not only by marginalizing, by setting aside the victims, but also by doing so in such a way that no trace remains of the victims, so that no one can testify to the fact that they are victims or so that they cannot even testify to it themselves. ... To name and to cause the name to disappear is not necessarily contradictory. Hence the extreme danger and the extreme difficulty there are in talking about the effacement of names, Sometimes the effacement of the name is the best safeguard, sometimes it is the worst "victimization." ...Cinders... is a trope that comes to take the place of everything that disappears without leaving an identifiable trace. The difference between the trace "cinder" and other traces is that the body of which cinders is the trace has totally disappeared, it has totally lost its contours, its form, its colors, its natural termination. Non-identifiable. And forgetting itself is forgotten." Jacques Derrida, *Points...: Interviews, 1974-1994*, ed., Elizabeth Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 387-391.

[69] Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)*, (New York: Verso, 1996); David Campbell, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics after the End of Philosophy," in *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance* 19, no. 4 (Summer: 1994); Bernard Waldenfels, "Levinas and the face of the other," in *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas*, eds., Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); John Caputo, *More Radical Hermeneutics: On Not Knowing Who We Are* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2000).

[70] bell hooks, fn. 58.

[71] Julia Kristeva, "A New Type of Intellectual: The Dissident," in *The Kristeva Reader*, ed., Toril Moi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 292-299.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, "Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (Spring 1990): 265.

[74] Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans., William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969); Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans., Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Collins, 1971).

[75] Jacques Derrida, *Limited, Inc.*, trans., Samuel Weber (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988).

[76] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans., John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 225ff.

[77] Thus, I cannot agree with one pre-publication reviewer of this essay who eloquently asserts, "We shouldn't limit the role of the intellectual to the 'responsibility for the practice of thought' for such a diminished role, however *avant-garde*, consigns us to political irrelevance...The role of the intellectual," this reviewer continues, "is to engage his society at the level of the practical by inviting his fellow citizens to a vision available only to those who live the life of the mind. The eyes of the intellectual are situated in the present, but are able to see through the dying past and the awakening future. It is this perspective that we must share, if only because society pays us and allows us to live the life we live precisely for the

privilege of seeing with our eyes." Blind Review II, fn. 4. I can only reiterate that "thought" cannot be reduced to the speculative; and that the "life of the mind" is not always the *avant garde* of transformation.

[78] Derrida, fn. 9, p. 20.

[79] My argument seeks refuge in Joanne Harris' novel, *Chocolat* (New York: Doubleday, 1999) and Gabriel Axel's and Isak Dinesen's film entitled, "Babette's Feast" (Released August 28, 1987).