THEORIES ON THE INTRODUCTION AND EXPANSION OF ISLAM IN MALAYSIA

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ONE of the fields of study relatively uninvestigated by scholars in the Philippines is the nature of the introduction and expansion of Islam in the Philippines, especially in the southern islands, namely, the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao. Much less has an investigation been made on the character and peculiarities of Islamic institutions and tendencies in these islands. And, certainly, a sociological and cultural interpretation of such institutions cannot have a claim to comprehensiveness unless an historical investigation is initially undertaken.

The historical field of study of Islam in the Philippines can be approached in at least two ways. The first approach considers the individual Moslem sultanate or principality in the south as an entity with a history all its own so that its relations with other Moslem principalities in Malaysia constituted its "external" relations. The second crosses present day political boundaries and considers the existence of the sultanates in the Philippines merely as manifestations of the general spread of Islam in nearly the whole of Malaysia.

The results of the first approach may be termed correctly as the "History of Islam in the Philippines" but the main limitation of this approach is that Islam in the Philippines will tend to be considered as if it were an isolated phenomenon with a logic of its own, following certain definite laws of historical development proper only to the Philippine scene. Since the Philippines has become an independent political entity, the propensity to utilize the first approach by some scholars will always exist. Dr. Najeeb Saleeby, an Arab student of Moro[1] history, utilized this first method. His position is understandable. He was intimately connected with the American government in the Philippines especially at a time when

[1] The term "Moro" is used to designate Moslems in the Philippines.

the political integration of the country as a colony under the United States was being vigorously pursued, a colony politically distinct from the other colonies in Malaysia that were under either Dutch or British rule. Possibly, too, the data and resources available to him were limited. In any case, his *History of Sulu* and studies on the Moslems in Mindanao remain the only ones of their kind and are indispensable sources for historical and sociological analyses.

The second approach considers the establishment and consolidation of the various Moslem sultanates and principalities in Malaysia as equivalent to the spread of Islam in the area. The southern Philippine sultanates are viewed as part of a wider social entity, namely, an Islamic community in Malaysia, a Malaysian *dar-al-islam*. Consequently, the establishment and strengthening of the sultanates in Sulu and Mindanao signified the direction of the expansion of Islam from North Sumatra to the north of the Philippine Archipelago. In brief, the Islamization of the Philippines would have constituted the end result of the process of the Islamization of Malaysia.

The conception of a wider social entity, a Malaysian Islamic community, transcending political boundaries is not to be dismissed as if it were merely the figment of the imagination of a Moslem jurisprudential philosopher. Although Islam or rather the Moslem principalities in Malaysia were established in some areas before others, there was a time between the beginning of the sixteenth century and the end of the eighteenth century when most, if not all, of these principalities were contemporaneous and a consciousness of Islam was quite widespread in all of them. The theory which attempts to explain the accelerated expansion of Islam in Malaysia in terms of the continued struggle between Moslem and Christian begun during the Crusades, cannot be at all significant unless it is asserted categorically that there was a Malaysian *dar-al-islam,* in the same manner that it can be reasonably assumed that when the Portuguese and the Spaniards came to Malaysia they were conscious of their having come from Christian lands.

The coming of Islam to the Philippines cannot be fully understood and appreciated except as part, and possibly as the checked and frustrated process, of Islam's expansion from the north of Sumatra in its eastward course to the rest of Malaysia. The failure of the Philippine north to accommodate itself to this eastward course can easily be explained by another force that acted upon it, namely, the Spaniards with the sword and the cross.

The Islamization of the greater part of Malaysia has been one of the most important ideological factors that have transformed the culture of the Area. But like all social change it is a fact that does not appear to lend itself to a single explanation. Such an explanation is doomed to failure. Actually, a great number of theories have been presented to explain and understand the Islamization of Malaysia. Theories have been presented from the beginning of the sixteenth century by Portuguese writers up to the present by contemporary scholars. All of these explanations are based on historical data but they differ in their interpretation of the facts. Some are conscious efforts to displace other theories, but upon closer analysis what they appear to displace they actually complement with further explanations. Some are specifically applicable to certain Moslem principalities and certainly cannot as such nullify another explanation relevant to other principalities. Explanations of this sort, although valuable, present the danger that they might be considered as general explanations for the spread of islam throughout the whole of Malaysia.

Other explanations represent generalizations based on selected data evaluated in terms of definite categories. It cannot be denied that theories of this kind have some form of probability value and definitely make a study of the history of the area intelligible, if not more fascinating. It can be stated outright that the different explanations belong to different levels of knowledge, that is, some are generalizations based on facts while others assume certain principles to explain the facts within a theoretical framework. With regards to emphasis on selective facts, it will appear that some theories refer more properly to the introduction of Islam while the others show how its spread was dramatically accelerated.

An analysis of explanations made by Portuguese historians or travellers and the theories of eminent Dutch scholars like Jacob Cornelis Van Leur, Hendrick Kern and Bertram Schrieke, reveal that they are all based mainly on archeological and historical data pertaining to the Indonesian Archipelago and the Malay Peninsula. As valid theories, they would have a relevant applicability to the areas which are the sources of the data. It is consequently interesting and fruitful to discover whether these theories can be utilized with minor modifications to give further understanding of and insights into the coming and expansion of Islam in the Philippines, or whether traditions and historical data available from the Philip-

pines can be used to support these theories in a manner that will increase their general applicability. Once these two alternatives have been accomplished, not only will the coming of Islam to the Philippines be viewed as part of a wider constellation but a possible general theory on the coming of Islam to Malaysia will become feasible.

I do not pretend to have discovered a general theory but it can be pointed out that all the different explanations and theories contain the basic ingredients for such a theory. What will be offered is simply a summary and elementary correlation of these ingredients. I do not have any new historical data or dramatic discovery to offer. If a discussion of the various theories can help to make the coming of Islam to the Philippines slightly more intelligible, or if the presentation of Philippine historical data will make them, in turn, more tenable and general, some modest contribution has been made. But before a discussion of these theories can commence, a brief historical introduction, with some interpretations, on the introduction of Islam in Malaysia must be given.

I. BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY

In all probability, the Arabs of the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula were the first navigators of the Indian Ocean. Centuries before the advent of Islam, Arab seafarers served as the intermediaries between European traders and Asian traders in India and western Malaysia. Although the Romans and, later on, the Persians (from the end of the fifth century up to the seventh) apear to have competed with the Arabs for control of the trade in the Indian Ocean, the Arabs (with other Moslems) had become the dominant traders by the ninth century. It was a monopoly that was never challenged until the coming of the Portuguese in the closing years of the fifteenth century.

The southern Arabs took full advantage of their geographic position to serve as intermediaries between Europe and the East. But it was more than their enviable geographic position that led them to become traders. The increasing aridity of the Arabian soil coupled with the failure of the Arabs to develop radical agricultural techniques brought about a general decline of agriculture. These forced the southern Arabs to seek new avenues for survival. In the cities of the Hadhramaut, the increase of the population could not be ac-

commodated anymore by the the stagnant or declining economy of the area. What a modern writer has reported of present day Hadhrami appears to be valid for the Hadhrami of earlier times:

> . . . the Hadhramaut being unable to provide sufficient sustenance for its large population, the Hadhrami has from early days been forced to go overseas and to seek not only a living for himself but to carry on the tradition of remitting home annually such moneys as will enable his relations to purchase those necessities (and often those luxuries) of life which cannot be produced locally.[1]

What has been said of the Hadhramaut can also be said of all the other regions in the south of the Arabian Peninsula.

The Arab vessels used the time honored sea routes at definite seasons. They would leave Egyptian ports in the Red Sea early in July, sail south to the gulf of Aden to be gently wafted in time by the Southwest monsoon to the western coast of India around September. By the end of November or early in December, they would, by means of the Northeast monsoon, return to the ports of southern Arabia, from whence they would sail back to the Red Sea ports at the Egyptian West.[2]

But the enterprising Arabs, it clearly appears, extended their trade as far as China. Chinese records reveal that as early as 300 A.D, the Arabs (and possibly the Persians) already had a settlement and a counting-house in Canton. Thus, in general, it can be maintained that during ancient and medieval times, the sea-trade between Egypt, Persia and India on one hand, and that of India to East and Southeast Asia on the other, remained in the hands of Arabs.[3] The number of Arab and Persian traders had increased considerably by the first decade of the seventh century so that "by the middle of the eight century the Mohammedans at Canton—which they called Khanfu—had become so numerous in 758 they were able to sack and burn the city and make off to sea with their loot."[4] There does not appear to have been any serious competition from

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[1] W. H. Lee Warner, "Notes on the Hadhramaut," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. LXXVII, No. 3, March 1931, p. 219.

[2] Francis Joseph Moorhead, *A History of Malaya and her Neighbors*, Vol. I, pp. 13-14 and J.A.E. Morley, "The Arabs and the Eastern Trade," *Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society Journal*, Vol. XXII, Part I, March 1949, p. 143 and p. 148.

[3] Cf. *Introduction of Chau Ju-Kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, entitled Chu-fan-chi*, (Translated by Friedrich Hirth and W. W. Rockhill), p. 4

[4] CF. Introduction to *Ibid.*, p. 15.

Hindu merchants. It is generally agreed that by the beginning of the ninth century, Arab merchants and sailors had begun to dominate the Nanhai Trade.[5] The earliest Arab accounts dealing with their trade with China pertain to this century. By this time the generality of the Arabs had already been Moslems for more than a century. Their ships from Oman are said to have sailed to and from the Sri-Vijaya port of Kedah in the Malay Peninsula. Around 850, this was one of the most important ports of call for Arab ships, and its prosperity increased as it became indispensible to the Arabs especially by the tenth century when the troubled conditions in China during the T'ang Dynasty led Canton to become a closed port to foreign merchants. Possibly at this time, Kedah became the farthest point east reached by Arab and Persian ships.[6]

Regardless of internecine squabbles in the Islamic world, and in spite of the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad in 1258, which resulted in a greater political fragmentation of the world of Islam, the Moslems still served as intermediaries in the trade between Europe and the East, both on the land and sea routes. The Venetian, Marino Sanudo, writing in 1306 with reference to the overland trade in Western Asia, stated that Indian merchandise passed to Baghdad and then to Syrian and Turkish ports. Regarding the maritime trade, he wrote that Indian goods went to Aden and thence to Alexandria.[7] From these Turkish and Arab ports, the merchandise would go to Europe, principally to Italian ports. Moslem ships would bring the merchandise to European ports but after the Crusades, Genoese and Venetian ships loaded the goods from the Moslem ports. The various sultans in Arab territories made the most of this system of trade whether overland or maritime. Seeing it as a source of income, they took care lest the goose that laid the golden egg were killed. They protected Moslem traders in whose interest no Christians were to be allowed in territories where they could offer competition. Needless to say, Italian merchants, regardless of Papal injunctions against trading with Moslems, were just as concerned that the trade run smoothly.

On account of the essentially seasonal character of the monsoons

[5] Cf. Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea," *JMBRAS*, Vol. XXXI, Part 2, No. 182.

[6] Cf. Moorhead, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-78.

[7] Cf. Bertram J. O. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, Part I, pp. 11-12.

and because of the "pedlar" and partly barter character of the trade, it became essential for the Arab merchants and, later on, other Moslem traders from India and Persia to settle in definite ports and establish settlements among the native population. Chau Ju-Kua writes about the great number of Arabs (Ta-Shi) in Ceylon and other places.[8] If Canton can be taken as a reference, these settlements were well defined districts the inhabitants of which where in contact with the government officials of the host country through intermediaries of their own religion or race, who were usually *cadis* or prominent merchants. As long as the host country was non-Moslem, the Moslem traders and their retinue lived outside the *adat* (customary law) of the country. The situation would presumably be entirely different for Arab and Persian traders in India, say among the Gujeratis when these were becoming daily more Islamized.

There is no evidence that Islam left the confines of these settlements in Malaysia before the twelfth century. Arab accounts between the ninth and twelfth centuries do not mention conversions, much less large scale conversions. However, after Islam had taken root in the Gujerati area in northwest India and with the increase in the population of Moslem settlements in part of the Malabar and Coromandel coasts in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the picture of Islam in the Sri-Vijayan ports in Malaysia began to change.

The place in Malaysia closest geographically to the centers of Islam, and a constant stopping place for Moslem traders, was the northern part of Sumatra. It is no wonder then that it would be in this area where Islam would go beyond the confines of the foreign Moslem settlements. Marco Polo, who was in Perlak at around 1290, said of Sumatra, "Its inhabitants are for the most part idolaters but many of those who dwell in the seaport towns have been converted to the religion of Mahomet, by the Saracen merchants who constantly frequent them."[9] Within a decade after Marco Polo's sojourn in Sumatra, Perlak's neighboring coastal principality of Pasai was governed by a ruler who had become a Moslem, taking the name Malik-al-Saleh. The conversion of neighboring principalities soon followed. Because its ruler was a Moslem and its position as a port was convenient, Pasai supplanted Kedah as a very important *pied*

[8] Cf. *op. Cit.*, p. 89.

[9] *The Travels of Marco Polo the Venetian* (Everyman's Library No. 3063,) p. 338.

[10] Cf. Moorhead, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

a terre for the foreign Moslem traders.[10] When Fra Odorico di Pordenone visited Southeast Asia around 1322, the greater part of Sumatra and other regions around Malacca were not yet Moslem. From Pasai, Islam was introduced through conversion to Malacca, where the first ruler was supposed to have married a Moslem Pasai princess.[11] This must have taken place at around 1400. This reveals that in terms of time the introduction of Islam to the Malay Peninsula had a head start of only about a century on that of Christianity by the Portuguese.

Islam's beach-head in Malaysia was definitely in North Sumatra. Malay literary traditions, specially the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals) and the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai,* affirm this, regardless of the differences in their versions as to the sequence of the conversions of the various principalities in North Sumatra.[12] Ibn Battuta, who made two trips to Sumatra between 1344 and 1347, wrote about the sultan of Samudra as follows:

> The sultan of Java (Sumatra), al-Ma'ik az-Zahir, is a most illustrious and open-handed ruler, and lover of theologians. He is constantly engaged in warring for the Faith (against the infidels) and in raiding expeditions, but is withal a humble-hearted man, who walks on foot to the Friday prayers. His subjects also take a pleasure in warring for the Faith and voluntarily accompany him on his expeditions. They have the upper hand over all the infidels in their vicinity, who pay them a po'l-tax to secure peace.[13]

Although it can be maintained that the introduction of Islam to Malaysia by foreign Moslems was generally peaceful, there is some evidence, as suggested by Ibn Battuta, that some of the recent converts used other more persuasive means to make their neighbors embrace Islam. Incidentally, Ibn Battuta found Malays in Ormuz, the Malabar coast and even as far away as East Africa. The possibility, therefore, of some Malaysians embracing Islam in places distant from their homes cannot be entirely discounted.

Evidence that relatively powerful Moslem principalities on the coast of North Sumatra began to appear during the thirteenth cen-

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[11] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[12] Compare the *Sejarah Melayu* (*JMBRAS,* Vol. XXV, Parts 2 and 3, October 1952) pp. 41-43 and the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* (*Journal of the Straits Branch Royal Asiatic Society,* No. 66, 1914), p. 9. Also cf. R.O. Winstedt, "The Chronicles of Pasai," *JMBRAS,* Vol. XVI, Part 2, December 1938, pp. 24-30.

[13] *Ibn Battuta: Travels in Asia and Africa 1325-1354,* (Translated and selected by H.A.R. Gibb), p. 274.

tury soon after Islam began to take firmer roots in India during the twelfth century as well as the fact that the majority of the Indian traders were Gujeratis (presumably nearly all of them Moslems), have suggested to various authors that the expansion of Islam, in terms of numerous conversions, was directly due to the work of Indian Moslems. According to Winstedt, these Moslems were more specifically Gujeratis:

> Finally about 1414 under the influence of Gujerati traders, the greatest missionaries of Islam in the East, Malacca became Muslim and rose to be a port of call for ships from the north of Sumatra, the Moluccas, Java and China, and from Gujerat, Malabar, Coromandel, and Arabia.[14]

Other authors, similarly accepting the vital role of India in the Islamic conversion of Sumatra and Malacca, nevertheless maintain that it was South India rather than Gujerat that was the real provenance of Malaysian Islam. According to Van Ronkel,

> It is well known that Islam and the greater part of Moslem mysticism found its way to the Indonesian Archipelago not from Arabia, but from Southern India... It may suffice to remind the reader of the undeniable fact that the very form of popular Islam, the character of its mysticism, the whole Islamic edifying and romantic literature, the form of many Arabic loanwords, the style of Muhamedan tombs and so on point to Southern India as the land of their origin.[15]

Another argument supporting the contention that Southern India was the provenance of Malaysia Islam is that the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence which predominates in Malaysia was also found in Southern India; whereas, in the Gujerati area, the Hanafi school was predominant. A counter argument to this is that most of the tombstones of the well-to-do and powerful sultans and chiefs of northern Sumatra were from Cambay in Gujerat. However, as G. E. Marrison has well pointed out, this fact is not necessarily inconsistent with the claim that the spread of Islam came directly from Southern India.[16] Marrison's researches on the relation of Malaysian Islam to Southern India appear, as he claims, to "vindicate Malay literary tradition, which has frequently been assailed

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[14] R. O. Winstedt, *A History of Johore (1365-1895 A.D.) JMBRAS*, Vol. X, Part iii, December 1932, p. 5.

[15] Ph.S. Van Ronkel, "A Tamil Malay Manuscript," *JSBRAS*, No. 85, March 1922, p. 29.

[16] Cf. G.E. Marrison, "The Coming of Islam to the East Indies," *JMBRAS*, Vol. XXIV, Part 1, 1951, p. 28.

for its lack of a historical sense, and in particular add another pointer to the historic value of the recension of the Sejarah Melayu..."[17]

The fact that there are scholars who, while generally agreeing that the conversion of Malaysia to Islam was directly due to India but nevertheless disagreeing as to whether it is Gujerat or Southern India that deserves the credit, is symptomatic of a desire to provide a simple key to explain the phenomena of Islam in Malaysia. Those who choose southern India have assumed as a general principle that the Islamization of Malaysia was due to some conscious missionary activity; while those who point to Gujerat have assumed another general principle which is that traders brought Islam to Malaysia. These latter scholars point out that Cambay in Gujerat had become one of the most important trading ports in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and true enough Ibn Battuta witnessed its grandeur, its wealth, its beautiful mosques, and the brisk trade carried on there. For an overall picture of India's influence on Malaysian Islam, it might become necessary to consider inclusively the important roles played by both Gujerat and southern India. However, one must note some danger in overemphasizing the role played by Indian Moslems in conversions, for this will negate the possible role played by the Arab sherifs, sayyids, and adventurers from Arabia as well as that played by the Malaysian converts themselves.

The conversion of the first or second ruler of Malacca in which the ruler of Pasai probably played some role, was an event of tremendous importance in the history of the spread of Islam insofar as the rest of Malaysia, including the Philippines, is concerned. In an important sense, the glories and tribulations of this great international emporium were intimately linked with the activities of its Moslem trader patrons who held unchallenged control of the spice trade up to the beginning of the sixteenth century. Although Pasai claimed priority as a theological center, it was Malacca that was destined to become one herself. As a place where theologians and preachers gathered, where discussions became frequent, it was, as it were, Islam's headquarters in Southeast Asia and Malaysia during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Its relative orthodoxy and the piety of its ruler and of the generality of the population were recognized by the neighboring Islamic principalities. Ying Sheng-lan (1416) wrote about Malacca that "the king and the peo-

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

ple are Mohammedans and they carefully observe the tenets of this religion."[18]

By the beginning of the sixteenth century, Western European powers, more specifically the Portuguese, were ready to challenge the monopoly of the spice trade by the Arabs, the "real heirs of Sri Vijaya" in matters of trade. The defeat of the Moslem fleet (composed of Egyptian and Indian ships) at Dui in 1509 broke the Arab monopoly but it did not in any vital manner hamper the force of Islam's expansion in Malaysia. If one of the theories of Islam's expansion is to be accepted, it was this very challenge to the Moslem trade monopoly that further accelerated Islam's spread. The fall of Malacca in 1511, though a loss, forced the Moslem traders to search for another, though possibly less convenient, center for mercantile activities. Acheh was chosen. From thence on, North Sumatra became once again a bastion of Islam, and Acheh became so prosperous and so powerful as to poise a challenge to Portuguese Malacca.

II. THEORIES ON THE SPREAD OF ISLAM IN MALAYSIA

From accounts of historians we learn that Arab traders began to control the Nanhai trade as early as the beginning of the ninth century. Yet, up to the end of the twelfth century, there does not appear to have been any appreciable number of conversions among either the ruler or the inhabitants of the principalities of Malaysia. However, by the end of the thirteenth century conversions among rulers in Sumatra began to appear, a process extending to the Malay Peninsula and Java during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. An acceleration is then witnessed by the beginning of the sixteenth century in the Moluccas, Borneo and the Philippines. Various theories have been presented to explain this phenomenon, a phenomenon of conversion that is still continuing, although in a less dramatic manner, up to the present.

At the outset, the "imperialism" theory can be dismissed for lack of historical evidence. The Arabs and other foreign Moslems who appeared in Malaysia, did not make any attempt to conquer areas intended to be subject to the mother countries to which they belonged. Unlike Portugal at Malacca and Spain in the Philippines, and unlike the Moslem armies which invaded North Africa and

[18] Quoted by W. P. Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Malay Peninsula* from Chinese Sources, p. 123.

in the seventh and eighth century, respectively, the Moslems did not initially appear in Malaysia except in peaceful pursuits. And if Egyptian and Turkish mercenaries appeared later on, it was only in the sixteenth century when the Portuguese had become a threat.

It might have well been that, on account of internal weaknesses or internecine quarrels, the mother countries of the traders were not in a position to go about conquering other principalities separated from them by great distances over water. Certainly, the cities of Southern Arabia would not have had the resources for oversea invasions. Possibly, too, the concept of *dar-al-Islam* had become flexible. After the destruction of the Caliphate in the thirteenth century, the conception of an Islamic community identical to an Islamic empire was only a fond dream shared by a few. To many Moslem jurists, the universal imamate was gone. As long as the different sultanates remained Moslem, they all belonged to *dar-al-Islam*. Regardess of his country of origin and to whomever sultan he owed loyalty, a Moslem in *dar-al-Islam* was in theory to be well-treated, protected, permitted to travel and definitely allowed and encouraged to follow the pillars of Islam. In any activity, including trade, a Moslem was supposed to be given preference over a non-Moslem in Islamic territory. Moslems left their land of birth to serve or to offer their talents to sultans known for their liberality. The sojourn of the famous Ibn Khaldun in Spain and Egypt to serve as *cadi*, away from Tunis which was the land of his birth, is a case in point.

1. *The Trade Theory*

Regarding the introduction and initial expansion of Islam in Malaysia, the most common explanation and the oldest so as to be denominated the classical theory, is that Moslem traders brought Islam with their merchandise. One of the earliest statement regarding this was given by Tomé Pires who wrote around 1515. According to Pires,

> Some of them (merchants) were Chinese, some Arabs, Parsees, Gujaratees, Bengalees and of many other nationalities, and they flourished so greatly that Mohammed and his followers determined to introduce their doctrines in the sea-coast of Java (together) with merchandise.[1]

[1] *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires: An Account of the East from the Red Sea to Japan, written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515*, Vol. I, p. 174.

The statement that Islam came with the merchandise of the Moslem traders is so general and ambiguous that it requires some elaboration. Actually, various elaborations, one of them given later on by Pires himself, constitute variations of the trade theory. A first variation maintains that the peaceful penetration of Islam in Malaysia was due to Moslem traders living in the area permanently and intermarrying with the native population and eventually inducing non-Moslems to embrace the Faith. According to Van Leur, it was Nicolaas Krom who adhered to this explanation by asserting that Islam spread in Indonesia in the same manner that Hinduism did before the introduction of Islam. The adoption of Islam, like that of Hinduism, "was a result of pacific penetration carried on by traders who after settling permanently perhaps had initiated more countrymen, including nontraders, to follow their example."[2] Krom goes on in his attempt to compare similarities between the Islamization and Hinduization of Java as follows:

> Traders from India and Malacca settled on Java, just as in turn a large Javanese colony lived in a quarter of Malacca at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Marriages of the foreigners with maidens of the country had the same results as earlier with the establishment of Hinduism, and as far as religion is concerned the effect must have been even more immediate, since the wife of a Mohammedan must after all have embraced Islam herself.[3]

A second variation of the trader theory views some Moslem traders as adventurers who were out to establish principalities for themselves either by acting on their own initiative or by marrying into the families of rulers with the net result that they ended having political power. The renowned Dutch scholar, Hendrick Kern, uses the first and second variations. Following the first variation, he maintained that Islam made headway in the Indian Archipelago "by persuasion, friendly relations, and intermarriages between believers and pagans," and that, previous to large scale conversions, there were many Moslem traders, principally Arabs, in the most important ports in Sumatra and the neighboring islands, who "sowed the seeds

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[2] Quoted from Jacob Cornelis Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History*, p. 91.

[3] Quoted from Van Leur, *op. cit.*, p. 113. Krom is inaccurate when he contends without qualification that the wife of a Moslem must embrace Islam. Islam allows marriages with non-Moslem women like Christians and Jewesses but not with idolaters. However, no Moslem woman is allowed to marry a non-Moslem.

that would in time sprout profusely."[4] But then Kern shifts to the second variation by quoting and asserting that Francisco Gainza's explanation for the introduction of Islam in the Philippines was also applicable to other islands in Malaysia.[5] Here the view of Kern coincides with that of Thomas W. Arnold who also quotes Gainza.[6] Published in 1851, Gainza's views which refer to the Moslems of the Philippine South, are as follows:

> The social conditions of these people must have been similar to those in the rest of the Philippine Archipelago until the arrival of some Arab missionaries who instructed them in Islam and who settled permanently in the Rio Grande (Pulangi) to be better accepted by the people and make them more tractable (to their teaching). They introduced some religious practices, intermarried with the women, adopted the native language and many customs of the country, adjusted themselves to the social order, acquired numerous slaves to enhance their importance, and merged themselves into the datu class which was the most elevated class. Working together with more skill and harmony than the natives, and possessing slaves like the latter, they progressively consolidated their power and formed a confederacy till they finally established a form of monarchy which they made hereditary in a family among whose members the Datus would elect a Sultan.[7]

Malay literary traditions report of wealthy Moslem traders marrying into ruling families. The fourth bendahara of Malacca, Tun Ali Sri Nara 'diraja, who served as minister to Muzaffer Shah (1445-1459), was a son of a Pasai princess who married a rich Moslem merchant. In Java, the sixteenth century dynasties of Banten and Cheribon were of Arab origin. Various selesilah versions of Brunei agree that a daughter of Sultan Ahmad, the second Moslem ruler of Brunei, married a certain Sherif Ali from Taif, who later on succeeded his father-in-law, ruling under the name of Sultan Berkat.[8] It was this fifteenth century sultan who "enforced the laws of the Prophet, and built a mosque in the city of Brunei, and by the

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[4] Hendrick Kern, "Over den invloed der Indioche, Arabische en Europeesche beschaving op de volken van den Indischen Archipel," *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. VI, pp. 25-26.

[5] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[6] Cf. Thomas W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, p. 295.

[7] Francisco Gainza, *Memoria y antecedentes sobre las expediciones de Balanguingui y Jolo*, pp. 131-132.

[8] Cf. *Selesilah (Book of the Descent) of the Rajas of Brunei* by Hugh Low, *JSBRAS*, No. 5, June 1880, p. 3 and "Transcription and Translation of a Historic Tablet," *Ibid.*, p. 33.

aid of his Chinese subjects he erected the *Kota Batu* (stone wall)."[9] According to a tarsila of Sulu, the first ruler who took the title of "sultan" was a certain Sayid Abu Bakar, an Arab believed to have been an authority on Islamic jurisprudence and religion, who married the daughter of Raja Baginda, a Menangkabao prince who established a realm in Sulu at the end of the fourteenth century.[10] Tradition points to Abu Bakar as the founder of the dynasty which ruled Sulu. Different Magindanao tarsilas allege that the founder of the various main sultanates in Mindanao, namely, the Magindanao and Buayan sultanates, was the Sherif Mohammed Kabungsuwan, son of the Arab sherif Ali Zeyn-al-Abidin from Hadhramaut who married a princess of Malacca.[11]

The pattern of Arabs marrying into the ruling families, as attested by tradition, has recurred up to as late as the end of the eighteenth century when Arab "adventurers" succeeded in carving principalities for themselves in Sumatra and Kalimantan in Borneo. According to Van der Kroef, a sayyid married a daughter of the reigning sultan in Siak (Sumatra). His son overthrew the sultan's legitimate heir and made himself sultan. Also, the sultans of Pontianak belonged to a dynasty descended from another sayyid who arrived in 1735 in Matan, Southwest Borneo. His son married into the family of the Sultan of Bandjarmassin in South Borneo and carved a principality, Pontianak, with himself as sultan.[12]

Various sayyids appear to have become sultants of Ached, and various others were territorial chiefs (ulubalangs) in Sumatra.[13] However, it is not known whether all of these sayyids were foreign born, for the sons of sayyids who married into the local population also used their father's title. One of the most recent and celebrated cases of a sayyid who rose to political prominence was that of Abderrahman (el Habib Abderrahman). Expectations among the Achenese were such that he was constrained to lead them in an organized resistance against an invasion of the Dutch in Acheh in the latter

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 3. Also cf. H. R. Hughes-Hallet, "A Sketch of the History of Brunei," *JMBRAS*, Vol. XVIII, Part ii, August 1940, pp. 26-27.

[10] Cf. Najeeb M. Saleeby (*The History of Sulu*) p. 150.

[11] Cf. Najeeb M. Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion*, pp. 24, 26-27, 37.

[12] Cf. Justus M. Van der Kroef, "The Arabs in Indonesia," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1953, p. 304.

[13] Cf. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achenese*, Vol. I, p. 158.

part of the last century. He definitely had great political and diplomatic skill and deep understanding of the character of the people, but his major asset appears to have been his noble descent.[14]

The coming of sayyids to Malaysia proves that some of the Arab and Moslem traders belonged to the aristocracy of their own countries. Actually, it can be maintained that, in general, the traders did not come from the humbler classes but from the aristocracy.[15] The sayyids, in their own countries, were and are still to a very great extent the most esteemed, venerated and respected families. What Warner says of the contemporary sayyid at the Hadhramaut can be taken as a fair estimate of the position they have always held:

> The Hadhrami Saiyids are deeply respected and are grouped in varying numbers of families throughout the towns and in the wadis. They consider themselves as undoubtedly of the very purest blood and of direct descent from the daughter of the Prophet, and they most jealously resent any inter-marriage save with the bluest of blue Islamic blood. . . The Saiyids bear no arms and, owning as they do large bodies of slaves and the most fertile pieces of land, need not occupy themselves with any bodily labour. They exercise a very strong influence both in religious matters and in local politics, and are often appealed to as arbitrators in the case of tribal quarrels or clan disputes.[16]

The sayyids in southern Arabia became quite numerous, but this fact did not reduce their prestige as descendants of the Prophet. Of special note is that they were those who "had taken the lead in migrating to foreign countries," using their trade to consolidate their wealth in land owned in the Hadhramaut.[17] It must not be supposed, as Hurgronje pointed out, that all of the sayyids were learned men or theologians. Many were traders and later on agriculturists but, nevertheless, "they enjoy none the less the customary reverence based on religious feeling, even where their life is far from testifying to a devotional spirit on their part."[18]

In the Moslem South of the Philippines today, there is a great deal of Arab blood in the veins of the scions of the datus who still remember either their Arab fathers or grandfathers. Needless to say, many of them claim to be descendants of sayyids. Incidentally, a case of a Moslem trader who carved out a principality for himself

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[14] Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 158-164.

[15] Cf. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," *op. cit.*, Part 1, p. 28.

[16] W. H. Lee Warner, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

[17] Morely, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

[18] Snouck Hurgronje, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 156.

on the coast of East Africa is cited by a Portuguese writer in the sixteenth century.[19]

Without elaborating on the nature of intermarriages between Arab adventurers and the indigenous population, John Crawford wrote in 1820 that

> Arabian adventurers have settled in almost every country of the Archipelago, and intermarrying with the natives of the country, begot a mixed race, which is pretty numerous. Of all the nations of Asia who meet on this common theatre, the Arabs are the most ambitious, intriguing, and bigotted.[20]

Crawford then implied that the Arab trader, along with his merchandise, assumed the role of a religious mentor.

> They have a strength of character, which places them far above the simple natives of the country, to whom, in matters of religion, they dictate with that arrogance with which the meanest of the countrymen of the prophet consider themselves entitled to conduct themselves. They are, when not devoted to spiritual concerns, wholly occupied in mercantile affairs, and the genuine Arabs are spirited, fair, and adventurous merchants.[21]

Morely, writing in 1949, presents a view which coincides partially but not wholly with that of Crawford. According to Morely,

> There are innumerable instances in the history of the East Indies of an Arab settling in one of these states and rapidly acquiring for himself (and his compatriots) an altogether preponderating influence there. Sometimes they had only to present themselves in these surroundings to be appointed provincial governors, and to be given as wives the daughters of princes or of the high aristocracy. The Malay explanation, like Raffles', is that the Arabs traded on an often spurious religious connection, and commanded the veneration of the religiously disposed but relatively uninstructed peoples through being of the same race and origin as the founder of their faith. This may be partially but it is not entirely true—many of the countries in which they succeeded in entrenching themselves most securely were pagan countries. Van den Berg attributes much of their success in this field to other than religious causes. Their diplomatic skill, their ability to exploit the weak sides of the native character without weakening their own, and their dignity and gift of expression generally made a tremendous impression on the peoples among whom they appeared. Their bearing appeared to justify their claim to represent an older and higher civilization, Perlis in Malaya, Siak Kampar and Jambi in Sumatra, Kubu and

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[19] Cf. *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque*, (translated by Walter de Gray Birch), Vol, p. 36.

[20] John Crawford, *History of the Indian Archipelago*, Vol. I, p. 139.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

> Pontianak in Borneo are among the places where Arabs either became established as rulers or intermarried with the ruling house, and their position in Palemban, Singapore and other centers owed much initially to the respect with which the Malay authorities regarded them. This respect was partly based on ignorance. . . and greater familiarity caused, not exactly contempt, but a more candid and accurate appreciation of their true worth.[22]

The main difference between the view of Crawford and that of Morely is that while the former suggested that the Arab trader and adventurer was in some manner also a missionary interested in conversions, the latter held that conversion was a tool utilized for personal material interest or at most it was of secondary importance. Crawford's view cannot be neglected entirely as a partial explanation of the initial introduction and possible expansion of Islam. Precisely on account of Koranic exhortations and injunctions and in part possibly because of the absence of a well-organized clergy to propagate Islam, a devout Moslem is duty bound to assume some of the responsibility of seeing to it that the faith is propagated. This may be a constant and important peculiarity of Islam. The author has had friends who literally brought their merchandise and religion with them. While spending part of their time selling merchandise, they have found time to indulge in theological controversies with non-Moslems and in teaching the relatively uninstructed the rudiments of the Faith. Arnold's views on the matter are thoroughly relevant and valid:

> Accordingly, however great an exaggeration it may be to say, as has been said so often, that every Muhammedan is a missionary, still it is true that every Muhammedan may be one, and few truly devout Muslims, living in daily contact with unbelievers, neglect the precept of their Prophet: "Summon them to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and kindly warning."[23]

Arnold then goes on to describe how Moslems of all ranks, from rulers to peasants, have endeavored to spread the Faith and how a man learned in Islamic theology and jurisprudence could find his search for material rewards not inconsistent with his studies.

The *Sejarah Melayu* vividly portrays this situation when the Sri Rama Panglima Gaja during the reign of Sultan Mahmud Shah interrupted a theological discussion between the Bendahara and a learned scholar, Maulana Sadar Jahan, who was an instructor of

[22] *Op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 333.

theological affairs to the Sultan and heir-apparent. "When the Sri Rama reached the Bendahara's house and perceived that the Bendahara was conversing with the Makhdum, he said, 'Let me join the class!' And Bendahara Sri Maharaja bade him be seated. But when Makhdum Sadar Jahan perceived that the Sri Rama was drunk and whiffed the smell of alcohol in the Sri Rama's breath, he said *'Al-khamru ummu'l-kaba'ith'* which means 'Alcohol is the mother of evils,' to which the Sri Rama retorted *'Al-hamku ummu'l-khaba'ith'*, which means 'Worldliness is the mother of evils.' 'Why was it, sir, that you came here from above the wind? Was it not to acquire riches? That was the result of worldliness!' At that the Makhdum was deeply offended and arose to go . . . ."[24]

It cannot be denied that just as there must have been traders who were devout Moslems, there must have been also those who had no interest at all in conversions or who held at most that conversion was of secondary importance. This latter view, following closely that of Morely, can serve as an explanation for the coming of traders who were interested in personal advancement, but if this was overemphasized, it cannot serve as an explanation for the widespread expansion of Islam. Since it is clear that the fact of Islam's expansion cannot be explained by the view that the first Moslem traders were merely out to seek worldly or political advantage either by trading or by wiggling themselves into the ruling families, other writers maintained that these traders were followed by mullahs and other religious functionaries. Francisco Colin, a Spanish Jesuit and one of the few early Spanish writers on the Philippines who reflected however briefly, on the coming of Islam to Malaysia, wrote that it was probably greed and mercantile interest that brought the Moslems to Malaysia. Basing his reflections on the accounts of Portuguese writers, Colin described how these traders by means of expensive and rare gifts began to ingratiate themselves with the native rulers until they were able to consolidate their power to the extent of finally acquiring political control over the principalities. Later on, missionaries and other Islamic religious functionaries followed.[25]

Colin's views, written around 1656, parallel those of Pires whose writings at the beginning of the sixteenth century possibly served

[24] *Sejarah Melayu*, p. 153.

[25] Cf. *Labor Evangelica de los Obreros de la Compania de Jesus en las Islas Filipinas*. (New Edition Barcelona 1904), pp. 15-16.

as a source to Colin and Portuguese historians. Pires stated the adventurer variation but he suggested that mullahs followed these adventurers.

> At the time when there were heathens along the sea coast of Java, many merchants used to come, Parsees, Arabs, Gujaratees, Bengalees, Malays and other nationalities, there being many Moors among them. They began to trade in the country and to grow rich. They succeeded in way of making mosques, and mollahs came from outside, so that they came in such growing numbers that the sons of these said Moors were already Javanese and rich, for they had been in these parts for about seventy years. In some places the heathen Javanese lords themselves turned Mohammedans, and these mollahs and the merchant Moors took possession of these places. Others had a way of fortifying the places where they lived, and they killed the Javanese lords and made themselves lords; and in this way they made themeselves master of the sea coast and took over trade and power in Java.[26]

Making allowance for possible usurpations of the ruling power in certain principalities by Moslem traders, and accepting as fact the cases in which native Moslem rulers overpowered neighboring non-Moslem principalities, Pires' view of Moslem intrigue is a bit exaggerated for he overlooked the simple fact that the native rulers themselves needed the services of the traders and depended on them for many things. Thus, to maintain their prestige it was not always necessary for the traders to rely constantly on intrigues and usurpations. The fact was that as pointed out before, the traders came mainly from the aristocracy of their land, had some education and, certainly, a lot of experience in dealing with people. And "when one reads over the Chinese accounts of the trading places in India and the archipelago, the Portuguese sources, or the journals of the early Dutch and English voyages, one is struck by the fact that foreigners often held more or less official positions of confidence—under various titles, apparently dependent on their knowledge of languages and so forth—as intermediaries between the authorities of the emporia and the foreign trader."[27] With control of the trade held by foreign Moslems, it is quite natural to expect that the majority, if not all, of the shahbanders would be Moslems. In 1282, it was not surprising to note that the Hindu-Malay ruler of Samudra sent to China as his envoys, two Moslem foreigners, Suleiman and Shams-ud-din, who were *mantris*. As Schrieke stated, "Functionaries of this sort (in-

[26] Pires, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 182.

[27] B. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," *op. cit.*, Part 1, p. 28.

cluding shahbanders) had such an influential position that, apparently partly to ensure the personal interests of the ruler, they were considered worthy to marry his daughter. In this way Islam was able to make its entry into such families."[28] If Schrieke's views are mainly correct, the adventurer version of the trade theory needs to be qualified, for it now appears that it was also to the interest of the native ruler to seek alliance with the wealthy Moslem traders. This must certainly hold true as far as the sea coast principalities were concerned. As long as the economic status of the rulers with its corresponding expectation was a function of the patronage of the Moslem traders, the identity of interest between the rulers and traders was bound to ensue.

As the identity of interest increased, it was to be expected that the influence of the traders, especially the shahbanders who not only served as contacts between traders and rulers but even served as advisers to the latter, would become stronger. A time would come when "they introduce Moslem scholars to the rulers..." and even create a negative attitude on the part of the rulers against other non-Moslem competitors. [29] Once these scholars or scribes were attached to a court, they "gave spiritual impetus to the efforts of Moslem rulers to extend their power."[30] And when Islam became to some extent a going concern in Malacca, the involvement of Moslem traders in court affairs increased. It is believed that when Rajah Kasim of Malacca became sultan Muzaffar after the murder of his brother, a Moslem sea-captain was involved in the affair. It appears that the murdered ruler alienated the Moslem traders by ordering an increase in taxes and tolls on shipping from the Coromandel coast.[31] It is to be noted, incidentally, that Rajah Kasim's mother was the daughter of a wealthy Tamil merchant and a sister to the Bendahara Tun Ali. The elimination of Sri Parameswara Deva Shah (Raja Ibrahim, Sultan Abu Shabid) and the subsequent assumption of the sultanate by his brother Sultan Muzaffer has been interpreted as a victory of Islam over the remnants of Hindu elements in court.

It should be noted that intrigues of his sort would not have been possible unless there were fertile ground for the traders to work upon, and such ground was provided by the fact that the rulers and

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

[29] "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," *Ibid.* Part 2, p. 238.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

[31] Cf. Moorehead, *op. cit.*, p. 130 and the *Sejarah Melayu*, pp. 62-63.

part of the populace had already become Moslem. Majapahit too would not have easily fallen unless the influence of Islam were already felt within the confines of the empire.

To summarize, the trade theory is that Islam was introduced by Moslem traders. It has two major variations. The first is that the Moslem traders were in some sense proselyters and that they played the double role of merchants and religious mentors. The second variation was that, at most, conversion was of secondary importance to the trader. This second variation affirms that, in general, the traders were interested in enhancing their worldly interests either by trading or by carving out or inheriting principalities for themselves. In any case, political alliances or interests were of paramount importance. But in so marrying into the native population, the Moslem population expanded beyond the confines of the settlement.

It cannot be denied that there are facts which may be selected to support the two variations. But what must be pointed out is that neither of them can be assumed to explain fully the widespread expansion of Islam in Malaysia. However, they can partially explain the coming of Moslems to the area and Islam's spread to others with daily contacts with these Moslems.

As explanations for the spread of Islam, the trade theory has various limitations. The first variation leaves unexplained how the missionary spirit of an individual Moslem can sometimes be effective. It has to be supplemented by other consistent explanations because it is quite improbable that the preaching and the individual conversions made by traders could have brought about such a widespread and complicated phenomenon. The second variation ignores the role played by the native rulers who might have had personal interests in adopting the new religion themselves. This is essentially Van Leur's criticism of Krom's statement of the trade theory. However, Van Leur's alternative theory which will be discussed later, has been taken to task by Hussein Alatas whose criticism against Van Leur is just as applicable to the trade theory, especially to its second version.

Hurgronje who believed that the first Moslem traders who came to Malaysia had come merely for motives of profit with conversions as a secondary task, reveals a limitation of the trade theory by suggesting that the inner qualities of Islam can provide a clue to the explanation of Islam's spread.

> Those who sowed in the Far East the first seeds of Islam were no zealots prepared to sacrifice life and property for the holy cause, nor were they missionaries supported by funds in their native land. On the contrary these men came hither to seek their own worldly advantage, and the work of conversion was merely a secondary task. Later on too, when millions had in this way been won over to Islam, it was the prospect of making money and naught else that attracted hitherward so many teachers from India, Egypt, Mecca and Hadramaut.
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> In those countries where Islam originally won the mastery by force of arms, the genuineness of the conversion was of course much more open to question than in the Eastern Archipelago, where it was chiefly moral suasion that won the day. In the latter case the new religion was from the very first felt not as a yoke imposed by a higher power, but as a revealed truth which the strangers brought from beyond the sea, and the knowledge of which at once gave its adherents a share in a higher civilization and elevated them to a higher position among the nations of the world.[32]

2. *The Missionary Theory*

It has been noticed above that Pires and Colin, the latter basing his views on that of Portuguese authors, suggested that once the Moslem traders had assumed or shared political power with the rulers of the sea coast principalities, Moslem religious functionaries followed them. As can be readily seen, the missionary theory is not inconsistent with the trader theory, for it intends to supplement the trader theory. Assuming that some of the traders made some initial conversions, at least among their families and immediate contacts, even if their work of conversion was of secondary importance, it is quite credible they were possibly accompanied or followed by religious teachers. It is a matter of history and common knowledge that even though Islam is not a sacerdotal religion in the sense that an organized priesthood is part and parcel of its institutional character, there are Moslems who have entirely dedicated themselves to purely religious matters like preaching and theological pursuits. It is in this sense the term, missionary, will be used, that is, as a professional preacher or learned man in Islamic theology or in the Shari'a.

It is accepted that the first area in Malaysia which received Islam is the Acheh region of North Sumatra and that this event took place before the end of the thirteenth century. The honor has, however, been contested by Perlak, Pasai, and Samudra. Accounts

[32] Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achenese*, Vol. II, pp. 278-279.

of the conversion of Pasai and Samudra are found in the *Hikayat Raja Raja Pasai* and the *Sejarah Melayu,* the latter adding the names of more North Sumatran principalities. Both annals maintain that Islam was brought by missionaries. The *Sejarah Melayu* describes how a vessel under the command of a certain captain Shaikh Ismail had been despatched by the Sherif of Mecca to bring about the conversion of Samudra in accordance with both the instructions and the prophecy of the Prophet. The Captain, too, had instructions to stop at Ma'abri in the Coromandel coast.[1] The ruler of Ma'abri, Sultan Mohammed, leaves his kingdom to his son, turns fakir and begins to convert the people of Lamiri, Haru and Samudra. The converted ruler of Samudra is invested with royal regalia from Mecca and takes the name of Malik-al-Saleh.[2] Regardless of some differences, both the *Sejarah Melayu* and the *Hikayat Raja Raja Pasai* agree that the first Moslem missionaries to Sumatra came directly from the Coromandel coast.[3] This view is also held by Arnold based on the fact, "Most of the Musalmans of the Archipelago belong to the Shaf'iyah sect, which is at the present day predominant on the Coromandel and Malabar coasts, as was the case also about the middle of the fourteenth century when Ibn Batutah visited these parts.[4]

It is to be noted in the account of the *Sejarah Melayu* that the two principal figures in the conversion of the principalities of North Sumatra were the sea captain, Shaikh Ismail, and Sultan Mohammed, the Indian fakir who is alleged to have descended from Abu Bakar, the first Caliph. One is tempted, at this point, to speculate that a trader and a missionary came hand in hand, suggesting that the missionary theory complements the trader theory. It is proposed that those who maintain that the provenance of Islam in India was Gujerat or the Coromandel coast, but not both, can now qualify their assertion by stating that Moslem traders from India were mainly Gujeratis while Moslem missionaries came mostly from the southern part of India. In the same manner, both parties do not contradict each other when they insist that Islam was introduced to Malaysia mainly from India. But, as will be shown later, the statement that

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[1] Marrison's analysis that "Ma'abri" or "Ma'abar" was applied by the Arabs to the the Coromandel coast and not to Malabar is by the author. Cf. Marrison's *opñ cit.*, p. 31.

[2] Cf. *Sejarah Melayu,* pp. 41-43.

[3] Cf. Marrison's *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[4] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

Indians were instrumental in the conversion of Malaysia has to be qualified. Missionaries coming from India need not always be Indians, for Arabs had large trade settlements in India, and they could have played a missionary role also.

When Ibn Batutta visited north Sumatra in 1345, it was a grandson of Malik-al-Saleh (the first Moslem ruler of Pasai who died in 1297 A.D.) who was reigning as Al-Malik-az-Zahir (died 1326 A.D.). This ruler's enthusiasm for the new religion was manifested by his theological discussions with Moslem divines and by his war on the pagans in the interior, probably not without some aim at conversion.[5] Ibn Batutta's testimony that the court of Pasai was a center for discussions on theology and mysticism seems to describe a situation at the court for the next two hundreds years. It will be recalled that theological problems vexing Moslem divines at Malacca even at the pinnacle of its glory were sometimes referred to Pasai.

According to Winstedt, "By 1416 the Chinese found the Sumatran peoples of Aru, Samudra, Pidir, and Lambri, all Muslims, while they record that as early as 1409 Malacca had embranced Islam, a conversion d'Albuquerque ascribes to the marriage of its ruler with a Pasai princess."[6] Assuming the orthodoxy of the rulers of Pasai, the marriage of a Moslem princess to a non-Moslem would be unthinkable without the man turning Moslem. The fact was that trade relations between Pasai and Malacca became more intimate with Malacca depending on Pasai for its rice supply, as the agricultural yield around the area of Malacca was meager. Although the Islamization of Malacca probably started at Pasai, its reinforcement came from India and the Arab world, for by the beginning of the fifteenth century Malacca was already becoming the greatest port of Malaysia.

However, the *Sejarah Melayu* traces the Islamization of Malacca to the missionary work of a certain Sayyid Abdul Aziz, a makhdum from Jiddah. This sayyid is supposed to have converted Rajah Tengah who, as sultan, took the name of Mohammed Shah and who in turn asked his courtiers and subjects to embrace the new religion.[7] The title "Shah" of the sultan suggests some Persian influence. The title, "Sayyid," used by this missionary suggests that

[5] Cf. Ibn Batutta, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

[6] Richard Winsted, *A History of Classical Malay Literature*, (Revised Edition), *JMBRAS*, Vol. 31 Part 3, No. 183, June 1958, p. 71.

[7] Cf. *Sejarah Melayu*, pp. 53-54.

he was an Arab. However, the use of "makhdum" may also suggest that he was an Indian missionary, unless the title was given to Abdul Aziz in retrospect by people already accustomed to using the title for any Moslem scholar or learned man. A way out of this difficulty is the possibility that the makhdum was an Arab who had settled in India.

Malacca, in its glory, became a center to which theologians and scholars flocked. The *Sejarah Melayu* is full of maulanas. During Sultan Mansur Shah's reign, a certain Maulana Abu Bakr arrived by ship with a theological work entitled *Durr ul-Manzum* which was sent to another Makhdum in Pasai for its exposition. The Sultan himself studied with the Maulana Abu Bakr "who highly commended his aptitude and the progress that he made in his studies."[8] Another Makhdum, Sadar Jahan, gave Sultan Mahmud Shah (who ruled Malacca from 1488 to 1511) and his son instruction in religious matters. It was Mahmud Shah who sent an envoy to Pasai for an answer to a theological problem that vexed Moslem theologians in other centers of orthodoxy.[9] To Pasai and Malacca went many Javanese to study the Korean and the Hadiths. In time these Javanese became missionaries themselves. In any case, many of the foreign missionaries in Java came from either Pasai or Malacca which served as their headquarters. According to Schrieke,

> Both in Malacca and in Pasai Persian and Arab Moslems filled an important role as men of learning. . . . Sunan Gunung-Jati (Shaikh Ibn Maulana), who founded Banten and converted Sundanese Java to Islam, came originally from Pasai, while from the period of the religious transition on Java onward many Javanese obtained their religious training there and in Malacca. Questions of mysticism also occupied the minds of many at the court of Mansur Shah (circa 1458-1477) of Malacca. At that time Pasai was still Malacca's oracle in religious matter. Susan Bonang and Susan Giri both received instruction in Malacca. . . .

It is clear then that the provenance of missionary activities in Java was both Pasai and Malacca. With the conversion of many of the rulers of the small coastal principalities of Java, the handwriting on the wall for the eventual downfall of Hindu Majapahit was read by all.

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[8] *Ibid*, p. 100.

[9] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

[10] Schrieke, "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," *op. cit.*, Part 2, pp. 261-262.

According to Raffles who based his reflections on Javanese historical sources, several missionaries established themselves in Eastern Java towards the end of the fourteenth century.[11] Among these was the famous Maulana Malik Ibrahim, a reputed sayyid descended from Zein Al-Abidin, a grandson of the Prophet. He was supposed to be also a cousin of the Rajah of Chermen who attempted to convert a ruler of Majapahit.[12] Maulana Malik Ibrahim died at Grisek in 1419 A.D.[13] The next famous missionary in the Java area was Maulana Ishak from Malacca who married a daughter of the chief of Balambangan.[14] At the beginning of the fifteenth century, Sheik Ibn Maulana (Shaykh Nur-ud-Din Ibrahim, Susunan Gunung Jati) also made a great deal of conversions in the western provinces of Java. His son, too, Maulana Hasanud-Din, was a missionary; and father and son were both reputed to have gone to the court of Menangkabao for a visit[15] as well as to Mecca on a pilgrimage.[16] Another missionary in the eastern coast of Java was Shaykh Maulana Jamadal-Kubra.[17] Judging from the appellation, "maulana," of these religious leaders, it can be inferred that they were either Indians or Arabs originating from Arab settlements in India.

Although Arabs have been stopping at Kedah north of Malacca since the ninth century, it appears that it was only in 1474 that its ruler became a Moslem.[18] The Islamization of the Kedah area is ascribed to the work of an Arab learned man named Shaykh Abdallah.[19]

By the end of the fifteenth century, some of the rulers of the Moluccas had become Moslems. The ruler of Tidor "yielded to the persuasions of an Arab, named Shaykh Mansur, and embraced Islam together with many of his subjects." However, it appears that the Islamization of parts of Borneo and the Moluccas was due more to the work of converted Malaysians than to foreign Moslem traders or learned men.

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[11] Cf. Thomas S. Raffles, *The History of Java*, Vol. II, p. 1.
[12] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 122. Also cf. Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-306.
[13] Cf. Richard Windstedt, *A History of Classical Malay Literature*, p. 71.
[14] Cf. Raffles, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 128 & Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-309.
[15] Cf. Raffles, *o. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 131.
[16] Cf. Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 312.
[17] Cf. Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 308.
[18] Cf. Richard Winstedt, "Notes on the History of Kedah," *JMBRAS*, Vol. XIV, Part 3, December 1936, p. 156.
[19] Cf. Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 300-303.

A Sulu tarsila and oral tradition state that the first missionary that came to Sulu was a certain Sherif Aulia Karim-ul Makhdum who built a mosque at Bwansa. The title, Sharif Aulia, suggests that he was looked upon as a holy man, for "aulia" is a term also used by Filipino Moslems in referring to a sainted man. Although tradition maintains that Karim-ul Makhdum was an Arab, the use of the term, "makhdum," in its religious connotations suggests once more that he might have come from India. However, an oral tradition maintains that he arrived on a junk from the Chinese mainland. Saleeby calculates that Karim-ul Makhdum arrived in the Sulu Archipelago at about 1350 A.D.[20] However, a Moslem tomb in Bud Dato in the island of Jolo carries the date 710 A.H. (or 1310 A.D.) suggesting that Moslem traders or missionaries had already frequented Sulu as early as the beginning of the fourteenth century. It is probable that the first missionaries in Sulu came from Arab settlements in China.

According to Hurgronje, most of the religious leaders or reputedly sainted men of Acheh just like most of her kings were foreign Moslems. The case is similar to that of Java where "many of the greatest walis came from beyond the seas, and were said to be of Arab descent, as shown by their being given the title of *sayyid* or descendants of Husain, the grandson of Mohammed."[21] Actually, it is not inconsistent to assert that the greatest missionaries in Malaysia came directly from India and yet originated from Arabia or were of Arab descent. It will be recalled that the Arabs had large settlements in India. Also, many Indian Moslems have themselves claimed descent from Arab traders and sayyids. Consequently, their being of Arab descent does not deny the possibility that they were also of Indian ancestry or birth. Besides, laying emphasis on one's ancestry with the race of the Prophet is a common phenomenon.

The fall of Malacca and the coming of the Portuguese and later

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[20] Cf. Saleeby, Najeeb. *The History of Sulu*, pp. 149-150, p. 153, and pp. 158-159.

[21] Hurgronje, *The Achenese*, Vol. p. 292. As noted above, Filipino Moslems, like the Achenese, use the plural "aulia" for *wali* and apply it to holy men. Hurgronje is quite technical when he designates the descendants of Husain as sayyids. Some Arabs reserve the title sherif for the descendants of Hassan, the brother of Hussain, while reserving the title sayyid for the descendants of Hussain. To other Moslems, sayyid and sherif are interchangeable while others viz., in the Philippines, use both titles simultaneously to designate a descendant of the Prophet.

the Dutch, did not radically stop the coming of the Moslem traders from both India and the Arab lands. Although in time there would be a lessening in the influx of Arab traders to Indonesia, some of them were until the eighteenth century still clever and shrewd enough to compete with other foreign traders. But what is important to note is that the fall of Malacca brought about an influx of Moslem learned men to Sumatra and Java.[22] This could have increased religious or missionary fervor. If this were so, then the fall of Malacca parallels that of Baghdad in its religious consequences.

Foreign Moslem missionaries gained a new ally among the converted native population. For a time, the missionary activities of the Javanese existed side by side with that of the non-Malaysian Moslems but eventually it supplanted the latter to a large extent. As early as 1332 Javanese traders frequented Ternate for cloves and by 1495 they had already established settlements on this island.[23] It is clear that the Javanese played an important role in the spice trade. It appears that, in general, the Javanese traders got products from the Moluccas and then brought them to Malacca although after the fall of Malacca other ports began to serve as collecting places for these products. The Arab and Indian traders would then bring these products to India, Aden and Red sea ports. Consequently, foreign Moslem and Javanese traders complemented one another in this international trade in an indispensable manner. There is enough evidence to support the contention that Javanese trade and attempts at conversion went hand in hand.[24] Once the people of the Moluccas had become converted, some of the payment to the Javanese preachers would be in terms of cloves at around 5 1/2 lbs. per student.[25]

A center of missionary activity in East Java was Bantem. By the seventeenth century it had become a center of Islamic learning, a role which Acheh had to play after the fall of Malacca. One of Bantem's sultans, Abu'n-Nazar Abd-al-Qahhar (Sultan Hadji) went to Mecca twice. One of the highest religious functionaries in his court was an Arab named "Saeyt Seach" (Sayyid Shaikh?).[26]

Granting that a great deal of credit belongs to Javanese traders

[22] Cf. Richard Winstedt, *A History of Classical Malay Literature*, p. 112.
[23] John Crawford, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 148.
[24] Cf. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 488.
[25] For the religious instruction of Islam in Ambon by Javanese missionaries, cf. Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," *op. cit.*, Part 1, pp. 33-35.
[26] Cf. "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," *Ibid.*, Part 2, p. 242.

in the work of conversion in the Moluccas and Borneo, the role of Sumatra must also be considered. According to Crawford, the principal agents in the conversion of Macassar were from Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, and "the most renowned (was) *Khatib Tungal*, a native of Menangkabao, commonly known by the name of Datu Bandang."[27] The shift in missionary activity from the Arab or Indian sayyid to the Javanese or Indonesian *khatib* is significant.

A Sulu tarsila describes how Rayh Baginda, a prince from Menangkabao, travelled to the Philippine islands of Mindanao and Basilan, finally landing in Sulu to establish a principality. He was reputed to have been a Moslem and he came to live among a people which had already been exposed to some of the practices of Islam. This event is calculated to have taken place by the end of the fourteenth century; not much later after the arrival of the Sherif Aulia Karim-ul Makhdum.[28] This narration suggests that Islamic influences in the Philippines had also come from Sumatra.

Once part of the Moluccas had been islamized, the reinforcement of Islam in Mindanao is traced to it. It is interesting to note that in a pitched battle between Spanish soldiers and Moslems in Mindanao, Moslems from the Moluccas were involved, as there were alliances between the sultanate of Ternate and that of Magindanao. One of the dead was "from Terrenate and was a *casis* (*ghazi?*) who instructed them in their religion."[29] However, the provenance of Islam in the other islands of the Philippines, principally Luzon, is Borneo. Bornean traders and preachers were constantly coming to and from Manila which was growing to be a strong Moslem coastal principality by the beginning of the sixteenth century. Actually, the reigning chiefs of Manila were relatives of the sultans of Brunei. Raja Soliman, one of the Manila chiefs who fiercely resisted Legaspi, was reputed to have been in Brunei and to have been a nephew of one of the Brunei sultans. Seif ul-Rijal (the Spanish Sultan Lixar), whose capital of Brunei was attacked twice by the Spaniards in 1577 and 1580, was either an uncle or a cousin of Rajah Soliman. The Governor of the Philippines, Francisco de Sande, writing to the King of Spain in June 7, 1576, maintained that it was the Bornean Moslems

[27] John Crawford, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 385.

[28] Cf. Najeeb Saleeby, *The History of Sulu*, pp. 150, 153, & 159.

[29] "Pacification of Mindanao (letter from Juan de Ronquillo to Governor Tello, May 10, 1957)," Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, 1593-1597, Vol. IX, p. 284.

who were preaching the doctrines of Islam in the country. However, he also revealed that the subjection of the sultan of Acheh might prevent his sending of Moslem preachers.[30]

According to Antonio de Morga (who lived in the Philippines from 1595 to 1603), a few years before the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines, traders from Borneo were constantly coming to Manila and Tondo in Luzon and the inhabitants of Borneo and Luzon were inter-marrying. The traders brought with them preachers or missionaries (*gazizes*) who taught the people the short prayers and basic ceremonies of Islam to the extent that the chiefs in Manila and Tondo were becoming Moslems and taking Moslem names. Were it not for the timely arrival of the Spaniards, according to Morga, Islam would have spread throughout the entire Philippines. To uproot it then would have been difficult, for it would have become as well established as it was in Sulu and part of Mindanao where the natives "are nearly all Moslems, guided and instructed by their *gazizes* and *morabitos*, who come to preach and continuously teach them, from the straits of Mecca and the Red Sea, from whence they travel to these islands."[31] Morga intimated that the Islamization of Sulu and Mindanao had its sources in Arabia while the Islamization of Luzon, of Manila in particular, had its origin in Borneo. That Islam in Luzon came from Borneo was testified to by Magat-China, a petty chief who hailed from the southern part of Luzon and who was interviewed by Spanish authorities around 1578. According to the Magat, he had heard the preaching of Islam by Borneans and seen a copy of the Holy Koran. He also testified that he had heard his relatives tell "how in former times the king of Borney had sent preachers of the sect of Mohamad to Cebu, Oton, Manila, and other districts, so that the people there might be instructed in it as were those of Borney. And. . . in his own time, has heard the said doctrine preached in Balayan, by a Moro regarded among them as a priest, by name of Siat Saen."[32]

In general, there is an analogy between the spread of Islam to Western Malaysia by non-Malaysian Moslems and the spread of Islam

[30] Cf. "Relation of the Filipinas Islands," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 66.

[31] *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* (Edited by W. Retana 1910) pp. 198. Also cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

[32] "Expeditions to Borneo, Jolo, and Mindanao, (Francisco de Sande, and others: April 13, 1578 to June 10, 1579)," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 151

to Eastern Malaysia by the Javanese and other Malaysian converts. However, it must be emphasized that whereas Islam was propagated peaceably in the former, the element of coercion was not entirely absent in the latter. As will be discussed later, the Islamization process in the latter case was fraught with greater political overtones. As Van Leur put it:

> The most interesting of the things taking place in East Indonesia around 160[illegible] was the missionary activity of Islam. The expansion of Islam into that 'farther East' was something emanating from the Javanese traders, who were there truly as pedlar missionaries. The youth and thus their families were pushed toward the new doctrine *via* what must have been very defective instruction in the religion and the holy tongue Arabic. What is more important in this connection is that with the process the authority of the nobility remained the same—more strongly put, the Islamization took place under its protection. . .[33]

Van Leur's remarks about the activities of Javanese "pedlar missionaries" in the Moluccas and other islands near Java are also applicable to the activities of Bornean "pedlar missionaries" in Luzon and possibly Mindoro and some Visayan islands in the Phiilippines. Missionary activities of Bornean traders in Manila and other coastal towns were under the patronage of the Bornean sultans and were, therefore, accompanied to some extent by political motives.

3. *Possible Sufi Influence in the Conversion of Malaysia*

An interesting and important amendment to the missionary theory has been presented by A. H. Jones. First of all, Jones rejects the widespread and common contention that Islam was preached by Moslem traders and sailors, for this hypothesis "involves too high a degree of psychological improbability to be tenable."[1] Jones' thesis is that members of Sufi orders facilitated the conversion of Malaysian especially in the urban areas. Noting that while Arab and other Moslem merchants had been visiting Indonesia regularly from the eighth century, no Islamic community of note appeared until the thirteenth century, he suggested that this was because Sufism and the Sufi orders did not play an important and dominant role till after

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[33] Van Leur, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[1] A. H. Jones, "Sufism as a category in Indonesian Literature and History," *Journal Southeast Asian History*, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 1961, p. 14.

the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in the middle of the thirteenth century.[2] The Sufi teachers who presented themselves to the Indonesians were characterized as follows: they were wandering preachers originating from all over the Islamic world and who belonged to or were associated with certain *tarikats*, depending on their craft or trade. They had some knowledge of "magic" and the art of healing. Furthermore, they taught a "complex syncretic theosophy largely familiar to the Indonesians" that they made subordinate to the fundamental doctrines of Islam. In this manner the Sufi teachers "were prepared to preserve continuity with the past, and to use the terms and elements of pre-Islamic culture in an Islamic context."[3]

On the interpretation of data from the *Sedjarah Banten* and the *Babad Tanah Djawa*, Jones asserted that the introduction of Islam to Java was done by travelling teachers of the Sufi type. These teachers "by virtue of their charismatic authority and magical power, were able to marry the daughters of Indonesian nobility, and thus gave their children the prestige of royal blood, in addition to the divine aura of religious charisma".[4] Jones warns the reader that these teachers belonged to orders or confraternities that were at that time not ascetic or "escapist institutions" but rather a sophisticated urban phenomena that played a distinct role in the centers of the Muslim international trade, at least till the end of the eighteenth century.[5] Jones summary of and conclusions on his thesis are as follows:

i. Islam did not take root in Indonesia until the rise of the Sufi orders, and the quickening tempo of the development of Indonesian Islam subsequent to the 13th century is in the main due to the labors of the Sufi missionaries.

ii. The Sufi teachers visiting Indonesia were of various nationalities, being participants in a vast circular pattern of religious peregrination, a pattern in which the Indonesians soon took part. The Indonesian sources are reliable in this respect. The comment then, that Java was converted from Malacca needs considerable qualification.

iii. These religious teachers found in the Indonesian countries people with much the same level of spiritual and material culture as themselves.

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[2] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.
[5] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

iv. The Sufis were prepared to base their teaching on the cultural forms and traditions already existing in Indonesia, albeit excluding or reinterpreting what was incompatible with the basic doctrines of Islam.

v. The Sufi Muslims, affiliated to the various mystical orders and under the direction of their Shaikhs during this early period of Islamic development in Java constituted an important element in the economic and political structure of the city.[6]

It is substantially correct to assert that the destruction of the Baghdad Caliphate in 1258 did not in any manner prevent the expansion of the abode of Islam. The destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols was not as tragic to the fortunes of Islam as it was viewed by many at the time. Even before the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate, its eventual dissolution was anticipated or, rather, its unifying role was already being questioned. The world of Islam during the fall of the Caliphate was already divided in various sultanates and petty kingdoms whose rulers could disregard the orders of the Caliph with impunity. When a sultan requested the confirmation of his position by the Caliph, it was merely a gesture of concession to tradition. The political decline of the Caliphate began centuries before its destruction by the Mongols. Consequently, Moslem thinkers were already making a distinction between the functions of an imam from those of a sultan. Before Baghdad fell it was already contended that "It is the duty of the imam to concern himself with the khutba and the prayers, which the temporal rulers are engaged in protecting, and which are the best of works and the highest offices, but to commit the sovereignty (pádisháhi) to sultans and leave worldly rule to their authority."[7] Other Moslem thinkers maintained that there was no canonical limitation to the number of imams.

This digression is intended to emphasize that to counteract the possible setback to the religious spread of Islam resulting from the political fragmentation of Islam and its concommitant weakening of the Caliphate, the Sufi orders or confraternities assumed a vital role. In brief, the Sufi orders were to achieve by other means what the Caliphate partially attained in terms of its political prestige and coercive power. To put it in another way, the missionary activities of the Sufis represented an attempt, conscious or otherwise, to make

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[7] Rawandi, *Raht al-Sudur*. Quoted from Hamilton Gibb, "Constitutional Organization," Law in the Middle East, p. 22.

for the political decline of the Islamic world, which could have implied at that time the reduction of the territorial gains of Islam. To be mentioned, too, is that the fall of Baghdad brought about an influx of Moslem divines to India and other parts of the Islamic world. This could have brought about a missionary ferment.

Although initially there was bound to be a conflict between the scholars and the legalists of the Moslem West on one hand and the apparently unorthodox *tarikats* on the other, which essentially represented a conflict between the Shari'a and Mysticism, the decline of the Caliphate and a reversal of Islamic political fortunes justified the existence of the *tarikats*. These kept the flame of Islam alive. As Al-Ghazali, Islam's theologian *par excellence*, himself contended, the death of the imamate did not imply the giving up of the Islamic way of life.[8] Al-Ghazali was arguing that the powers-that-be had to be acknowledged regardless of the decline of the Caliphate, as long as the Islamic way of life could be preserved. Although he was looking at the problem from the point of view of a jurisprudential philosopher, the Sufis in their own organized mystical manner were preserving and propagating the Islamic way of life.

The shift from political methods for the propagation of Islam to persuasive peaceful ones can be appreciated especially in Spain when it became evident that the territories lost to the Christians could not be recovered anymore. To prevent further loss of territory, volunteers were stationed in fortified places (*ribats*) on the frontier. The fighters for Islam, the jihadists (*mujabid*) were now called *ghazis* or *murabits*. This was true in Spain when Islam was on the defensive. After the fourteenth century, these *ribats* were transformed into religious confraternities or houses. The term *murabit* or *marabout*, in North Africa, then came to signify a saint or holy man. Antonio de Morga, writing at the end of the sixteenth century, used the terms *gazizes* (*ghasis*) and *morabites* in the latter sense, that is, as missionaries or religious functionaries to refer to Burmean preachers who went to Luzon, especially Manila. He did not intend to refer to them as warriors which was the original connotation of the terms during the Islamic era in Spain.

The contention of Jones that the Moslem missionaries in Java

[8] Cf. Gustave E. von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation*, p. 168.

after the fourteenth century were Sufis or were at least strongly influenced by Sufi teaching is quite plausible. Definitely, some of the problems discussed by Moslem divines in Pasai and Malacca were essentially those belonging to mysticism. Sufi influence cannot, therefore, be ignored. In any case, mystical doctrines of Sufi tradition became quite common in Acheh at the beginning of the seventeenth century.[9] Incidentally, oral tradition in the Moslem south of the Philippines supports the view that the first Arabs or missionaries who landed there were familiar with "magic" and other superhuman activities. Spanish historians, principally Combes, mention the beliefs of Filipino Moslems regarding the superhuman qualities of the early sherifs.[10]

As Jones had correctly pointed out, the claim that Java was converted from Malacca needs qualification. It might be more accurate to state that Malacca, as pointed out above, was rather an headquarters or stopping place for missionaries. Indeed, the *Sejarah Melayu* is explicit in stating that its maulanas or makhdums (makhdumin) were foreign Moslems from "above the winds." However, Jones' reflection that the Sufi teachers were of the same spiritual and material cultural level as the inhabitants of Indonesia is problematical. It might have been the case that among the heathen populations, the recognition was universal that the foreign teachers or traders represented a higher form of culture and civilization. This is at least true in the Philippines. That the foreign teachers were willing to accommodate indigenous beliefs, provided that they did not contradict the basic tenets of Islam, as Jones maintains, is quite acceptable. The fact that the different *adats* have survived in spite of the tendency of Islam to penetrate into details of everyday life shows the acceptance of some form of diversity in Islamic culture. However, it must be mentioned that the initial requirements for one to become a member of the Islamic community are not very diifficult; although it is expected that in time the convert should run the difficult gauntlet of all the pillars of Islam. History has demonstrated that the Islamization of whole communities had been a gradual process characterized by a lessening of indigenous religious beliefs in proportion to greater commitments to Islamic ideo-

[9] Cf. A. H. Jones, *Malay Sufism, JMBRAS*, Vol. XXX, Part 2, No. 178 (entire number), for the nature of Sufi influences in Indonesia.

[10] Francisco Combes, *Historia de Mindanao y Sulu* (new edition edited by Retana) pp. 44-45.

logy. An acculturation process is certainly still going on in the Islamic community in the Philippines and in other parts of Malaysia. The view that the mystical qualities of Sufi doctrines have made Islam more acceptable to those Indonesians who where already exposed to some forms of Hindu pantheism is, though difficult to prove, psychologically tenable.

Finally, that Moslems (whether Sufis or not) constituted an "important element in the economic and political structure of the city" is adequately supported by facts. Even if the Sufis themselves were not traders, they were closely associated with their trader countrymen who wielded economic power in all the coastal principalities. With the conversion of the rulers, Moslem scholars and scribes attached to the courts acquired political power. The refusal of Mahmud Shah, the last Moslem ruler of Malacca, to deal peaceably with the Portuguese is attributed to the preachings of "cacizes" who made long sermons to the Sultan regarding the matter.[11] According to Pires, too, the mullahs counselled the Sultan not to make peace but to resist the Portuguese "for as India was already in the hands of the Portuguese, Malacca should not pass to the infidels."[12]

With the firmer establishment of Islam throughout a great part of Malaysia a corresponding reverence for the memory of early missionaries increased and their tombs became holy places. Their position of honor and prestige would now be inherited by the learned among the native population constituted into an *ulema*. During wars the help of the *ulema* would be invoked, a practice which should normally increase their power. Any war against foreigners or heathen tribes in the interior could be declared as a holy war (*jihad*) against infidels. Regardless of whether they could be used as tools by the rulers, they would in turn remind the ruler of his holy duties and obligations to the Faith. Certainly, in Islam it is both an individual and collective duty to defend its frontiers from non-Moslems. And among peoples who have recently embraced Islam, the crusading spirit has always been noteworthy.

Although it has been pointed out constantly that Islam is not a sacerdotal religion, it is not entirely true that in Islam there have not been individuals who have on their own initiative or on the encouragement of others dedicated their life completely to the propagation of

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[11] Cf. *Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque*, Vol. III, p. 69.
[12] *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 280.

the Faith. Indeed, there have been many whose lives have been entirely dedicated to the development of Islamic scholarship, religious confraternities, Koranic schools, or the activities of the mosque. All of them are in effect potential missionaries. This means that the charisma of religion in Islam is not confined to a definite priestly class. According to Van Leur, Islam has remained a missionary community. "Because of the expansive, missionary nature of Islam, every Moslem is after all a propagandist of the faith. That is why the trader from the Moslem world was the most common 'missionary' figure in foreign regions. That is why in this case the faith was certain to follow the route of trade."[13] However, Van Leur's comments must be qualified. As pointed out above, Islam has had its professional missionaries. But this is not to mean that non-professional missionaries have not affected conversions. A limitation of the missionary theory is that it emphasizes the role of professional missionaries too much as if all conversions were made by them. To deny non-members of the *ulema*, religious confraternities and other religious agencies some role in conversions is to disregard the possibility of ordinary devout or zealous Moslems of knowing their Faith well enough to follow the Koranic prescription for preaching the precepts of Islam. It is enough to recall the following Koranic verse: "And say unto those who have received the Scripture and those who read not: Have ye (too) surrendered? If they surrender, then truly they are rightly guided, and if they turn away, then it is thy duty only to convey the message (unto them),"[14] and "Are the messengers charged with aught save plain conveyance (of the message) ?"[15] It cannot be assumed that these verses were followed only by a professional group.

Actually, the missionary theory complements the trader theory. As attested by Portuguese historians and travellers, the Muslim professional missionaries accompanied or followed the Moslem traders. And this is not to deny that conversions had possibly been made by the traders on account of either Koranic prescriptions or other motives.

Although it can explain to a great extent the increase of conversions among the rulers in close contact with Moslems and part of the native populations, the missionary theory cannot again be

[13] *Op. Cit.*, p. 114.

[14] From *The Glorious Koran* (tr. Mohammed M. Pickthall), Surah III, 20.

[15] *Ibid.*, Surah XVI, 35.

the whole explanation. At least two elements must be considered: the receptivity of the rulers to conversion and their interest in having others follow their adopted faith, and the receptivity of the native populations in accepting it. The first, as already suggested, points out to political and economic elements involved in the conversion. The latter suggests that Islam must have had a quality that made it attractive to the peoples of Malaysia, or rather that it satisfied some expectations or needs of the people.

The Political Theory

Making allowance for the persuasive attempts of pious traders or inspired preachers, which might have brought about some individual conversions, it would be interesting to analyze whether the the rulers had, over and above the satisfaction of spiritual needs, other motives in adopting the new Faith. The question is whether the rulers of the coastal principalities had political benefits to gain from the conversion. Noting, with the proponents of the missionary theory, that whereas Moslem traders have been found in great numbers in Malaysia as early as the ninth century, the conversion of the rulers of Sumatra began at the end of the thirteenth century while that of Java began at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Yet since trade was constant all throughout these centuries beginning even before the ninth century, trade could not, therefore, have been the decisive factor in the conversion of the natives to Islam. As Van Leur has stated, "The trade of the Moslems was no more directly related to the conquests of Islam in southeast Asia than Indian trade has been related to the expansion of Brahmanic culture there."[1] Actually Van Leur's thesis and analysis, although intended to be applicable primarily to Indonesia, can also be used if valid, to explain the spread of Islam in the other principalities of Malaysia. First of all, Van Leur considers as "historically and sociologically irresponsible" the contention referring to Hinduism and for that matter to Islam, that initially there were colonies of these religious groups out of which a ruler sprang and reigned over an area. What is necessary, according to Van Leur, is to drop this "colonization hypothesis" and consider "the Indonesian ruler on Java as a person who had royal investiture conferred on him—what a powerful sacral

[1] Van Leur, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

legitimization in the eyes of persons coming overseas from India, in the eyes of strangers and perhaps of southern Indian rulers:—and a mythological Indian genealogy assigned to him by the Indian priesthood. . . ."[2] By analogy, Van Leur's thesis is that the Moslem traders served to legitimize the independence of the petty chiefs from a central authority or simply to initiate or establish a new dynasty. Those legitimizing the rule of the prince and the ruler himself are viewed as partners in the exploitation of the agrarian population and in the control of the international trade. Regarding the times when the Indian priesthood was established in Indonesia, Van Leur commented:

> The ruler, for his part, guaranteed the existence of the hierocracy. And authority and hierocracy, both of them based on the power to exploit the Indonesian agrarian civilization and/or international trade dominated early Indonesian history politically and culturally.[3]

By analogy, the argument of Van Leur when applied to the Moslem traders would appear as follows: The ruler would guarantee the economic position and privilege of the Moslems while these, in turn, would accept and support the rule or dynasty of the ruler and deal or share with it in all economic ventures. It is very clear, too, that both the Moslems and rulers profited from such a system.

> Commercial and other motives of Gujarati Moslems regarding the trade of the Javanese ports and the lords of the trade there, the Javanese patriciate; political motives of that patriciate regarding the international trade and the government of Madjapahit—those two factors together brought about the Islamization of Indonesia.[4]

Van Leur's thesis that the Islamization of Indonesia was determined at every stage of its development by "political situations and political motives" can be interpreted as having been manifested by at least three historical transformations which took place in Malaysia. The first refers to the Islamization of Malacca. The second deals with the revolt of the coastal principalities against Majapahit. The third has to do with the legitimatization of the newly established dynasties.

According to Van Leur, the Malacca dynasty adopted Islam

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 109.
[3] *Ibid*, p. 109.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

and used it as a political instrument against Indian trade—in which the Moslem trade from the ports of northwest India was at that time taking a chief position,—against Siam and China, and against the Hindu regime on Java. The ruler was thus assured of the backing of powerful allies in the west and was given admittance to the unity of Islam, the political influence of which was then expanding into Indonesia."[5] In brief, the Malacca rulers became Moslems to get the patronage of the Moslem merchants who were ousting the Hindus from the trade.

The second point is that the coastal chiefs and the aristocratic families in their conflict with the central authority of Majapahit utilized Islam as a political instrument in order to secure independence from or exercise authority over the domains of Majapahit. "Like the dynasty of Malacca, but for Javanese political motives, the aristocratic communities striving upwards accepted Islam out of opposition to the Hindu central authority."[6]

Actually, two events, among others, accelerated the decline of Majapahit: First, the rise of Malacca as one of the greatest Moslem emports and, second, the expansion of Islam in Java. According to the historian Moorhead, as the empire of Majapahit became weaker and it started to lose its power to command obedience from its subjects, a number of little states were formed especially in the northern seaboard. The needy princes of these principalities married the daughters of wealthy Moslem merchants who called from Malacca. These princes became converted to Islam and by 1920 they had destroyed the Shaiva-Buddhist state of Majapahit.[7] It might be more accurate to state that the growing wealth of the rulers of the coastal principalities and their concommittant disobedience to the central authority of Majapahit signified, in effect, the progressive weakening of Majapahit. And the wealth of these rulers came from an alliance by marriage with the Moslem traders and the patronage of the latter, who, also, in their own manner, were benefiting from the alliance.

Now, just how Islam could have contributed further to the downfall of Majapahit in a manner consistent with Van Leur's thesis can be formulated. First of all, Islam had always legitimized

[5] Ibid., p. 112.
[6] Ibid., p. 113.
[7] Cf. op. cit., p. 115.

a war against idolaters and there was nothing to prevent the coastal chiefs from conveniently viewing Majapahit as such. It will be recalled that according to Javanese traditional history, Raden Patheh was supported in his war against Majapahit by Moslem divines closely associated with him.[8]

Once the rulers had become Moslems, their distinction as Moslems from the other unbelievers in the interior or the other islands became more prominent. To the Malayan traders on the coasts of Borneo and Celebes, "the chapter on the spreading of the Holy Word was one of the most interesting parts of the Koran. If directed against pagans, the propagation of the faith by the sword was not only justifiable but even highly laudable. This was a wonderful expedient, to combine piety and piracy, and the petty kings on Sumatra's north coast grasped the opportunity."[9] Certainly, that the new converts used force in some cases to speed up the Islamization of Malaysia cannot be entirely denied. Actually, part of the Islamization of the islands of Malaysia was under the protection of newly converted rulers or their descendants. Thus, the political motive cannot be entirely discounted.[10]

The third aspect of Van Leur's theory which maintains that Islam was utilized as a tool to bring about a confirmation or establishment of the legitimacy of the rulers interested in establishing their own dynasties or rationalizing their disavowal of the claims of Majapahit's sovereignty over them is quite valid. This aspect is closely related to the second in that Moslem scribes and leaders would justify the actions of the converted rulers against idolatrous Majapahit. However, the legitimacy aspect can be developed further than what Van Leur originally anticipated or cared to elaborate. What is meant in particular is that the converted rulers claimed that their power to rule came from Islamic sources. It will be recalled that in the *Sejarah Melayu* it is related that Shaikh Ismail brought with him royal regalia from Mecca given by Sherif of Mecca for the ruler of Samudra. It was with this regalia that Merah Silu was installed as sultan with the name of Malik al-Saleh.[11] Similarly, the Brunei sultans are supposed to have received their regalia from Johore (Malacca?) when the first Moslem sultan, Paduka Sri Sultan

[8] Raffles, *History of Java*, Vol. II, p. 135.

[9] Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago* p. 72.

[10] Cf. Van Leur, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[11] Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 41-43.

Muhammed, was converted to Islam.[12]

The studies of Schrieke have borne out the fact that it was quite common among rulers of dubious or non-royal descent to let their court historians "smooth out genealogical irregularities," for "Descent was the proof of legitimacy par excellence."[13] Along with claims of descent from Alexander the Great, a great deal of rulers have claimed descent from the Prophet himself. It is not a coincidence that the founders of the sultanates of Sulu and Mindanao were claimed by their descendants to have been sherifs. The Brunei *Selasilah* claims that the third sultan was also a descendant of the Prophet.

All this is not to deny the possibility of genuine descent from the Prophet among Malaysian ruling families, but this simply demonstrates that descent from the Prophet can be used as an argument for legitimacy in so far as ruling is concerned. In Islamic jurisprudence, such a claim for legitimacy is based on the expectation that should a ruler have religious functions it was preferable that he should belong to the family of the Quraysh in accordance with a saying attributed to the Prophet that "The imams are of Quraysh."[14]

Economic Aspect of the Political Theory

Since political power is closely intertwined with economic power, it would be interesting to investigate further into some of the possible political and economic relations between the Moslem traders and the petty rulers. To begin with, the rulers of the coastal principalities had themselves become, if not traders themselves, beneficiaries of the taxes imposed on merchandise coming to their ports. Consequently, their economic power was largely dependent on the smooth progress of the international trade. For example, Malacca depended entirely on trade for its prosperity. As long as the area around it was not suited to or developed for agricultural purposes, and as long as she depended on Pasai and other places for rice and other agricultural products, trade was her main life source. The petty

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[12] H. R. Hughes-Hallet, "A Sketch of the History of Brunei," *JMBRAS*, Vol. XXVIII, Part ii, August 1940, p. 26.

[13] Schrieke, "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 13.

[14] Quoted from Hamilton Gibb, "Constitutional Organization," *Law in the Middle East*, p. 9.

coastal chief, too, could control to a great extent the traffic of merchandise through his territory, or he could even be the major native trader of the area. In his enterprises, too, he could have the cooperation or backing of the wealthy Moslem traders who might by now be related to him by blood or marriage. The Moslem trader appeared as one who had to some extent possible command of some of the resources of the Moslem state to which he belonged. Facts demonstrate that after the coming of the Portuguese, the Moslem traders were able to induce their respective sultans to help Acheh contain Portuguese power in the area. It can be assumed that the ruler of the coastal principality in Java could, under certain circumstances, count on the wealth and resources of sympathetic Moslem traders. This can explain, to some extent, the inevitable fall of Majapahit.

What is just as important to emphasize is that the Moslem traders could, in effect, build or break any port by means of extending or witholding their patronage. Or, at least, the strengthening of a port as a *pied a terre* needed the sympathy, if not some cooperation of other Moslem principalities. An illustration of this second point is narrated by Pires regarding how Iskandar Shah, the first ruler of Malacca, wanted part of the Java trade that went to Pasai. The sultan of Pasai is reported to have consented to this arrangement hoping that the ruler of Malacca would become Moslem. With the ensuing friendly relations between the two rulers, Moslem traders, including Arab merchants, moved from Pasai to Malacca, bringing with them their mullahs who were principally Arabs. Iskandar Shah was reported pleased with these rich Moslem merchants, honoring them and allowing them to build a mosque. Malacca was then on its way to becoming a prosperous emporium. The Moslem traders and mullahs tried to convert the Malacca ruler, and this was the great desire of the Pasai sultan. "The said king *Xaquem Darza* did in fact come to want to establish the said priests and to like them. When this news came, the said king of Pase, on the advise of the priests he had sent there, secretly sent others of greater authority to impose upon him and turn him away from his race and heathenry and to convert him, and this by underhand means and not publicly."[1] Before Malacca had been turned into an important port of call by the Moslem traders, Pasai was their major *pied a terre* in the Straits. It is hardly credible that Ma-

[1] Tomé Pires, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 239-241.

Malacca would have arrived at the heights it did in the face of insistent opposition from Islamic Pasai. How Islam was also used for political motives is further suggested by Pires when he wrote of how Sultan Muzzafer Shah of Malacca who reigned from 1445 to 1459, "by secret means. . . found a way through his priest to induce important men from the coastal districts to turn Moors, and these are now pates."[2] Making allowance for some religious zeal on the part of the Sultan, the conversion of the petty coastal chiefs of northwest Java signified that they were prevented from being used by the ruler of Majapahit to attack Malacca.[3]

The refusal of Sultan Mahmud Shah to make peace with the Portuguese, a refusal partly caused by the preaching of the mullahs, can be further interpreted as also due to the influence of the Moslem traders. According to the *Commentaries of Dalboquerque*, the shahbander of the Gujeratis told the sultan not to befriend the Portuguese as these, besides belonging to another religion, would compete with them in matters of trade and attempt to drive them out of it.[4]

The action of the shahbander impliedly carried with it a veiled threat that the lack of cooperation from the sultan would make the Moslem traders go elsewhere. In the same manner that the Moslem merchants left Calicut and departed for other ports when Portuguese influence was felt there, Malacca was for all practical purposes abandoned when it fell to the Portuguese in 1511.

It was not just discrimination against Moslem traders and the encouragement of Hindu trade in Malacca that led the Moslems to change their headquarters as Schrieke maintains. North Sumatra was still a bastion of Islam and the Moslems would naturally revert to it once more as their *pied a terre*. The Portuguese prediction, may, wish, that with the fall of Malacca, Pasai would become tributary to it, failed to materialize. In 1524, Acheh eliminated the vestiges of Portuguese influence in Pasai and annexed it. However, Pires, writing around 1515 already noticed the shift of Moslem patronage from Malacca to Pasai.

> And now, since Malacca has been punished and Pedir is at war, the kingdom of Pase is becoming prosperous, rich, with many merchants from many dif-

[2] Ibid., p. 245.
[3] Compare *Ibid.*, p. 253.
[4] Cf. *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 69-70.

> ferent Moorish and Kling nations, who do a great deal of trade, among whom the most important are the Bengalees. There are Rumes, Turks, Arabs, Persians Gujaratees, Kling, Malays, Javanese and Siamese.[5]

The expansion of the kingdom of Acheh with its inclusion of Pasai and its utilization by the Moslem merchants as their "chief station in the intermediary trade of the Mohammedans of western Asia and India with the Indonesian Archipelago"[6] increased its prosperity and material strength. For many years Acheh posed a genuine and continuous threat to Portuguese rule at Malacca assaulting the city in 1537, 1551, and 1547. And in its conflict with the Portuguese, the resources of the Moslem traders became indispensable. By the end of the sixteenth century they were able to induce the Sultan of Egypt to send mercenaries who knew the use of firearms.

> Achin, then, was during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries one of the main channels through which spiritual life on Java was given nourishment from Moslem India and the Holy Land, thus strengthening Moslem inclinations there. As the center of religious study it owed its influence to its position as a crossroads of Moslem trade. It was under the influence of the court scholars that Achin came to enjoy a certain renown from the frequency with which the *hadd* punishments prescribed by Moslem scholarly laws were inflicted, and under their influence that there, as well as at the court of Demak heretics were hunted down.[7]

Acheh, too, became the stopping place for nearly all the pilgrims to Mecca from Malaysia. It was with pride that the Achenese called their country "The gate of the Holy Land."[8] In the propagation of Islam, Malacca had already served its purpose.

There is enough evidence to show that the sultans of Brunei had a direct interest in converting the natives of Luzon and nearby islands to Islam. The testimony of Magat-China before Governor Sande testifies to this. This point is that the Bornean traders were frequenting the ports in the Visayas and northern Mindanao and beginning to control their trade. And if the pattern of Islamization in Malaysia is considered, the coastal chiefs of these places would have eventually turned Moslems as they began to depend greatly on Bornean trade. Actually some of these coastal chiefs did not

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[5] Tomé Pires, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

[6] Schrieke, "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," *op. cit.*, Part 1, p. 44.

[7] "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," *Ibid.*, Part 2, pp. 248-249.

[8] Snouck Hurgronje, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 19.

want to alienate the Bornean traders, probably for the very reason that they could have been ignored or bypassed by the Moslem Bornean traders. In brief, the economic relations between the Moslem traders and the coastal rulers is paralleled by the relation between the converted Bornean rulers and the Filipino chieftains.

Emphasis on the political and economic motives involved in the spread of Islam would lead one to assert, as Van Leur clearly does, that the spread of Islam was "exclusively an affair of the aristocracy, the people in political power."[9] But this precisely points out a limitation of the political and economic theory. It cannot explain in what manner Islam began to have a popular and mass appeal. The political theory can explain how the rulers became converted and why they would like their subjects to follow the new faith also. However, it is likely that once the ruler adopted the faith, a great number of his courtiers and subjects would follow suit. This justifies the assertion that the conversion of the ruler is equivalent to the conversion of the principality and region. However, unless one is ready to assert dogmatically that the subjects also accepted Islam on purely political motives, it is necessary to study the factors among the population that made them, in general, embrace Islam readily. The major criticism against Van Leur's theory was presented by professor Syed Hussein Alatas in that Van Leur's theory implied that Islam represented only a thin glaze on Indonesian indigenous civilization. Van Leur and others, including Hurgronje, have failed, according to Alatas, to note that Islam has an "individuality of its own" and that, therefore, it served to satisfy some of the deep aspirations of the people. That people who had already been exposed to the relatively high Hindu and Buddhistic civilizations began to adopt Islam demonstrates that either the old religions had failed to keep up with deep aspirations or that the new faith brought new values and promised them something novel and worthwhile. That tribes also abandoned their idols and animistic beliefs for the new faith, as happened in the Philippines needs some explanation, too. And it is wise to consider that many of the converted populations did not have a direct economic stake in the trade as the rulers did. Without entirely disregarding the contributions of the political theory, it is necessary to go to other theories that can in their own special manner explain the spread of

[9] Van Leur, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

Islam, not so much among the rulers, but among the native peoples.

6. *Theory of Islam's ideological worth*

In his attempt at a reconstruction of Malaysian history and defense for a need in assigning a definite period for the Islamization of Malaysia as an important period in its history, Professor Syed Hussein Alatas has shown quite well that this period has been quite neglected. Every time it has been dealt with, it was with reference to either the decline of Majapahit or the coming of colonialism or used as a reference in the study of present day Islamic institutions. In effect, most of these approaches have tended to disregard the idea that Islam is possessed "with an individuality of its own." Furthermore, they do not consider, according to Professor Alatas, Kern's observation that the spread of Islam in Malaysia during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was a revolution from within. Rejecting the contention that Islam has been "interested more in territorial expansion rather than inner religious intensification," Alatas suggested a deeper study of pre-Islamic societies in Malaysia and the psychology of conversion both in the individual level as well as that of a mass level. It is further urged that a study be made of possible internal crises that might have existed in these pre-Islamic societies —crises either among its elites or among the people.[1]

It is generally valid to assume that no mass conversions or radical change of religious or their ideological beliefs in a large scale is possible unless there are tensions in society that find their solution in the acceptance of new values or beliefs. These tensions come about when certain expectations cannot be satisfied within an existing ideological order or when additional expectations are introduced to society on account of economic shifts and their corresponding political changes. This is an area of study that still needs to be thoroughly analyzed. And one must be careful about careless generalizations. Certainly, a situation where the Javanese who were already exposed to the highly developed Indian religions would embrace Islam, might be different from that, let us say, of Filipinos in Sulu and Mindanao who possessed a relatively primitive and animistic religion.

[1] Cf. Syed Hussein Alatas, "Reconstruction of Malaysian History' (mimeographed form), Singapore, January 1961.

More specifically referring to Indonesia, Willem Wertheim stated that the attraction of Islam for people living under the rule of Hindu princes, was to be "discovered in the world of Ideas." For

> Islam gave the small man a sense of individual worth as a member of the Islamic community. According to Hindu ideology he was merely a creature of lower order than the members of the higher castes. Under Islam he could, as it were, feel himself their equal, or even, in his quality as a Moslem, the superior of such of them as were not Moslems themselves, even though he still occupied a subordinate position in the social structure.[2]

Furthermore, according to Wertheim, Islam gave to a large number of Indonesian simple peasants a sense of solidarity over and above the feeling of individual worth. By means of a uniform system of religious instruction and the pilgrimage to Mecca, a greater sense of unity was slowly being effected. Regional and tribal loyalties were bridged, with the consequence that later on the position of the local chiefs became threatened.[3]

Although not explicitly stated, Wertheim's views assume that Indonesian society began to feel a need for some form of greater unity and that this expectation found its solution in Islam. With this assumption, Wertheim claimed that many Moslems saw in their new Faith "a strong unifying force—a kind of pre-nationalism" to the extent that Islam can be regarded "as the fermenting agent for the revolutionary process which has taken place in the twentieth century."[4] Although not possibly intended by Wertheim, his theory suggests that in the movement for greater unity and eventual independence from foreigners among the Indonesian peoples, Islam can be viewed in retrospect as having played a decisive role.

However, it must be pointed out that Wertheim's emphasis is on the value of the feeling in belonging to *dar-al-islam* as conceived by the converts. In Islamic jurisprudence, *dar-al-islam* is viewed as a wide brotherhood or community of believers living in a territory where, regardless of political divisions, all believers were equal and all possessed of individual worth. Outside *dar-al-islam* was the abode of unbelievers. Just to what degree of emotional security and what advantage the Indonesian would get from this sense of belongingness is a problem belonging to the psychology of religion.

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[2] Willem F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, p. 196.
[3] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 202.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

That there was eventually bound to be a conflict between the chiefs representing the *adat* and the *ulema* representing the *Shari'a* or Holy Law is understandable. It is simply the conflict between a universal system of laws versus a regional one. However, that the *adat* chiefs who had already turned Moslems would find themselves in opposition to the peasants who had also turned Moslems, must be discovered in causes other than religious ones. In the history of the beginnings of Islam in the Philippines, it was initially only the chiefs and the ruling families who were devout in the practices of Islam. But in time and under the influence of religious instructors, piety became more associated with the followers. It was then that the *ulema* could ally itself with the people against religiously-lax rulers. From this point of view, Islam could serve to unify the people against undesirable rulers, even if these had become Moslems. However, in actual affairs the Shari'a has merely remained a standard or model, and it was never totally enforced in Malaysia. This is in spite of the fact that the school of jurisprudence that prevails in Malaysia is the Shafi'i one, which, among the other schools, has in principle been relatively more intransigent in its opposition to *adat* law.[5]

The views of Wertheim are found in a more elaborate form in Van Nieuwenhuijze's enumeration of factors which are believed to have brought about the spread of Islam in Malaysia, more particularly in Indonesia. Rejecting the trader theory as not valid for the same reasons given by Van Leur, Van Nieuwenhuijze suggested that the Islamization of Indonesia represented not only an attempt to depart from Hinduism and Buddhism, as these two systems were not only incompatible with the "aboriginal Indonesian way of thought," but an effort as well to do away with the Hindu caste system. It was Islam which filled the vacuum left by the rejection. The attempt to escape the caste system is believed to have been the reason for the acceptance of the new Faith by many of the humbler classes.[6] This, among others, could have been one of the reasons why unlike the petty rulers and inhabitants of the coastal areas, who wanted precisely to free themselves from the central authority of Majapahit, the Hindu rulers in the interior of Java resisted any social change, like the spread of Islam, which might threaten their sanctified po-

[5] Cf. S. G. Vesey-Fitzgerald, "Nature and Sources of the Shari'a," *Law in the Middle East*, pp. 109-110.

[6] Cf. C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia: Five Essays*, p. 35, Also cf. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

sition.

Wertheim's view that membership in *dar-al-islam* allowed Indonesians to emancipate themselves from regional or provincial bias or outlook is also echoed in Van Nieuwenhuijze. Van Nieuwenhuijze's view is that Indonesians were representing a system of closed societies which began to show signs of disruption in traditional values due to their exposure to commercial and cultural relations with other countries. It was thus the Islamic community which was ready to take the place of the disintegrating societies by "broadening the horizon of man's outlook, from the narrow scope of a single village or clan to the virtually world-wide vista of Dar-al-Islam . . . "[7] Furthermore

> The observation that Islam sometimes offers a solution to the problems arising from the disintegration of closed community life applies not only to the idea of community but, more specifically, to religious matters. Once the integrity of closed community life is lost, e.g. because the territory of the community is drawn into commercial relations with other social entities, there is an urgent need for the re-establishment of this entity in the shape of a new harmonious way of thought and life.[8]

What is further implied, too, is that the above-mentioned disintegration was counteracted by a search for another form of social unity. Just how Islam was able to satisfy this search is found in the manner it was introduced and accepted in Indonesia, namely, in the the form of Islamic mysticism.

> Wherever Islam is directly or indirectly involved in the disruption of the religious thought of a closed community, it offers the additional attraction of its mysticism to those who seek a sense of unity. In the first centuries of the conversion of Indonesian life to Islam, converts were attracted by the mysticism of Islam rather than by any other aspects of its doctrine.[9]

Nevertheless, it must be considered that the introduction of Islamic mysticism made the transition from former religious beliefs not radical and abrupt. As Schrieke wrote, the mysticism that characterized Islam during the time it was beginning to make headway in Indonesia made conversion neither difficult nor objectionable especially since the "mysticism so popular at the time was closely

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[7] Ibid., p. 38.
[8] Ibid., pp. 38-39.
[9] Ibid., p. 39.

linked to the pantheistic views of the early period:"[10] Also, another factor facilitating conversion mentioned by Nieuwenhuijze is that the new convert needs simply to begin with the profession of the Faith, the *shahada;* although in time, he is expected to know more of the tenets of and his commitments to Islam.[11]

As can be seen, the explanations of both Wertheim and Nieuwenhujze refer principally to the Javanese and to a lesser extent to the Sumatran part of Malaysia where Hindu elements had already taken root in varying, though less, degree. However, their sociological analysis of a society disintegrating due to the commercial penetration by foreigners and to its exposure to an international trade can be validly applied to the other parts of Malaysia where the people were still in the animistic stage, for these peoples, too, were faced with a society where traditional values were being disrupted. If the above explanations are correct, Islam served a solution to the problem of disintegration and the search for a new form of unity to make society adapt itself to new changes. The fact is that the traders who were responsible for the disruption of traditional values were Moslems. To these traders their trade and religion were compatible. Once the rulers had turned Moslems, Islam was associated with prestige, further encouraging conversions. But this is not all. The new religion had its mystical attractions.

It is clear that the theory of Islam's ideological worth is not at all incompatible with the other theories, for it especially complements the missionary theory, especially the variation dealing with Sufism. It is not enough to have the propensities for mysticism, for in its particular Islamic form it must be introduced and taught. And this the professional missionaries probably did.

The theories of Wertheim and Van Nieuwenhuijze need, however, to be supplemented with a study of Islam's character as a competitive religion. For after the coming of the Europeans, both Islam and Christianity were simultaneously offered to many Malaysians who were still in the animistic religious stage. Christianity, as much as Islam, could have offered itself as a solution to the closed or disintegrating society; but the fact is that the majority of the inhabitants of Malaysia went to Islam. Also, the fact that once converted to Islam many of the principalities fiercely resisted Chris-

[10] Schrieke, "Rulers and Realm in Early Java," Part 2, p. 237.
[11] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

tianization, demonstrates that Islam could, in effect, satisfy deep spiritual impulses or society's search for greater cohesion. Possibly, too, the willingness of Islam to accommodate elements which are not incompatible with it or which, in time, are capable of being amended so as to be consistent with it, can be a reason for its ready acceptance among many diverse peoples. In the totality of its demands, Islam is certainly, not easier to follow than any of the other historical religions. But it has allowed some diversity in its jurisprudence, although it has left to hope, in the absence of a central hierarchical authority, the preservation of the unity of its essentials. But again, its attractiveness as well as the nature of both individual and mass conversion to Islam, must be left to theologians and psychologists.

The Crusader Theory

The last theory for discussion regarding Islam's expansion in Malaysia will, for purposes of convenience, be called the Crusader theory. In brief, this theory asserts that the spread of Islam in Malaysia came about as an answer to and against the coming of Christians to the area, initially the Portuguese. To these can be added the Spaniards and to some extent later on, the Dutch. This theory views the conflict between Portuguese and Moslem traders as a continuation of the wars of the Crusades fought in Arab lands and in Spain and as an extension of the wars between the Turks and Christian princes. It is clearly evident that Portuguese writers during the sixteenth century viewed the conflict between the Portuguese and Moslem princes and travelers as a manifestation of a conflict between Christ and Mohammed. However, their views show an admixture of religious and economic motives. Writers on the conflict between Spaniards and the Filipino Moslems, like Saleeby, Vic Hurley Moore, reflected that such a conflict was an extension of the wars of the Crusades, more specifically the conflict between Spanish Christian and Moor, which had already been resolved in Spain by the end of the fifteenth century. A more recent writer who repeats this theory regarding Malaysia is Schrieke, and it is his version that will be considered presently.

Allowing for the validity of the explanation that marriages between Moslem traders and members of the Malaysian ruling families was a factor in the gradual spread of Islam, Schrieke feels that this

factor could hardly be the whole explanation for the reason that conversions of rulers and intermarriages represented a small number as compared with a great bulk of the population which were, in general, socially separated from the settlements of traders. These Moslem traders, too, were mainly transient and lived outside the adat community.[1] Consequently, the spread of Islam must be sought in another factor. This, he maintained, was the antagonism between the Portuguese newcomers and the Moslem traders who were not only in economic competition but also in religious conflict with them.

> Two irreconcilable, envious powers, medieval Christiandom and Islam, stood thus face to face, one just as exclusive in its attitude as the other. On the one hand a conglomeration of people of one faith who for ages had been in possession of an extensive and profitable trade which had been constantly increasing for the last three centuries and whose interests entailed the exclusion of other competitors; on the other hand a nation which considered it its 'true heritage,' a 'priviledge allowed them through an extraordinary blessing of God,' to exterminate the mortal enemies of the faith.[2]

It cannot be denied that the struggle between the Portuguese on one hand, and the Moslem traders and princes in Arabia, Persia and India on the other, commenced almost immediately after the wars between the Portuguese and the Moslems in the Spanish peninsula and North Africa. But the war in North Africa was commenced because the Moors presented a real danger to Spanish and Portuguese interests in the Mediterranean. However, the war in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean was a clear struggle for the control of the trade in the area. The Portuguese needed a system of ports to allow them to control the trade and get rid of Moslem competitors. As part of their plan, they attacked all Moslem merchant vessels. They tried to prevent any form of merchandise coming from Malaysia and India to Egypt and instead tried to send merchandise themselves to Portugal, through the Cape of Good Hope—a threat not only to Egyptian profits from the trade but also to the Italian trading centers of Genoa and Venice who got a great deal of their foreign merchandise from Egyptian ports. The fact that Christian ports would suffer some decline on account of the activities of

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[1] Cf. Schrieke, "The Rise of Islam and the Beginnings of Hinduism in the Archipelago," *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, Part, 2, pp. 308-309.

[2] "Shifts in Political and Economic Power," *Ibid.*, Part 1, p. 39. Also cf. "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," *Ibid.*, Part 2, p. 234.

Portuguese Christians, demonstrates that motives other than religious ones were to some extent predominant. However, chronic internecine troubles among Moslem leaders were temporarily shelved in the face of a common danger to their mercantile interests. This explains why Turkish and Egyptian mercenaries were found in Malaysia fighting the Portuguese. But it was to be expected that anti-Christian sentiments would be fanned by Moslems. It was not difficult to influence the minds of the Moslem rulers against Christian competitors.

The interdependence of religious and economic motives in the conflict between the Portuguese and the Moslems can be appreciated from the fact that Albuquerque had two projects which he wanted to consummate before he died. The first was to divert the waters of the Nile river to the Red Sea so as to make useless the irrigation network of Egypt. The second was to capture the city of Medina, strip the Prophet's tomb of all its treasures, get his remains and use it as ransom for the holy places in Jerusalem which was at that time under Moslem control.[3] The reported speech of Albuquerque before the second attack on Malacca in 1511 shows this interdependence again:

> The first is the great service which we shall perform to Our Lord in casting the Moors out of this country, and quenching the fire of this sect of Mafamede so that it may never burst out again hereafter; and I am so sanguine as to hope for this form our undertaking, that if we can only achieve the task before us, it will result in the Moors resigning India altogether to our rule, for the greater part of them—or perhaps all of them—live upon the trade of this country and are become great and rich, and lords of extensive treasures. . . . (Malacca) is the headquarters of all the spiceries and drugs which the Moors carry every year hence to the Straits without our being able to prevent them from so doing; but if we deprive them of this their ancient market there, there does not remain for them a single port, nor a single situation, so commodious in the whole of these parts, where they can carry on their trade in these things. . . and I hold it as very certain that if we take this trade of Malacca away out of their hands, Cairo and Mecca are entirely ruined, and to Venice will no spiceries be conveyed except that which her merchants go and bring in Portugal.[4]

Regardless of the priority of motives that stimulated the capture of Malacca, its fall and other Portuguese victories merited a

[3] Cf. *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque*, Vol. IV, pp. 36-37.
[4] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 116-118.

public thanksgiving in Rome in 1515. The oration made by Camillo Portion to Leo X on this occasion eulogized the conquest of Ormuz as facilitating the recovery of Jerusalem, explained how the cross was now being brought to distant places, accused the defeated Malacca sultan as a Moore who hated the Christians, and appealed for a new crusade to capture Jerusalem.[5] Regardless of possible anachronistic elements in the oration and the impracticality of some of its suggestions, it demonstrates that in a sector of the European Christian population the spirit of the Crusades was still an intense one. It must be recalled that the last Moorish kingdom of Granada was destroyed less than twenty years before the capture of Malacca and that the Turkish threat to Eastern Europe was gathering momentum, Constantinople having fallen to them in 1453.

It is quite safe to look at the views of Tomé Pires as a typical reflection of the thinking of intelligent Portuguese at that time. In the preface of his work, he writes to Manuel, the Portuguese King, that Albuquerque was fighting "against the name of Mohammed (*Mafamede*)," and that it was evident "that God's omnipotence is favoring these efforts because He wills to make Christianity take root throughout your kingdom."[6] And speaking of Malacca, he said: "And since it is known how profitable Malacca is in temporal affairs, how much the more is it in spiritual (affairs), as Mohammed is cornered and cannot go farther, and flees as much as he can."[7] Pires even goes as far as to suggest an alliance with Ismail Shah of Persia, who was in conflict with the Turks, "if only because it (Persia) is opposed to Mohammed."[8] Unless Pires had forgotten that Ismail Shah was a Shia Moslem, certainly to him political motives were just as paramount as religious ones.

Definitely, the notorious cruelties of the Portuguese in Arabia, India and other parts of Malaysia were not inflicted on Moslems with impunity. Forced conversions and circumcisions of Portuguese prisoners took place.[9] In the same manner that the Crusader invasions of Syria and Egypt provoked intolerance as a defense, the Portuguese intrusion in Islamic territory in Malaysia generated a coun-

[5] Cf *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 175-177 and 186.

[6] Pires, *op cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 1-2.

[7] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 286.

[8] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 21.

[9] Cf. *Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque*, Vol. III, p. 46, and pp. 58-59; Vol. IV, p. 53.

fanaticism and an anti-Christian propaganda. According to Schrieke,

> From the conquest of Malacca in 1511 onwards, one finds the Portuguese including the archipelago in their struggle against Islam and Islamic trade. Their conquests were accompanied by vigorous missionary activities, and *these stirred their opponents to action in their turn*. (Italics mine).[10]

Schrieke's theory suggests that a vigorous Islamic missionary activity took place in order to counteract that of the Portuguese and also that the resistance of the Malaysian rulers took the formal character of a *jihad*. In this political and religious conflict, the Moslems had an advantage for they had a headstart. By the time the Portuguese had arrived in Malaysia, most of the coastal rulers of Java were already Moslems. Majapahit had already fallen. The fall of Malacca only served to strengthen the position of Acheh *vis á vis* the Portuguese and other Moslems principalities. In 1521, Brunei unleased a *jihad* against its neighbors to convert them, and in 1539 Sultan Ala-ud-din Riayat Shah of Achin waged a vigorous war against the pagan Bataks. In 1575, Sultan Bab-ul-llah of Ternate destroyed the work of the Portuguese missionaries, a work commenced by his father, Sultan Haroun.[11] Bornean preachers made efforts to point out that Christians were antagonists of Islam.[12] The intensification of Islamic activity in the Moluccas made life for the Portuguese there intolerable to the extent that they gave up all attempts to monopolize the spice trade in the area. The spread of Islam in Celebes was reinforced by a female ruler of Acheh along competitive lines with the Portuguese missionary activities. Although a great deal of conversions were at this time being made by Malaysians themselves, a great deal of their activities involved Arabs. The conversion of Sukkadana, in Borneo, at around 1521, is attributed to an Arab who had settled in Palembang, Sumatra.[13]

When the Spaniards came to the Philippines in 1521, Moslem traders from Borneo were carrying on a brisk trade with the different islands or were possibly even in actual control of the bulk

[10] "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 235.

[11] Cf. Schrieke, *Ibid.*, pp. 235-238 and Bernard Vlekke, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

[12] Cf. "Expeditions to Borneo, Jolo, and Mindanao, (Francisco de Sande, and others; April 19, 1578 to June 10, 1579), "Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 150-151.

[13] Thomas Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-317.

of the outside trade of these islands. The capture and destruction of the Moslem settlement of Manila and the subsequent building of a Spanish settlement on its site by Legaspi in 1571 signified that the spread of Islam to the north of the Philippine Archipelago had been blocked. But the sultanates in the south like those of Sulu and Magindanao were prepared to offer resistance. By the end of the sixteenth century, Islam in southern Philippines was reinforced by preachers from Borneo and the Moluccas. It was the recognition of this fact that led Francisco de Sande, the Governor of the Philippines, to mention in his letter in 1578 to Sultan Seif-ul-Rejal, the Borneo Sultan, to desist from sending preachers to the interior of Borneo and to the Philippines but to admit, on the contrary, Catholic missionaries in Borneo.[14] Sande underestimated the religiosity and missionary zeal of the Sultan who when the letter was read to him called the Castillians "capie" (Kaffer).[15]

Actually on May 28, 1565, royal officials in the Philippines requested the Royal Audiencia of Mexico for authorization to enslave Moslem traders in the Philippines for "they preach the doctrines of Mahomet."[16] The letter of Philip II, the Spanish King, to Legaspi in 1571, gave in effect this authorization. Governor Sande's instructions to Captain Gabriel de Ribera on January 15, 1579, to pacify Mindanao also ordered him to see to it that no Moselm preachers were allowed to do their work, to inform the native inhabitants that Christian missionaries were to follow and that they were to be told of the victory of Spanish arms in Borneo and the burning of the mosque at Brunei.[17] A similar letter of instructions had already been given to Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa on May 23, 1578, regarding the pacification of Sulu. Here, orders were given to arrest the preachers, to destroy the mosque and prohibit its rebuilding.[18]

For nearly three hundred years wars between the Spaniards

[14] Cf. "Expeditions to Borneo, Jolo and Mindanao. (Francisco Sande, and others; April 19, 1578 to June 10, 1579)," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 153-154.

[15] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[16] "Letter from royal officials of the Filipinas to the Royal Audiencia at Mexico, (Guido de Labesares and others, May 28, 1565)," *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 187.

[17] Cf. "Expeditions to Borneo, Jolo and Mindanao. (Francisco de Sande and others; April 19, 1578 to June 10, 1579)," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 234.

[18] Cf. *Ibid*, p. 178.

and Filipino Moslems ensued. The devastations made by the Moro pirates and the capture of thousands of Christians to be sold as slaves are well known. This was the response of the Moslems to efforts aimed at their subjugation and Christianization. It was only by the middle of the nineteenth century that Moslem depredations were checked and the possibility of relative peace imminent. Spanish warships and technological advantages were deciminating the resources of the Moslems. However, by this time, a new sentiment as to the manner of bringing peace and establishing the sovereignty of Spain in the Moslem areas had already been felt in high circles of the Spanish colonial government. A memorial written by Baltazar Giraudier, the Director of the *Diario de Manila* who had actually served in the Jolo Campaign of 1876, to the Spanish Governor General in March, 1880, reflects this sentiment. Giraudier recommended as a new policy for the Moslems in the Philippines that attempts to Christianize them be stopped immediately and that, instead, efforts be made to Hispanize them, that is, accommodate them within the structure of Spanish colonial system. Asserting that successful Christianization in the Philipines had taken place mainly among a pagan population, such a task was not too feasible among Filipino Moslems who already belonged to an organized religion, and who as proponent of the Koran "looked with horror, if not with hate, at the priests of a religion that was an enemy to theirs." Also, the fact was that "the Moro was faithful to the Koran and all attempts to destroy its principles would bring the opposite (intended) effects."[19] Appealing for the similar pursuance of the policy of religious tolerance adopted by the British in India and by the Dutch in Java and used as a technique to safeguard their colonial domination, Giraudier warned that an insistence on the Christianization of Sulu would bring about untold difficulties and added complications in its pacification.[20] Parallel to these ideas, Miguel Espina, a nineteenth century writer, reflected that should a religious policy be perpetuated, considering the inevitable resistance, the only recourse would be an almost impossible one: the complete extermination of Filipino Moslems. If at all this were possible, there would be nothing to prevent the continuous influx of other Moslems from Borneo, the Celebes, the Moluccas to populate the land. The war would then not be ended

[19] Quoted from Miguel A. Espina, *Apuntes para hacer un libro sobre Jolo*, pp.

[20] Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 395–396.

but rather transformed into one against Moslems as such, a situation which would excite and generate a fanaticism among the votaries of Islam in the other countries of Asia.[21]

This is all a far cry from Governor de Sande's policy of repressing Islam in the Philippines which for nearly three hundred years remained, consciously or unconsciously, a constant one regarding the Moslems in the Philippines. In retrospect, however, the initial meeting between Moslem Filipinos and Christian Spaniards in Manila was still viewed as an extension of the battle between Christian and Moors that commenced in Spain. According to a Spanish author writing in 1884:

> When they landed in Manila, the soldiers of Legaspi found on the same site of the present Fort Santiago key to the capital of Manila, a powerful Moslem principality under Raja Matanda . . . who . . . reigned in company with a nephew, Rajah Soliman, the one who favored a policy of war. . . Under the walls of this fort a historical event, little appreciated but which influenced our conquest, took place. It was there that for the first time since the conquest of Granada that the Spaniards once more stood face to face with the standards of the Prophet, both meeting after circling the globe from opposite directions. They met under the walls under artillery fire as was inevitable and they continue to do so in Jolo fighting a battle that began at the borders of Guadalete. And as if that nothing should detract from this continuity, Legaspi called them *moros*, a name they preserve up to this date and which, regardless of their having nothing in common with the mauretanians, signifies a community of religion shared with the Spanish Arabs.[22]

As can be clearly seen, the Crusader theory is an attempt to explain the spread of Islam in Malaysia only for the time beginning with the end of the fifteenth century or the beginning of the sixteenth century. It cannot therefore explain the Islamization of North Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Sulu and a great part of Java. Indeed, Islam was flourishing in North Sumatra a couple of centuries even before it became entrenched in the Javanese coastal principalities of the North. The other theories can explain to a great extent the introduction and initial expansion of Islam in Malaysia and if they are supplemented by the Crusader theory, an explanation for an added acceleration of Islam's expansion during the sixteenth century and upwards apppears.

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[21] *Ibid.*, p.884.

[22] Victor M. Concas y Palau. Quoted from Retana's edition of Morga's *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*, p. 379.

The concept that the struggle between Christians and Moslems in Malaysia was a mere extension or continuation of the struggles between Christians and Moslems in the Mediterraneans as a category for understanding historical events in Malaysia leads itself as a principle that can be complemented by certain jurisprudential concepts of Islam. As is well known in Islamic jurisprudence the world is divided into *dar-ar-Islam* and *dar-al harb*. *Dar-al-islam* refers to a territory under Moslem rule or at least to an area in which Moslems are allowed the free exercise of their religion. *Dar-al-harb* would refer to the land where both of these two alternatives are absent. Making allowance for a flexibility in the meanings of these terms, depending on the time and place of the jurists who interpreted them, the Crusader theory can, in effect, be enunciated as an expression of a conflict between *dar-al-Islam* and *dar-al-harb*. Regardless, of its original meaning, *jihad* now means either the promotion of the increase of Islamic territory or its defense from external enemies. If it does not imply the making of others believers, it could at least mean the prevention of believers from being subjected to non-believers. During the conflicts with the Spaniards, the *ulema* in the Moslem South of the Philippines never hesitated to pronounce the war as a *jihad*. It will be recalled that the *jihad* is primarily a state duty and upon the failure of the state to maintain it, its prosecution becomes as individual duty when defense is involved. The resistance of Borneo and the sultanate in the Philippines against the Spaniards and the war between Acheh and the Dutch can be understood partially in terms of these Islamic categories. And oral traditions in the Philippines have always distinguished those who have died as *shahid* in battle from those who did not.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

All the above theories are supported by historical facts, albeit selective ones. This suggests that they all have their limitations and, therefore, possess partial validity if interpreted as general theories. It is dificult to point out theoretical inconsistencies among them and it is actually possible to demonstrate that they all complement one another. Probably, the complete truth about Islam's introduction and expansion in Malaysia is found in a judicious synthesis of all of them.

A coordination of all these theories by a selection of their distinct contributions can be constructed along the following lines: At

the beginning of the ninth century, after they had monopolized the trade between India and Egypt, the Arabs began to dominate the Nanhai trade. This means that by the end of the ninth century they controlled the maritime trade between Egypt, India, Malaysia, and China. The Arabs had established various settlements in the coasts of India and the Western part of Malaysia and a few in China. Although they intermarried with the local population, they, in general, lived outside the *adat* of the peoples among whom they lived.

As trade expanded, the Arab traders were joined by Moslem Indian merchants, principally Gujeratis. Possible individual conversions were made by sayyids and pious traders either by marriages or by familiar contacts. With a flourishing of the settlements of the Moslem traders in Malaysia, their mullahs and learned men joined them. These, in turn, began to effect further individual conversions. The fall of Baghdad in 1258 brought about an exodus of many learned men and theologians to the neghboring Moslem countries as far as India, further intensifying Islamic preaching activities, the effect of which were felt in places in Malaysia where Moslems had already established themselves. A counteraction to the political reversals of the fortunes of Islam was a vigorous revival of missionary activities along peaceful and persuasive techniques.

By the end of the thirteenth century, the coastal principalities of North Sumatra became Islamized. On account of their religious zeal, Sumatran rulers effected conversions, not without some element of coercion. The intensification of the international trade on account of increased needs in Europe and the Middle East brought about a greater number of Moslems to Malaysia. The benefits of the trade accruing to the rulers of the sea coast principalities increased, and some of them became traders themselves or partners with the Moslems traders. An identity of economic interests and frequent contacts brought about further alliance by marriages between the Moslem traders and the families of the rulers.

By the beginning of the fifteenth century, the rulers of Malacca had been induced to become Moslems through offers of a family alliance with Pasai and expressions of the willingness of the Moslem traders to patronize the port of Malacca. Malacca and Pasai became the theological centers in Malaysia, and Javanese missionaries studied in these emporia. They also served as headquarters for other missionaries, places from which they spread out to others areas. The increased exposure of the rulers to the international trade and the

participation of the people in it aroused economic expectations among them with corresponding cultural changes. Different Malaysian groups which had been steeped in traditional values so as to be considered closed societies, were now being exposed to powerful forces of change. To avoid a possible social disruption due to a threat against their traditional values, the peoples began to adopt Islamic values as replacements for their traditional values. Besides satisfying deep spiritual aspirations, Islam was also associated with rulers, who symbolized power, as well as with affluent traders who were viewed as representing a higher and vigorous civilization. Islam, too, was looked up to as an ideology that did away with some fetters of the past like the caste system. Besides, it provided a sense of belonging to a wider community that transcended regional and insular barriers. It was an international religion associated with traders dealing in an international trade. However, the initial type of religion propagated by the Moslem missionaries who accompanied the traders was such that it did not represent a radical discontinuity with familiar mystical doctrines or elements of the past. By the end of the fifteenth century, the petty rulers of the coastal principalities of Java had become Moslems. They viewed their Moslem patrons as powerful fiends allied with them by both marriage and economic interests, and in time they began to assert their independence from the central authority of Majapahit. The destruction of Majapahit at the end of the fifteenth century was also defensible in terms of liberal and convenient interpretations of Islamic principles. The petty rulers, too, utilized their connections with the centers of Islam to legitimize their rule and dynasties. In time, Islam would become deeper and more intense among the rulers and the people.

The coming of the Portuguese at the beginning of the sixteenth century was met by a people already greatly exposed to and influenced by Islamic institutions and practices. Besides, Moslem traders, both Arabs and Indians, were ubiquitous in the courts, using their influence to maintain their trade monopoly and protecting the interests of their cherished religion. The arrival of the Portuguese threatened the trade monopoly of the Moslems and thus resistance against their influence became inevitable. The Moslem traders could also intimidate the coastal rulers, if these did not support them, by threatening to withdraw entirely their mecantile patronage. The fall of Malacca in 1511 resulted in an influx of Moslem pundits and theologians to other places in Malaysia, principally Sumatra and

Java. This situation, similar to the fall of Baghdad, could have stimulated added missionary zeal. The Portuguese, with both mercantile and religious motives, brought about a situation where a vigorous counteraction became imminent.

To the religious zeal of the Christians, there responded an analogous Islamic zeal. Moslem missionary activities under the patronage of rulers began in earnest. A competition for the conversion of the pagan tribes began and this time force was employed by Moslem rulers to some extent. The Javanese traders who brought the spices of the Moluccas to their ports saw to it that the Moluccas and neighboring islands remained or became Moslem, and they were apprehensive lest the christianization of these areas might cause them to lose their main sources of certain spices. Indeed, the Javanese disliked Portuguese, and they were the most avid missionaries in the Moluccas and parts of Borneo. In their missionary activities, they were encouraged and accompanied by Arabs acting in the role of traders and propagandists of the Faith. By the end of the sixteenth century, the rulers of Acheh became more conscious of their position as an Islamic power, and they began to supplement the work of Javanese missionaries. Wars against the Portuguese acquired the character of the *jihad*. The Bornean sultans at the same time began to combine trade and missionary activities in the Philippines, principally in the island of Luzon. The coming of the Spaniards to Luzon ended their activities. Consequently, with the consolidation of Spanish power in the Philippines, Islam became generally confined to the Sulu Archipelago and parts of Mindanao. In time, the rising of local *ulemas*, more frequent contacts with the centers of Islamic orthodoxy, and greater exposure to Islamic teachings led the Moslem peoples of Malaysia to commit themselves further to the ideology of Islam. The result is that today there are ninety million moslems in Malaysia and the process of conversions among the pagan thribes in Malaysia, and the process of conversions among the pagan tribes, though modest in its scope, is still going on as the manifestation of the inertia of a powerful movement that commenced at the middle of the thirteenth century.

(NOTE: After this paper was written, I had the opportunity to read Professor S. Q. Fatimi's paper on "The Role of China in the Spread of Islam in South-East Asia." This paper provides an important clue to the coming of Islam in Sulu and supports an oral tradition that the first Moslem missionary to Sulu came from China. Professor Fatimi also provides additional insights into the Sufi variation of the missionary theory.)

BOOK REVIEWS

Donn V. Hart. *Riddles in Filipino Folklore: an anthropological analysis.* Donn Hart. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1964. xiii, 318 pp. US$10.00.

Almost all of us have participated in riddling as a pleasant form of recreation. Dr. Hart, without detracting from its pleasantness, explores the scientific and functional dimensions of riddles and the processes of posing and solving them. He considers Christian Filipino riddles in their cultural setting as revealed by subject matter, form of expression, and manner of usage, and in their context in Filipino folklore. In addittion, he refers both carefully and generously to riddles, riddling, and relevant folklore analysis and interpretation as given by many other scholars of the Philippines and other countries.

This book will attract a variety of readers. Filipinos will want to see if the riddles they know are included and are presented in the social and cultural setting with which they are familiar. Students of Filipiniana will find new data and comments to help them to better understand Philippine culture, especially that of the Visayan region, the largest linguistic division of the country. Anthropologists and folklorists will welcome the volume for its basic information and its comparative method of treatment. A point of interest to Sillimanians is that the book is dedicated to the memory of Valentin G. Montes, a close friend of the author whom he met in Boroñgan, Samar. Atty. Montes lost his life in a plane crash near Bombay, India in 1962.

It took a couple of readings for this reviewer to appreciate the encyclopedic nature of the book. As most readers are apt to do, she looked first for what she was most curious about; the ridles themselves, the cultural description, and the notes on meanings. It was only when this first curiosity was satisfied that she went back to concentrate on the structural patterns of analysis and the cross-reference potential. After two readings and the writing of this review she is ready to place the book on her own library shelf where it will be available for browsing by herself and others, as well as for reference on its subject matter and and for resource material on research techniques.

The introductory chapter describes the way in which the book developed. The author who is Associate Professor of Anthropology of Syracuse University, has spent several years in field work research in social organization in the Visayas. He found that telling and guessing riddles was a popular and amusing way to get acquainted with potential informants on other subjects and to establish rapport with a shy or embarrassed individual or group. He planned to write a short, unanalytical article on riddles. The response from informants, the encouragement of colleagues, and the growing interest of himself and his wife, who was doing research in folklore, led him to expand his plan.

He was dissatisfied with the historic, cataloging approach largely used in the past and found himself looking at the riddles for "clues to societal values or political and religious content and functions." He began testing and supplementing his own generalizations about riddling and culture through reference to other collectors and theorists.

The geographical base which furnished the setting for his personal collection of riddles and their meaning as an expression of social and cultural characteristics of a specific group of people was described in Part One, "The Cultural Milieu of Riddling". This was Barrio Caticugan of the municipality of Siaton in Negros Oriental and of Borongan, municipality in Samar. About one-third of the annotated riddles quoted in Part Two of the book were collected by the author in these places. Each of these "was recorded in the dialect and translated on the spot." In addition to recording he kept notes on the place, the people, and his field techniques and experiences, some details of which he describes in the book.

His selection is confined mostly to the descriptive type, also called folk or true riddles in contrast to the artistic riddle which is defined as a shrewd or witty question that "calls for a particular bit of information." The former are used mostly for entertainment; the latter sometimes have a special place in the literature, but are seldom as popular for ordinary riddling use.

Descriptive riddles are among the folk material that should be salvaged before it disappears, for they are generally told, not written. Listing and cataloging them is not enough; what they tell of the people and their behavior is significant. This latter information is to be found in the range and frequency of subjects, by a knowledge of which individuals tell riddles, and attention to the kind of situa-

and places where they are told. They are mainly used, but not always, by children and adolescents. Young people remembered more riddles than older people, and they usually told those associated with their role and responsibility in the social group.

The use of riddles seems to be associated with periods of crisis, such as death, courtship, agricultural rites, and other family gatherings. They are widely used during the time of death rituals such as funerals, wakes, and novenas when relatives and neighbors entertain themselves while giving emotional support to the bereaved. Harvest time is often occasion for riddling. Night is more usual than daytime for riddle exchange, although groups differ in timing. Now used mostly for entertainment, riddles may once have been assigned magical properties and ritualistic functions. For some groups and on some occasions erotic *double-entendre* riddles which have both an ordinary and a "naughty" meaning, are popular.

Riddle contests occur throughout the world. Participants vary as to number, age, and sex, and as to the type of forfeit or award to be given. Riddles are used to convey certain information and attitudes for the socialization of children, and to fulfill psychological functions such as displacement of aggression, the reinforcement of moral values, and as an aid to reducing anxiety. Since this usage is not systematic, and some subjects are treated while others occur rarely if at all, many questions remain to be answered, according to Dr. Hart.

Subjects of riddles are usually familiar objects, but not all the common things in a culture are included. They may deal with processes also, but seldom with abstractions. The basis of selectivity of riddle subjects in various cultures offers possibilities for further research, for choice is influenced by a people's value system.

Part Two of the book includes the texts and translations of 909 largely Visayan riddles collected either in Negros and Samar or obtained from published and manuscript sources. The source and identification of informants are given in code. These are classified according to 19 subjects and 1 miscellaneous section, and each category is described to show its relation to Filipino culture.

The ten largest subject groupings are discussed in more detail. They occur in this order: agriculture, wild and domesticated fauna, parts of the body, food, geographical and meteorological data, dwellings and furnishings, religion, clothing, fishing, and hunting, and communication.

In addition to the interpretative comments on each grouping, a chapter entitled "Comparative Notes" adds specific information on background or interpretation of most of the riddles. This includes pointing out local meanings of words, comparative ideas, cultural allusions, and comments on sources and uses. This is followed by an index of solutions, and comparisons, using both the dialect and the English translations.

The Appendix lists the subjects of the 2662 Christian Filipino riddles which were collected on the field and obtained from printed and manuscript sources, and the total number of solutions for each major subject heading. This is followed by a bibliography in which the sources of Christian and pagan Filipino riddles are annotated, and a general index for the books.

So, dear reader, you have been introduced to what is. . .

"Not a tree but it has leaves; on its leaves the flesh sticks.
Its flesh is tasteless because the same flesh cannot be
eaten yet it can satisfy." (A Book)

HARRIET R. REYNOLDS

The Philippines: Nation of Islands. By Alden Cutshall, Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1964. 134 pp. $1.75.

With only a year between their publication, the D. Van Nostrand Company has given us two short books on the Philippines, covering somewhat the same ground. Albert Ravenholt's *The Philippines: Young Republic on the Move* (1962, 200 pp.) is journalistic in style and focuses particularly on people and human interest. Alden Cutshall is Professor of Geography at the University of Illinois, and perhaps naturally he concentrates on the geographical, economic and political as well as cultural factors which determine the character of the Philippines. The difference between the two books—and their authors—is readily seen in their chapter divisions. While Ravenholt writes of "Early History and Spanish Rule", "The Philippines Under the Stars and Stripes" and "The Free Philippines", Professor Cutshall covers the same material in a single chapter called "Colony, Commonwealth and Nation". On the other hand, while Cutshall discusses "Production, Patterns and Problems of Agriculture", "Emerging Industrial Patterns" and "Philippine Commercial Centers, Transportation, and Commerce", Mr. Ravenholt compresses much the

information within the confines of his chapter entitled "The Economy".

The meat of both books can be easily extracted in the course of a fast jet flight from Honolulu to Manila, and this is precisely their value. While based on sound scholarship, they are merely introductions to the Philippine scene designed for people in a hurry. Both suffer from the oversimplications unavoidable in summary studies, though it is remarkable how much factual information they were able to squeeze into 197 and 128 pages of text, respectively. Both books provide short bibliographies of more comprehensive studies of the Philippines for those with time and interest.

Professor Cutshall's treatment is fair and insightful. He constantly reminds the reader that the Philippines should be judged in the context of Asia, and in that perspective it shows up as having one of the most stable governments, one of the best educational systems, one of the soundest economies, and one of the most promising futures of any of the Asian nations. Filipinos would do well to ponder his words:

> Potentially, the Philippines is in a reasonably strong position with respect to industrial development—in fact, in a stronger position than most of its neighbors. Probably no country of comparable size has as great a variety of mineral wealth. Among the basic raw materials of modern industry, only good quality coal is lacking. There is relative economic stability. In Monsoon Asia, the Philippine per capita income is surpassed only by Japan and Malaysia, which should make possible a moderately high ratio of savings and investments without sacrificing educational and health standards. The population has a relatively high level of literacy, more than three-fourths of the people can read and write, and the ratio between population and resources is still small. Together these factors provide a strong basis for the development of a sound economy based on a balance between agriculture, manufacturing, and the extractive industries. Can the government and the people provide the continued mature leadership that is necessary? Can the labor force rise to the challenge before it is too late? (p. 79).

There are a number of small errors of fact which do nothing to detract from the general usefulness of Professor Cutshall's study. To set the record straight, however, it might be well to point out that the Moro sultanates were larger political units than *barangays*, and precisely because of their effectiveness, the Spaniards were unable

to subjugate them to any degree until after the middle of the nineteenth century (p. 11). The United States formally acquired the Philippines by act of the Treaty of Paris in December of 1898, not in February of 1899 (p. 13). There are some 84 or more languages and dialects in the Philippines (p. 37). The national language is not a required course on the college and university level (p. 38). Muslim Filipinos constitute better than 5% of the population (p. 39). There are more than 1800 alien Roman Catholic priests at work in the Philippines; divorce is practiced among Muslim Filipinos; and it is Notre Dame de Jolo not Ateneo de Sulu (no such institution exists) which is operated in Jolo (p. 40) There are six elementary grades in the Philippines, not seven, and it is an overstatement to generalize that Moros are hostile to Philippine rule—some are but most wish to be regarded and respected as loyal citizens of the Republic (p. 42). The City of Davao according to the 1960 Census is the fourth largest in the nation with a population of 225,712 (not 60,000 as reported on page 82).

In Professor Cutshall's excellent summary of Philippine foreign policy, this reviewer was sorry to see no mention of the abortive "Maphilindo"—the formal accord proposed by the Philippines to bind more closely together the three great Malay nations: Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Nor was there any comment on the Philippine attempt to mediate in the serious trouble between Malaysia and Indonesia occasioned by President Sukarno's "Confrontation" policy. Also, the North Borneo question is actually more of an issue than Professor Cutshall wishes to recognize. The Philippines does have a claim—a proprietary claim though not a claim to sovereignty perhaps.

Having waited many hours for "delayed" flights in airports all over the Philippines, this reviewer's only comment on Professor Cutshall's statement (p. 92) that air service is frequent, and exact schedules are maintained is "Ha!"