

The Initial Spanish Foothold in the Philippines*

T. Valentino Sitoy, Jr.

The Spanish Conquest of Cebu

When Legazpi's flagship, the *San Pedro*, and the pinnace *San Juan de Letran* arrived at Cebu on April 27, 1565,¹ what greeted them was the sight of several hundred warriors arrayed for battle on the beach in front of the settlement of Sugbu (Cebu). Undoubtedly, this settlement was the largest in the Visayas, for it appears that aside from Sugbu proper there were houses stretched along the beach to the next settlement to the north. Jesuit Fr. Pedro Chirino, who came to Cebu in 1595, reported that during Legazpi's time the settlement was "so large and populous that it extended a space of more than a *legua* [i.e., about five kilometers] along the beach."² Writing in 1630, the Augustinian chronicler Fray Juan de Medina also said that previously Cebu had stretched along the shore from Mandawe to San Nicolas, the native settlement south of the Spanish city.³

Legazpi sent ashore the fleet's interpreter Geronimo Pacheco with an offer of peace and friendship to Rajah Tupas, the chief of Cebu. Presently there came a prau with an envoy from Tupas, saying that the latter would come to the flagship to speak with Legazpi that same day. But two hours later, another messenger, a Malay-speaking Muslim from Borneo, accompanied by two Cebuanos, came to say that the Cebuanos were frightened at the sight of the strange vessels and that Tupas and his chiefs were getting ready to come and make peace. This Bornean, who had married and had lived for some time in Cebu, added that Tupas had appointed him to serve as interpreter between the Cebuanos and Legazpi. Despite these polite exchanges, it was seen from the fleet that there was much frantic activity in the settlement, as non-combatants took their possessions and fled to the hills on foot or elsewhere by boat.⁴

The following day came and Tupas still did not appear. The Spaniards thought that the Cebuanos were stalling in order to cart away their possessions, food supplies, and domestic animals. Meanwhile, more and more warriors from other settlements arrived in ten or twelve praus, to reinforce those arrayed in groups of 50 to 100 along the beach. By this time, the frigate *San Pablo*, which had been left behind during the passage from Bohol, caught up with the rest of the fleet. Legazpi then

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ordered the master-of-camp Mateo del Saz, Fray Andrés de Urdaneta, the notary Fernando Riquel, and the interpreter Pacheco to approach the shore in a skiff and ask the Cebuanos as "vassals" of the Spanish king to receive the expedition peacefully. A local chief, who claimed to be the governor and captain of Tupas, answered in Malay that he would meet with Legazpi, in place of the rajah who was sick and could not come. Legazpi answered that he would treat and have a blood compact with no one but Rajah Tupas himself. Three times the Spanish emissaries approached the shore to repeat Legazpi's demands—all to no avail; the Cebuanos shot arrows into the skiff on its second trip.

The Spanish Capture of Cebu.

The Cebuanos' refusal, as might be expected under the circumstances, gave Legazpi the justification to commence hostilities. As his own account later put it:

...At length—seeing that all our good intentions were of no avail, and that all the natives had put on their wooden corselets and rope armor and had armed themselves with their lances, shields, small cutlasses, and arrows; and that help of men had come in praus from the outside, so that their number must be almost two thousand warriors; and considering that *now was the time for us to make a settlement and effect a colony, and that the present port and location were exactly suited to our needs,* and that it was useless for us to wait any longer; and seeing that there was no hope for peace, and that they did not wish it, although we had offered it—the master-of-camp said to the natives through an interpreter: 'Since you do not desire our friendship, and will not receive us peacefully, but are anxious for war, wait until we have landed; and look to it that you act as men, and defend yourselves from us, and guard your houses.' The Indians answered boldly: 'Be it so! Come on! We await you here.' And thereupon they broke into loud cries, covering themselves with their shields and brandishing their lances.⁵ [italics supplied]

Hostilities immediately began. The Cebuanos attacked the skiff, while the Spaniards at once commenced bombardment and landing operations. Legazpi's account goes on to say that in accordance with the orders apparently previously given the fleet's gunners, "some shots were fired from the ship upon the multitude of praus anchored near a promontory, as well as at the landsmen upon the shore, and upon the town."⁶ Thus it is difficult to maintain that the Spanish action at Cebu was without premeditation. One of the shots directed at the town started a blaze—though there was later an attempt to suggest that the Cebuanos might have set the fire themselves—which razed about a hundred bamboo and nipa houses.⁷ This unprecedented experience of bombardment discon-

certed the Cebuanos, who broke and ran. Some of the praus managed to flee, but others were simply beached, their occupants rushing inland with the rest of the population.

Soon after Cebu fell into Spanish hands Legazpi ordered Saz and the captains to attack another settlement, probably Mandawe, not more than a league away, where the fleeing praus were seen to have headed. The Spaniards arrived there before dawn, and the people fled leaving quantities of millet as well as pigs and goats. The Spaniards soon came upon another coastal settlement a little farther away, perhaps Liloan, where they were engaged in a daring skirmish by some 300 native warriors. But the arquebusiers soon had the upper hand and beat them off.⁸

Meanwhile, the Spaniards had occupied the settlement of Sugbu. Legazpi ordered his men to take their quarters in private houses, four to a mess. The rest of the dwellings still standing, after being stripped of all useful articles, were destroyed. All in all, more than two-thirds of the settlement was razed to the ground.⁹

The Discovery of the Santo Niño.

It was in the course of rummaging for provisions and valuables that a Basque sailor named Juan de Camuz,¹⁰ a native of Bermeo in Vizcaya, came upon an image of the *Santo Niño* (the Holy Child) in a small house, one of the more modest and humble in Cebu. Also found were two cannons, one of iron and the other of bronze. Although the Spaniards thought the cannons remnants of the Spanish expedition of Magellan, they were probably of Bornean origin. These pieces were never used against Legazpi's troops,¹¹ and probably served more for ceremonial than war purposes.

It was the finding of the *Santo Niño*, however, which excited interest. Done in the Flanders style, with loose shirt and velvet hat, the image was still in its pine cradle. In a notarized statement before Legazpi, corroborated by the testimony of several others, Camuz some three weeks later said that upon finding the image, he had immediatly set up a makeshift bamboo cross on top of the house and had shared his discovery with a soldier named Esteban Rodriguez.¹² A few days afterwards the Spaniards learned from some Cebuanos that the house in which the image was found belonged to "no person of importance, and there dwelt in it only a slave."¹³ Beyond this the Cebuanos knew nothing, even as to how the image came to be in their settlement. In all probability, however, this was the same religious object given by Padre Pedro de Valderrama of the

Magellan expedition to the chief wife of Rajah Humabon when she was baptized in 1521. But the fact that the Cebuanos of 1565 could not tell anything about the image is good evidence that nothing more than this material object remained of that endeavor which resulted in the precipitate baptism of the Cebuanos some forty-four years earlier.¹⁴ Neither is there any evidence that, as suggested by Fr. Pedro Chirino, rector of the Jesuit college at Cebu about 1595, the Cebuanos had recognized the image as that of the *diwata* of the Castilians and had accordingly made sacrifices to it, anointing it with oils as they customarily did to their idols.¹⁵

In any case, this discovery apparently strengthened the Spaniards' resolve to settle in Cebu. Legazpi ordered that the image be reverently placed in the first church built, and that this be called the church of the *Santisimo Nombre de Jesus* (Most Holy Name of Jesus). Ten days later, on the eighth of May, the Spaniards commenced building their fort, a triangular palisade of stakes commanding the sea. A site was also chosen for the Spanish quarters, while another, measuring 175 meters square, was given to the Augustinian friars for their monastery and church, to be built on the site of the house where the image was found.¹⁶ At the urging of the Augustinians a confraternity of the Most Blessed Name of Jesus was also established, patterned after that of San Agustin in Mexico City.¹⁷ The majority of the expedition joined as members. This religious society served to inspire the Spaniards to persevere in that hostile environment, half-way around the globe from their homeland.

Meanwhile, the Cebuanos, watching all this activity from a safe distance, quickly realized that the Spaniards meant to stay. From the first day of the Spanish occupation of Cebu the enraged Cebuanos attacked the Spanish camp each night, giving no rest to the sentries and placing the whole force in a state of constant alert. On the night of May 8, the very day when the Spaniards began building their fort, the Cebuanos managed to set fire to the houses that the Spanish soldiers and sailors had appropriated for their use. Fortunately for the Spaniards, they were able to extinguish the blaze before it razed their entire encampment. These nightly attacks continued for several weeks, except for three days when, as will be seen shortly, peace negotiations, later aborted, took place between Legazpi and Rajah Tupas.¹⁸ Indeed, on May 28, 1565, the royal officials Guido de Lavezaris, Andrés Cauchela, and Andrés de Mirandaola wrote King Philip II that "since the day of our arrival up to this day we have not found a single friend in this entire archipelago."¹⁹ Strangely enough, it does not seem to have occurred to them that they were intruding on someone else's territory. They attributed the hostility to the Portuguese-

Ternatan raid on Bohol and Limasawa about 1563, which, while certainly a factor in the Visayans' animosity, was not as great a reason as the Spanish invasion and occupation of Cebu. The officials added, moreover, that the Cebuanos were a "war-like and vicious people," full of wicked customs; they implored Philip II to send more soldiers, friars, and clerics for the political and spiritual conquest of these people and those in the surrounding region.²⁰

The Conduct of the Castilian Conquerors.

If the Spaniards had not up to this time made any progress towards their objectives, it was perhaps because their conduct had shown no evidence that they had come for any but malevolent purposes. They continually aggravated the hostility of the Cebuanos. Many times foraging parties sallied forth from the Spanish camp to scour the surrounding countryside for food supplies, and "always brought back chickens, pigs, rice, and other foodstuffs, while some returned with fine gold, porcelains, and other good things found in the land."²¹ One can very well imagine how the Cebuanos must have viewed this regular looting of their possessions by unwelcome strangers, whose presence, moreover, not only deprived them of their traditional abode but also disrupted their regular economic activities.

To be sure, the Spaniards were apparently driven to this resort by the fact that they had no other means of sustaining themselves. But what must have been unforgivable to the Cebuanos was the manner in which the fine gold and porcelains, from an initially undetermined source, came into the hands of the foraging parties. Legazpi soon found, as his subsequent proclamation tells, that "many Spanish soldiers and sailors have opened in this island of Zebu many graves and burial places of the native Indians and have found therein a quantity of gold and other jewels."²² His findings prompted him to take drastic measures. But Legazpi was disturbed, not by the act of pillage and desecration *per se*, but by the fact that the scavengers were cheating the King of his share of the loot. As he put it, "the persons opening [these graves] and finding therein the said gold have not made a report thereof to his excellency nor to His Majesty's officials, so that His Majesty may collect and have his royal fifths and rights."²³

On the other hand, dismayed that their strategy of starving out the Spaniards was not succeeding, the Cebuanos ultimately were forced to consider the idea of accommodating to the new state of affairs and to the

reality of Spanish presence in their land. On May 16,²⁴ two Cebuano chiefs and more than thirty warriors came to sue for peace, apparently in the hope of putting an end to the incessant forays of the Spanish food parties and the desecration of their sacred grounds. By coincidence, that day also happened to be the occasion when the Spaniards carried in a procession the image of the Holy Child to the newly constructed makeshift church. The contemporary Spanish account of these events says that the Cebuano visitors admired the solemnity of the proceedings,²⁵ though it is more probable that the latter were simply intrigued by the strangeness of the Spaniards' religious rites and by the reverence they paid to the image found in the slave's house. This Cebuano embassy did not seem to have had any definite proposals to make. After briefly speaking with Legazpi, the chiefs and their retainers left. Not many days afterwards, another chief claiming to be Rajah Tupas's own brother came to make peace on his behalf. But Legazpi, apparently sensing a weakening on the part of the Cebuanos, insisted that he would treat only with Tupas himself, so the chief made a blood compact only with master-of-camp Mateo del Saz. The nightly attacks against the Spaniards continued, though now some Cebuanos were coming to the Spanish camp and native praus were coasting near the anchored fleet during the day.

It was not until about a week after his brother's visit that Rajah Tupas himself was coaxed to appear, in the company of a chief called Datu Tamuñan and some forty or fifty retainers. After the Mass and sermon which the Cebuanos were invited to watch, Legazpi informed Tupas that the Spaniards had come in the name of the King of Castile "whose vassals and slaves they were."²⁶ Legazpi then added that the Castilian king would pardon the Cebuanos for their treachery against Magellan, on condition that they would accept the Spaniards as friends and provide them with food supplies. One would have to credit the Cebuanos with sufficient intelligence to realize that this was simple robbery under their very noses. Visibly disturbed at the mention of Magellan's name and knowing that his people had nothing to stop Spanish cannons and muskets, Rajah Tupas for the moment could only accede. But once safely back in their retreats, the Cebuanos regained their courage and decided not to appear at the time appointed for the conclusion of the disadvantageous treaty.

On the morning of May 23, a Spanish sailor named Pedro de Arana, who had foolishly wandered too far from the Spanish camp, beyond the protection of the muskets, was brutally attacked and slain.²⁷ The deed was the handiwork of Datu Dagami, of Gabi on Mactan Island, who

had made a pact with four other chiefs to kill all Spaniards they could lay their hands on, and who had clandestinely landed with some seventeen warriors opposite the Spanish camp the night before. The raiders made off with Arana's head and subsequently celebrated a rousing victory feast in Gabi.²⁸

But little did the Cebuanos seem to have realized the determination of their somewhat desperate invaders. As reprisal, the Spaniards sent out punitive expeditions, one of which entered a village at dawn and captured more than twenty Cebuanos. The prize hostages were two high-born women (one of whom was Rajah Tupas's own niece) and two children of a chief.²⁹ This was about the beginning of June 1565, when the flagship *San Pedro* left to discover the return route to Mexico. The ship took with it a complement of 210 sailors and soldiers; although Legazpi was left with only 170 men, he was apparently confident that the hostages he held precluded the possibility of a Cebuano attack.

The Surrender of the Cebuano Chiefs.

Legazpi's diplomatic skill and adroit exploitation of his advantage deriving from the seizure of the hostages finally won the day. Almost immediately, one of Tupas's brothers came with six retainers to seek the release of his daughter. This, however, proved fruitless, as Legazpi demanded the appearance of Tupas himself as condition for the release of the captives.³⁰ After feelers through a Muslim named Sidamit (apparently the same man who came on board Legazpi's flagship before the battle of Cebu), who spoke to Legazpi through the interpreter Pacheco, two local chiefs named Sicatepan and Simaquo, who identified themselves as Rajah Tupas's brothers, eventually came to the Spanish camp.³¹ Simaquo, the husband of one of the hostages and the father of the two children, brought many gifts and pleaded to be taken in place of his wife and children — even if he were to be made a slave and taken to Spain. Legazpi now pushed forward his advantage, and insisted on the necessity of a joint peace treaty with Rajah Tupas and the other chiefs, so that it could be ascertained, Legazpi said, who wanted peace and who did not. He made it clear that the hostages, whom he declared to be under his personal protection, were to remain in Spanish custody until all the Cebuano chiefs had made their submission.³²

In the end, Rajah Tupas, his son Pisuncan (in his early twenties), and several other chiefs — Sicatepan, Sibatumay, Simaquo, Sicabun, Sigiguin, Sibatala, Silinti, Sicarlie, and Sicagumo — were all forced to

accede. The only one who refused to appear was Datu Dagami, who was responsible for Arana's murder. In token of their submission the chiefs were all made to kneel before Legazpi and declare themselves Spanish vassals. As if it were sufficient to assuage this humiliating surrender, all were given presents of garments, mirrors, strings of beads, and pieces of blue glass. With skillful persuasion, Legazpi also extracted from them universal consent to the erection of a Spanish fort, on the pretext that the Spaniards needed "a strong house, in which to keep and place under guard the articles of barter and the merchandise brought to this land, as well as artillery and ammunition."³³

Legazpi also asked that a tract of land be granted to the Spanish soldiers for their townsite, which demand the chiefs, after their initial act of submission, could not now refuse. The limits of this land determined, Legazpi went through the ceremony of taking possession of the area, which covered the original settlement of Sugbu. He had all the Cebuanos stand outside the demarcation lines, and the Spaniards within. Then passing from one corner to another, he lopped branches off trees on the Spanish side, thus taking possession in the name of the King of Spain.³⁴ This act seems to have been for the benefit of the Cebuanos, for earlier, on May 8, Legazpi had taken possession of the whole island of Cebu and its neighboring islands.³⁵ Rajah Tupas and his chiefs, realizing too late the logical consequences of their original submission but bound by oath to keep their part of the bargain, helplessly watched the proceedings.

According to the treaty agreed on, Cebuanos and Spaniards were to aid one another in case of attack by hostile forces, and were entitled to equal shares of the spoils of battle. Each side was likewise obliged to return any fugitive slave or any other person who might go over to one camp or the other. A barter agreement was also reached whereby food supplies were to be traded for European articles at previously fixed prices. All these provisions seemed mutually beneficial at first glance, but in fact constituted a Spanish victory, for their intrusive presence had now gained a measure of Cebuano recognition. Moreover, other articles of agreement clearly gave the Spaniards the better deal. For example, any Cebuano who committed a wrong against any Spaniard had to be surrendered to the Spanish camp for the appropriate punishment. But any Spaniard who offended a Cebuano was to be tried not by the local chiefs but by Legazpi. No Cebuano might enter the Spanish camp carrying weapons of any kind, on pain of punishment by Legazpi. But nothing was said about Spaniards entering Cebuano settlements in a similar manner. The Cebuanos were also told that that year they need not pay any trib-

ute until after their harvest (for which they were supposed to be grateful), "for the King of Castile had no need of their possessions, nor wanted more than that they recognized him as lord, since they were his [vassals] and were within his domains" (*dentro su demarcación*).³⁶

Only after these proceedings were completed did the Spaniards release the hostages. For the moment, the joy of reunited families dispelled the shadowy implications of the agreements which the Cebuanos had been coerced to commit themselves to. In effect, Rajah Tupas and his chiefs were constrained, through adroit diplomacy, to submit to the Spanish *conquistadores* and grant them extra-territorial jurisdiction. The Cebuanos, on the other hand, were forced to give their word of honor to comply with the terms of this unequal treaty, before they had fully realized what they had gotten themselves into.

Much fraternizing followed this treaty, and a number of Cebuano chiefs who had hitherto refused to make peace with Legazpi came to do so. The Spaniards got the food supplies they wanted, while the Cebuanos, despite Legazpi's strict prohibition, also managed to acquire pieces of iron, which individual soldiers and sailors bartered for extra items of food. Moreover, to the dismay of Legazpi, who found himself unable to stop it, many local women prostituted themselves throughout the Spanish camp.³⁷ It was also during this time that a woman said to be Tupas's niece, whom he had sent to serve Legazpi, was baptized along with two servant children. But though it seemed the dawning of a new day, the fact was that this amicable relationship was but a temporary release of tension in the confrontation which had begun with the Spaniards' arrival.

The Years of Uneasy Peace: 1565-1569

The period 1565-1569 may be regarded as a time of uneasy peace in the Visayas. The Spaniards had gained a foothold in the central Philippine islands, though for a number of years their position was as precarious as their ability to sustain themselves was uncertain. On the surface, the Cebuanos seemed to have quickly accommodated themselves to their new status as a conquered people, though there was a smoldering resentment which menaced the Spaniards simply by refusing to dissipate itself. Before long, it appeared that both Spaniards and Cebuanos were exploiting this condition of uneasy peace as far as they could to their own advantages. The Spaniards seemed eager to help the Cebuanos in subduing the latter's enemies and rivals, for, on the pretext of assisting their native allies they were actually attempting to expand their control

in the Visayas. On the other hand; Rajah Tupas, while taking advantage of Spanish assistance to subdue those villages which did not submit to him,³⁸ apparently tried to limit as much as possible the extent of Spanish control over his friends.

Oblique Visayan Resistance to Spanish Presence.

Despite Rajah Tupas's promises, Legazpi knew that the wily chief was actually working against Spanish interests. The best illustration of this duplicity was the way Tupas cleverly prevented the islanders of Mactan from submitting to the Spaniards. On the pretext that he would personally attempt to convince them to accept Spanish offers of friendship, Tupas spent three days on that island, but came back to report that the people of the villages of Mactan and "Gain" (Gavi, or Gabi) had fled to other islands hostile to Cebu. This, says a contemporary Spanish account, subsequently turned out to be a mere "fiction or double deal" (*ficción o trato doble*), which Legazpi tactfully accepted at face value.³⁹

Legazpi knew that the people of Mactan and a few other places secretly conspired with those of Cebu against the Spaniards, boasting of sooner or later slaying them to the last man or at least driving them out through hunger.⁴⁰ That there was some truth to this view may be shown by the fact that although the Spaniards had difficulty in obtaining food supplies from the Cebuanos, when Tagalog Muslim traders from Luzon and Mindoro came to Cebu in 1565, they were able to purchase "chickens, goats and other food items" which they in turn sold at exorbitant prices to the half-famished Spaniards.⁴¹

Occasionally, those who refused submission to Legazpi raided those settlements which had done so. This was the sad experience of the village of "Mandam" (Mandawe), which was attacked by people from western Leyte. Some eight or ten Mandawe villagers were slain, and more than twenty others including their chief, Datu Tabduc, taken into captivity. This incident is usually cited in illustration of the endemic internecine warfare among the Filipinos, which Spanish rule happily brought to an end. But the original Spanish account of this incident, stressing at several points that the people of Mandawe "are our friends" or "vassals of His Majesty, our friends," does not preclude the possibility — and in fact, even suggests it — that this raid on a friendly settlement not too far from the Spanish camp took place precisely because the victims had accepted Spanish friendship.⁴²

Lacking the necessary arms to combat Spanish muskets and cannons, the Cebuanos resorted to cleverness and guile, confirming the Spaniards' scorn for them as a perfidious and treacherous race. Thus, when Captain Martín de Goyti led a punitive expedition to Leyte — which served as the refuge for those Cebuanos who refused submission to Legazpi — the guide, Datu Simaquo, deliberately took him not to the chief settlement of Baybay but to the relatively unimportant village of "Caramucua" (Caramuan?). Naturally, the village was deserted by the time the Spaniards got there. Moreover, at Calabazan the local inhabitants, who were responsible for the Mandawe raid, duped Goyti by pretending that they were themselves Cebuanos. They asked Goyti and his men to wait in the village for two days, for them to bring in the chiefs of the surrounding settlements. But while the Spaniards waited, the Calabazan inhabitants dispersed into the hills and disappeared, as did the expedition's Cebuano guide. Earlier, Simaquo had insisted that his agreed task was simply to take the Spaniards across the sea to Leyte, not to go tramping with Goyti in the hills.⁴³

It would appear that the Visayans hoped to force the Spaniards to leave because of scarcity of food supplies, or to wear out their patience, or to sap their military capability through guerrilla warfare. They preferred ambushes to direct confrontation. Neither did they attack anywhere within the recognized limits of a particular settlement, which might subsequently be subjected to Spanish reprisals, but in more or less open territory where it was impossible to tell the village of origin of the assailants. Thus, while the Cabalian people professed friendship, Goyti lost five men in an ambush at a location only five kilometers away, and on another occasion he lost two more. Moreover, while the Spaniards at this time, as noted elsewhere, were impressed with the richness and abundance of Cebu, it would also appear that the Cebuanos either hid or undervalued their farm produce, or at least refrained from planting much beyond what they needed themselves. They willingly guided Spanish food-hunting parties to other islands, where — if the local inhabitants had been adequately forewarned, as it would appear they invariably were — the Spaniards would find just enough provisions to maintain the "credibility" of their guides. As a Spanish account of 1565 puts it:

Generally, almost all, whether friends or enemies, vied with one another to expel us from this place through hunger, which is clearly seen in the fact that the people of Zubu and of other villages in the vicinity who were at peace with us neither sowed nor cultivated their fields, and sought to keep us hungry; and all who were given money to buy rice and [other] provisions failed to do so—no one brought back anything, nor found any-

thing to buy, and with other lies and duplicities (*cautelas*)... explained why it was not possible to bring back anything.⁴⁵

It was the insufficiency of food supplies which soon became the most serious problem for the Spaniards in Cebu. There is also evidence to suggest that the Spaniards grew more vicious the longer this condition lasted. An Augustinian account of 1574, in recalling the events at Cebu during these uneasy years, has the advantage of both perspective and hindsight.

The manner in which [the Spaniards] sought to sustain themselves while they were on this Island of Zubu was to go at first to the more immediate villages, and then to others much further, not only on Zubu but also on the neighboring islands. Striking at dawn, they seized the provisions, as well as gold and jewelry, that they found in the houses, killed many of the inhabitants when these sought to defend themselves, or at times forced these to flee on account of their great fear and the cruelty of the Spaniards.

This mode of pacifying the land lasted for some time. Afterwards they went about this business with slightly greater rigor, for they did not find enough to eat, on account of the fact that they robbed of their gold those who bought food provisions to sell in the camp, and those whom they took alive they enslaved — all these with the authorization of the governor [Legazpi], who took his own share of the booty and slaves, ordering a fifth to be set aside for His Majesty, which was then entrusted to the officials of the royal treasury. Thus was destroyed the greater part of that island of Zubu, causing the death of many inhabitants from hunger and the depopulation of many villages, because their provisions, wealth, women and children having been seized, they became restive, neither daring to remain in their homes nor sowing their fields.⁴⁶

Thus it was that the Spanish search for food began to extend from Cebu into the neighboring islands.

But in some cases, the Cebu chiefs led the Spanish food-hunting parties to native settlements of doubtful persuasion, as when some of them took a party of 100 men under Captains Saz and Goyti to the island of Negros at the end of September 1565. At that time, the Spaniards' daily ration had become a small amount of millet per person per day. The Cebuanos promised that there would be plenty of rice to buy at the settlement of "Tanay" (Tanjay) on the eastern coast of the island of Buglas (i.e., Negros). But the guides landed first at another settlement apparently not too far from Tanjay and remained there two days, with nothing to show for their efforts but a little grain (*borona*), not to mention the fact that one Spanish soldier was slain at that place by the hostile inhabitants.

Not surprisingly, by the time the Spanish party arrived at Tanjay the settlement had been deserted, and the only provisions they obtained were a little rice collected from various abandoned houses. The Spaniards

remained in Tanjay more than fifteen days, with no advantageous result. They likewise found another settlement not far away deserted upon their arrival; while in yet a third, the people fled as the food-hunting party approached. Across the river from this third settlement was a fourth, the inhabitants of which at first promised to sell the Spaniards some rice within three days. But by the end of that period the entire village had absconded into the hills under cover of night, leaving nothing behind.⁴⁷ The Spaniards subsequently learned from a local inhabitant that a man from Bohol, a refugee from the Portuguese-Ternatan attack, had warned the people of eastern Negros to be wary of the Spaniards.⁴⁸ As the Cebuanos were known — Legazpi himself was aware of it⁴⁹ — to have dissuaded other Visayans from submitting to the invaders, it is interesting to speculate as to the extent the Cebuano guides were responsible for the failure of this fooding-hunting expedition.

What temporarily staved off the hunger of the Spaniards was the arrival in October 1565 of a prau owned by an enterprising Muslim trader from Manila named Mahomat, who brought from Panay 200 *quintales* (9.2 tons) of rice, which he sold at Cebu, half to the Spaniards and half to the Cebuanos, at moderate prices. When he left, Legazpi in his gratitude sent through Mahomat greetings and an overture to exchange envoys with "the king of Luzon."⁵⁰ Stringent as the Spanish attitude generally was to Muslims in the Philippines, it is interesting to note that it was a Muslim trader who once gave them relief at Cebu.

A Question of Endurance and Survival.

These supplies gave the Spaniards only temporarily relief. The rice rapidly dwindled, so that late the following month a plot was hatched by certain men to desert and return to Mexico. After the abortive mutiny was quelled, Legazpi was forced to resort to asking the chiefs of Cebu to purchase food from other islands. The wily Datu Simaquio volunteered to go to Panay to buy rice, in return for gold and an iron cannon. Legazpi provided him with gold enough to buy twelve containers (*cestos*) of rice. Another Muslim trader named Vapasilao also offered to go, apparently to Leyte, on a similar errand for the same reward.⁵¹ But when they did not return within the expected period with the much-needed provisions, Legazpi ordered Goyti to take with him a party of 100 soldiers to places reportedly at war with Cebu and there obtain food supplies. By this time, hunger had driven some Spanish soldiers to eating cats and rats.⁵² Yet up to January 1566, Goyti managed to bring back only three meager loads of grain.

When Datu Simaquio, after an absence of three months, returned from Panay on January 6, he did bring some rice, but tempered this good news with a sad story. He ruefully recounted that he had loaded four or five praus but that one of these had been lost in a storm. When the boats (actually numbering seven!) came in the following day, Legazpi was dismayed to hear that three of these belonged to "Panay traders" who, reportedly, had simply come along with Simaquio, and that another belonged to Rajah Tupas, so that what actually belonged to Legazpi was only three *cestos* of rice, amounting to 90 *fanegas*, not even 1100 gallons of grain. Although he knew that all these were lies, Legazpi could do nothing. From the "Panay traders," some of whom "were married to Cebu women and had relatives" there, Legazpi bought another 90 *fanegas*, more or less, which he had to pay for in gold, for the traders would accept no other form of payment.⁵³

From these incidents, it would appear that although the Cebuanos suffered along with the Spaniards by refusing to cultivate and sow their fields, they knew where to get food. Was their "fast" a calculated risk, which they felt they would survive and the Spaniards would not? One wonders why it took Datu Simaquio three whole months to secure rice from Panay. It goes without saying that he could have made several trips during that period, landing on the western coast of Cebu out of the Spaniards' ken, and returning to the Spanish camp when further delay would not be credible.

By the latter half of 1566, however, the various Spanish food-hunting parties were ranging far and wide among the Visayan islands and in Mindanao, and were beginning to bring in rice and other foodstuffs regularly. Some Ilonggo traders from Panay also came with rice to sell, at one time bringing eight or nine praus.⁵⁴ Thus, whatever else may have been in the minds of the Cebuanos, they soon realized that their plans to starve out the Spaniards were difficult to achieve. There were far too many places which were being forced to give "tribute" of food supplies to the Spanish conquerors.

However, there was at least one chief from the island of Negros who managed to stay on good terms with Legazpi without having to pay tribute. This enterprising man, Siumbas, chief of the coastal village of "Tilavan" or "Ticagluan" with a population of 330, came to the Spanish camp toward the end of 1566. Earlier, the pinnace *San Juan de Letran* under the command of Captain Saz had gone to his district, forcing a neighboring village to sue for peace, though at that time Siumbas and his people managed to flee to the hills. Probably to prevent another visit

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by the Spaniards, Siumbas claimed that he came voluntarily to offer himself as a vassal of the Spanish king, and that for this purpose he had started with a prau laden with rice as tribute to Legazpi. Unfortunately, some six or seven leagues from Cebu the prau was lost in a storm, and he and his men barely were able to save themselves. Siumbas then promised that by the next harvest he would bring 330 *fanegas* of rice, one for each of his people, as tribute. Legazpi was deeply gratified by this generous offer and gave Siumbas some necklaces and other things before sending him home.⁵⁵ Strangely enough, Legazpi does not seem to have heard anything from Datu Siumbas again! When some forty Spaniards went to "Ticagluan" the following May, to collect what Siumbas had promised, they came back empty-handed.⁵⁶

Despite all these experiences, Legazpi up to 1569 continued to maintain his optimistic view that tact and diplomacy would eventually win over the simple Filipinos and make them willingly submit to be ruled in their homeland by a foreign invader. As Legazpi put it:

I believe that these natives will be easy to subdue through kindness and charity. . . . If some of them at first refuse to come in peace, well, the good treatment shown to those who have accepted our friendship will incline them to do the same. But if we subjugate them by force of arms and war, they will perish and [we shall lose both friend and foe], for they readily abandon their houses and towns for other habitations, or disperse among the mountains and sierras, and neglect to sow their fields, and thus die from hunger and misadventures.⁵⁷

Succeeding years were to show how overly-optimistic Legazpi had been in his ethnocentric-based views, both in terms of his captains' ability to refrain from rapacity and of what he thought to be attractive blessings sufficient to make the Filipinos want to be subjected to Spanish rule. The Augustinian Fray Diego de Herrera was more straight-forward in his letter to King Philip II, January 1570, in which he reported that many of the Cebuanos —

fled and deserted their villages, and those who remained, determined not to cultivate nor sow their fields, believing that by this strategy of resistance (*ardid de guerra*) they could drive us from their land. Consequently, they and we have suffered great extremities, because the same thing was done in other islands where the Spaniards had gone to find food, so much so that many times [the people] have removed their food more than four leagues inland, carrying it upon their shoulders and crossing creeks and rivers, at great risk to their lives.⁵⁸

There is also some ground for suggesting that occasionally the Cebuanos did undertake more direct sabotage against the Spaniards. A mys-

terious fire broke out in the Spanish camp on All Saints' Day in 1565, "just about the hour of Mass" (*casi a hora de Misa*),⁵⁹ razing more than twenty houses. On another occasion poisoned drink, probably *tuba* (fermented coconut sap), was sold by some women to the Spanish soldiers, resulting in two deaths and the illness of several others.⁶⁰ And on top of all these difficulties, the Spaniards had to contend with the continuing murmurs of discontent within their camp, leading to more abortive mutinies and attempts on the part of some to return to Mexico or desert to the Portuguese at Malacca.⁶¹

Spanish-Portuguese Confrontation at Cebu.

As noted earlier, the Portuguese were not unaware that Legazpi had sailed with four vessels across the Pacific to contest their Asian monopoly. Thus, before long a Portuguese fleet under the command of Admiral Gonzalo de Pereyra Marrañaque sailed from India to look for Legazpi in Philippine waters. Early in November 1566 a small frigate commanded by the master-of-camp Mateo del Saz, who was bound for Kawit on the western coast of Mindanao to take on a load of cinnamon, encountered off the coast of Dapitan a Portuguese fusta which was part of Pereyra's fleet. The Spaniards pretended that they were lost sailors, feigning innocence by asking the names of nearby islands. The Portuguese captain, Antonio de Sequeira, was not fooled, however, and there nearly erupted a battle, prevented only by the fact that neither vessel seemed eager for a fight.⁶² Saz hurried back to Cebu, the Portuguese vessel not losing sight of him till he eluded it in a storm. The following evening, while Saz was passing Siquijor Island, he encountered a Portuguese squadron of four ships refitting after the storm. This time it was Saz who demanded of the Portuguese who they were. Probably thinking that there were other hostile vessels nearby, the Portuguese answered that they were "Castilians." Saz prudently decided not to argue. As he came to southern Cebu he saw two more Portuguese vessels, which sight was sufficient to cause him to speed home.⁶³

By now both Iberian parties were well aware of the other's presence. For three days and nights, Legazpi made hectic preparations for battle. The Cebuanos took their women and children inland or to other coastal settlements, perhaps remembering the havoc wrought by the *Prangis* and their Ternatan allies on Bohol and Limasawa a few years earlier. Remembering also their promise to aid the Spaniards in time of war, some Cebuanos volunteered to fight against the Portuguese. Legazpi knew that he had scored a diplomatic victory, and he pushed

forward his advantage by graciously declining the offer, saying it was going to be a Spaniards' fight.⁶⁴ This must have sounded reasonable enough to the Cebuanos, for after all, if the Europeans fought among themselves the end result might be the Spaniards' departure from Cebu. In this particular case the Cebuano attitude was probably no different from that of the people of Kawit on the Zamboanga peninsula, who about this same time attacked a company belonging to Pereyra's fleet while they were washing their clothes in a river. Some forty Portuguese and Malabar Indian recruits were killed, while two skiffs and two or three cannons were captured. Five Malabar Indian captives were subsequently sold as slaves to Jolo.⁶⁵ Months later a Spanish cinnamon-buying party saw some of the people of Kawit sporting Portuguese *saraguelles* (breeches), shirts, and bonnets.

Two Portuguese fustas did appear at Cebu on November 19, 1566. Though they pretended to have been simply separated from their fleet of eight vessels bound from Goa to the Moluccas, there was no doubt that their main purpose was to gauge Spanish strength. Early the following July two Moluccan *caracoas*, bearing two Portuguese captains, a dozen Portuguese soldiers, and 140 Moluccan warriors, appeared in Cebu.⁶⁶ They carried a letter from Admiral Pereyra accusing the Spaniards of occupying territory belonging to the King of Portugal and advising Legazpi to quit the islands and go to the Moluccas, where he and his men would be given Portuguese assistance to return to Spain.⁶⁷ As might be expected, Legazpi refused to be cowed by the Portuguese threats. There followed a few anxious months, but at the end of that year there arrived from Mexico two galleons bearing 300 soldiers to reinforce the meager Spanish garrison.⁶⁸

Fifteen months later, on October 2, 1568, the main Portuguese force under Admiral Pereyra, composed of four galleons, three galiots, and three fustas, sailed into view. When Legazpi refused to surrender and go to Goa,⁶⁹ Pereyra blockaded Cebu and bombarded the settlement, destroying the Spanish fort and all the Cebuano houses along the shore. The Portuguese siege was to last for three months. To starve out the Spaniards, the invaders sent landing parties to burn some seven or eight Cebuano settlements and their rice fields.⁷⁰ The Portuguese reportedly tried to convince the Cebuanos that their land "belongs to the King of Portugal," and that the Spaniards had come to steal it. Therefore, all those who befriended the Spanish rogues must be slain. The Portuguese also added that many native towns, especially those along the coasts of

Mindanao, had already expressed their desire for peace (with Portugal!) by withdrawing their friendship from the Spaniards.⁷¹

But if the Cebuanos were placed in the position of having to make a choice between the Spaniards and the Portuguese, the Spaniards were not spared problems. At the height of the Portuguese siege, the Spanish soldiers, said Fray Diego de Herrera (who in the same breath spoke of Cebu as an "abundant land"), were forced "to hunt rats" for food.⁷² Thus goaded by the extremities in which they were excruciatingly placed, and persuaded by Portuguese propaganda and promises, a number of Legazpi's men passed over to the Portuguese camp.⁷³

The Spaniards did move to the island of Panay late in 1569, not only for fear of the Portuguese but also because they no longer could sustain themselves in Cebu.⁷⁴ But if the Cebuanos thought that they had gotten rid of the Europeans, they were sorely mistaken. As it turned out, Legazpi was promptly ordered by the viceroy of New Spain not to abandon Cebu.⁷⁵ Legazpi attended to the establishment of a permanent Spanish settlement at Cebu just before he set out from Panay for the conquest of Manila.

The Pioneer Christian Missionaries

The First Augustinians.

The Augustinians were the pioneer Christian missionaries in the Philippines, in the truest sense of the word. Four Augustinian priests and one lay brother accompanied the Legazpi expedition. Their instructions were to preach the Gospel, baptize those who accepted the Christian faith and admit them into the Catholic Church, and teach the new converts their religious duties. They were also authorized to serve as preachers and confessors, administer the sacraments, and establish convents of their order.⁷⁶ To assist them in their missionary labors, Legazpi was instructed by the Royal Audiencia of Mexico to, among other things, erect near the Spanish fort as soon as this was built a church and convent for the friars. Legazpi's instructions go on to say:

You must take special care that in all your dealings with the indigenous inhabitants, you must always have present with you some of the friars, not only that you might avail yourselves of their good counsel, but also so that, seeing the great reverence that the soldiers have for them, the natives might also show them the same. This will be of great importance when the friars shall have learnt their language, or will have interpreters to preach to the natives the teachings of our Holy Catholic Faith. Therefore, know that His Majesty's more important intention is the advance of our Holy Catholic Faith and the salvation of the souls of those heathen.⁷⁷

Legazpi was then given instructions on how to assist the Augustinians further, indicating the close identification between Spain's politico-commercial and religious objectives in Asia.

Two of the first Augustinian arrivals, the Basque sailor-priest and veteran of the Loaysa expedition Fray Andrés de Urdaneta and Fray Andrés de Aguirre, had to return to Mexico in June 1565 with Legazpi's son, Don Melchor. From there Urdaneta went to Spain to submit his report in person to King Philip II. Thus, the first actual Augustinian missionaries in the Philippines were the three friars who stayed behind, Fray Diego de Herrera (d. 1576),⁷⁸ Fray Martín de Rada (1533-1578), the scholar among this first batch of Augustinians,⁷⁹ and the lay brother Pedro Gamboa, although Gamboa not long afterwards also returned to Mexico on account of ill health. It might be added that in October 1566 there also arrived on board the galleon *San Gerónimo*, in the capacity of chaplain of the troops, a secular priest named Don Juan de Vivero.⁸⁰ He was followed the next year by three other priests, Don Juan de Villanueva, Don Juan de Vivante, and Don Nicolás Riccio.⁸¹ It would appear, however, that these seculars ministered only to the Spanish colonists.

The Friars' First Converts.

It was not long before the Augustinians won their first convert—reportedly a niece of Rajah Tupas whom the latter had sent to the Spanish camp to serve Legazpi. She had been given European clothes and instructed in the Christian faith upon her arrival. At her own request, she was baptized by Fray Diego de Herrera, along with her three-year-old son and two child servants. It seems that Rajah Tupas had intended her to serve as Legazpi's concubine, as part of the Cebuanos' way of sealing the treaty with the Spaniards. But after her baptism, Isabel, as she was now called, was given in marriage by Legazpi to a Greek named Andreas. This marriage, following so closely the woman's baptism, must have given a distorted idea of Christian conversion to the Cebuanos. For it was observed that a good number of local females soon offered themselves for baptism, "in imitation of her."⁸² The friars instructed them in Christian doctrine and taught them the basic prayers, but prudently refused them baptism. The only ones who were given the sacrament at this time were some seven or eight dying children of women serving as slaves to Spanish soldiers in the camp.⁸³

It was not until more than a year later, toward the end of 1566, that a few more converts were baptized. A Muslim named Camotuan (a man

of fifty who should not be confused with his namesake, the son of the chief of Cabalian) had decided to embrace Christianity. As he had served as the Spaniards' interpreter, it was hoped that his example would lead to the conversion of all the Cebuanos. Camotuan was baptized, along with his son and the latter's wife and child, and given the name "Mateo del Saz," after the master-of-camp who served as his godfather, while his son was named "Miguel," after Legazpi. For this occasion Legazpi ordered a great feast, highlighted by volleys from the fleet's artillery while all the Spanish infantry stood in formation.

Thereafter, a number of Cebuanos asked for Christian baptism. Rajah Tupas, however, refused to become a Christian unless he were assured that the Spaniards would remain and not go away, as would be indicated if they brought their own women from New Spain.⁸⁴ It would thus appear that Tupas understood Christian baptism at least partially in political terms. It seems that he did not wish to identify himself with the Spaniards' religion, if after doing so the latter would depart and leave him alone to face the consequences of his action. In any case, Tupas, his son Pisuncan, and a number of other chiefs of Cebu were finally baptized by Fr. Herrera on March 21, 1568.⁸⁵ The fact that not until then did the number of baptisms increase to a few score shows that the conversion of the local chieftain was almost a necessary condition before the rest of a Filipino community accepted Christianity.

Although most of the Cebuanos apparently continued to be suspicious of the Spaniards, this handful of converts constituted the nucleus of what years later became a thriving Christian community. Probably soon after Camotuan's conversion, a large cross was set up in Cebu where many of the local people did obeisance and prayed in imitation of the Spaniards. As early as 1567, daily evening instruction in Christian doctrine was also held in the Augustinian convent and in Legazpi's house for the benefit of the new converts. These places served as centers for Christian instruction, inasmuch as many of those not yet baptized also came, learning Christian songs and chanting the catechism "in imitation" of their baptized neighbors.⁸⁶

Establishment of the Philippine Province of the Augustinians.

In 1569, soon after the arrival of two Augustinians from Mexico, the Philippines was established as a "province" of the Augustinian order, named after the Most Holy Name of Jesus (*Santisimo Nombre de Jesus*). The first provincial was Herrera, while Rada was named the

first prior of the convent in Cebu. Fray Alonso de Jimenez (d. 1577), one of the new arrivals, subsequently accompanied Captain Luis Enriquez de Guzman in the latter's conquest of the islands of Masbate and Burias. After briefly visiting northern Leyte and Samar, Jimenez went with the *conquistadores* under Captain Andrés de Ybarra to Ybalon (Albay) on the Bicol peninsula. On the other hand, his companion from Mexico, Fray Juan de Alba (1495-1577), who was already a septuagenarian, went with Legazpi when the latter moved his capital to Panay late in 1569. There Alba studied the Hiligaynon tongue and until early in 1571 preached at a settlement by the Jalaur River, in the area of what is today Dumangas.⁸⁷

Yet their initial labors must not have been encouraging enough for most of these early Augustinians to want to remain in the Philippines. For one thing, they were uncertain until 1570 whether Philip II wanted them to remain. To be sure, Fray Martin de Rada advocated staying in the islands, which he felt were ripe for missionary work. As he put it: "Soldiers are not necessary to conquer this land, for they do not care for its welfare; being eager to go home and this desire being unfulfilled, they destroy and ravage the land." On the other hand, some of the inhabitants seemed to him ready for conversion, for they were like "very eager monkeys (*monos deseosísimos*) in imitating us in dress, speech, and everything else."⁸⁸ Rada went on to say that if not for the great lack of certainty as to the King's intention, which uncertainty prevented the Augustinians from daring to baptize more, the friars could have easily baptized more than 20,000 converts. The Augustinians up to that time had baptized only a few score.

But if this was what Rada thought, the prior provincial Fray Diego de Herrera took another view. Herrera thought little of the culture of the islanders, whom he described as "very barbarous" in a letter to King Philip II early in 1570. He hoped that the king would send the Augustinians on to what he reported as the more attractive and richer lands of China, "Lequios" (the Ryukyus),⁸⁹ Japan, or Java. The uncertainty of their remaining in the Philippines, Herrera apologetically explained, was the reason why up to the end of 1569 they had baptized only "about a hundred" (*como cien*)⁹⁰ Filipinos, probably mostly children. In a way, the paucity of evangelistic results was not surprising, considering the Filipinos' hostility, prompted by the many and repeated instances of Spanish rapacity as Herrera himself and his fellow friars were subsequently to complain time and again. In fact, despite the establishment of their Philippine province, Herrera when he wrote his letter was in Mexico on his way

to Spain to propose that the Augustinians completely abandon the Philippines in favor of China.

But as Philip II by this time had made it clear that he had no intention of handing the Philippines over to the Portuguese through default, the Augustinian provincial of Mexico promptly ordered Herrera to rejoin Legazpi in Panay. With him were sent two more Augustinian priests, Fray Diego Ordoñez de Vivar (d. 1603) and Fray Diego de Espinar (d. 1596). Thus, Herrera's return to the Philippines in 1570 marks the beginning of serious missionary efforts in these islands.

Notes

- ¹The account of the Legazpi expedition from its arrival in the Philippines on February 13, 1565 to the conquest of Cebu is contained in various documents found in *Colección de Documentos inéditos relativos al Descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de Ultramar*. Segunda Serie. (25 tom.; Madrid: Est. tipografico "Sucesores de Rivadeneyra," 1886-1922), vol. II, pp. 252-325, 394-420.
- ²Pedro Chirino, S.J., *Relación de las islas Filipinas y de lo que en ellas se trabajó los padres de la Compañía de Jesus [1604]* (2a. edición; Manila: Esteban Balbas, 1890), p. 9.
- ³As the Augustinian, Fray Juan de Medina, put it in 1630; "Certificáronme los antiguos que cuando llegaron los españoles, estaba el pueblo de Sugbu tan poblado que sus casas cogían desde Mandave [Mandawe] hasta S. Nicolas, que a mi ver, hay más de legua y media por tierra..." See Juan de Medina, O.S.A., *Historia de la orden de N. gran P.S. Agustín de estas islas Filipinas, desde que se descubrieron y poblaron por los españoles, con las noticias memorables [1630]*, tom. IV de *Biblioteca Historica Filipina* (Manila: Tipografía de Chofre y Comp., 1893), cap. xix, pp. 100-01.
- ⁴"Relación circunstanciada de los acontecimientos y sucesos del viaje y jornada que hizo el Armada de S.M., de que fue por General el muy Iltr. Señor Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, en el descubrimiento de las Islas de Poniente, desde 19 de Noviembre de 1564 que partió del puerto de Navidad hasta fin de Mayo del siguiente año que salió del puerto de Zubu para Nueva España....," in *Colección de Documentos inéditos...*, vol. II, p. 394.
- ⁵See Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898* (55 vols; Cleveland: A.H. Clark & Co., 1903-1909), vol. II, pp. 213-14. Cf. "Relación circunstanciada..." pp. 332-33. Cf. also the report by Hernando Riquel, royal notary for the Legazpi expedition, in *Colección de Documentos inéditos...*, vol. III, pp. 272-76.
- ⁶See Blair and Robertson, vol. II, pp. 213-14. Cf. "Relación circunstanciada..." p. 332.
- ⁷Blair and Robertson, pp. 332-33.
- ⁸Blair and Robertson, p. 335.
- ⁹"Relación del orden que la gente española, que por mandado de su magestad salió de la nueva españa para las islas Philipinas, a tenido y tiene en pacificar la tierra y sustentarse en ella." dated [September 17, 1574], in Fray Isacio Rodriguez y Rodriguez, O.S.A., *Historia de la Provincia Agustiniiana del Smo. Nombre de Jesus de Filipinas* (14 vols.; Manila: Catholic Trade School; Valladolid: Seminario Mayor Agustiniiano, Filipinos, 1965-1978), vol. XIV, p. 222. Henceforth, this source will be cited as HPA.
- ¹⁰See "Testimonio de como se halló en la isla de Zibu el niño Jesus," dated Cebu

- May 16, 1565, in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. III, pp. 278-84. The same also appears, under the title "Tanto jurídico de la Información que Miguel Lopez de Legazpi mandó hacer de la invención del Santo Niño de Cebu," in *HPA*, vol. XIII, pp. 396-406. See also "Relación circunstanciada..." pp. 333-34, 338.
- ¹¹ "Carta que escribieron los oficiales de las Islas del Poniente a la Real Audiencia de Nueva España, dando cuenta de su salida del puerto de Navidad a los 20 de Noviembre de 1564, y de su llegada a las islas de Filipinas a 13 de Febrero siguiente, con lo ocurrido posteriormente en aquellas Islas hasta la fecha de esta carta," dated Zubu, May 28, 1565, in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. II, p. 361. See also Andres de Mirandaola, "Carta escrita al Rey por Andrés de Mirandaola dándole cuenta del suceso y navegación que hizo la Armada del descubrimiento de las Islas Filipinas, que salió el año anterior del puerto de Navidad a cargo del General Miguel Lopez de Legazpi," dated Zubu, May 28, 1565, in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. II, p. 369.
- ¹² "Testimonio de como se halló en la isla de Zibu el niño Jesus," p. 277.
- ¹³ "Relación circunstanciada..." p. 339.
- ¹⁴ A detailed historiographical study of the various views expressed about the source of this image of the Santo Niño may be found in *HPA*, vol. I, pp. 73-91.
- ¹⁵ See Chirino, pp. 9-10.
- ¹⁶ See "Tanto jurídico de seis mercedes hechas por el Adelantado Miguel de Legazpi al convento del Santo Niño de Cebu," the first document of which is dated "Villa del Smo. Nombre de Jesus," January 13, 1571, in *HPA*, vol. XIV, p. 3.
- ¹⁷ "Relación circunstanciada..." p. 338. See also "Testimonio de como se halló en la isla de Zibu el niño Jesus," pp. 278, 282.
- ¹⁸ "Relación circunstanciada..." pp. 335-37, 339, 346.
- ¹⁹ As the royal officials put it: "... desde el día que llegamos a ellas [i.e., these islands] asta oy abemos allado ningun amigo en todo este Arcipiélago." See "Carta al Rey de los Oficiales Reales de Filipinas, dándole cuenta de su llegada a las Islas, venida de los portugueses, estado de la conquista, religiosos Agustinos que han quedado en Filipinas, y otras temas de interés personal," dated Cebu, May 28, 1565, in *HPA*, vol. XIII, p. 388.
- ²⁰ *HPA*, vol. XIII, p. 390.
- ²¹ Estevan Rodriguez, "Relación muy circunstanciada de la navegación que hizo el Armada de S.M. a cargo del General Miguel Lopez de Legazpi... por Estevan Rodriguez, Piloto mayor de la misma Armada y descubrimiento" [dated 1565], in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. II, p. 423.
- ²² See "Bando sobre los que hubiesen abierto sepulcros y extraído de ellos oro, joyas y otras preseas, y prohibiendo se abran en lo sucesivo sin la licencia correspondiente," proclaimed by Legazpi and dated Zubu, May 16, 1565, in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. II, p. 355.
- ²³ *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. II, p. 355.
- ²⁴ This date is determined by the fact that this was the same day, May 16, 1565, when sworn statements were taken by Legazpi as to where, when, and how the image of the Santo Niño was found, and who was responsible for finding it. See "Relación circunstanciada..." p. 339.
- ²⁵ "Relación circunstanciada..." p. 339.
- ²⁶ "Relación circunstanciada..." p. 345. The account of the pilot Estevan [Esteban] Rodriguez differs slightly from this "Relación circunstanciada..." in a number of details. See *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. II, pp. 423-24.
- ²⁷ "Relación circunstanciada..." p. 347.
- ²⁸ "Relación muy circunstanciada de lo ocurrido en el Real y Campo de la Isla

de Zebu de las Islas Philipinas desde 1 de Junio de 1565, que su Gobernador Miguel Lopez de Legazpi despachó la Nao Capitana de su Armada a descubrir la Navegación de la vuelta para Nueva España; y de los varios descubrimientos y conquistas que hizo en aquellas Islas hasta el mes de Julio de 1567..." in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. III, pp. 210-11. Henceforth, this source will be cited as "RmcZ."

It is interesting to note that late in 1566, Datu Dagami was captured by the Spaniards and executed at the very place where Arana was killed. Dagami's head and quartered parts were subsequently skewered on stakes and displayed at intervals along the beach, to strike fear into the local people. Though Rajah Tupas was apparently careful not to show any indication of having had secret dealings with Dagami, as alluded to elsewhere, he could not help but extol the latter's courage as a "very valiant and magnificent (*soberbio*) chief in the Visayas." See "RmcZ," in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. III, p. 211; also see editor's note, p. 464.

29 "RmcZ," pp. 92-95. Cf. Estevan Rodriguez, p. 425.

30 Estevan Rodriguez, pp. 425-26.

31 "RmcZ," p. 94. See also Andrés de Mirandaola to King Philip II, dated Zebu [May 28, 1565], in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. II, pp. 370-71.

32 "RmcZ," p. 94.

33 "RmcZ," p. 104.

34 "RmcZ," pp. 105-106.

35 See the account of the taking of possession of Cebu on May 8, 1565, in "Testimonios de toma de posesión de algunas Islas," in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. III, pp. 89-90.

36 "RmcZ," p. 100.

37 "RmcZ," pp. 111-12.

38 An anonymous Spanish account of 1567 tells how Rajah Tupas asked Legazpi for 100 Spanish soldiers to accompany 500 of the former's own men for an attack on an enemy settlement on the island of Cebu about twenty leagues from the Sugbu settlement. See "RmcZ," pp. 124-25.

39 As the same account of 1567 puts it:

"El Tupas trató diversas veces con el Gobernador, se holgaría y quería que los de Matan fuesen nosotros amigos: el Gobernador siempre dixo que si, que se viniesen de paz, y recibiría, y los tenía por amigos, que los hiciese llamar y venir, y el decía, que si, y nunca vinieron, hasta que un día el mismo Tupas dixo, que el quería ir alla en persona y traerlos y así fue en un Parao, y al cavo de tres dias volbió y dixo, que se habían huydo y despoblado su pueblo y casas los de Matan, y los de Gain [sic], que se habían ido a otras Islas y pueblos comarcanos, que eran enemigos de los de Zebu, aunque a lo que después pareció fue ficción o trato doble: el Gobernador desimuló luego con él, y le despidió con buenas palabras..."

40 "Estos de Matan estuvieron siempre muy contumazes y rebeldes de no querer paz, antes se entendió les aconsejaban a los de Zebu como a los demás no la tuviesen con nosotros, diciendo, que ellos nos matarían, u a lo menos por hambre nos echarían de aquí, y así hacían todo el mas daño que podían donde quería que llegaban..." See "RmcZ," p. 116.

41 "RmcZ," pp. 126-29.

42 "RmcZ," pp. 156-61.

43 "RmcZ," pp. 160-61.

44 "RmcZ," pp. 169-70.

45 "RmcZ," pp. 162-66.

46 See "Relación del orden que la gente española, que por mandado de su magestad salió de la nueva españa para las islas Philipinas, a tenido y tiene

- en pacificar la tierra y sustentarse en ella," dated [September 17, 1574], in *HPA*, vol. XIV, p. 223.
- 47 For the reference identifying Buglas with the present island of Negros see "Relación de las Islas del Poniente y del camino que a ella se hizo desde la Na. España," probably by Captain Juan de la Isla, in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. III, pp. 229-30.
- 48 "RmcZ," pp. 129-34. For more details of this Portuguese-Ternatan raid, see *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. II, pp. 292-93, 299-300, 360, 367; vol. III, pp. 284-305. Cf. also "Copia de una carta venda de Sevilla a Miguel Saluador de Valencia," as reproduced with accompanying English translation in Blair and Robertson, vol. II, pp. 228, 230. Traditions about this raid were collected much later by Fr. Francisco Combes, S.J.
- 49 "RmcZ," pp. 115-17.
- 50 "RmcZ," pp. 126, 135.
- 51 "RmcZ," p. 124.
- 52 "RmcZ," p. 151.
- 53 "RmcZ," p. 156.
- 54 "RmcZ," p. 178.
- 55 "RmcZ," pp. 202-04.
- 56 "RmcZ," pp. 222-23.
- 57 See Miguel Lopez de Legazpi to the Viceroy of New Spain, dated Cebu, ca. July 1569, as cited in *HPA*, vol. XIV, p. 132n.
- 58 "Carta del P. Diego de Herrera a Felipe II, dándole cuenta de su viaje a Filipinas, su llegada a Cebu, lo que pasó con los portugueses y objeto de su regreso a Nueva España," dated Mexico, January 16, 1570, in *HPA*, vol. XIV, p. 39. The same document is also reproduced in *The Christianization of the Philippines*, with accompanying English translation by Rafael Lopez, O.S.A., and Alfonso Felix, Jr. (Manila: Historical Conservation Society and University of San Agustin, 1965), pp. 113-14.
- 59 "RmcZ," p. 136.
- 60 The significance of this particular act of hostility was not necessarily diminished by the fact that it was the handiwork of four aggrieved women, one of whom was subsequently executed by quartering. The three others were sentenced to flogging and then perpetual exile from Cebu. For details, see "RmcZ," pp. 207-10.
- 61 For example, see "RmcZ," pp. 140-50, 166-69.
- 62 The letters exchanged between Don Antonio Lopez de Sequeira and Captain Mateo del Saz are reproduced by Juan Martinez in his "Relación detallada de los sucesos ocurridos durante el viaje de la nao San Jerónimo que salió de Acapulco bajo el mando de Pedro Sanchez Pericon y por piloto a Lope Martín, con el objeto de llevar auxilios a Legazpi, y la noticia del arribo a Nueva España del navío San Pedro," dated Cebu, July 25, 1567, in *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, vol. III, pp. 470-73.
- Though written on the same day, the Portuguese letter is dated November 12, 1566, that of Saz, November 11, due to the fact that the Spaniards at this time usually did not make allowance for crossing of what today would be the International Date Line. Juan Martinez, however, was struck by this difference of reckoning of dates, and gave a rather detailed explanation for it.
- 63 "RmcZ," pp. 188-92.
- 64 "RmcZ," p. 195.
- 65 "RmcZ," p. 220.
- 66 "RmcZ," pp. 224-25.
- 67 Letter of Guido de Lavezaris to King Philip II, dated Cebu, July 25, 1567, as cited in *HPA*, vol. XIV, p. 10n. Pereyra's letter dated May 25, 1567 and Legazpi's answer on "June" (July?) 24, 1567, are reproduced in Fray Gaspar de San Agustin, O.S.A., *Conquistas de las Islas Philipinas* (2 vols.; Madrid,

- 1698), vol. I, pp. 190-92. Cf. Francisco Colin, S.J., *Labor evangelica. Ministerios apostolicos de los obreros de la Compañia de Jesus, fundación y progresos de su provincia en las Islas Filipinas* [1663] (New edition, illustrated, annotated and documented by Fr. Pablo Pastells, S.J.; 3 vols.; Barcelona: Imprenta y Litografía de Henrich y Compañia, 1900-1902), vol. I, pp. 35n., 123n.
- ⁶⁸ San Agustín, vol. I, pp. 191-92. Cf. Colin-Pastells, vol. I, pp. 152-53.
- ⁶⁹ For more details, see "Los Autos e requerimientos que pasaron entre Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, Governador y Capitan en las Islas del Poniente por S.M. el Rey D. Felipe nuestro señor y Gonzalo Pereira, Capitán de la Armada del Serenísimo Rey de Portugal, sobre que saliesen de la Isla de Cebu; 1568-1569," an English translation of which appears in Blair and Robertson, vol. II, pp. 234-39.
- ⁷⁰ See "Carta a Felipe II de Andrés de Mirandaola, dándole cuenta de lo sucedido con los portugueses, con noticias de la China, grandeza, costumbres, etc.," dated Cebu, June 8, 1569, in *HPA*, vol. XIV, pp. 11-12. See also "Carta de Miguel Lopez de Legazpi al Virrey de México, Marqués de Falces," dated Cebu, July 7, 1569, in *HPA*, vol. XIV, pp. 19-20.
- ⁷¹ *HPA*, vol. XIV, pp. 11-12.
- ⁷² "Carta del P. Diego de Herrera a Felipe II. . .," dated Mexico, January 16, 1570, in *HPA*, vol. XIV, p. 38.
- ⁷³ "Carta de Miguel Lopez de Legazpi al Virrey de México. . ." dated Cebu, July 7, 1569, in *HPA*, vol. XIV, p. 21. See also Legazpi's "Testimonio de como el capitán mayor de Portugal rompió la guerra y la hizo a los españoles que estaban en la Ysla de Cebu," written sometime between 1568 and 1570, an English translation of which appears in Blair and Robertson, vol. III, pp. 113-18.
- ⁷⁴ The royal officials Lavezaris, Cauchela, and Mirandaola put it thus to King Philip II in 1570: "en la ysla y puerto de Zubu no nos podíamos sustentar, porque se entendía que no abría suficiente bastimento para la necesidad que se offresciese, si caso fuese que nos cercasen, como lo hizieron en Zubu. . ." See their "Carta a S.M. de los Oficiales Reales de Filipinas dándole cuenta de la victoria alcanzada contra los moros de Luzon por Martín de Goyti y Juan de Salcedo, con relación del encuentro tenido con ellos," dated Rio de Panay, July 25, 1570, in *HPA*, vol. XIV, p. 46.
- ⁷⁵ "Copia de algunos capitulos de carta de Legazpi al Virrey de Nueva España. . ." dated Panay, July 25, 1570, in *HPA*, vol. XIV, pp. 49-50.
- ⁷⁶ "Letras patentes dadas en Culhuacan a 9 de Febrero de 1564, y destinación de los religiosos para Filipinas," in *The Christianization of the Philippines*, pp. 5-9.
- ⁷⁷ "Instrucción que se dió por el Presidente y Oidores de la Real Audiencia de Méjico a Miguel Lopez de Legazpi. . ." dated Mexico, September 1, 1564, in *The Christianization of the Philippines*, p. 34.
- ⁷⁸ For a brief biographical note on Herrera, see Fray Gaspar Cano, O.S.A., *Catálogo de los religiosos de N.P.S. Agustín de la provincia del Smo. Nombre de Jesus de Filipinas desde su establecimiento en estas islas hasta nuestros días, con algunos datos biográficos de los mismos* (Manila: Imp. de Ramirez y Giraudier, 1864), p. 9. Cf. Fray Agustin Maria de Castro, O.S.A., *Misioneros agustinos en el extremo oriente 1565-1780* ("Osario Venérable?"). Edición, introducción, y notas por M. Merino, O.S.A. (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Santo Toribio de Mogroviejo, 1954), pp. 64-66. See also *HPA*, vol. I, pp. 144-45.
- ⁷⁹ Fray Martín de Rada, who came from a noble family of Pamplona, went at the age of twelve to the University of Paris with his brother Juan, and there studied Greek, mathematics, and the physical and natural sciences.

On his return to Spain, he continued his studies at the University of Salamanca, spending two more years in theological studies at the same institution not long after joining the Augustinian order. See *HPA*, vol. I, p. 134. For more details, see also Cano, p. 8; Castro-Merino, pp. 221-22, 239, 386.

⁸⁰ "RmcZ," p. 183.

⁸¹ See "Annales Ecclesiasticos de Filipinas," *Philippiana Sacra*, vol. II (1967), p. 166.

⁸² "RmcZ," p. 122. Cf. *HPA*, vol. I, p. 143.

⁸³ "RmcZ," pp. 121-22.

⁸⁴ "RmcZ," pp. 204-205. See also Martinez, pp. 464-65. Cf. Manuel Merino, O.S.A., "Semblanzas misioneras: Fray Martin de Rada," *Misionalia Hispanica*, vol. I (1944), pp. 186-87.

⁸⁵ See *HPA*, vol. I, p. 143.

⁸⁶ Martinez, p. 465.

⁸⁷ *HPA*, vol. I, p. 149.

⁸⁸ See "Copia de carta del P. Martín de Rada al Virrey de México, dándole importantes noticias sobre Filipinas," dated Zebu, July 8, 1569, in *HPA*, vol. XIV, pp. 30-31. An English translation of this same letter may be found in Blair and Robertson, vol. XXXIV, pp. 223-28.

⁸⁹ The Spanish "Lequios" is apparently derived from the Chinese *Liu-chiu*, which, says a modern Chinese scholar, refers to the "Ryukyu Islands, sometimes including Formosa or Formosa only." See Wu Ching-hong, "A Study of References to the Philippines in Chinese Sources from Earliest Times to the Ming Dynasty," *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review* 24 (1959), 148.

⁹⁰ See "Carta del P. Diego de Herrera a Felipe II..." dated Mexico, January 16, 1570, in *HPA*, vol. XIV, p. 40.