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Notice to Authors

The Silliman Journal welcomes contributions in all fields from both Philippine and foreign scholars, but papers should preferably have some relevance to the Philippines, Asia, or the Pacific. All submissions are refereed.

Articles should be products of research, taken in its broadest sense; a scientific paper should make an original contribution to its field. Authors are advised to keep in mind that Silliman Journal has a general and international readership, and to structure their papers accordingly.

Silliman Journal also welcomes the submission of "Notes," which generally are briefer and more tentative than full-length articles. Reports on work in progress, queries, updates, reports of impressions rather than research, responses to the works of others, even reminiscences are appropriate here. Book reviews and review articles will also be considered for publication.

Manuscripts should conform to the conventions of format and style exemplified in this issue. Whenever possible, citations should appear in the body of the paper, holding footnotes to a minimum. Documentation of sources should be discipline-based. Pictures or illustrations will be accepted only when absolutely necessary. All articles must be accompanied by an abstract and must use gender fair language. All authors must submit their manuscripts in duplicate, word-processed double-space on good quality paper. A diskette copy of the paper, formatted in MSWord 6.0 should accompany the submitted hard copy.

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EDITOR'S NOTES

hawk eagle, *image Helga Schulze*

One is left with a horrible feeling now that war settles nothing; that to win a war is as disastrous as to lose one.
— Agatha Christie

The highest form of treason: to do the right thing for the wrong reason.
—T. S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral

No peace among the nations without peace among the religions;
No peace among the religions without dialogue between the religions;
No dialogue between the religions without investigation of the foundations of the religions.
—Global Ethic Project

IN THIS ISSUE: In prophetic words, Omar N. Bradley wrote that "ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants". According to him, "we know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living. We have grasped the mystery of the atom and rejected the Sermon on the Mount". As the global community finds itself polarized by the crisis in Iraq, at no other time do such words ring ever truer than they do at this moment, forcing us to confront the values we hold dearly

and wrestle with questions of the justification of war as we shake from deep-seated crisis of identity and loss of faith. It is unfortunate that the world's most powerful and influential institutions have chosen to realize the common good and secure peace by going to war. Mark Twain captures the supreme irony of this turn of event when he said, "Man has made a graveyard of the globe, trying to smooth his brother's path to heaven."

But it is a tribute to the tenacity of the human spirit that despite the threats of war and violence, there are still segments of the global community that continue to search for peace and work to achieve it. Spurred by the awareness of our increasingly interdependent world, these segments of the global community are at the forefront of peace initiatives that promote justice, friendship, understanding, and cooperation among people of different race, religion, or ethnic origin. Such initiatives are grounded on basic belief that regardless of our religious beliefs, the world shares a common understanding of the destructive nature of violence. In pursuing these initiatives, Silliman University has always played a leading role. Woven into the fabric of its own vision and mission is its recognition and respect of religious freedom and diversity, its dedication to the moral ideals of peace, justice, freedom of conscience, and the essential humanity of women and men, the eradication of violence, and care for the environment.

As the excerpts in these editorial notes suggest, the articles in this collection invariably address the issues of religious diversity, tolerance, reverence for life, the horrors of war, the stigma of poverty, and concern for the environment. In the words of Carl Sagan, "The time has come for a respect, a reverence, not just for human life, but for all life on the planet." In the midst of the present world crisis, Silliman Journal stands at a defining moment. In putting together this collection at such an opportune time, it re-affirms Silliman University's belief in the spiritual values of the world's great faiths. Echoing the vision of the Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions, it commits itself to promoting "a just, peaceful, and sustainable world in which the earth and all life are cherished, protected, healed and restored; religious and cultural fears and hatreds are replaced with understanding and respect; people everywhere come to know and care for their neighbors; the richness of human and religious diversity is woven into the fabric of communal, civil, societal, and global life; the world's most powerful and influential institutions move beyond narrow self-interest to realize the common good; religious and spiritual communities live in harmony and contribute to a better world from their riches of wisdom and compassion; all people commit to living out their highest values and aspirations".

Following these thematic threads, nothing could be more appropriate to serve as the lead article of this collection than Jeffrey Ayala Milligan's *Religion, Diversity and the Public School: The Challenge for Teacher Education in the Philippines and the US.* In this article Milligan addresses one of the most important issues underpinning the present world crisis. Although exploring the significance of religious diversity and the conflict it often causes for teacher education specifically in the U.S. and the Philippines, Milligan's arguments have far-reaching implications in a world rocked by religious conflict. In seeing the fundamental relationship between religion and public education, he argues that teacher education in both countries must respond to this challenge by producing teachers who are "prophetic pragmatists". Suggested in this paper is the need to build an educational system that promotes harmony between the world's religious and spiritual communities and foster their engagement with the world and its other guiding institutions with a view to establish a social order where the

ideals of peace and justice become the standards of human relationships.

Equally reflective of the themes of diversity and plurality is the the next article by Lester Edwin J. Ruiz aptly titled *Nationalisms in Southeast Asia: An Essay on the Carthography of Struggle*. Ruiz examines the varying discourses surrounding the concept of "nationalism" as it is understood, practiced, and lived through in as distinct and differing ways both across Southeast Asia and within particular states or nations in the region. Ruiz refers to this sense of nation in Southeast Asia as "nationalisms" reflecting the "kaleidoscopic diversity" of the region, the varying interpretations of the term, and the plurality that characterizes its historical, political, economic, cultural, and religious specificities. The paper also examines the relation between nationalism and religion both at the theoretical level and in the histories of the Southeast Asian nations. A corollary theme thus examined in this paper is the decisive role religion and religious identities played in the emergence and consolidation of political ideologies and the formation of modern national identities in the region and the struggles that have been fought to win it.

The following article by Cornelio R. Bascara entitled *The Leveling of Hierarchies: The Spanish Prisoners of War in the Hands of the Filipino Revolutionists* examines a little known dimension of the Philippine-Spanish revolution involving the fate of the Spanish prisoners of war caught between the conflicting interests of the Spanish, the Filipinos, and the Americans. Although the paper focuses only on the Spanish prisoners as pawns in an intricate political plot involving the Americans, the Filipinos, and the Spanish, the subtext that claims equal attention is the plight of human victims of war and the consequent legacy of physical handicapping, psychological desecration, and cultural rifting.

The next three articles in this collection deal invariably with the escalating human impact on the environment. Commenting on the intensifying ecological crisis and the increasing social conflict over the management and distribution of the world's resources, Carl Sagan said that "we are close to committing what in religious language is sometimes called 'crimes against creation'". According to him problems of such magnitude "must be recognized as having a religious as well as a scientific dimension and every efforts to safeguard and cherish the environment must be infused with a vision of the sacred".

In the first of this group of papers, Enrique G. Oracion's *Constructing Ecotourism: The Application of the Tourism Model in the Philippine Context* focuses on the adverse impacts of mass tourism on the ecological profiles of most tourist destinations and proposes ecotourism as a desirable alternative. The author argues that ecotourism, properly managed and remaining faithful to its objectives, will allow people the opportunity to enjoy the beauty and bounty of nature while ensuring the sustainability and biodiversity of the environment. The paper stresses that maintaining a balance between economic imperatives and protection of the environment is a not an option but the duty of everyone sharing this planet. The unwritten thesis of this paper recalls Wendell Berry's timely admonition that "there must be new contact between men and the earth; the earth just be newly seen and heard and felt and smelled and tasted; there must be a renewal of the wisdom that comes with knowing clearly the pain and the pleasure and the risk and the responsibility of being alive in this world".

Moving now to the natural world, Albert Schweitzer's famous words: "We are not truly civilized if we concern ourselves with the relation of man to man. What is important is the relation of man to all life" provides a proper introduction to our last two papers.

The first of this article entitled *Aspects of Biology and Conservation of the Philippine Cockatoo* (Cacatua Haematuropygia) *on Rasa Island, Palawan, Philippines* by Peter Widmann, Indira Lacerna, and Siegfred Diaz discusses the conservation efforts being undertaken by the Philippine Cockatoo Conservation Program to save the Philippine cockatoo, a highly endangered bird species, from extinction. One of the activities of this program is gathering information on the conservation status, population dynamics, feeding, and breeding biology of the species. Using an ecosystematic, rather than a purely species conservation approach, with the cockatoo serving as flagship species, the project activities on Rasa consequently include all terrestrial and marine ecosystems of the island. Consequently, basic inventories of woody plants, fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammals have been conducted. Following a strongly community-based approach to management, the project involves all stakeholders in the design of the project from the beginning. Complementing the project's conservation work are programs including information-education-communication campaigns, alternative livelihood, and community organizing.

The last article by Glenn Rebong, Marc Boussekey, Peter Widmann, Indira Lacerna, and Siegfred Diaz, on *Psittacine Beak and Feather Disease Testing and DNA Sexing of Wild Red Vented Cockatoo Chicks at Rasa Island, Palawan* is also part of the research projects of the Philippine Cockatoo Conservation Program. This paper identifies habitat destruction, extermination, poaching for the pet market, and potential diseases caused by the introduction of captive birds in wild populations as the cause for the decline in species population. In particular, the paper describes the testing process for the Psittacine Beak and Feather Disease (PBFD) virus to determine whether the wild population carries the virus. As reported in this paper, the

PBFD Test and the DNA sexing conducted at the VetFrance Laboratory in the UK showed negative results.

Finally, this gives me great pleasure to close this introduction by thanking our authors whose intellectual vigor and sophistication in presenting their arguments have vastly enlarged my own understanding of the issues they raised. It is hoped that readers of these articles will be similarly touched. Especially I would like to thank them for their patience and understanding for the long time it has taken us to go to press. For the perspicacity of their insights and the rigorousness of their reading, our reviewers deserve so much gratitude and appreciation. In particular, I wish to make special mention of the time they have poured on the manuscripts. As the revised versions indicate, this was time very well spent indeed. Many thanks.

"Gaia is the only metaphor [both] scientific and mythological enough to see us through our present crisis and lead to a re-sacralization of the world."

— Nancy Todd of New Alchemy

Ceres E. Pioquinto

RELIGION, DIVERSITY AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL: THE CHALLENGE FOR TEACHER EDUCATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE U.S.

Jeffrey Ayala Milligan

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the significance of religious diversity and the conflict it often causes for teacher education. It briefly reviews both the U.S. and Philippine experience of the relationship between religion and public education and argues that teacher education in both countries must respond to this challenge by producing teachers who are "prophetic pragmatists".

Introduction

At the beginning of the last century the eminent African-American sociologist and educator, W.E.B. DuBois, noted that "the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color-line" (1903, 210). While the racism that concerned DuBois—as well as other forms of bigotry like sexism and homophobia—continues to plague society, any even cursory survey of the contemporary world scene would strongly suggest that one of the major problems of the 21st century will be, to borrow DuBois' phrase, the problem of the "religion-line".[1] The recent terrorist attacks in the U.S., the horrific violence between Hindus and Muslims in India, tensions between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sudan, and the Philippines, and Muslim-Jewish tensions in the Middle East all remind us of the very real danger that religious differences, exacerbated by social, political and economic problems, can explode into ethno-religious conflict. While such conflicts typically involve far more than religious difference, religious affiliations frequently define the protagonists and often provide a major rationale for the conflicts.

There is more than a little irony in this sad fact given the confidence with which some 19th and 20th century philosophers predicted the retreat of religion before the steady march of scientific

progress and expanding education. Marx, of course, disparaged religion as the "opiate of the masses", while the great American philosopher of democracy, John Dewey, predicted that faith in supernatural religion would inevitably give way before a "common faith" in science as the "one sure road of access to truth—the road of patient, cooperative inquiry" (1934, 32-33). But religion has not gone away. In fact, it seems to be thriving, with what often seems to be the more conservative, other-worldly sects rising in prominence as traditionally mainstream denominations appear to wane in social influence (Finke & Stark, 1990; Kepel, 1994). Religion is resurgent in the former Soviet Union and survives repression in China. And around the world, from the U.S. to the Middle East to the Indian subcontinent, religious fundamentalisms vie for political influence and power (Marty & Appleby, 1992). As the African-American philosopher of religion, Cornel West, reminds us: "the culture of the wretched of the earth is deeply religious...yet...most of the progressive energies among the intelligentsia have shunned religious channels. And in these days of global religious revivals progressive forces are reaping the whirlwind." Ignoring this reality, he asserts, is "tantamount to political suicide" (1989, 234). Even the United States, that supposed bastion of modernity and secularism, has been described by at least one perceptive cultural critic as "religion mad, even religion-soaked" (Bloom, 1992, 35). In fact, international comparisons of levels of religiosity done in the early 1990s in twelve nations consistently ranked the U.S. and the Philippines at the top of almost every measure (Abad, 1995).

Clearly, then, religion continues to be a major cultural, political, and economic factor in both the Philippines and the United States in ways that are not necessarily true of other democratic states. In addition, both countries—as do many others—face a similar specific challenge in their relations with minority Muslim communities internally and with the larger Muslim world internationally. One must be careful, of course, not to overstate the similarities, for tensions between the Muslim minority and

Christian majority in the Philippines have a long and quite unique history that is in no way analogous to the U.S. experience with a growing, but relatively new Muslim community of converts and immigrants (Majul, 1973). Furthermore, tensions between the mainstream in both countries and political Islam have tended to be more international in the case of the U.S. and domestic in the case of the Philippines (George, 1980; Che Man, 1990; Vitug & Gloria, 2000). However, both countries are faced with the task of fostering more peaceful and tolerant relations with Muslim communities, a task that is illustrative of the larger challenge posed by religious diversity in multicultural democracies. In addition, one result of the profound impact of American imperialism on Philippine social and political institutions—particularly the educational system—is that there are sufficient similarities in history, aims, structures, and values (albeit manifested through quite different cultural filters) to make a comparative analysis of both countries' experience with education and religious diversity an informative exercise for educators in both countries (Pecson & Racelis, 1959; Gowing, 1983; Lardizabal, 1991; Suzuki, 1991).

If one of the roles of public education in a democracy is to prepare children to become intelligent participants in democratic society, then religious diversity and conflict are challenges that public education ignores at the risk of political suicide. And if religious diversity and conflict are a challenge for public education, then they ought to be important matters for reflection and action in the teacher education programs that serve our educational systems. In this essay I will argue that teacher education, and public education in general, has largely failed to adequately respond to the challenge posed by religious diversity in the U.S. and the Philippines. In doing so, our educational systems fall short of their democratic mission to foster equality of opportunity and civic participation for all citizens regardless of race, culture, ethnicity, or religion.

While I will not attempt to offer a specific agenda for change in teacher education—any such agenda must be worked out within

the specific political and cultural contexts of both countries—I will attempt in this paper to tentatively sketch conceptual shifts in the ways education and teacher education have been conceived and implemented in both countries that may make education more responsive to religious identity and diversity. This sketch will be offered, however, not as a recipe for immediate, concrete action but rather in the spirit of an Emersonian "provocation" to further reflection and dialogue on how teacher education might better respond to the problem of the "religion-line" in the 21st century (West, 1989, 25).

Religion and Public Education in American Experience

The relationship between religion and public education in the U.S. has changed considerably since its origins in the colonial period as an institution explicitly charged with inculcating the religious beliefs of the communities the schools served. The earliest ordinances, such as the "Ye Olde Deluder Satan Act," charged schools with teaching the basic literacy skills necessary to read and understand scripture (Fraser, 1999, 10). Throughout the 19th century white, Protestant religious, political, and cultural values continued to define the culture of the common schools by making activities such as daily prayer and Bible reading a common feature in most classrooms. Such practices, however, raised increasing protests from a growing population of Catholics in the U.S. who objected both to the Protestant bias of the schools and the fact that they were taxed to support such schools. Their demand for public funds to support their own schools on an equal basis with Protestant schools was met with anti-Catholic resistance and led educational leaders to de-emphasize religion in schools in order to make them less objectionable rather than allow funding to flow to Catholic schools (Fraser, 1999, 56-7). This unintended secularization of public education was accelerated in the latter half of the 19th century and into the 20th as educators sought to claim credibility for their profession by attempting to ground educational practice in scientific thought and principles (Hall, 1911;

Thorndike, 1923; Dewey, 1934; Gage, 1978; Gromko, 1995). This secularizing trend was reinforced in a series of landmark Supreme Court cases after World War II that interpreted the constitutional principle of separation of church and state to mean that common practices such as school prayer, Bible reading, and other vestiges of religious culture in schools violated the U.S. Constitution (Nord, 1995, 63-96). Thus, in many ways, contemporary American public schools have become highly secularized institutions.

This secularization of American education has not been without controversy, however. Over the past four decades fundamentalist and conservative evangelical Christian communities have grown in political prominence, inspired to a considerable degree by what they see as a public educational system that is hostile to them and which threatens the cultural and religious identity of their children (Gaddy, Hall & Marzano, 1996). Such groups have exercised a powerful influence on the composition and selection of textbooks, agitated for the inclusion of "creation science" as an alternative to the theory of evolution in science classrooms, and attempted to re-introduce school prayer as voluntary "moments of silence." But their criticisms go far beyond school prayer and evolution to include attacks on multicultural education for its alleged moral relativism and censure of the U.S. for its treatment of minorities. In this regard conservative Christians have often found common cause with less religious political conservatives who decry multiculturalism's emphasis on diversity as a threat to the unity and national identity of the country. In recent years, many such critics of public education have turned much of their energy to movements that would break up what they see as a government "monopoly" in education, arguing for vouchers or various "school choice" agendas that would supposedly facilitate parents' ability to select culturally and religiously conducive educational environments for their children.

While the agenda of the so-called "Religious Right" has generated considerable concern among secular educators, many

acknowledge that, in their efforts to avoid controversy and legal problems, many schools have gone too far toward creating the "religion free zones" their critics decry. This recognition has led in recent years to calls to re-think the relationship between religion and public education. Some educational reformers have attempted to clarify for teachers and administrators what is constitutionally permissible in public schools, thereby reducing the instances of schools infringing upon the legitimate religious expression of students or allowing illegitimate religious activity (Haynes & Thomas, 1998). Others have argued for the importance of studying about different religions and their contributions to history, the arts, and politics as a necessary component of a liberal education (Noddings, 1993). Still others have called for a more explicitly spiritual dimension to schooling as well as the acknowledgement of religious ways of knowing and being in the world as living, credible options to secular ways of understanding the world (Purpel, 1989; Yob, 1995; Nord, 1995). Some of these arguments have deployed the ethical and epistemological assumptions underpinning multicultural education to demand, in the name of moral and philosophical consistency, that public education become more responsive to religion and religious identity as one of the most important elements of individual and cultural identity (Milligan, 1996a, 1996b, 2000).

These educational reformers, however, have been moved to re-think the place of religion in the curricula of American schools by more than just the criticisms of the Religious Right. They recognize that the increasing religious diversity of U.S. society demands that school curricula and policies respect that diversity if they are to accurately reflect the reality of the societies in which American schoolchildren live. There are, for instance, six to seven million Jews in the U.S., representing approximately 3% of the total population of the country, hundreds of thousands of practicing Buddhists, and thousands of adherents of so-called "New Age" religions (Gaddy, Hall & Marzano, 1996, 158-68). Many Native Americans have revived the religious traditions of their different

tribal communities, sometimes incorporating beliefs and practices from other tribes or from Christianity (DeLoria, 1999, 275-89). And to the surprise of many Americans there are more than two million Arab Muslims in the U.S. with several million more Muslims of South Asian decent, African American Muslims, and others worshipping and studying at 2300 Islamic institutes. There are, in fact, more Muslims in the U.S. today than such "mainline" Protestant denominations as the Episcopalians and the Church of Christ. Moreover, Christianity itself is far from monolithic in the U.S., finding expression in a bewildering variety of denominations and languages (Gaddy, Hall & Marzano, 1996, 158-68). Given this diversity, as well as the continuing cultural and political influence of the Religious Right and Catholicism, the idea that one can adequately understand contemporary American society without taking religious diversity into account is absurd.

In the U.S. context, then, religion and religious diversity remain major factors in the political and cultural milieu in which American schools operate and to which they must respond, a challenge that comes in two related forms. First, there is the challenge of a relatively large segment of the population which feels alienated from and threatened by a public educational establishment whose values they see as inimical to their own and which is leading a serious political challenge to the very idea of public education as we have traditionally known it. Second, there is the challenge of rapidly increasing religious diversity in the U.S.—including a growing Muslim community as well as problematic relations with the Muslim world—for an educational establishment that, over the last century, had come to see religion as something irrelevant to the mission of public schools and which, therefore, had no place in educational deliberations. Both challenges require an attentiveness to religious identity and diversity that most public educators have not been professionally prepared to give. As such, they represent significant challenges to teacher education programs in the U.S. to adequately prepare teachers to negotiate such a complex and politically charged environment.

Religion and Public Education in Philippine Experience

Relations between religion and schooling in Philippine history are every bit as long and intimate as they have been in the United States, perhaps more so. As in the American colonial era, schools were, through much of the period of Spanish rule, seen as a mechanism for inculcating Catholic Christianity among Filipinos (Bazaco, 1953, 54; Estioko, 1994, 166). Consequently, when formal teacher education began in the 19th century as a result of the Educational Decree of 1863, it emphasized subjects like religion, morals, and sacred history, as well as pedagogy (Isidro, 1949, 15). When the United States colonized the Philippines after the brutal repression of Filipino independence forces at the beginning of the 20th century, American colonial officials brought with them not only the constitutional rhetoric of separation of church and state which they deployed to counter Catholic influence in the country, but also a long tradition of unexamined Protestant cultural and religious biases in public education. They also brought their experience with Native American education, in which schools had been used as a deliberate instrument of a policy of "civilization" whereby "savage" peoples were to be brought into a "civilized" world largely defined by white, western, Protestant values (Milligan, 2001). Thus education during the American occupation of the Philippines was ostensibly secular—influenced by U.S. constitutional principles as well as the rising prominence of the "science" of education—but still deeply colored by American religious biases as well as the deeply religious cultures of the Philippines (Pershing, 1913, 59).

Since the demise of overt American colonial rule after World War II, public education and educational policy have played a major role in the socio-economic development efforts of successive Philippine governments (Magculang, 1998). Thus Philippine education has taken on a much wider range of responsibilities in the education of informed, productive citizens of a modernizing democratic state. Many of these responsibilities are specifically addressed in the Philippine Constitution (1986),

which also states unequivocally that "the separation of Church and State shall be inviolable (Article II, Sec. 6). However, the Philippine Constitution interprets the meaning of church-state separation differently than have U.S. courts for it explicitly charges Philippine schools with strengthening the "spiritual values" of Filipino schoolchildren (Article XIV, Sec. 3(2)), a charge which the Philippine Department of Education, Culture and Sports has enacted in one of the goals of its Values Education Program to create citizens with an abiding faith in God (1997, 30). Such explicitly religious provisions in public education are no doubt more in keeping with Philippine history and culture than the American effort toward strict secularization and, moreover, quite practical given the prevalence of religious values in Philippine cultures and the dominance of religious—especially Catholic—schools, particularly at the higher levels (Dy, 1994; Estioko, 1994, 210).

It is, of course, no surprise that two different countries with different cultures, histories, and values would arrive at somewhat different conclusions regarding the appropriate relationship between religion and public education. However, the formulation of different approaches to the issue does not necessarily rescue either country or its schools from the challenge of religious identity and diversity. For the Philippines' troubled relationship with its Muslim minority is an educational and political challenge that has plagued the country throughout the 20th century and which continues to plague it in the 21st (Gaerlan & Stankovich, 2000). And while the Philippines' problems with its Muslim minority are quite different from the challenges of the Religious Right or religious diversity in the U.S., both contexts illustrate the challenges that public education in democratic, multicultural states face in dealing with diverse religious identities. Obviously responses that may work in one context will not necessarily work in the other; however, educators in both countries can learn from the efforts—failures and successes alike—of their counterparts in the other.

Since at least the beginning of the 20th century public education has been one of the primary mechanisms deployed by

successive Philippine governments to mitigate tensions between the Christian majority and Muslim minority. This approach to the so-called "Moro Problem" was introduced, along with military repression, from almost the beginning of American rule. Inspired by the new progressive faith in education as an instrument for conscious social change and reassured, in their own minds, by the racist ideology of social Darwinism that their colonization of the Philippines was for the Filipinos' benefit, American colonial officials reconceived the Moro Problem as a pedagogical problem analogous to the education of Native Americans in the American west (Saleeby, 1913/1983; Torrance, 1917; Jones, 1920, 609). This approach to the problem, however, was carried out within a social discourse of civilization that placed the various "levels of civilization" present in the Philippines on a continuum defined by "Moro savagery" on one end and white, male, American, Protestant "civilization" on the other (Bliss, 1909, 29-30). Thus, while the education of Muslim Filipinos was no doubt a better option than their extermination—an either-or choice contemplated by some officials (Saleeby, 1913/1983)—it established goals for that education that required Muslim Filipinos to surrender their cultural and religious identity as the price of integration in the Philippine mainstream of a marginalized and subordinated minority.

The stated purpose of direct American administration of Mindanao and Sulu until 1920 was to prepare both Muslim Filipinos and Christian Filipinos for Filipino Christian administration of the region; in short, the American schoolmaster was preparing his Filipino protégé to take over this classroom of "unruly" Moros. Thus American colonial officials bequeathed to subsequent Filipino administrations the idea of using education as a tool for integrating Muslim Filipinos into an ideal of civilization largely defined in western, Christian terms. This policy of integration via education continued well into the era of Philippine independence after World War II (Indin, 1960; Lacuesta, 1967; Clavel, 1969, 25). In this transition from American to Filipino rule of Muslim Mindanao and Sulu the overtly racist discourse of "civilization" and "savagery"

was largely subsumed into a discourse of "modernization" and "development" that, while perhaps superficially more palatable, nevertheless left largely undisturbed the assumption that the solution to the Moro Problem was for the Moro to stop being like a Moro and to become more like the "modern," westernized "mainstream." For instance, many well-intentioned calls for the development of "our Muslim brothers" is marred by a paternalism that fails to mask strong religious biases and that can only be insulting to Muslim Filipinos, while other attempts to locate the impediments to such development in Muslim values read as if they were written by American colonial officials in the 1910s (Santos, 1974; Isidro, 1979; Dy, 1994).

It is important to acknowledge that the provision of educational opportunities to Muslim Filipinos under the policy of integration did and does benefit many Muslim Filipinos. However, many resisted and continue to resist. Many Muslims refused to send their children to American schools and even burned half of the school buildings in Lanao in 1920 during a period of protests of the transition to Christian Filipino rule (Che Man, 1990, 53; Milligan, 2001). More recently, the phenomenal rise in the number of *madaris* in Mindanao since 1970, the rise of Islamic revivalist groups like the *tabligh*, and the continuation of political and military movements for autonomy, if not outright secession, strongly suggest that large segments of the Muslim Filipino community reject integration into a mainstream largely defined by western, Christian political, cultural, and religious values (Boransing, Magdalena & Lacar, 1987; Bauzon, 1991; Vitug & Gloria, 2000). They recognize that integration into an educational system and society dominated by alien cultural values enforced through a highly centralized educational bureaucracy is, in fact, assimilation. This definition of the civic center, of what it means to be modern and educated, inevitably privileges those with the good fortune to be born into this cultural center while it disempowers those—like Muslim Filipinos—who have the misfortune of being born into marginalized communities (Freire, 1990).

This definition of center and margins is perpetuated, in part through school curricula, particularly textbooks. Content analyses of textbooks in use in Philippine public schools have shown that Muslim Filipinos are barely acknowledged, where they are not entirely ignored, and when acknowledged are often portrayed in an erroneous or insulting fashion (Bula, 1989; Salic, 1990; Rodil, 1998). While recent textbook writers have endeavored to be more inclusive of Muslim Filipino history and culture (Gonzalez, 1999) at least one current, widely used textbook in Philippine History and Government portrays the Philippines as a Christian nation ordained by God to bring the Gospel to Asia (Zaide, 1999). As numerous critical theorists have demonstrated, school curricula represent "authorized knowledge" which is designed to shape the way children come to "divide the world" (Apple, 1990; Willinsky, 1998). Such a conception of the Philippines can leave little doubt for either a Muslim or a Christian child to know just who is in and who is out. Thus the Muslim child is in a predicament not unlike African Americans in the U.S. who, as DuBois (1903, 45) described them, were "born with a veil and gifted with second-sight...always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity."

In recent years, the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and the subsequent devolution of some educational policy authority to a Regional Department of Education, Culture and Sports in the ARMM represents an important recognition of the principle of local involvement in educational decision making. Muslim Filipino educators in the ARMM have used their new authority to explore and attempt to implement educational practices that reflect the culture, history, and values of Muslim Filipinos (Tamano, 1996). These efforts have been severely hampered, however, by the larger political and budgetary problems of the ARMM. An important effort to rewrite textbooks for Muslim children, for instance, failed to produce books in anything like the quantity needed for ARMM schools (Tamano, 1999). Such

problems are exacerbated by the profound material poverty of the region, where teachers lack not only access to supplemental curricular material but also the training and authority to revise school curricula to better reflect the local cultures in which they work.[2]

While this new policy of autonomy is a necessary and important response to Muslim educational needs, it seems to imply—as did the policy of integration—that the Moro Problem is the Moro's problem. The idea, implicit in the policy of integration, that the problem of Muslim-Christian relations was largely a problem of Muslim ignorance and intransigence and not a problem of mainstream bigotry, is left undisturbed by a policy that turns over control of Muslim education to Muslim educators who have little or no say in the way Muslims are portrayed to non-Muslim schoolchildren. Thus the policy of autonomy runs the risk of exacerbating centrifugal tensions in Muslim-Christian relations. These tensions are manifested in many Muslim parents' choice of *madrasah* education for their children over public education—despite the fact that it provides little hope for success in mainstream society (Damonsong-Rodriguez, 1992)—and in the response of many middle class parents in opting for so-called "integrated *madaris*" that seek to preserve the religious identity of Muslim children while preserving some hope for social mobility within Philippine society (Panambulan, 2000). Autonomy fails to address the problem of Christian bias in school curricula and in the definition of the civic center into which Muslims are supposedly encouraged to integrate.

However, it is vital to acknowledge the extent to which important sectors of both the Muslim and Christian communities in the Philippines have recognized this problem. Ecumenical religious groups like the Bishops-Ulama Forum (1998) and others, as well as numerous grass roots cause-oriented groups have done important and courageous work in critiquing the social and cultural impediments to improved Muslim-Christian relations and struggling for positive improvements. In addition, there is a considerable and growing body of scholarly literature on the causes of Muslim-

Christian conflict in the Philippines (Majul, 1973; Tanggol, 1993; Muslim, 1994; McKenna, 1998; Kamlian, 1999; Gomez, 2000). Analyses of school curricula and interviews with teachers and scholars in the region suggest, however, that public education and teacher education lag far behind the important advances made by Filipino social scientists and grass roots activists (Rodil, 2000).

Philippine and U.S. experiences with religious diversity are quite different of course. Socio-political, cultural, and religious differences in the U.S. have never erupted into anything like the on-going war in Mindanao. These experiences nevertheless represent a common challenge to educators: How ought the public schools of a culturally diverse democracy respond to individual students and minority communities that define and express their identity in explicitly religious terms? While intra-religious dialogue may well be a common feature in theological circles, and the inculcation of tolerance is an explicit responsibility for Philippine schools articulated in the Philippine Constitution (Article XIV) and promoted in the multicultural education movement in the U.S., operationalizing the value of religious tolerance remains a profound problem for Philippine education and is largely ignored in American education. All too often majority religious or secular perspectives are privileged in schools in spite of legal and constitutional strictures at the expense of minority religious identities and, in the name of "separation of church and state" or "national identity," those who protest are often forced to the margins of civil society. This represents an important challenge for teacher education in both societies; therefore, the comparative analysis of both societies' efforts to address this and related issues of diversity could lead to new insights for teacher educators in both countries. How, then, might teacher education respond to this challenge in the Philippines and the U.S.?

Responding to Religious Diversity in Teacher Education

Taking religious identity and diversity seriously as important parts of the complex cultural milieu in which teachers function

suggests a number of changes in the way we think about education in general and teacher education in particular. One of these changes is an expansion of the conception of education as a profession grounded in science to a greater recognition of its aesthetic dimension as an activity informed by science but fundamentally creative and aesthetic. While much has been gained by the application of scientific thought to education, conceiving education as a science has tended—especially in the U.S.—to obscure the importance of culture and especially belief systems in shaping normative visions of the good life and risks reducing the art of teaching to simple transmission models and the role of the teacher to that of a mere technician employing "scientific" instructional methodologies.

While such scientific models of education have no doubt influenced Filipino teachers and educational scholars, their fundamentally different approach to understanding the appropriate relationship between religion and education has helped them to recognize the importance of religion in the culture of their students and to avoid the American obsession with separation that is so often interpreted as hostility to religion. However, the strong emphasis on the inculcation of a national identity through Philippine education (DECS, 1993, 4) is in some ways analogous to the hegemony of the scientific model of education in its effect for religious minorities, for where the curricula that comes to define this identity for Filipino children is written, in spite of the best intentions, from the dominant cultural perspective and disseminated by a centralized bureaucracy the result is a hegemonic ideal that empowers those closest to that ideal and disempowers those on the margins. Many teachers in Lanao del Sur, for example, implicitly recognize this problem when they say that local conditions reduce their teaching to merely "spoon feeding" a "cooked" curriculum that does not meet the needs of their students (Panambulan, 2000). This is, surely, an unacceptably impoverished conception of teaching and education. In the U.S. case, then, there exists an epistemic hegemony that marginalizes those who do not or cannot

fit the ideal. In the Philippine case, there exists a cultural hegemony that marginalizes those who do not or cannot fit the ideal. Either case represents a form of existential violence against those on the margins.

One alternative to such national and epistemic essentialism in education is to learn to negotiate diversity rather than control it, a lesson that is best approached through the conception of education as an art, as the creative fashioning of a just and meaningful life, for in art we are more likely to recognize and thus honor the historical contingency and cultural relativity of the values that shape the aesthetic sense of different communities. Thinking of education as an art preserves space for scientific contributions and the need to forge relations of solidarity between and among national communities. At the same time it correctly emphasizes the cultural and historical contingency of these normative visions and the necessity for creative participation by all parties in their formulation. Approaching education as art redefines the ends of education from epistemology or nationalism to aesthetics and ethics, emphasizing not merely the acquisition of bits of information or a single national identity but rather the creative fashioning of a good life, thus bringing education more in harmony with religion as an inhabited aesthetic even as it avoids becoming synonymous with it.

In order for teachers to prevent this aesthetic conception of public education as the creative fashioning of a meaningful life from being subsumed by the older and much deeper channels of religious approaches to this task, teachers must learn how to negotiate diversity rather than control it. Control of diversity is one of the primary objectives of essentialist conceptions of education—whether scientific, nationalistic, or religious—for each is concerned with correctness, whether of method, identity, or truth. Deviation in this context—difference—is error. As such, essentialist conceptions of education in public schools are inherently violent and oppressive. Negotiating diversity on the other hand entails respect for difference, respect that can avoid the

absolutism of essentialist education and the balkanizing tendencies of unfettered relativism by placing discussion and debate about national, cultural, religious, and epistemic ideals as well as the shared struggle for their realization at the heart of the educational enterprise.

Learning to negotiate diversity requires that teachers first learn to recognize their own biases. They must come to understand the cultural and historical contingency of their understanding of the world and how that contingency differs from and influences their interaction with the Other, for those who are convinced that they possess the truth are unable to really hear or respect the Other. When teachers recognize the contingency of their own understanding of the world they are then in a position to learn about and from the Other without seeing her in terms of error or deviation from an essentialized norm. Obviously, there are practical limitations to learning about and from others. There is such a bewildering diversity of cultures and religions in almost every society that even a superficial understanding of them would require lifetimes of study. However, the substantive study of at least one other culture and religion—Islam, for instance in the Philippines and U.S.—by all teachers, whether they will be encountering Muslim children or not, would go a long way to equipping prospective teachers with the skills necessary to negotiate cultural and religious diversity.

Learning to negotiate diversity need not mean surrendering one's own religious beliefs. The devout Muslim or Christian or confirmed atheist should have an equal right to teach in public schools. What they should not have the right to do is impose their religious or cultural identity on their students. This means that teachers must learn to distinguish between their personal philosophy and identity and the legitimate aims of the public school in a multicultural, religiously diverse democracy. The teacher as an individual may adhere to the absolutist claims of their faith or essentialist conceptions of cultural or national identity, but the public school and the teaching role in it must be governed by a philosophy

of pragmatism because democracy is premised upon inclusion and the participation of diverse voices in democratic deliberation on the organization and direction of society. Religious voices are full and legitimate participants in such democratic deliberations, and public schools, as the nurseries of democracy, should do a better job of ensuring their participation. They should not, however, allow any single voice—religious, scientific, or nationalistic—a monopoly on discourse in the public school.

Shifting our conception of education from scientific or nationalistic essentialism to that of an aesthetic social construct and thus eschewing simple transmission models of teaching will require greater flexibility and creativity from teachers and challenge teacher educators to equip them with these talents. Teachers' education should liberate them from their bondage to textbooks and "pre-cooked" curricular materials even as it teaches them to use such materials as part of an ensemble of materials including their own knowledge of the subject at hand, professional judgement, familiarity with local culture, and insight into the needs of individual students in a creative and flexible balance of individual needs, local conditions, and instructional goals. While most teacher education programs may claim to teach such skills and educational systems to value them, the practical consequences of essentialist conceptions of education and transmission models of teaching utterly belie those claims. And the prevalence of "banking methods" (Freire, 1990) in U.S. and Philippine schools bears this out. The art of teaching, therefore, should be approached more as a jazz performance rather than the mechanical, if faithful, reproduction of the authorized knowledge contained in textbooks and "cooked" curricula.

Negotiating religious identity and diversity will also require a different relationship between teachers and students. Teachers will have to learn to eschew the subject-object, master-slave relationship of the transmission model in favor of a subject-subject relationship governed by an ethic of love. By this I do not mean the sentimental and often shallow "love of children" that teachers

often claim as their motivation for teaching, nor do I mean the oppressive "love" that manifests itself in the impulse to shape the child's identity in conformity to some alien ideal "for their own good." I mean rather the love of individuals as inevitably imperfect beings endowed—by their Creator, if you like—with infinite worth and dignity and the ability to struggle toward the realization of ideals that they themselves have a hand in shaping. Such love requires more than support and encouragement, however. It also requires careful analysis and courageous critique of the forces—both within the individual and in her society—that impede the individual's realization of his or her fullest potential.

To reiterate, the reality of religious identity, diversity, and tension in the U.S. and the Philippines challenges teacher education in both societies to help teachers see their profession as an art in which students and others must participate, to learn to negotiate rather than control diversity, to recognize their own biases, to learn to see through others' eyes, to distinguish between personal and professional philosophies, to be creative and flexible, and to approach their task from within an ethic of love. In short, we must produce teachers who are, in Cornel West's (1989, 211-239) words, "prophetic pragmatists" (Milligan, 1997, 1998, 1999a). Such teachers will be deeply suspicious of the idolatry of essentialism in religion, science, or national identity as an adequate organizing principle for public schools in multicultural, religiously diverse democracies. They will be critical—and self-critical—of social and individual impediments to human flourishing. And they will be inspired and directed by ethical ideals—contingent and imperfectly understood as they may be—which flow from diverse religious, cultural, and secular sources. And finally, they will approach their task in the spirit of jazz as the creative, improvisational, yet disciplined composition of ethical, aesthetically pleasing, and meaningful lives by and with their students (West, 1993, 242; Milligan, 1999b). Such a conception of education and teaching constitutes a more open, tolerant, and creative response to the challenge of religious identity and diversity than

the essentialism of nationalism or scientific methodolatry, the vulgar pragmatism of functionalist approaches that simply perpetuate the inequalities of the status quo, or even the well-intended indoctrination of religious education.

In responding to this common challenge in their very different cultural and historical contexts, both Filipino and American teachers and teacher educators have developed insights that may be useful to one another. Philippine education's frank recognition of the unavoidable connections among religion, culture, and education is an insight American education should learn from if it is to avoid the infringement of children's rights of religious expression which often results from the misunderstanding and misapplication of the principle of separation. On the other hand, Philippine educators might also profit from the on-going struggle of many U.S. educators to identify and dismantle in themselves, their profession, and their society essentialist ideologies like racism, sexism, homophobia, and nationalism that impede individual human flourishing and democratic community. In learning from the successes and failures of both systems and exploring the practical implications of the re-conceptualization of education as art and teaching as jazz performance proposed here, teacher educators in both societies may better help the teachers they train understand and negotiate the challenge of religious identity and diversity in the U.S. and the Philippines.

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NOTES

[1] It is not the purpose of this paper to offer a definition of religion. As John Dewey (1934, 7-8) has noted, any such definition broad enough to encompass all that goes by the name "religion" is likely to be so vague as to be meaningless, while any more specific definition is likely to leave out much that calls itself religion. Moreover, any such definition represents a framework imposed on human experience by the individual doing the defining. I am using the term here in its common sense understanding as referring to religions, for instance Islam and Christianity, and/or to beliefs adherents describe as religious.

[2] These observations are based on interviews and fieldwork conducted among teachers in 15 high schools in Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Misamis Occidental between August 2000 and May 2001.

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NATIONALISMS IN SOUTHEST ASIA: AN ESSAY ON THE CARTOGRAPHY OF STRUGGLE

Lester Edwin J. Ruiz

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the concept of "nationalism" in Southeast Asia is neither a homogeneous nor a monolithic notion, but is understood, practiced, and lived through in as distinct and differing ways both across the region itself characterized by a "kaleidoscopic diversity", and even more significantly, within particular states or nations. Thus, this paper's use of "nationalisms" in South East Asia reflects not only the varying interpretations of the term and the plurality that characterizes the historical, political, economic, cultural, and religious specificities of the region. At the same time it is also suggestive of the highly contested filed that is the study of nation and nationalism which has brought about a maze of definitions, theoretical approaches, and methods of understanding and enacting nationalist discourses.

Introduction
NATIONALISMS, CONTESTATIONS, TRANSFORMATIONS

Change is the hallmark of the *fin-de-siècle*. As the world moves into the 21st century, nations, states, and peoples have been forced to deal with the fundamental transformations in the political, economic, cultural, technological, and, ecological processes that have occurred worldwide in the last quarter of this century, but particularly in the last decade largely brought about by the transnationalization of capitalism, if not its globalization, and its accompanying market-driven constitutionalisms, with their underlying normative, conceptual, and institutional discursive practices.[1] Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the way the questions around nationalism have been addressed, particularly in the context of such pressing issues as peace, development, and security, as well as the broader themes of culture, democracy, and governance.

As discursive, strategic, and tactical formations, nationalisms in Southeast Asia need to be understood in the context of these fundamental transformations now occurring. Put in this way, these nationalisms are discourses of conflict and collaboration, and continuity and change—first, during the period of colonialism (including World War II), second, during the Cold War, and, third, during the post, post-Cold War period. In fact, nationalisms in Southeast Asia were both struggles against the "foreign colonizer" as well as the *ancien regime*; they were both struggles against westernization as well as consolidations of western assumptions of "nation", "state", and "community", and, they were both struggles against Euro-American-led globalization as well as the defense of one's place within this globalization process itself.

THE SPECTRE OF COMPARISONS:[2] DILEMMAS AND *APORIAS* IN NATIONALIST DISCOURSES

The work of scholars from Max Weber (1948) to Benedict Anderson (1983) to Homi Bhabha (1990) remind us of both the difficulty and necessity of understanding nationalism, not to mention of making comparisons of *different* nationalisms, in the context of the fundamental transformations noted above. Here there are at least three dilemmas or *aporias* that need to be confronted.

First, there is the *substantive* and/or *definitional* dilemma. No scholar or student of nationalism today can maintain that "nationalism", not to mention "Southeast Asia", is a singular, let alone unitary, totalized reality. Strictly speaking "nationalism" arrives in Asia not only as a creature of colonialism, but it enters a region characterized by a "kaleidoscopic diversity" of distinct, though inter-related cultural, political, economic, realities. For example, Southeast Asia is home to several distinct ethno-linguistic groups: the Malayo-Polynesian Cham, the Mon-Khmer, the Burman, the Thai/Lao, and the Vietnamese, with the Malayo-Polynesian being the largest. Parts of Southeast Asia bear the marks of Indian-Sanskritic-Hindu-Buddhist influence (e.g., Burma,

Thailand, Laos, Cambodia); others the Chinese-Confucian (e.g., Vietnam); while others the Islamic (e.g., Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei); still others bear marks of the Christian influence (e.g., Philippines). "Southeast Asia" which first emerges in 1943 as a British term for the reach of Japanese imperialism in the region is today comprised by Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines—an area roughly 1,750,000 square miles.

These realities notwithstanding, there are common threads in the *experience* of nations and states in Southeast Asia. Indeed, as this essay suggests later, one of the significant factors of nationalisms in Southeast Asia is that they emerge in the context of peoples' struggles against colonialism in the region.[3] From an historical-methodological perspective, even if one took only the colonial experience of Southeast Asia, a period consisting roughly of four hundred and fifty years—with the Spanish and United States in the Philippines, the Dutch in Indonesia, the French in Vietnam, the British in Burma (now Myanmar), and the Japanese in the whole of Southeast Asia during World War II—ethnic, if not strictly (modern) nationalist, struggles against colonialism almost always involved assumptions, if not practices, of (i) a shared and common territorial basis, (ii) a shared and common language, (iii) a shared and common culture, (iv) a shared and common unity based on ties of blood, intermarriage, and kinship, (v) a shared and common history, and (vi) a shared and common sense of collective belonging (Parekh 1999, 296-298), as bases for what Max Weber called, in a different context, "community sentiments of solidarity".[4]

At the same time, and precisely because of these common threads traversing a wide historical and geographical area, these "nationalisms" were understood and articulated differently, both across the region, and even more significantly, within particular states or nations (Christie 1998; Anderson 1998). Indonesia's modern "nationalism", articulated in the *Pancasila*, for example, had (elective) affinities with Islam (*Sarekat Islam* being the first

mass nationalist movement of Indonesia) and, not to mention, with the communism that gave birth to the *Partai Komunis Indonesia*. Vietnamese nationalism was shaped by the ideological-political foundations of Marxism-Leninism, not to mention the cultural politics of a Phan Boi Chau and a Phan Chu Trinh, which were largely "patriotic struggles" against France (in contrast to Ho Chi Minh's "national liberation struggle" against both France and the U.S.). Philippine nationalism today travels between the bourgeois, *ilustrado* liberalism of a Jose Rizal and the popular, if not millenarian, popular folk Christianity of an Andres Bonifacio, not to mention the Marxism-Leninism of both the (old) *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP) and the (new) Mao-inspired Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDF). And, of course, Siam (now, Thailand), perhaps the only state in the region that escaped direct "external" colonization, not only put forward a paternalistic 'Thai-based' ideology that explicitly rejected Western political norms (Christie, 1998, 252-253), but also articulated the "nationalist project" within the framework of the Thai monarchy which was understood as the embodiment of the nation.

If nothing else, one thing can be concluded from the historical records: nationalisms in Southeast Asia have always been an historically-contingent pastiche of political, economic, cultural, religious specificities and pluralities which are not readily amenable to contemporary, modern-day systematic classification.

Second, there is the *methodological* dilemma. Basic paradigms, methodological approaches, and research projects in the study of nationalisms in Southeast Asia, many of which are profoundly different if not contradictory or contested, have contributed to the normative and conceptual, if not empirical, specificities and pluralities of nationalism itself. Here one is not only faced with the absence of consensus *vis-à-vis* definitions of nationalism, not to mention delimitations of the field, but also with what may be incommensurable terminological difficulties not only in the academic discipline in which the study of nationalisms is

situated, but equally important, in the warp-and-woof of life where nationalisms are enacted.

Indeed, even more difficult than understanding the substantive dilemma is perhaps navigating through the maze of definitions, theoretical approaches, and methods of understanding and enacting nationalist discourses. Here, Anthony Smith's (1998) useful *heuristic* classification of basic paradigms in the study of nations and nationalism is instructive. Primordialists like Clifford Geertz (1973) understand nationalism as fundamentally rooted in the interplay of basic social and cultural phenomena like language, religion, territory, and kinship. Ethno-symbolists like John Armstrong (1997) locate these sentiments in the myths, symbols, and values of peoples and communities, and track their roles in creating national identities. Modernists, like Benedict Anderson (1983) work at the role of discursive networks and of ritualized symbolizations in the forging of "imagined communities", i.e., nations, especially in the context of the experience of modernity. Postmodernists like Partha Chatterjee (1986) underscore the fragmentation of contemporary identities and identify emergent "post-national" identities.

How one *negotiates* these linkages—the connections of these perspectives—especially since what is at stake is not only the plurality of these perspectives, but their inextricable relations, and the fact that the grounds of these perspectives are constantly shifting may be the ultimate challenge for those who seek to understand both nations and nationalism, in general, and nations and nationalisms in Southeast Asia, in particular. In fact, political, epistemological, disciplinary boundaries are today constantly being negotiated and re-negotiated, just as the strategies and tactics of politics of everyday life, including the competing nationalisms in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, are today being negotiated as well. Mohammed bin Mahatir's (1996) struggle for an "Asian capitalism" is, perhaps, one of the more visible of these "negotiations". Benedict Anderson's *The Spectre of Comparisons,* (1998) while not as visible, is no less emblematic.

What is shared by these different perspectives in varying degrees is the methodological, if not intuitive, sense that nationalism

is a particular form of political identity rooted in a *fictive* community called "nation" (Balibar & Wallerstein 1991). In a different, though not unrelated context, Eric Hobsbawm (1983; cf. Anderson 1983), in his work on nations and national traditions, articulates this shared understanding. "'Invented tradition'", Hobsbawm explains, "is ...a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past..." (1-2). This continuity—or solidarity, if you like—is not established for the sake of the past but, fundamentally, for the sake, and in the name, of the present. In fact, nationalisms are not about *empirical* continuities with the past, but rather, legitimations of the present.

Modern nationalisms are about "community sentiments of solidarity" primarily within the context of the *modern* state. Strictly speaking, nationalisms in Southeast Asia are largely creatures of Euro-American modernity. Elements of this modern "nationalist" idea have been noted previously, but in particular, it is the dynamic interplay between the creation of strong and unified identities in the context of Euro-American assumptions of state and society, that is, of modern liberalism,[5] that is decisive to the introduction of the "national idea" in Southeast Asia. While this does not fully explain the intensity, resilience, or depth of these "community sentiments of solidarity", it certainly underscores what is involved: institutions, behavior, perceptions—and their intersections.

Third, there is the *metatheoretical* dilemma. As in the wider field of the social sciences, definitions, theoretical perspectives, and methodological approaches in the study of nationalisms are always and already implicated not only in the dilemmas noted previously, but also in the normative commitments, interests, and (institutional) politics of the field. Value-orientations do shape research agendas as well as political action. The discussion concerning the importance of nationalism *vis-à-vis* the

contemporary historical drift to globalization, for example, has given rise to renewed interest in the study of the problems, perspectives, and prospects of nationalism. The inadequacies of Eurocentric theories and practices of nation, state, and identity have given rise to postnational, postcolonial challenges to the discourses of nationalism. And the failures, if not inadequacies, of state-sponsored *national* development, in particular its tendency in Southeast Asia to overshadow, if not ignore altogether, cultural and indigenous movements and identities, have forced the re-examination of nationalism as a viable model for development, as well as solidarity.

Nationalisms in Southeast Asia and their Struggles

There are at least four areas in which nationalisms in Southeast Asia not only played significant roles but also found their articulation and self-definition: a) in the anti-colonial struggles against both "the colonizer" and the *ancien regime*; b) in the struggles for "national development", i.e., the creation of the nation-state and its accompanying "national" identity; c) in the struggles of communism against national and international capitalism; and, d) in the struggles against what is called by some, capitalist and imperialist-led globalization.

In the first place, nationalisms in Southeast Asia found articulation in the anti-colonial struggles against both "the colonizer" and the *ancien regime*. Clive J. Christie's *Southeast Asia in the Twentieth Century: A Reader* (1998) provides an insightful narrative of the early but decisive, dynamics of modern nationalism in Southeast Asia. The period 1900 through 1941 marks, for Christie, a historical period of education, reform and national awareness, as well as of revolution and constitutional change. At the center of these changes was a growing awareness of national identity, forged through struggles of resistance against colonialism. In the Philippines, for example, the Revolution of 1898, first against Spain, and then, against the U.S.—was rooted, on the one hand, in the ideas of the European enlightenment, including freedom, individuality, and citizenship, brought back to the Philippines by *ilustrados* like Jose Rizal, Marcelo H. de Pilar, and Emilio Aguinaldo—and, therefore, in this sense, was a modern nationalist revolution. On the other hand, it was rooted in the resistance of people informed by the values of folk Christianity (Ileto 1979), including *layaw* and *utang na loob*—and, therefore, in this sense, was a "pre-national" resistance movement. In fact, while the popular Revolution of 1898, up until it was "hijacked" by the so-called "middle classes", was less about the creation of a "national society" and more about resistance of local groups to Spanish and US colonialism, the struggle itself led to the formation of a political community based on Euro-American assumptions of national community.

In the case of what W. R. Roff (1967) calls "Malay nationalism", the struggles of resistance in what is now Malaysia and Singapore at the turn of the century, not unlike "Philippine nationalism," revolved around issues of national identity and anti-colonial struggle this time against the British, and to some extent, the Dutch. What is particularly interesting in this particular setting is that the nationalist idea is part of an Islamic-inspired resistance (cf. *Sarekat Islam* in Indonesia), not only against the "colonizer", but also against the *ancien regime*. "The principal confrontation in Southeast Asia", Christie observes, " was not between the Islamic reformers and the colonial powers, but between the Islamic reformers and the entrenched Islamic hierarchies throughout the maritime Southeast Asia region..." (17).

> Before they could challenge *kafir* (unbeliever) colonial power, Islamic reformers (the so-called *Kaum Muda*, or 'young faction') had to challenge the *ancien regime* (the so-called *Kaum Tua*, the 'old faction') represented by traditional Islamic scholars at the village level and by the administrators of Islamic law at the level of local states (17).

Of course, the relationship between Islam and nationalism was never unambiguous. *Sarekat Islam*, in Indonesia, for example, is illustrative. While Islamic-inspired reform movements almost always involved challenges both to the "colonizer" and to the *ancien regime,* these reforms were carried out largely within the framework of a pan-Islamic vision rather than a national, i.e., nation-state, framework. Indeed, most Islamic reform movements in Southeast Asia, including *Sarekat Islam*, viewed nationalism as a "secular" movement that was a threat to the survival of Islam. Much later, with the Sukarno announcement of the nationalist, and largely *institutionally*-secular *Pancasila*, the relationship between Islam and nationalism is fundamentally revised. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the anti-colonial struggles of the early 1900s, in Indonesia provided the initial impetus for the development of nationalism in the region.

Also in the early part of the 20th century, the pan-Buddhist reform movement of Phan Boi Chau (1867-1940) and Phan Chu Trinh (1871-1926) both against French colonialism in Vietnam and the Nguyen dynasty which it supported similarly illustrates the "nationalist" challenge posed by resistance movements to both the "colonizers" and their domestic surrogates. Phan Boi Chau challenged the *ancien regime* which was based on the assumptions of Chinese-based classical learning (fundamentally tied to Chinese language and writing), by advocating the rejection of Chinese characters in favor of a popular/populist romanized form of writing. In so doing, it was believed that Chinese cultural hegemony would eventually collapse and with it, French colonialism. In contrast, Phan Chu Trinh, while also critical of the French, held the Nguyen dynasty mainly responsible for the oppression of the Vietnamese peoples, and advocated a strategy of "learning from the West", in order to strengthen Vietnamese society, and through its strengthening, bring about the eventual demise of French colonialism. (Hue-Tam Ho Tai 1992). In fact, both are examples of culturally-based resistance movements that understood themselves to be engaged in a struggle less in terms of the creation

of a modern national community, and more in terms of the religio-cultural transformation of the *ancien regime* and, consequently, of the colonial power. One might say that in this case "anti-colonial struggles" preceded "nationalist struggles".

The so-called inter-war years were a period of growing "nationalist" identities. The Philippine Commonwealth was established in 1934 after almost 30 years of both overt and covert suppression of Philippine nationalism by the U.S. colonizers. An independent Burma was established in 1937 also after years of rural and urban resistance to British colonialism; and, even though the British in the Malayan peninsula, the Dutch in Indonesia, and the French in Indochina continued to assert their colonial rule through the end of World War II, these years saw the burgeoning of grassroots participatory movements, resistances to colonial rule—all in the name of both anti-colonial and nationalist values (Christie 1998)—values that were often contradictory. For example, the Hsaya San rebellion that occurred in British-ruled Burma in 1930-1932 played a central role in the establishment of Burmese independence, not only because it was, in fact, one of the sites of resistance to British rule, particularly in its appeals to the "symbolism of royalty, of the mythical Galon (garuda) bird, the drinking of oath-water, the rebels' faith in tattoos and amulets..." (Herbert 1982, in Christie, 63), as the inspiration for rebellion, but, in its being a movement deeply rooted in the village nationalist associations *(wun-tha-nu athin)* that dominated Burmese nationalist politics during this period. More than a traditionalist, millenarian movement, these associations, informed, among others, by the writings of C. P. Hkin Maung's *Wun-tha-nu Ret-hki-ta* (Nationalist Principles), for example, were expressions of Burmese national spirit, pride, and character. Indeed, they were *rural* grassroots political movements that served as a precursor to a much larger Burmese modern nationalist movement. Their existence, however, underscores a truth about nationalism, reflected elsewhere in Southeast Asia (e.g., in the popular movements in the Philippines between 1840 and 1910), namely, that most

rebellions, including peasant rebellions and urban insurrections, are, for the most part, conjunctures of economic, traditional, millenarian, and other elements, and that the establishment of nationalism as a modern ideology, was not exclusively the work of the elite of, in this case, Burmese, society.

It is true, however, that in the face of the consolidations of Euro-American modernity, particularly after World War I, it became clear to many engaged in anti-colonial struggles that the fate of their struggles rested on the *rapprochement* between modernity and these struggles. The *modern* state, or at least, aspirations for a modern state, with its accompanying liberal assumptions of nation, state, and community, became the primary vehicle for reform and revolution. "National" identities were articulated in terms of western ideals of citizenship, participation, democracy.

These anti-colonial and nationalist struggles were "overtaken" by the events of World War II. With the European colonizers pre-occupied with the war on the European front, Southeast Asia was largely surrendered to Japanese imperialism effecting a temporary "truce" in the anti-colonial and nationalist struggles against the West. British Malaya (including Burma, now Myanmar), Dutch Indonesia, French Vietnam, and American Philippines, were all overrun by the Japanese with their project of a "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" and its "nationalist" ideology of "Asia for the Asians". In fact, many of the anti-colonial and nationalist movements became anti-Japanese movements, for example, the *Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon* in the Philippines—the *Huks,* as they were popularly known—the *Viet Minh* in Indochina, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in Malaya, the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI), as well as, minorities along the Burma-India border (the Karens and the Mons, for example), and aligned themselves with the Western colonizers in their respective struggles against the Japanese. These strategic and tactical alliances resulted in part in the ideological and institutional consolidation of the already existing anti-colonial

movements, especially the communist-led movements, and the strengthening of the idea of *modern* nationalism as a basis for identity, citizenship, and solidarity.

In the second place, nationalisms in Southeast Asia found articulation in the struggles for "national development," i.e., the creation of independent and modern nation-states and their accompanying ideologies of "national" identity in the long post-World War II era—reaching from the immediate postwar period (1945-1955), through the decade of instability (1955-1965), through the period of stabilization (1965-1975), and beyond (1975-present).[6] In this context, Sukarno's *Pancasila*, or five principles (nationalism, internationalism, representative government, social justice, and belief in God), announced in 1946, reveals some of the substantive, methodological, and political/institutional contours of the struggles of nationalism in this period of "national development." On the one hand, it defined nationalism in terms of territory "from the tip of Sumatra right to Irian..." and *one* "national identity": "... neither Javanese... nor Sumatran Nationalism... nor the Nationalism of Borneo, or Celebes, Bali, or any other, but the Indonesian Nationalism which at one and the same time becomes the principle of one National State..." (Sukarno 1946 in Christie 1998, 132). On the other hand, it rejected a "chauvinistic nationalism" by affirming the principle of "internationalism", although, to be sure, it was to be "rooted in the soil of nationalism." The *Pancasila* also affirmed the place of a "civilized" Islam and Christianity in "national development," at the same time that it placed importance on the "principle of consent, the principle of representative government, the principle of consultation..." (136) in order to safeguard "national" solidarity. Sukarno's *Pancasila*, in fact, was a "nationalist project" that sought to provide a context, if not the opportunity to reconcile, the contested multiplicities of religion, culture, and politics, as well as of regions of a fundamentally pluralistic Indonesia (Reid 1974). The establishment of *Bahasa Indonesia*, as the national language, as well as the attempt to establish a *national* bureaucracy or state

apparatus, were important steps in this direction. Nationalism in this period, in fact, becomes associated with the modern state and, as in other Southeast Asian contexts, becomes the ideology of the nation-state.

Thus, in the Philippines, following political independence in 1945, the struggles for "national development" largely took the form of consolidation of the newly-independent Philippines against the excesses of U.S-led westernization. Elite leaders from Ramon Magsaysay to Carlos P. Garcia to Diosdado Macapagal, embodied this consolidation not only in their attempts to overcome more unacceptable aspects of the colonial legacy, but also in the ways in which they were unable to—or refused—to overcome this legacy. President Garcia's objectives both reveal the "nationalist aspirations" that fueled these struggles and the fundamental contradictions that characterized these struggles:

1. To complete Philippine economic independence through the adoption of the Filipino First policy and similar measures;
2. To establish Filipino dignity as a free people by dealing with foreign powers on terms of sovereign equality;
3. To achieve a balanced economy by providing equal impetus to agriculture and industry;
4. To promote social justice and the general welfare of the masses; and,
5. To minimize and, if possible, to eradicate graft and corruption. (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1977, 549).

In fact, "national development" in post-World War II Philippines, as with other nations and states in Southeast Asia, was not only circumscribed by a colonial legacy that promoted national economic development within a U.S.-led capitalist framework, the growth and institutionalization of a U.S.-oriented middle class as the origin and goal of development, and a popular demand for a representative and responsive government free of excessive "foreign" and elite control; it was also largely carried on

and articulated through, a state-sponsored nationalist ideology. It is not surprising, therefore, that 1955 marks the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in Bandung, Indonesia. In other words, nationalist struggles became part of the post-colonial leadership most of which were part of the anti-colonial struggles of the past.

To be sure, national development in this period was not uncontested, not least because of the identification of the nationalist agenda with the state. In fact, capitalist development was challenged primarily because of the structural poverty and inequality that it engendered, including the asymmetries between agriculture and industry, between the rural and the urban, between the elites and the masses, between the national and international. Similarly, direct foreign control of the economy, as well as through its domestic surrogates, and their refusal to recognize "national sovereignty" was largely challenged in the name of "popular sovereignty" and because of the neo-colonialism that it continued to sustain, including the so-called "colonial mentality" in education that bred class and social stratifications. The *de facto* marginalization of the so-called masses was mainly challenged in the name of social justice and for the same reasons, including the serious lack of direct and indirect representation in national governments.

In the third place, and in the context of "national development", nationalisms in Southeast Asia found articulation in the struggles of communism against national and international capitalism. As noted above, communist movements played a decisive role in the resistance against the Japanese in World War II. In fact, the history of the relationship between communism and nationalism in Southeast Asia goes further. Almost all Southeast Asian states have had communist and communist-led movements: from Indonesia's PKI, to Malaysia's Malayan Communist Party (MCP), to the Philippines' *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP) and the Communist Party of the Philippines

(CPP), to Vietnam's Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), and later, the *Viet Minh*—to name several of the major ones.

Communism was attractive for those engaged in struggles in Southeast Asia primarily because of its practical anti-colonial program and a compelling, if not coherent, alternative worldview. Indeed, it was V. I. Lenin's "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" (1947) that was the key text for many of the Southeast Asian Marxist-Leninists. Thus, Ho Chi Minh (1960) wrote:

> At first, patriotism, not yet communism, led me to have confidence in Lenin, in the Third International. Step by step, along the struggle, by studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, I gradually came upon the fact that only Socialism and Communism can liberate the oppressed nations and the working people throughout the world from slavery. (450)

Marxism-Leninism provided a political and economic analysis of the dynamics faced by colonized nations and states: imperialism, feudalism, and, bureaucrat-capitalism, and, an ethical and moral vision about a "new humanity" that was liberated and free. The historical development of communism in Vietnam illustrates the continuities and discontinuities between communism and nationalism. Huynh Kim Khanh (1971 in Christie 1998) identifies three moments in the Communist movement of Vietnam: i) 1930-1931, characterized by a nation-wide, Communist-initiated, revolutionary protest typified by workers' strikes and peasants' demonstrations surpassing all previous anti-colonial rebellions from the *Can Vuong* Movement to the Tax Protest Movement of 1908, to the Yen Bay Mutiny organized by the *Viet-nam Quoc dan Dang;* ii) the Popular Front period of 1936-1939, characterized by Communist involvement in the open and legal struggles; and iii) the period of 1941 and the creation of the Viet Minh Front which led directly to the August Revolution in 1945 that marked "the end of French colonial imperialism, the

end of the Confucianist-oriented monarchical regime, the regaining of Vietnamese independence and the beginning of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (128).

In its earliest formulations, the ICP understood itself as waging a "bourgeois-democratic revolution" consistent with the Comintern's two-stage theory of revolution, namely, an anti-imperialistic stage with the liberation of Vietnam from French colonial imperialism, and an anti-feudalist stage with the overthrow of the landowning-mandarinate class. This formulation was radically revised with the formation of the Viet Minh Front in 1941 when the Indochinese revolution was no longer described as a bourgeois-democratic revolution.

> It is no longer a revolution to solve the two problems of anti-imperialism and land [reforms], but a revolution to solve only one urgent problem—national liberation. Thus, the Indochinese revolution *during this period is a revolution of national liberation*... [our] revolutionary forces... [do not discriminate] between workers, peasants, rich peasant, landlords, or national capitalists. Whoever loves our country and race will together form a united front, gathering all the forces to do everything possible to fight for independence, destroying the French and Japanese bandits who have occupied our country. [*emphasis mine*] (122-3)

The communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, was "interrupted" by World War II, and while it managed, at the end of the war to consolidate power in the north, it was unsuccessful in administratively unifying the country. With its acknowledgement of its communist identity, and the recognition and support of the Bao Dai government (later to be replaced by the Ngo Dinh Diem government) by the Japanese, the French, and later the U.S., the Viet Minh Front was forced to continue its anti-colonial and nationalist struggle, finally succeeding with the defeat of the U.S. in the Vietnam War. Indeed, the case of Vietnam, illustrates

the ways in which communism and nationalism were interwoven in the struggles against national and international capitalism.

The history of Philippine communism shows remarkable similarities with its Vietnamese counterpart, their different organizational and ideological origins notwithstanding. As noted above, its trajectories included resistance to the Japanese as well as to the "national government" established under the auspices of the U.S., and, since the 1970s, resistance against "U.S. imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism". The failures of the "independence" government to address the fundamental problems of poverty, governance, and "national development", as well as its continued support of and by the U.S. provided reasons for the establishment of communism in the Philippines. The historical origins of communism, however, reach back to nationalist literatures like the *Muling Pagsilang* of 1906, which placed the tenets of socialism before the view of the peasants and laborers. As early as 1922, peasants banded themselves together into the *Confederacion de Aparceros y Obreros Agricolas de Filipinas*, a socialist-inspired peasant movement. However, it was not after 1928 when representatives of the Philippine Labor Congress, after attending a trade conference in Canton, China, and the subsequent organization of the Labor Party, and the Congress affiliation with the Red International (Organization) of Labor Unions in 1929, that communism was "officially" introduced in the Philippines. In 1929, the Socialist Party was founded. The following year, 1930, the *Partido Comunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP) was established with the avowed purpose of: i) working for the improvement of the living and working conditions of the workers and peasants, ii) overthrowing the American colonial government and the establishment of an independent Philippines patterned after Soviet Russia, and iii) uniting all workers (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1977, 522). However, while the Socialist Party continued to receive legal recognition, the PKP, in 1932 was outlawed, forcing it "underground". Later, both parties merged (CPP 1988, 4).

As in other Southeast Asian nations and states, World War II brought together Philippine communists, socialists, and nationalists to fight the Japanese. "Anti-Japanese Above All" became the slogan of the peasant underground movement. In 1942, the *Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon* (*Hukbalahap*) with the communists and socialists at its organizational core was established based on a "united front" ideology for a "free and democratic Philippines". With the defeat of the Japanese and the restoration of the U.S.-supported Philippine government, the communists were arrested and jailed, although later, were granted amnesty. This was to be a major setback of the communist movement in the Philippines.

What is important to note, in the context of the struggles of nationalism in the Philippines, in particular, and Southeast Asia in general, is that the socialist and communist movements of the period, not unlike their Vietnamese counterpart, were largely agrarian/peasant movements informed not only by communist ideology, but by peasant—that is, anti-colonial and popular/nationalist—sentiments. It was left to the re-organized Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1968, to develop a much more comprehensive ideological-political-organizational framework based this time, on Marxist-Leninist-Mao-Tse-Tung-Thought. If the earlier socialist and communist movement bore affinities to the national liberation sentiments of the Viet Minh, the CPP reflected its "bourgeois-democratic" strategy, except, perhaps where the organizational centrality of the Party was concerned. Indeed, the CPP, following the Maoist principle of the "Three Magic Weapons" organized a "national democratic movement" comprised of an army (the New People's Army), a united front (The National Democratic Front), and a party (CPP). Led by the Party, this tripartite organization spearheaded a movement engaged in an armed struggle to overthrow U.S. imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism, and in the establishment, first, of a national-democratic government followed, eventually and

finally, by the establishment of a socialist government. In both the Vietnamese and Philippine contexts, nationalism continued to play a central role.

The relationship between communism and nationalism, however, has not been entirely uncontested or problematic. Indeed, the experience of the PKI suggests that while it was successful in the 1920s in mobilizing the people around anti-colonialism, it found itself at odds with the nationalist elite, on the one hand, and the Islamic elite, on the other hand. Communism for the latter was a secular ideological project contrary to Islamic religious sentiments; while for the former, it carried the seeds of an "internationalism" that would eventually threaten the nationalist project. Indeed, the almost complete, not to mention bloody, elimination of the PKI in 1965, in the now infamous *Gestapu* affair that paved the way for the installation of military rule in Indonesia was due, in part, to the "fear" which communism generated within Indonesian experience, namely, that a political ideology not completely congenial with either Islam or nationalism, was a fundamental threat to public life and order and, therefore, in a world not only of change, but of the Cold War's geopolitical rivalries, necessitates its elimination in the name of "order, development, and progress".[7]

In the other contexts of Southeast Asia, wherever communism allied itself with, if not accommodated to, anti-colonial and nationalist/patriotic sensibilities and movements, as was the case in Vietnam and the Philippines, and to some extent, in Malaysia, it found itself providing a viable and meaningful context and opportunity for struggles of national liberation; where it did not, it found itself either isolated from these struggles, if not completely irrelevant. At the same time, where communism (and, indeed, nationalism) became a political and ideological threat, particularly in terms of capitalist-led "national development" as in Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines, it faced challenge and elimination, as well. In fact, the wars and insurgencies in mainland Southeast Asia beginning in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s and 1970s (the *Pathet Lao*, the *Viet Minh*, the *Khmer*

Rouge) as well as the repudiation of the PKI and of Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" in Indonesia, and the long "communist insurgency in the Philippines" (1950s through the 1990s) may be understood not only as the playing out of the logic of the Cold War, but also as the resolution of the relationship between communism and nationalism, on the one hand, and capitalism, on the other hand, as sites of resistance, solidarity, and identity.

In the fourth place, nationalisms in Southeast Asia found articulation in the struggles against multinational, if not global, capitalism. The triumph not only of global capitalism, particularly in the post, post-Cold War era of the late 1980s through the 1990s, but also of the ideologies of "national development" which arises in the mid-1960s through the 1980s when nationalism became the ideology of the state, fundamentally transformed the character of nationalisms in Southeast Asia and significantly shifted the grounds on which resistance and struggle were articulated in Southeast Asia.

In fact, the last half of this century has seen the conflation of ideologies of modernization, national development, and globalization, where the "national" is not only identified with a particular territory or people (whether as *populus* or *ethnos*) but with the logic and values of the modern state, its apparatus, and, in almost every context, of the "development process" or what Kinhide Mushakoji (1998), called "development nationalism"—state-centered ideology of national economic growth; and, where "modernization" is not only identical with development, but, where both are circumscribed, if not defined, by global capitalism. Moreover, while authoritarian regimes during this period, whether in its military form (particularly in Indonesia and Thailand) or in its civilian form (as in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore), were almost always accompanied by appeals to the "nationalist", if not "national," origins and goals of economic development. Nevertheless, their hidden logics, if not their explicit definitions, remained inextricably-wedded to the assumptions of capitalisms' "global reach". Ironically, despite its protestations, *modern*

nationalism has become a representation of capitalist-led globalization.[8]

This "development nationalism", with its centralizing and homogenizing tendencies, as well as its historical, if not pervasive, rituals of authorization, has led both to the political, economic, and cultural subordination of poor people, women, and cultural/indigenous peoples, and to the proliferation of local sites of knowledge, and as a consequence, the insurrection of these subjugated knowledges (Foucault 1980). Indeed, postmodernists and/or postcolonialists like Bhabha (1990) and Chatterjee (1986) have reminded us that such *modern* nationalisms have created monolingual and anti-pluralist cultures and discourses that often frustrate and inhibit the formation of autonomous local cultures. Indeed, *modern* nationalism's fundamental flaw was its legitimation of the massive asymmetry between a dominant culture (with its ruthless drive toward cultural homogenization) and local cultures. Here, local sites of resistance and struggle are overrun.

What may have been movements and flows of capital, people, goods, information, ideas, and images among and within nations, states, and peoples in Southeast Asia, in fact, have become embedded in processes of profound structural transformation that have gained some level of autonomy at the global level, altering thereby the conditions under which "national" communities and identities are enacted (Featherstone 1990). The restructuring of labor on a global scale, for example, the migration of peoples in search of meaningful and productive work, essentially following the scent of capital, has raised questions not only about the state and its capacity to provide for its citizens "at home and abroad," but also about the nature of "national" identity, citizenship, and the boundaries of "nation" (See, for example, Klein-Beekman 1996).

In fact, at the same time that capitalist-led globalization is contracted in Southeast Asia, the traces of resistance embedded in the anti-colonial, nationalist, and communist movements noted above were gradually shifted to other sites of "community sentiments of solidarity", even as new forms of resistance were

discovered, invented, and articulated. These new sites of resistance included, in particular, social movements influenced, on the one hand, by the gradual acceleration of movements and flows of capital, peoples, goods, information, ideas, and images throughout the globe brought about primarily by the advances in modern technology; and, on the other hand, by the gradual recognition of the serious inadequacies, if not failures, of the so-called "western project of modernity"—including the alternatives emerging from within it, in particular, of socialism as an alternative to capitalism and the state, as well as institutions of the international system of states (e.g., the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and other regional organizations).

Unlike the earlier anti-colonial, nationalist, and communist, movements that were largely committed to the creation of a "national" community, which in this period was the nation (or the state), these social movements were primarily engaged in the creation of alternatives to the practices of the modern state. While many of these movements continue to be informed by anti-colonial, nationalist, and communist sensibilities, they are oriented more around concerns that reach beyond state and nation. Peoples' movements, citizens' groups, and non-governmental organizations around, for example, the U.N. conferences on environment (1992), human rights (1993), population and development (1994), social development (1995), women (1995), as well as people's conferences around APEC, WTO, ASEAN, are illustrative of these social movements. In other words, new forms of resistance, as well as different concerns accompany and are accompanied by new forms of identity: local, national, regional, international/global.

The proliferation of these peoples' movements, citizens' groups, and non-governmental organizations in Southeast Asia in the last fifteen years, has dramatically transformed the political, economic, cultural, and epistemological geographies, not only of the state, but also of nationalism. In fact, the question of nationalism, in general, and of nationalisms in Southeast Asia, in particular,

directs our attention not only to the importance of immediate historical and structural contexts, but rather suggests that any discussion of nationalism cannot be detached from the even more basic claims about human identity and subjectivity. Indeed, the history of nationalisms in Southeast Asia may be interpreted, as postmodernists have done, as a question not only about *who* are the people, but *what* is entailed in being a people and, most important, *how* a people are brought into being (Benhabib 1996). As noted above, this coming into being of a people, as the history of nationalisms in Southeast Asia has clearly shown is an essentially long, intensely contested, and fundamentally protracted, struggle.

The Future of Nationalisms in Southeast Asia: Identity, Reflection, Discourse

These transformations in the geographies of nationalisms in Southeast Asia raise a number of issues for the future of nationalisms in the region, in particular, of nationalism as a fundamental question of identity: i) the character and location of the political, i.e., the nature of the social totality, ii) whose "nationalism" is being assumed and under what conditions, i.e., the question of the subject and of subjectivity, and, iii) the languages (or discourses) of nationalism.

The first area of identity asserts that nationalism is tied to the location of the "political"; and precisely because this is so, it is today no longer possible to simply assume that the state (or the system of states) is the primary if not the exclusive, locus of politics, and that the "political" which has always been more than government or the state, needs to be re-thought in order that the question of nationalism can be re-thought as well. The restructuring of labor on a global scale noted above does, in fact, raise the question not only of the nature of the social totality, but, of the character and location of the "political". As well, the discourses around, for example, the revitalization of civil

societies, of ecological and environmental politics, as well as of gender, race, and class—are significant also for this reason.

The second area of identity contends that it is today no longer possible to simply assume that nationalism is mainly either about the identities of particular individuals or specific states, but, rather, about the demands for recognition by those who have been historically mis-recognized, indeed, excluded; and that, any notion of identity must include these demands as part of its self-understanding. This is the significance of discourses that raise the question of the marginalization and proletarianization of peoples of color, the pauperization and feminization of poverty, the sexual division of labor, not to mention sexual slavery, the commodification of sex, domestic violence, and enforced prostitution and trafficking of women and children, for the understanding and definition of nationalism. These peoples are the ones excluded, or mis-recognized, and made to pay for the costly obsessions and rituals of repetition of capitalist-led globalization.

The third area of identity insists that it is no longer possible to make facile assertions, as modern epistemologies and ontologies do, about the separation, say of knowledge and power, reason and desire, fact and value, language and institutions; that, in fact, what appears to be abstract, in reality, are articulations of actual relations of ruling—beyond the fact that they may also be *mere* ideological legitimations of certain ruling elites (Mohanty 1991). Thus, there is a need to attend today to the very language, that is, the discursive formations and strategies, of nationalism itself—as part of the task of re-thinking nation, peoples, and identity. The point, of course, is not only that language is not innocent, nor that who speaks, and whose language is spoken, shapes the political agenda, but also that language, as Foucault and others have amply demonstrated, is productive—it produces an effect.

Where nationalisms in Southeast Asia are concerned, Smith (1998) lists at least four areas for further reflection:

1. the impact of current population movements on the prospects of the national state, and especially the fragmentation of national identity and the rise of multiculturalism[cf. Bhabha (1990) and Chatterjee (1986)];
2. the impact of feminist analysis and issues of gender on the nature of national projects, identities and communities, and the role of gendered symbolism and women's collective self-assertion [cf. Mohanty et al. (1991) and Jayawardena (1986)];
3. the predominantly normative and political debate on the consequences for citizenship and liberty of civic, ethnic types of nationalism, and their relations with liberal democracy [Miller (1995)]; and
4. the impact of globalization trends and of 'postmodern' supranational projects, on national sovereignty and national identity. (202)

However, the future of nationalism as a discourse, may require at least, three discursive "tasks". First, nationalist discourses need to continue to recognize, affirm, and articulate different ways of producing and reproducing knowledge (epistemology): here, not only is this about situated knowledges and partial perspectives, but also of subjugated and insurrectionary knowledges and agents of knowledges—and the ways in which they are related. Even more important, however, is the need to consistently focus, among other things, on the fundamental situatedness and partial character of our ways of organizing thinking, feeling, and acting, as well as on the necessity, if not desirablity, of rethinking "the relationship between knowledge and emotion and construct [ion of] conceptual models that demonstrate the mutually constitutive rather than oppositional relationship between reason and emotion" (Jaggar 1994). On face value, this may be a straightforward, even

simplistic, if not obvious, statement about the nature of knowledge. However, when one understands that these claims are set in the context of the historical pretensions about the universality of (masculinist) reason as opposed to say, feminist desire, and of the reality that emotion is associated with subordinate groups—particularly women—and deployed to discount and silence those realities deemed to be irrational, then one begins to realize how these epistemologies actually explode patriarchal myths about knowledge (Harding 1991, 1998).

Second, nationalist discourses need to continue to recognize, affirm, and articulate different modes of being (ontology): here, not only is this about thinking, feeling, and acting—as relational practices, but also about "volatile bodies", i.e., of re-figuring and re-inscribing bodies, of moving through and beyond the conventional divide of gender as socially-contructed, on the one hand, and of sex as biologically-given, on the other hand, to "our bodies our selves". Elizabeth Grosz has suggested that the "male (or female) body can no longer be regarded as a fixed, concrete substance, a pre-cultural given. It has a determinate form only by being socially inscribed" (Grosz 1987, 2). "As a socio-historical 'object'", she continues, "the body can no longer be confined to biological determinants, to an immanent 'factitious', or unchanging social status. It is a political object par excellence; its forms, capacities, behaviours, gestures, movements, potential are primary objects of political contestation. As a political object, the body is not inert or fixed. It is pliable and plastic material, which is capable of being formed and organized" (Grosz 1987, 2). This profound insight is shared by Foucault who argues that the body is an "inscribed surface of events" (Foucault 1984, 83). Thus, the body becomes "malleable and alterable", its surface inscribed with gender, appropriate behavior, standards of, for example, femininity. The significance of such an understanding cannot be underestimated. For this means not only that nationalism, for example, is about "imagined communities" or "community sentiments of solidarity", but that it is "what, when, where, and

how" are inscribed—written on, embodied—in our very bodies.

Third, nationalist discourses need to continue to recognize, affirm, and articulate different *empowering* practices (politics): here, not only is this about the importance and power of self-definition, self-valuation, nor of self-reliance and autonomy, but also about transformation and transgression, of finding safe places and voices in the midst of difference, and of making the connections. Chandra Mohanty summarizes this point quite well. She notes:

> ... third world women's writings on feminism have consistently focused on (1) the idea of the simultaneity of oppressions as fundamental to the experience of social and political marginality and the grounding of feminist politics in the histories of racism and imperialism; (2) the crucial role of a hegemonic state in circumscribing their/our daily lives and survival struggles; (3) the significance of memory and writing in the creation of oppositional agency; and (4) the differences, conflicts, and contradictions internal to third world women's organizations and communities. In addition, they have insisted on the complex interrelationships between feminist, antiracist, and nationalist struggles... (1991, 10).

This may turn out to be the most serious challenge for nationalist discourses as we enter the new millennium.

NOTES

[1] The term "global capitalism" used throughout this essay is intended to be imprecise. My concern is less with a substantive definition of capitalism–clearly an impossibility given the plural forms of capitalism today–and more with specifying a region of discursive practices characterized by the globalizing trajectories of *modern* capitalism. In fact, it might be argued that "multinational capitalism" could very well be the more useful term to describe the many capitalisms at the end of this century. See, for example, Anthony Giddens' *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990). By "globalization" I refer to those processes of profound structural transformation that have gained some level of autonomy at the global level, which sustain the movements and flows of capital, people, goods, information, ideas, and images, and which are altering the conditions under which communities and identities are enacted. See Michael Featherstone, ed., *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (London: Sage, 1990).

[2] The phrase is Benedict Anderson's, in *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World* (London: Verso, 1998).

[3] This is the central argument of Clive J. Christie's *Southeast Asia in the Twentieth Century: A Reader* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1998).

[4] Max Weber writes, "A nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own" (1948, 176).

[5] For the definition of "liberalism" used in this essay, see Roberto M. Unger, *Knowledge and Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1975). Cf. C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[6] The periodization is Clive J. Christie's (1998).

[7] The interesting contrast, of course, is the experience of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) or the Khmer Rouge, when, in 1975, after achieving victory in a five-year civil war against the U.S. backed Khmer Republic, it engaged in a bloody war eliminating its political, class, and/or ethnic enemies. The Pol Pot regime may very well be an example of the alliance between extremist interpretations of both communism and (xenophobic) nationalism. The so-called *Kahos* "purgings" inside the Communist movement in the Philippines in the 1980s when elements of the Party, with the tacit consent of the leadership, sought to eliminate "deep penetration agents" from within its ranks, deserve further study in relation to the question of the relationship between communism and nationalism as sites of struggle and resistance.

[8] In Southeast Asia, this is difficult to ignore, particularly if one focuses on the political and economic agendas and/or aspirations of nations and states (from Mahatir's Malaysia, to Arroyo's Philippines, to Hatta's Indonesia, not to mention Brunei, Thailand, and, even Vietnam) that all hew towards capitalist development. In addition, of course, there is the APEC.

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THE LEVELING OF HIERARCHIES: THE SPANISH PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE HANDS OF THE FILIPINO REVOLUTIONISTS

Cornelio R. Bascara

ABSTRACT

In the hands of the Filipino revolutionaries, the Spanish prisoners of war were pawns in an intricate political plot involving the Americans, the Filipinos, and the Spanish. A large number of these prisoners were peninsular troops who were not too fortunate to be repatriated. A smaller percentage comprised of religious or friars who remained in the country either because of their religious vows or attachment to their holdings. These prisoners were caught at a fateful moment when strong conflicting interests interplayed among the three "actors": the Spanish, the Americans, and the Filipinos. These prisoners were treated well not only by the native population but also by the Aguinaldo government which was concerned with presenting to the world a newly-born nation with civilized manners, as well as with using the prisoners as a convenient leverage for bargaining to achieve its desire for independence. Althouhg, the Spanish showed their tendency to bungle negotiations and ignore the desires of the colony they were just about to give up, they were tenacious in their efforts to release their compatriots. This paper examines another dimension of the Philippine-Spanish revolution.

Introduction

Shortly before the outbreak of the hostilities between the Filipinos and the Americans on February 4, 1899, an estimated 9,000 Spanish prisoners of war were believed to be in the hands of the Filipino insurgents. Of these, as recorded by the Spanish author Luis Moreno Jerez, 8,200 were Generals, chiefs, officers, and soldiers; 250 were an assortment of employees; 310 were private citizens; and about 399 were Bishops and friars. Altogether, this brought the total of Spanish captives to 9,159.[1]

The number of the civilians was small partly because many of them, seeing the seriousness of the situation, had returned home to Spain shortly after the outbreak of the revolution. Others took advantage of the terms of the capitulation of Manila on August

13, 1898 between Spain and the United States which provided for, among other things, the expatriation of civilians at their own convenient time.[2] As for the ecclesiastics, the number was small and accounted for by the friars who themselves were prisoners of war. Fr. Ulpiano Herrero, OP, ex-cura of Orion, Bataan, accounted for 116 Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinians, and Recollects in Ilocos Sur. Meanwhile, another prisoner, Fr. Graciano Martinez, OSA claimed that 117 friars were made prisoners in different provinces of Cagayan Valley. Unaccounted number of religious in Southern Tagalog and some parts of the Visayas and Mindanao brought the total number of ecclesiastic prisoners to about 300.[3]

The military comprised the largest number of prisoners constituting approximately 30% of the estimated 24,000 peninsular troops sent to the Philippines between October 1896 to January 1897. Believing that the revolution was over with the signing of the Pact of Biak na Bato, Governor Primo de Rivera sent home thousands of troops. This was confirmed in a report to the French Government on December 14, 1898 by Consul G. de Bérard who wrote that thousands of sick and wounded as well as able-bodied Spanish soldiers were sent home in conjunction with the provision of Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Paris.[4]

The switching of roles of the colonizers now turned captives and the colonized now the captors presents only a small dimension of a bigger story known as the Philippine-Spanish Revolution. One of the consequences of the take over by the marginalized Filipinos of the once Spanish-centric world in the Philippines was the leveling of hierarchies. The turn of events which dominated *fin de siècle* Philippine history, however, peripheralized many of the events accounting for this reversal of roles. One of these accounts describes the attempts of the Spanish to liberate their compatriots from the Filipino revolutionists. This, along with the stance of the revolutionists and their motives for keeping the prisoners, are the central topic of this paper. In discussing this topic the paper will also examine the experiences of the prisoners in the hands of their

captors and the treatment they received from the Filipinos. As well, this paper will also focus on how and when the prisoners regained their freedom.

Circumstances Leading to the Captivity of the Spanish

Spain's belief that the Philippines was still "salvageable" did not wane easily. The debacle at Manila Bay was followed by the failed bid of Admiral Manuel Camara to recoup Spanish defeat when his fleet was denied passage along the Suez Canal by the British and the Egyptians. Again, Spain failed to recognize this failure as another "defeat." In a last bid to save the integrity of the nation, Spain appointed General Diego de los Rios as new governor of the Philippines on September 1898 with Iloilo as the new capital. This move only made the fate of the Spanish in Luzon and other parts of the colony even more uncertain. Thus, when the hostilities between the Filipinos and the Spanish, and later on between the Filipinos and the Americans erupted, the remaining unrepatriated Spanish were caught in the crossfire.

Moreno, an officer in the Aguinaldo army during the second phase of the revolution, blamed the capture of the Spanish to Governor Basilio Agustin who, before the coming of the Americans, ignored the advice of the military hierarchy to evacuate all the Spanish civilians and troops to Manila where they were safer. This move was the result of an assessment by the military that the Spanish troops did not possess arms and were thus not ready to face hostile resistance from Filipinos. It was only between 28 and 30 of May that Agustin realized the seriousness of his *faux pas. However,* his order to evacuate came late as many Spanish had either surrendered to the insurgents or fallen captive. Reacting to Agustin's lethargy, Moreno contended that the capture of the Spanish would not have taken place had Agustin heeded the advice of the military rather than attended first to the safety of his own family.[5]

Contrary to expectations, the invasion of Manila by the Americans proved Moreno wrong. The hardships suffered by the Spanish civilians and troops trapped in Intramuros showed that it would have been worse had Agustin heeded the advice to evacuate the Spanish to Manila. In the end, what had been thought of as Agustin's lack of vision had averted the capture and consequently prevented the sufferings of a greater number of Spanish.

The Otis Intercession

Both the Spanish civilian and military assailed their government for having abandoned them to their captors. Their collective resentments can be gleaned from the letter of an anonymous prisoner from Dagupan dated December, 1898. He wrote:

"...Because I believe it is my duty, I am writing Your Excellency about these sad happenings of our abandonment. I do not know of any measures that are being taken for our freedom... Your Excellency can judge how painful and hateful it is to see privileges enjoyed by Manila officials, in addition to their receiving their salaries, while the unfortunate who have given their lives and blood, and sacrificed for their country languish in prison."[6]

Indignant over the alleged lack of concern by their government, the prisoners were, however, unaware of the predicament faced by their government. Much as it wanted to intervene on their behalf, it was constrained by the position it maintained towards the Aguinaldo government which it considered to be vulnerable and shaky. For his part, Aguinaldo considered this show of indifference as a "strange behavior of the Spanish government which avoided all contact with the Tagalogs..." Aguinaldo remarked that all that the Spanish needed to do was open lines of communication and begin negotiations.

For their part, the Spanish decided that any negotiation for the release of the prisoners should be settled through indirect channels such as the intervention of General Elwell S. Otis, newly appointed military governor of the Philippine. Otis agreed on August 29 to work for the release of the civilians and religious only, excluding the soldiers whose case he considered to be political in nature. Based on the content of Aguinaldo's November 3 reply to Otis' letter of November 2, it appeared that Otis tactfully asked for the release of the civilians and friars on the grounds that they were non-combatants and therefore should be exempted from being taken as prisoners of war by virtue of the Geneva Convention.[7] Aguinaldo disagreed contending that the civilians and the friars actively participated in the conflict in many capacities.

Aguinaldo's position can be gleaned from a report published in the newspaper *La Vanguardia* describing Spanish government officials and professionals like Antonio Fuset, president of *Casino Espanol,* and the *Escuadron de Leales Voluntarios* as "fully equipped and armed" during the early days of the revolution.[8] The involvement of these civilians was a response to a directive made by General Agustin on April 23, 1896 calling for all government employees and their sons to join the forces of the government. Heeding this appeal, the civilians "formed corps of armed volunteers that stood guard in towns, made arrests, tortured the prisoners...or joined the regular soldiers to fight against the revolutionists".[9]

Otis managed only to annoy Aguinaldo with ill-informed allegations why the Filipinos imprisoned the Spanish. One such serious charge against Aguinaldo was the imprisonment of Spanish women, children, and nuns. Aguinaldo, in the same letter dated November 3, assured Otis that it was the women themselves who requested that they, along with their children, be allowed to stay with their husbands.[10] Despite the initial exchange of acrimonious notes, Otis continued communicating with Aguinaldo. Whether Otis ignored the cue, or simply failed to sense Aguinaldo's unwillingness to set the prisoners free is a matter of speculation.

Aguinaldo's Reasons for Keeping the Prisoners

In the same letter dated November 3, Aguinaldo told Otis that the imprisonment of the Spanish was due to "political purposes".[11] But exactly what Aguinaldo meant by "political purposes" seemed to have escaped Otis' notice although it is also possible that he simply ignored these cryptic terms as he continued sending letters to Aguinaldo. A possible explanation behind Aguinaldo's position might be his interpretation of the "law of reciprocity". From Aguinaldo's perspective, since the Spanish were not treating the Filipino prisoners justly or humanely, then the Filipinos would do the same to the Spanish they held in prison. As later events showed, the Aguinaldo government adopted this law of reciprocity as a bargaining leverage for the release of the Filipino prisoners exiled to Spain and other parts of the Spanish dominion, to exact demands such as ransom money in exchange for the release of the prisoners, as well as to press for the "recognition of the secular rights of the Filipino clergy by the Vatican".[12]

Although it might appear that Aguinaldo only wanted to address the Vatican and Spain to get even, his real intention was to bring the cause of the Philippines, then besieged by American expansionism, to the attention of the international community of nations. For this purpose, Aguinaldo launched successive propaganda blitz beginning on August 7 with his "Manifesto to Foreign Governments" in Hong Kong. These propaganda campaigns did not only seek for world recognition of the Philippine government but also inform foreign governments about its legitimacy. To win the sympathy of the international community, Aguinaldo issued a decree on May 24, 1898 ordering humane treatment of prisoners. This exhortation was zealously heeded by Aguinaldo's men who prided themselves for respecting what they called *"derecho internacional,"* or the human rights of the prisoners.

While Aguinaldo did not categorically admit to having used the prisoners to call the attention of the world and expose the treachery of America and Spain at the Treaty of Paris, Jose Genova

Iturbide, a Spanish resident of Manila hinted, although vaguely, that this was what Aguinaldo had wanted. Genova said that had Aguinaldo released the prisoners early enough, he could have gotten what he wanted — not only a good image before the eyes of the world but also its support.[13]

But far greater than Aguinaldo's "political purposes" and his quest for world support was his fear of a civil war. The Filipinos were divided on the subject of revolution and many of them were still loyal to Spain. Aguinaldo feared that once they were set free, the friars could still sway a large following of friar loyalists which he considered as "fanatics" to launch a counterrevolution. Ferdinand Blumentritt concurred with Aguinaldo's fear when he wrote Rizal that the revolution was bound to fail because there were still many Filipinos who professed loyalty to the friars.[14] One of the groups alluded to by Blumentritt was the *Guardia de Honor*. Organized by the natives to protect the Church against the onslaught of the revolutionaries, these dissidents fought against the revolutionists in Zambales, La Union, and Tarlak.

Aguinaldo expressed fear of a civil war because he realized that the country would brace for a war of attrition. His fear was not without basis. As the friars were still in possession of boundless wealth—the so-called friar lands—Aguinaldo knew that the friars could use this inexhaustible wealth to finance a war. Writing to Otis about his misgivings, Aguinaldo said:

"...The Archbishop, as well as the Spanish bishops in the Philippines, belong to the regular Spanish clergy and it is not licit for them to continue predominating in the Islands because they can promote a counter revolt helped by their gold...."[15]

Wishing to avert a counterrevolution by the friars, he decreed on January 23, 1899 the expulsion from the Philippines of all members of the Spanish clergy including those affiliated with them either as priests or secular

employees. However, due to the outbreak of the hostilities between the Filipinos and the Americans, the expulsion did not take place.

The Reaney Intercession

The move to free the religious began on July 1898, three months before efforts to liberate the civil and military prisoners began. Luck for the ecclesiastics took a new turn when the Dominican father, Cándido García Valles, found an ally in Fr. W. H. I. Reaney, the American Catholic chaplain of the USS Olympia, who promised the Dominicans to do his best for the release of the religious.

Father Garcia's argument revolved around two issues – that the case of the friars was not political in nature and that they were imprisoned because the Katipuneros and the Freemasons hated them. Fr. Garcia insisted that the friars engaged themselves in purely spiritual affairs and were never involved in the revolution in any way. As mentioned earlier, Aguinaldo, however, indirectly rebutted the Dominican's claim by presenting Otis with reports documenting the friars' participation in the revolution. In his letter to Otis on May 18, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote:

"...Some of them, as for example, the parish priest of Lipa, province of Batangas, placed themselves as head of volunteer corps. In Manila, during its siege by many forces, all the priests organized and armed as a military group that formed part of the municipal corps for the defense of the city and all that can be assured, gave the Spanish forces direct and effective cooperation in fighting against the Filipinos either by maintaining armies at their expense, accompanying them in their expeditions, or inciting them to fight."[16]

Interestingly, Fr. Garcia's other claim regarding the alleged "hatred" of the revolutionaries against the friars was contradicted by the Spanish religious themselves who did not share the sentiment. Although the friars admitted that torture, verbal abuse,

threats, and forced labor were committed against some of them, the religious themselves attested that these violations of their human rights were isolated cases and were perpetrated only by a few such as Gen. Gregorio del Pilar and Col. Daniel Tirona. The affection toward the priests of many Filipinos like Vito Belarmino, Jose Leyva, Emilio Aguinaldo, and the people of northern Luzon provinces, some parts of the Visayas, and even where the revolution and anti-friar sentiments were markedly stronger continues to this day to defy explanations. Extracts from Fr. Herrero's account belied Fr. Garcia's claim on the inhumanity of the native:

"...despite our imprisonment by the insurgents, the masses accorded us with due respect and kind attention with the exception of the few who succumbed to the pressure of the Katipuneros. Any calumnies against us went to naught since the people, with their resolute Christian faith, did not believe in them. Now and more than ever, there is no doubt that the natives, as proofs would show, indeed loved the religious."[17]

Reaney took his role as negotiator with enthusiasm. He replied assiduously to Fr. García's letters, visited and comforted the ecclesiastics in their detencion cells in Cavite, and talked to Dewey and Aguinaldo for the release of the prisoners. The chaplain was convinced that the release of the prisoners was only a matter of time. This optimism sprung from his belief that the Filipinos would soften their stance because they were beholden to the Spanish for bequeathing the Catholic faith. But more encouraging for Fr. Reaney was the willingness of Aguinaldo to release some of the friars in order to ease the cash-strapped republic from the burden of maintaining the prisoners. On his second visit to the ecclesiastics on July 14, Fr. Reaney reported that Dewey and Aguinaldo had agreed that the Spanish clergy would be allowed to go to Hong Kong on two conditions: that they travel on their own account and that no one should be inconvenienced by their departure.[18]

But Fr. Reaney's optimism was short-lived when he witnessed on his visit to the ecclesiastics in Cavite what he described as "unchristian" treatment of the prisoners by the revolutionists. Fr. Reaney began to doubt the release of the Spanish fathers especially after confirming Aguinaldo's half-hearted gesture to release the prisoners. In a breach of propriety, Fr. Reaney opened the letter which Aguinaldo handed him for delivery to Gen. Emiliano Riego de Dios, chief of the Filipino commanding forces in Cavite. As translated from Tagalog to English by the friars for Fr. Reaney, the letter revealed that Aguinaldo had ordered Riego de Dios not to grant the chaplain permission to visit the prisoners and to spy on him and the friars by listening to their conversations or censoring their communication.

In the end, Fr. Reaney conceded that the release of the prisoners was a remote possibility especially that there were some quarters which obstructed the efforts for the release of the friars. Fr. Reaney categorically identified these quarters as the European Freemasons but did not mention who the other sources were. It can be theorized however that he was referring to Pedro Paterno and Felipe Buencamino whose role in the negotiation will be discussed later in this paper. Although the rupture of the relations of the Filipinos and the Americans at the onset of the revolution on February 4, 1899 prevented Fr. Reaney from accomplishing his mission, it was Aguinaldo's order to move the friars in the interiors of Luzon that dealt the final blow to Reaney's plan.

The Foreign Nationals as Mediators

While yet in Iloilo, then capital of the besieged Spanish government, General de los Rios asked the Filipino, Spanish, and other foreign friends of Aguinaldo to request the president for the release of the prisoners. Thus, on December 27, 1898, de los Rios instructed Octaviano Romeo, auditor of the army, to request his friend, Joaquin Gonzalez, delegate to the Malolos Congress, to deliver his letter bringing the plight of the prisoners to Aguinaldo's

attention.[19] Although Romeo's letter to Aguinaldo was civil in language and tone, it was deemed tactless by Aguinaldo who was insulted by the comment insinuating that the prisoners were being kept in exchange for gold and other concessions: "I do not mind whatever aspiration the Filipino government has but I hope it doesn't keep the prisoners in exchange for some US concessions or for gold."[20] More provocative was Romeo's statement that despite the existence of the Revolutionary Government, the unfolding events had already presaged a take-over by the United States of the Philippines. Romeo's candidness infuriated Aguinaldo. Feeling betrayed in the Treaty of Paris and then pressured by the outbreak of the Fil-Am War, Aguinaldo rejected Gonzalez' intercession.

Nevertheless, de los Rios refused to give up as he shifted to soliciting the influence of the foreigners as another strategy. On March 29, 1899, he gathered the businessmen, the press, and the foreign consuls in Manila not only to move Aguinaldo but also apply a semblance of international pressure on him. Deeming such "pressure" inappropriate and might only alienate Aguinaldo, de los Rios abandoned the plan. Instead, a letter of appeal to Aguinaldo was prepared by the Manila-based foreign firms only such as Smith, Bell & Co., Levy Brothers, E. Andred & Co., Tillson Hermann & Co., and others.[21] Their letter talked about justice and compassion – language incomprehensible to the Aguinaldo camp. Like the previous appeals, Aguinaldo turned down the request of the foreign businessmen.

Despite this setback, de los Rios was unrelenting when he sent a personal letter to Aguinaldo threatening the latter that he had no alternative but to release the prisoners by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In brief, de los Rios' message was for Aguinaldo to accept reality, however grim it was, that the Americans had already taken over the Philippines. But the more the Spanish became insensitive by talking about American sovereignty in the

Philippines — a view offensive to Aguinaldo— the more the Spanish botched the case of the prisoners and jeopardized their freedom.

The Filipinos Set the Demands

When negotiation through private sectors failed, the Spanish changed strategies by dealing directly with Aguinaldo through government-recognized commissions. De los Rios then commissioned Octaviano Romeo, accompanied by Las Heras, the commandant of engineers, Armando Alvarez, an employee of Tabacalera, and the Spanish Manila-resident Jose Gomez Centurion to meet with Mabini. At this meeting the Romeo Commission was told that since negotiations were already underway between the Americans and the Filipinos, the latter had ceased to have any more business with Spain. De los Rios was pleased with Mabini's remarks because it meant the cessation of Spanish negotiations with the recalcitrant and arbitrary Filipinos. The Spanish felt it wiser to negotiate directly with the Americans. But the question now was what if the Filipino negotiators set unreasonable demands on the Americans thus delaying the release of the prisoners?

In reality, this development was far from good because the statements of Mabini virtually obstructed the release of the prisoners. Mabini remained adamant in his "rather [a] strange theory"[22] that since the United States had succeeded Spain in acquiring sovereignty over the Philippines, the prisoners were now under the Americans." Whatever the meaning of this position was, it implied only one thing—that the Filipinos were determined not to set their prisoners free.

Negotiations After De los Rios

On June 3, 1899, de los Rios left for Spain without resolving the issue of the Spanish prisoners. The Madrid government appointed Brigadier General Nicolas Jaramillo as the head of a new commission together with Antonio del Rio, former provincial

governor of Laguna, and Enrique Toral.

In a gesture to settle the issue on the prisoners, the Aguinaldo government created a special commission composed of Leon Ma. Guerrero as head, with Ambrosio Flores and Alberto Barreto as members. At the meeting with the Del Rio-Toral Commission on June 25, 1899 in Tarlac, the Filipino commissioners presented Aguinaldo's decree of January 23, 1899 which provided for the release of the sick prisoners. The session was momentarily suspended, however, when the Spanish commissioners protested against the Filipino commissioners' position that able-bodied Spanish friars would not be freed.

On June 26 the two commissions met again with the Filipinos now changing their former hard-line stance. This time it had already become too clear that the prisoners were being held for political and other considerations. One of these was the Filipino demand for Spain to recognize the independence of the Philippines. In exchange, the Aguinaldo government committed itself to repatriate the prisoners to Spain at its own expense. But should this condition prove unfeasible, the Aguinaldo government proposed to Spain that, as a gesture of generosity, it was willing to accept "arms, ammunitions, provisions, etc., or their equivalent in cash". Appalled by this proposal, the Spanish negotiators refused to commit their government to such conditions. Nonetheless, to avoid a stalemate, the Spanish commissioners enquired how much the "equivalent cash" was. The Filipino commissioners shrewdly refused to give a categorical answer as they bounced the question back to their counterpart. They knew that Spain was in a position to pay and once they named the price, the Spanish might grab the offer. Therefore, they wanted the Spanish themselves to name the price which would give the Filipinos a bargaining advantage if the proposed sum was unacceptable. In brief, the Filipinos wanted to measure up to how much the Spanish were willing to pay.

Although the Spanish expressed willingness to pay one million pesos, the Filipino negotiators rejected the amount and the meeting was thus adjourned. It reopened on June 29 when the

Filipino commissioners informed the Spanish that the "equivalent cash" was 7,000,000 pesos – a sum that took the Spanish by surprise. Nevertheless, the Spanish commissioners were cordial in requesting for more time to consult their government.

Hitches on the Release of the Prisoners

The negotiators appeared to have struck a fair deal. While Moreno did not specify why both parties concluded the negotiations happily despite the seemingly noncommittal stance of the Spanish, Genova's account revealed that the sum of seven million pesos demanded by the Filipino commissioners was reduced to four million pesos. According to accounts, Aguinaldo found this amount reasonable and ordered the implementation on July 5, 1899 in Tarlak of the January 23 Decree releasing the sick prisoners on July 31. As prescribed in this order, duly-authorized Spanish representatives were to pick up the prisoners in designated stations namely San Fernando, La Union for those imprisoned in Northern Luzon; Dagupan for those held in most Central Luzon area; Daet, Camarines Norte for those imprisoned in Bicol Region, and Sta. Cruz or Calamba for those held in most Tagalog provinces.[23]

Unfortunately, the release of the sick prisoners was suspended because Aguinaldo was forced back by heavy fighting between the Americans and the Filipinos especially in the port of La Union. More disheartening was the "mysterious order" from Madrid to Jaramillo to suspend negotiations with the Filipinos "due to some problems of international nature." Much to his consternation, Jaramillo could only surmise that the United States must have suspected that the money Spain was supposed to pay the Filipinos might be used to improve their military capability against the American forces. It is likely that Jaramillo arrived at this conclusion as a result of the United States pressure reminding Madrid that the Philippines had already been ceded to the United States via the Treaty of Paris.

Jaramillo now turned to Otis for help to fetch the prisoners for humanitarian reasons. Though he received a favorable reply from Otis, his elation was short-lived as Otis set the condition that the ships bearing prisoners would fly the American flag and not those of Spain and the Red Cross. Jaramillo found the condition outrageous because he knew that the Aguinaldo camp would reject it especially since it would make Aguinaldo's decree of January 23 irrelevant and the "boarding of the Spaniards not only humiliating but also ridiculous."

Otis' position can be gleaned from Jaramillo's letter which stated that the problem of the prisoners had already been turned into a sensitive political issue[24] such as the US sovereignty over the Philippines. Otis was firm on the US position that any negotiation with the Aguinaldo government was illegal or unacceptable to the Americans because the sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines was *de facto* by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. The United States maintained that it was going to consider any country which contested this reality as hostile toward it.

Jaramillo recognized Otis' position and Spain's commitment to the Treaty of Paris and acceded to Otis' condition although doubting the prospect of its success. Jaramillo was therefore not surprised when the Aguinaldo camp vehemently rejected the Otis proposition. But what took Jaramillo by surprise was the new motion from the Aguinaldo government demanding that "the authority or power vested in the Spanish commissions be adequate". In the past negotiations the legitimacy, degree of representation, or qualifications of the negotiators or commissioners, whether on a private capacity such as that of Fr. Reaney, or the foreign businessmen, or that of the fully-authorized Del Rio-Toral Commission, were never an issue. In fact, during the earlier negotiations Aguinaldo avoided being too legalistic and flatly did away with the credentials of the Spanish negotiators although he declared such negotiations on a semi-official level.

Equally disheartening was the resolution of the Aguinaldo government which demanded that the settlement of the issue on

the prisoners be done through a bilateral agreement basis. This meant that a foreign country would act as a mediator between the Philippines and Spain within the framework drawn by the international community of nations. This move thus made it difficult, if not impossible, for Aguinaldo and the Spanish to come to terms as no country then had yet recognized the Philippines as a sovereign state. Questioning the logic behind Filipino desire to raise the issue of the prisoners to the international level, Moreno argued:

"The reason behind this is that every internal treaty, as its name implies, is made between nation and nation or state and state. Has any power recognized the independence of the Philippines? No, is the only reply. Thus, which power can enter into an international treaty with the Philippines, between nation and nation and state and state? Not one, evidently. For any power to do it would mean a prior recognition of the Philippines, which the U.S. would consider *casus belli*."[25]

At this point, an important question arises on who was responsible for advising Aguinaldo to turn down the Otis proposal and require fully-authorized credentials for the Spanish negotiators at top-level negotiations for the prisoners within the parameters of international law. Genova and Moreno suspected that Pedro Paterno, Chief Minister of the Cabinet, and Felipe Buencamino, Minister of Foreign Affairs were behind the Aguinaldo decision. This suspicion was not without basis since first, Paterno and Buencamino held the most sensitive cabinet portfolio which had direct bearing on the case of the prisoners; and second, both Paterno and Buencamino held Aguinaldo in fear of losing the support of the conservative[26] which they represented. Genova and Moreno maintained that even if Paterno and Buencamino had accepted the Otis proposal, they were known to disapprove "previously done" agreements, and to paraphrase Moreno, disregard the following day whatever was already approved.[27] For Moreno, the insistence of Paterno and Buencamino to elevate the case of the prisoners before the world was plain and simple

obstructionism and sabotage. Meanwhile, Paterno and Buencamino were aware of the impossibility of their proposal given the unsettled political status of the Philippines, but this was precisely the reason why they wanted the issue on the prisoners unresolved. Mabini added credence to Moreno's view of Paterno and Buencamino when he said that Paterno and Buencamino "represented the plutocracts bent on destroying or nullifying whatever the Revolution had achieved so far".[28]

Understandably, the exasperation of the Spanish like Genova over the failed negotiations led them to entertain nasty notions about Paterno and Buencamino. Genova believed that since the agreement forged between the Del Rio-Toral and the Guerrero Commissions was suspended due to circumstances beyond the commissions' control, the ransom money of 4,000,000 pesos was never going to be forthcoming.[29] Convinced that that Paterno and Buencamino were after the ransom money which could have "enriched them in no short time at all"[30], Genova and Moreno concluded that this turn of events could have only disappointed the two Filipino officials. Mabini himself corroborated Genova's allegation of Paterno and Buencamino's corruption when he denounced them as being interested in controlling the finances of the Aguinaldo government.[31]

Unwittingly, when Genova and Moreno made Paterno and Buencamino appear as obstructionists, they had only succeeded in making the latter appear heroic in the people's eyes for having acted in the interest of the republic. However, Mabini vehemently objected and publicly exposed Paterno as a man who was "after honors...and want to appear the idol of the people."[32] Also, Genova and Moreno unwittingly projected Paterno and Buencamino as firebrand nationalists and staunch republicans when, in reality both men had shifted from independence to "autonomy under the American sovereignty." Antonio Luna decried the annexationist stance of these "autonomists" when he imprisoned some of them as traitors to the republic.[33] Because of the ambiguous stance of Paterno and Buencamino, negotiations

on the issue of the prisoners failed and all previous efforts came to naught. Meanwhile, the prisoners waited in vain for their rescue.

As a final note for this particular section, one question to ask is whether Genova, Moreno, and Mabini were right in their assessment of Paterno and Buencamino or were the latter just victims of personal prejudices. The Postmodernist approach advises everyone to be wary about hidden narratives as each individual has his or her own way of perceiving or looking at things which in turn gives way to biases. Following this perspective, it would be difficult to render fair judgment on Genova, Moreno, or Mabini, as well as on Paterno and Buencamino. In the end, history itself will be the judge whether they acted accordingly and appropriately given the particular circumstances which provided the backdrop for their actions.

The Prisoners in the Hands of the Revolutionaries

Stories of torture, verbal abuse, threats, and forced labor committed by the revolutionists against the prisoners occupy a central position in some Spanish post-revolution historical literature. Biases of course often take the blame for providing the backdrop for such topics. For their part, some Filipino historians have tried to justify the violations of the dignity of the prisoners as the consequences of three centuries of Spanish repressions.

As discussed earlier, the friars claimed that, while abuses were not lacking, the violations were isolated cases and should not be taken as collective resentments of Filipinos against the Spanish rule specifically toward the friars. Stories of reverence of the natives toward the friars while in captivity refuted the alleged general Filipino animosity against the friars. Based on their own accounts, the friars conceded that the civilian and military prisoners were treated more generously than the friars themselves.[34] In Camarines, for instance, the prisoners reported that the revolutionists left them milling freely around the town unharmed. Even in provinces such as Bulacan, Batangas and Laguna which were the hub of the revolution, the revolutionists treated the

prisoners with respect. A certain Enrique Hidalgo reported that in Bulacan and Tarlak, the Spanish soldiers were treated with much "consideration that any civilized nation is supposed to accord". Meanwhile, the prisoner and former Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Manuel Rodriguez de Vera, belied stories of cruelty when he reiterated the kindness of the Batangueños towards the prisoners. Meanwhile, the story of the Extremaduran Deogracias Gonzalez and other *cazadores* in Ilocos was perhaps unprecedented if not unequalled. According to this account, the Spanish prisoners were feted to local *bailes* and fiestas, allowed to take *paseos* in the towns and beaches, served with good food, lodged in private homes, and offered to marry available local women, thus making observers wonder whether they were prisoners or guests.[35]

Hidden behind the stories of the prisoners was their condemnation of their own government whom they believed abandoned them. Writing from Tarlak on November 10, 1898, a prisoner named Manuel del Valle assailed the insensitivity of his government towards their plight. He wrote:

"...a great number of soldiers walk around here barefoot, in underwear, without anything to eat. They had to work as house helps or *cocheros* in Filipino homes in exchange for food...In Dagupan, the situation of the officials is worse: they have no luggage, surviving only with a handful of rice; they have no money except the one-half peseta given to them by the Revolutionary government and they wash their clothing in the river without soap. All these, the government officials do not know up to now...."[36]

From the testimonies of the prisoners, it would appear that although they did not totally exculpate their captors for violating their fundamental human rights, the bulk of their complaint lay heavily on their government especially as Spanish officials had been reportedly living privileged life in Manila while pocketing the money intended for the prisoners.

The Case of the Prisoners Before the World

While informal negotiations were going on between Aguinaldo and Otis, Antonio Fuset embarked on a fund-raising campaign in Manila, Spain, and South America for the benefit of the prisoners. This move had thus brought the plight of the prisoners to the attention of the Iberian world which contributed 26,000 pesos to the campaign.[37] But the fate of the prisoners reached international proportions when the Queen Regent Maria Cristina herself brought the case to Rome. Acceding to her request, the Archbishop Nava di Bontife, Papal Nuncio to Madrid, communicated to Cardinal Rampolla, the Secretary of Papal State, the queen's desire for Pope Leo XIII to intercede in the liberation of the prisoners.[38] However, the Nuncio, in a caveat to cardinal Rampolla, wrote that the failure of the Americans to contain the hostility of the Filipinos and the absence of a well-established legitimate government posed serious obstacles. The Nuncio also intimated that "religious interests not compatible with some of the known conditions that Aguinaldo and his followers intend to demand"[39] might be in conflict with the views of the Pope. Whatever views the Pope maintained in relation to the Spanish prisoners were however, not disclosed but it can be surmised that the primary concerns of the Nuncio was the unpleasant prospect of dragging the name of the Pontiff into the issue of the prisoners. Or, perhaps trivializing it, or compromising it with what was a purely political affair. But of absolute cause for concern for the Nuncio was his discovery of Aguinaldo's scheme to deal directly with the Pope:

"...Aguinaldo and his adepts will insist on the demands, already manifested, of wanting to deal about the liberation of these religious, directly with the Head of the Church, in their evil intention of drawing for themselves a certain moral prestige...."[40]

To spare the Pope from the complications of direct

involvement in the case, the Nuncio directed Cardinal Rampolla to consider three options or "indirect means" which would not be detrimental to the Pontifical dignity."[41] The first of these three "indirect means" was to send an apostolic delegate who would negotiate with Aguinaldo but on condition that the prisoners be released first. The absence of records on this matter hinted at the lack of interest on the part of Aguinaldo given his arbitrary position on the prisoners.

The second indirect means was to request the local clergy to exhort the Aguinaldo government to release the prisoners.

a letter addressed to Aguinaldo pleading with him in the name of humanity to liberate the prisoners. Yet, the letter was not without warning, stating that if the prisoners were not released, something calamitous would befall the country. Since no prisoners were liberated, it was obvious that Aguinaldo was unmoved by the warning.

The third means was to offer the Aguinaldo government some money in exchange for the freedom of the prisoners. The Nuncio had earlier gotten wind of the fact that Aguinaldo was amenable to an agreed ransom. But before some of the Nuncio's plans could be laid down before the revolutionists, the Americans had already overrun the Philippines, sending the Aguinaldo government on the run.

The Road to Freedom

In the end, the credit for the liberation of the prisoners went to the American forces. As they advanced after capturing one province after another, they threw the revolutionary movement in disarray and forced the revolutionists, who lost grip of their prisoners, to run for their safety. According to the Spanish military officer and prisoner Matías Viló, the prisoners escaped while heavy fighting was going on in Sabang, Salitran, Dasmariñas, and Malagasang in Cavite. It appeared that the escape of the prisoners from Cavite to their final destination in Northern Luzon did not

happen in one go but in daily batches. This was the same scenario in other parts of the Philippines. The crux of the matter was that the prisoners owed their liberation to the Spanish themselves. Genova who served as captain in the Aguinaldo army and later on as aide de camp to the president, facilitated the escape of many prisoners such as those from Parañaque and Bacoor. Genova also managed to convince the military hierarchy such as Mariano Trias and Baldomero Aguinaldo to release many prisoners and to grant them safety conduct passes. Ultimately, the Filipinos, perhaps seeing the futility of keeping the prisoners, or out of humanitarian reasons, set the prisoners such as the friars held in Ambos, Camarines and Catanduanes free.[42] When the American forces finally subdued the resisting provinces, they found the prisoners already on the run but free finally. All that the US forces did was to rescue them and bring them to Manila. By the end of December 1899, most of the prisoners had been repatriated to Spain.

Conclusion

The Filipinos wanted their country to be treated as equal with any other nation, but Spain was in no position to grant that wish since it had already bound itself to the Treaty of Paris and to its position that the political status of the Philippines was unsettled. Mainly for this reason that the task of releasing the prisoners dragged on interminably leaving the Spanish with fewer and fewer options but to appeal to the Filipinos' sense of compassion. Given the peculiar conditions of the time, however, the Filipinos failed to respond. Compassion for the prisoners was sidelined in the face of a more compelling agenda of the fledgling republic – survival.

Historical records show that the Spanish applied all means, conventional and otherwise, to resolve the prisoner issue, but with little effect. They bungled the negotiations and jeopardized the speedy release of the prisoners. Some of the reasons included their insensitivity by recklessly touching on the issue of the legitimacy of the Aguinaldo government. Also, the Spanish tendency to adhere strictly to the law in the resolution of the issue delayed the

negotiations and prevented the achievement of positive results. In most cases, the Spanish were too straightforward and too outright, sometimes to the point of provoking the sensitive Aguinaldo. The Spanish negotiators, like the Aguinaldo men, did not have any guiding principles, at least initially, in the resolution of the issue and for this reason shifted from one strategy to another or followed a trial-and-error formula.

Despite diplomatic efforts of intermediaries, the Spanish attempts to move Aguinaldo failed because he was firmly resolved to use the prisoners for political reasons. In time it became obvious that no rhetoric could convince the Aguinaldo government to release the prisoners. Yet, as he wanted the world to see that the leader of a civilized nation was capable of compassion, Aguinaldo treated the prisoners kindly. Wanting to court the world's sympathy and support, Aguinaldo was well aware that any adverse action against the prisoners could provoke the international community of nations and cost him their support. To his credit, Aguinaldo was at least honest with one thing and that is in insisting that the prisoners were not being kept to avenge the 300 years of Spanish cruel domination of the Filipinos. If this were otherwise, there was little to prevent the revolutionary government from ordering the massacre of all the prisoners.

Nevertheless, Aguinaldo found that keeping the prisoners brought certain advantages that allowed him first, to uphold the integrity a newly-born nation; second, to show to the world that the Filipinos could not be intimidated; third, to demonstrate that the Filipinos were already a force to reckon with; and fourth, to prove to the world that by applying skill and talent in the rudiments of governance and by treating the prisoners humanely, the Filipinos were civilized people fit to become members of a civilized world. On the other hand, Aguinaldo also learned soon enough that keeping the prisoners brought a number of disadvantages, most serious of which was the draining of the government treasury. At the same time, holding the prisoners sorely obstructed the revolutionists' mobility, especially during the war with the

Americans, as they were forced to haul their prisoners along wherever they went. Finally, the prisoners had become an issue of morality. It was believed that these disadvantages had almost swayed Aguinaldo to consider setting the prisoners free if not for the presence of influential men around him who prevented him from doing so.

If there was something remarkable about the Spanish attempts to liberate the prisoners, it was their unyielding efforts to release their compatriots. History can not therefore condemn them for not doing anything. Their efforts contradicted the accusation of some Spanish that their government had abandoned the prisoners. Unknown to the prisoners, the Spanish government had sought help from all sectors including people close to Aguinaldo, the Church – from Filipino priests to American chaplains, cardinals, bishops, even the Pope of Rome. Indeed, the Spanish moved heaven and earth to help their compatriots in distress.

In the final analysis, the lesson learned from the experience of Spanish prisoners in the hands of the Filipino revolutionist is Postmodern in nature. When the Filipinos won the revolution and imprisoned the colonizers, they seized the exclusive centric world of their former masters. The reversal of the positions of the colonizer and the colonized finally brought the two face to face before the negotiating table as equals. That it had to take 300 years fo this to happen was a supreme irony but history had a way of leveling all fields.

NOTES

[1]Luis Moreno Jerez, *Los Prisioneros Españoles en el poder de los Tagalos* (Manila: Establecimiento Tipografico del "Diario de Manila," 1900), 6. Spanish to English sources used in this article is this writer's. This present research is indebted to Moreno's work, both in Spanish and English entitled *The Spanish Prisoners Held by the Tagalogs*. Trans. into English by the NHI. (Manila:

NHI, 1998). Notes culled from these works will not be cited anymore but will be enclosed in quotation marks.

[2]Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *Malolos Crisis of the Republic* (QC: University of the Philippines Press, 1960), 208.

[3]"The Dominicans and the Philippine Revolution." Compiled and Annotated by Fr. Fidel Villaroel, OP. (Manila: UST Publishing House, 1999), 326.

[4]See *French Consular Dispatches on the Phlippine Revolution.* Trans. by Ma. Luisa Camagay. (QC: University of the Philippines Press, 1997), 81.

[5]Carlos Ria-Baja, *El Desastre Filipino* (Barcelona: Tipografia la Academia, 1899), 65.

[6]Moreno, *The Spanish Prisoners*, 25-26. See Chapter III of this book for more details on the complaints of the prisoners against their government.

[7]See Otis-Aguinaldo records of correspondence in Pedro S. de Achutegui and Miguel Bernad, *Religious Revolution in the Philippines*, Vol. II (QC: The University Press, 1971), 35-42.

[8]*La Vanguardia*, Oct. 4, '96.

[9]*The Dominicans*, 356.

[10]Achutegui and Bernad, *Religious Revolution*, 34.

[11]*The Dominicans*, 354.

[12]See the letter of Aguinaldo to Otis, Nov. 10, 1898 in Moreno, *The Spanish Prisoners*, 43.

[13]Jose Genova Iturbide, *Los Prisioneros Memoria de la Comision desempeñada en el Campo Filipino* (Madrid: Establec. Tipografico de C. Juste, 1900), 29.

[14]Leon Ma. Guerrero, *The First Filipino* (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1963), 311-312.

[15]*The Dominicans*, 353.

[16]Ibid.

[17]See Fr. Ulpiano Herrero Sampedro, *Nuestra Prision* (Manila: Imprenta del Colegio de Sto. Tomas, 1900), 131.

[18]Ibid., 152. Aguinaldo confided to Consul Rounceville Wildman about his difficulty in maintaining the prisoners for

economic reasons and his willingness to set some of the friars free.

[19]See de los Rios and Romeo's efforts for the release of the prisoners in Genova, *Los Prisioneros*, 7-11.

[20]Genova, 28.

[21]See signatories in *The Letters of Mabini. Compiled and trans. by the National Heroes Commission. (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1965), 125-126.*

[22]Ibid.

[23]Data from this particular section are culled from Moreno, *The Spanish Prisoners.*

[24]See Jaramillo's letter, bid., 67-68.

[25]Ibid., 76.

[26]Agoncillo, *Malolos Crisis of the Republic*, 400.

[27]Moreno, *The Spanish Prisoners*, 73.

[28]Agoncillo, *Malolos Crisis of the Republic*, 392-393.

[29]There was no mention about the delivery of the money in the course of any negotiations.

[30]Genova, *Los Prisioneros*, 11-12.

[31]Agoncillo, *Malolos Crisis of the Republic*, 393-394 and 405.

[32]Ibid., 396.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Fr. Herrero, 130 .

[35]Read Deogracias Gonzalez story in Juan Chavez Palacios, *La Perdida de Filipinas* (Badajoz: Editorial Regional de Extremadura, 1998).

[36]Moreno, *Los Prisioneros*, 52-53.

[37] *The Dominicans*, 32. The succeeding section is culled from the same book, pages 360-366 and 369-373.

[38]See the letters of Nava di Pontifice to Cardinal Rampolla in *The Dominicans*, 360-366, 369-373.

[39]Ibid., 370.

[40]Ibid., 370-371.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Achutegui and Bernad, *The Religious Revolution*, 72.

CONSTRUCTING ECOTOURISM: THE APPLICATION OF THE TOURISM SYSTEM MODEL IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

Enrique G. Oracion

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the concept of ecotourism as a desirable alternative to mass tourism. Using the social constructionist perspective as a theoretical frame, the paper maintains that it is possible to use the tourism system model in the construction of ecotourism as a strategy to promote sustainable resource management and tourism but this approach will only have positive effect if individuals involved in the business of tourism such as brokers, locals, and tourists behave to a tolerable level that will cause the least damage to the local ecosystem. Such behavior, according to the tourism system model, could be modified or regulated by the individuals themselves. To exemplify the applicability of the tourism system model as a tool in planning, developing, and managing ecotourism, Apo Island in the Philippines is presented as a case study.

Introduction

Social constructionists argue that what is basically accepted as reality is in fact constructed by human actions and the interpretations of those actions which somehow vary but could be negotiated among actors (Howard and Hollander 2000: 35). For social constructionists, social reality does not just happen by chance but are constituted by relationships and situations which are in fact cultural but appear as natural to our mind because society makes us believe them to be such. According to this view, we see events in terms of how we have been conditioned to see them unfold before our very eyes. In other words, our reactions to the unfolding of events are defined or circumscribed by concepts that are in fact socially constructed. We learn to differentiate relationships and situations and classify them as positive or negative based

on these constructs which eventually also influence how we treat them. This view recognizes that our mode of thinking and eventually our behavior in relation to other people, objects, or events are influenced by the existing dominant discourse.

Using this perspective as a theoretical framework, this paper examines the varying discourses constituting the concept of tourism and the equally varying images associated with it. Borrowing the tourism system model to analyze the intertwined relationships of actors involved in the tourism business, this paper looks at the interplay of power that is constantly negotiated and re-negotiated among actors involved in this business and its impact on the success or failure of tourism. This paper maintains that power is not fixed on anyone in the tourism business but is relative to a particular situation, event, and time that it is exercised. It is not a static quality of a person but a dynamic, shifting property of a relationship that circulates among those interacting actors (Howard and Hollander 2000: 49). Finally, this paper will focus on ecotourism as an alternative type of tourism and will examine the case of Apo Island in central Philippines as an example of this model.

Images of Tourism and Tourists

Historically, *tourism* as a movement of people to other places purely for pleasure became popular only in this century. The early movement of a group of people to other places in search for new lands to colonize was described as *exploration*. When almost all places on the planet had been "claimed" by European explorers, *travel* became a major activity of wealthy families (Fussell 1980: 38- 39 in Miller and Auyong 1998: 10). Although the three terms demonstrate mobility in space and time, they differ in motives and experiences and the kind of people involved. While exploration shows a movement of a group of people who risk their lives to adventure in places that are not yet in the map, travel retains the excitement of exploration but of a lesser degree be-

cause it is fused with pleasure of knowing where one is. Tourism, on the other hand, shows the movement of people toward an established destination and is much associated with pleasure. It was first a monopoly of those who can afford the costs it entailed until the invention of mass transportation made travel less costly and paved the way to an increased desire of many to go to other places (Miller and Auyong 1998: 10).

The associated prestige of touristic travel in the twentieth century has inspired people to visit places for pleasure and recreation. Tourists eventually are stereotyped as people who spend money in exchange for the excitement they experience in a destination. And as a good number of people start to seek pleasure in travel and are willing to pay its price, the industry has grown into an attractive business making tourism available to everyone who has money (Grenier, Kaae, Miller and Mobley 1993: 3). Eventually, touristic venture becomes much associated with class position and power beyond its inherent value (i.e. those who travel can afford and, therefore, of a higher social class). As a consequence, tourists are hierarchically classified according to the quality of their mode of travel, accommodation, destination, activities, and so on.

For many tourists, tropical countries, often economically and politically categorized as developing countries, are attractive destinations. Designed to attract tourists particularly from western temperate countries, the images of these countries pictured in many tourism brochures and other advertisement materials show them as having the last havens of unspoiled nature — warm climate, diverse forestal and marine life, high mountains, spectacular waterfalls, secluded beaches fringed by coral reefs, and other exotic attractions (McGoodwin 1986: 144, Cater 1993: 85). They are projected as having untainted hospitality and a culture uncontaminated by modernity and therefore more close to nature. Such images attract certain types of tourists who want simply to become close to nature and traditional life in order to appreciate their beauty and simplicity. It is these types of tourists which have

contributed to the flourishing tourism industry of most developing countries.

However, reality shows that tourists travel for all sorts of reasons other than the pursuit of wholesome pleasure originally associated with tourism. As Fussell contends, the other motivations of tourists for traveling include the realization of fantasies of erotic freedom as well as of imagined position of superiority as a social class (1980: 42 in Miller and Auyong 1998: 10). These fantasies are reinforced by their possession of economic power manifested in their spending capacity. Unaware of the negative consequences, many developing countries have found economic value in catering to these motives. Studies show that beyond the short term benefits that come from this type of tourism, moral, social, and ecological problems that result from this have undermined the industry and brought long term damage to a tourist destination (McGoodwin 1986, Cater 1993, Odzer 1994).

The development of mass tourism in recent years has further eroded the image of the industry and wreaked havoc on the ecological balance of most tourist destinations. It has been observed that the convergence of a great number of people in one place at the same time causes problems to the local people. Along with these are also social relation problems that emerge in the process of handling mass tourists. Considered to be subjectively and negatively characterized by materialism, ignorance, and insensitivity, mass tourism is problematic because it requires the production of more technological and infrastructural supports and services most developing countries do not have the funds to provide (Miller and Auyong, 1998:11-12). The large number of people who travel cause transportation and accommodation problems which demand capital usually drawn from public funds intended to serve the needs of the local population. As a result, the local population become resentful of tourists whom they believe take away what is rightfully theirs. More specifically, as a population problem, mass tourism creates congestion that damaged the carrying capacity of a given ecosystem. Furthermore, the con-

struction of tourist facilities in massive scale means disfigurement of the natural landscape and pollution.

Negative Developments and Impacts of Tourism

As the preceding description of the images of tourism suggests, tourism is dynamic and creates changes in a tourist destination (Butler 1992: 33). The influx of more tourists often results in the proliferation of tourism-related businesses beyond the carrying capacity of a particular area. Butler laments that this happens because of the ignorance of people involved in the tourism business about its dimension, nature, and power (1992: 33). Overwhelmed by the desire to make profit out of the increasing degree of touristic demands, local businesses overlook the level of justifiable development that is necessary and fail to manage and control its operation in terms of activities and number of tourist landing. This shortsightedness of local businesses is a reflection of their ignorance of the irreversible damage that tourism can cause on local culture and on the environment.

Being permanent residents of tourist destinations, the locals suffer most when tourism reaches its peak and becomes uncontrollable. In response, they manifest dissenting attitudes toward the tourists in particular and the industry in general. Doxey demonstrates the succession of community attitude towards tourism in five levels with corresponding description of the degree of feelings people have from being pro- to anti-tourist (1975 cited in Kay and Alder 1999: 177). In the first level, described as euphoria, there is enthusiasm for tourist development reflected in mutual feelings of satisfaction for those involved, with the projected opportunities for local participation and the sure flow of capital and interesting contacts. But when the industry expands, the interest turns more towards profit making while tourists' needs are taken for granted. Personal contact also becomes more impersonal and the hospitality of the locals diminish. When the industry nears its saturation point, attitude turns to irritation because of the massive

expansion of tourist facilities and the encroachment of the industry on the local way of life. At the point of antagonism, the irritations of local people become more overt and the tourists are seen to be the source of all that is bad. Mutual politeness disappear. The final stage is reached when the environment, including the resource base which is the source of tourist attractions and the livelihood of the locals, has been changed irreversibly. The tourists and off-site brokers may come and go but the negative impacts of mass tourism are already imprinted in the consciousness of the locals, their culture, and the physical environment.

McGoodwin describes the damage caused by the tourism business, particularly in developing coastal communities as tourism-impact syndrome (1986: 132). The symptoms include some forms of sociocultural stresses and strains in the local community like loss of political and economic autonomy, loss of folklore and important institutions of traditional folk culture, social disorganization, and hostility toward tourists. Social disorganization particularly reflects radical changes in value orientations and in norms regarding social relations and maybe manifested in heightened desires for material objects, changes in norms regarding work and sexual behavior; drug abuse; pursuit of illusory life aspirations; feelings of alienation; the demise of charitable institution; loss of parental control and of respect for elders. These are the images created by tourism as an industry which is perceived to have turned bad along the way.

Guest-Host Dichotomy and Tourism System Discourses

From the perspective of Western society, tourism is often understood as a product of the individual decisions of tourists (Cheong and Miller (2000: 371). One of the earlier views advanced to explain the nature of tourism is the "guest-host dichotomy". According to this view, the relationship between tourists and locals is socioeconomic in character where tourists and locals interact either in a warm social milieu as "guests and hosts"

(Smith 1977) or in the economic market as "consumers and producers". This view of tourism focuses on the willingness of the host community to design touristic activities for the enjoyment of the tourists who can afford to pay the cost. The kind of deal established, however, has resulted in the blatant display of material consumerism by tourists and the commodification of the local culture by the tourism industry for the enjoyment of tourists. This demonstrates the one-sided domination and exploitation of the host community (Cheong and Miller 2000: 372).

Guest-host dichotomy (Fig. 1) captures the static hierarchical manifestation of the relationship of tourists and the local people in general but fails to appreciate the dynamics of how power revolves between them. It portrays a negative image of tourists as individuals who have the money to pay for their enjoyment at the expense of the local culture and environment. This model highlights the dominance of the tourists in carving the direction of the development of the industry in terms of facilities, services, and activities for their increased satisfaction. The experience of Boracay Island in Panay, Philippines where the tourist themselves and not the local brokers and residents in the island are the industry developers illustrates this (Smith 1992: 156). Although this reality is common in most developing countries (McGoodwin 1986, Cater 1993), this image of local tourism overlooks the dynamics of relationships and power in a tourist destination and underestimates the potential by which the local community could prevail over the tourists for its own advantage.

In the tourism system model, Miller and Auyong (1998: 3) extend the guest-host dichotomy to further differentiate the hosts, which include the brokers and the locals, from the guests. Brokers, categorized as private sector brokers or public sector brokers, consist of persons who pay professional attention to tourism in various ways. The private sector brokers are engaged in the business of tourism by providing touristic services and selling touristic products. On the other hand, the public sector brokers, as public officials, are engaged in the governance and management of tourism. All of them maybe classified as on- or off-site brokers relative to where they currently reside or work.

There are also variants of private brokers aside from those engaged in the tourism business. They include the social movement brokers which are formal entities referred to as non-government organizations, environment organizations, and the like which assist in the planning, developing, managing, and monitoring of tourism activities in particular setting. The academic brokers are those in the academe who examine or research on tourism as part of basic science. The travel media brokers include the reporters and journalists who make comments about tourism through the media like print, broadcast, and the internet to inform the public of good tourist destinations or activities available. The last group consists of the consulting brokers who are tourism analysts, marketers, travel writers, and a variety of other independent entrepreneurs who provide consultancy services to government, private enterprise, and organizations regarding tourism issues and concerns.

Meanwhile, the locals consist of persons who reside in the general region of tourism routes and destinations but do not directly derive any income from tourism. Nevertheless, they are affected by it being permanent residents in the community. They may be indigenous locals who have settled in the community and have ancestral claims to the resources in the community or migrant locals who have their ancestral roots in other areas and are classified either as established or recently arrived migrants. The established migrants have already formed their families to the third generations, intermarried with the indigenous locals, and secured themselves properties in the community. The recently arrived migrants have at least a year's residence in the community and have as yet accumulated less properties. Lastly, there are the seasonal locals who have no permanent residence in the community but are moving on and off because this is the location of the resources they work with such as farming and harvesting, or fishing for certain seasonal species of fish. Predictably, each group of locals

described above may demonstrate different degree of interests or reactions toward the tourism business in the community owing to their differential experiences and attachment to local culture and environment.

The tourists as mentioned earlier are strangers to the community but travel here or to other tourist destinations for relatively short visits for pleasure. Although most of them ultimately return home when vacation is over, some of them may decide to stay more or less permanently in places that have attracted their interests, become assimilated with the local community, eventually marry, and engage in the tourism business.

This dynamics in tourism shows that the tourism system model does not only treat the human elements of the tourism industry as a typology to compare or contrast one from the other. It regards the tourism industry as a system composed of interacting actors whose status and roles also vary anytime depending on available opportunities and existing circumstances (Cheong and Miller 2000).



Fig. 1. Tourist-Local Interaction Using Guest-Host Dichotomy



Fig. 2. Sociological Model of the Tourism System (after Miller and Auyong 1998)

Ecotourism as a Social Construct

The growing awareness of local communities of ecological degeneration and their sensitivity to the corruption of traditional way of life because of tourism have made them more conscious of weighing the trade-offs with the economic gains it brings. Because of this, the tourism industry, including the tourists themselves, are also becoming aware of the need to recreate their image to one that is identifiable with environmental protection and cultural preservation. The industry is particularly impelled to rid itself of the negative consequences brought about by mass tour-

ism. In the past years, it has been trying to promote an alternative image that is acceptable to the host communities. Miller describes the processes of recreating tourism image or the social construction of ecotourism as restoration and enhancement (1993: 189). The first aims to repair a damaged identity or image while the second refers more to a complete transformation.

A subgroup of tourists described as "backpackers" provides an example of a different image of tourists. Deviating from the typical image of conventional camera-toting tourists who travel in packaged and guided tours, look good and sophisticated compared to the locals, eat expensive food, and live in furnished hotel or resort, backpackers only carry with them their backpacks, from which they derive their name, containing practically all they need when they move through different sites in various countries on their list in search for unspoiled sites. They travel in pairs or cliques but not in bigger groups, and outside of the usual advertised tourist routes and destinations except those introduced by other backpackers, relying on maps to guide their way. Because of these characteristics, backpackers are considered as low-budget travelers who depart from mass tourism. However, the nature of their travel and expenditure may not sustain a viable travel industry and, therefore, may disappoint the local brokers in terms of short term cash benefits (Smith 1992: 157).

Another group of tourists whose interests are adventure and the search for the exotic consists usually of young professionals. Like the backpackers, they are in search of opportunities to renew intimacy with unspoiled nature but unlike the backpackers, they are usually not low-budget travelers. Tourist businesses which cater to this group have come up with touristic ventures that are gaining support as an alternative to mass tourism (Butler 1992: 31). Popularly known as ecotourism, these ventures are meant to be a transformation from mass tourism to a small or medium-scale industry that allows tourists to enjoy natural beauty as well as educate them of the need to protect the environment for the sake of the future generations.

Ecotourism is known in literatures by varied names that glitter with images of being environmentally-friendly, nature oriented, appropriate, soft, sustainable, green, responsible, ethical, and other related terms (Valentine 1991: 476). It is also promoted as a strategy in coastal resource management program. For example, the income from ecotourism prevents local fishers from destructive fishing activities and makes them appreciate the economic and aesthetic value of the marine environment (Flores 1999; White, Ross and Flores 2000). Because of this, it requires the active participation of the local community in the planning in order to get popular support particularly as ecotourism development comes along with the declaration of protected areas, marine or landscape, that deprives local people access to their traditional source of livelihood. It is through the economic benefits of ecotourism venture and other alternative enterprises, not directly related to traditional resources, that local people are motivated to support it. Nevertheless, ecotourism has to be regulated by local brokers to ensure economic benefits and to minimize environmental destruction.

But the development of any ecotourism program has also gained criticism from other sectors of the academe and society, like the hardcore environmentalists and policy analysts, for its being another type of mass tourism in the making (Butler 1992: 37). This claim results from observations of the way certain tourist destinations originally developed for nature-seekers end up becoming devastated. Sites that start by the "discovery" of a few tourists eventually become popular through the spread of information, often by word of mouth, from one tourist to another. Most often, such places may not even have amenities until local entrepreneurs step in to provide facilities to accommodate the arrival of a growing number of tourists. Moreover, the pioneering tourists, usually foreigners, also become interested in investing money in developing the site to accommodate more influx of tourists often without any development plan. This kind of situation has created problem in the management of the ecotourism industry of

Boracay Island which started as a backyard industry of on-site brokers. Because it failed to design a master development plan to regulate the building of more structures in the island, Boracay is now overrun by a mushrooming of resorts, diving shops, and restaurants owned by foreigners and their local business partners (Smith 1992).

The above situation exemplifies a fact that when the development of facilities for the use of tourists come under the control of agencies, whether public or private, the institutionalization of tourism or emergence of mass tourism is inevitable. Local brokers are overtaken by large-scale brokers who usually come, according to Naronha, from outside the local community, and often from outside the country (1977 *cited in* de Kadt 1979: 5). Boracay Island exemplifies this trend where foreigners have successfully established local social networks through marriage, friendship, and other social means that will enable them to engage in the tourism business. On the other hand, the local people in the peripheries of tourist destinations not only benefit little from this kind of tourism, but they are adversely affected by tourism development in many ways.

The way for ecotourism development to erase its negative image as another form of mass tourism is for it to remain true to its objectives. As an alternative to mass tourism, ecotourism must be rooted on a planned, organized, and integrated program that includes the consensual participation of the brokers, locals, and tourists (Grenier, Kaae, Miller and Mobley 1993). Requiring social preparation for its introduction, ecotourism concept must be well understood by the local community and the brokers of the program (Crawford, Balgos and Pagdilao 2000: 22). This will enable them to manage the influx of tourists without compromising the state of the environment and the culture of people. To make ecotourism truly sustainable and dispel the bad image and results created by mass tourism, Cater has proposed a set of criteria (1993: 86). First, it must meet the needs of the host population in terms of improved living standards, both the short and long term.

Second, it must satisfy the demands of a growing number of tourists and continue to attract them in order to meet the first aim. And third, it must safeguard the natural environment in order to achieve the two preceding criteria.

The above criteria require that ecotourism development must have a long-term and comprehensive plan that is integrated with the existing land use or coastal management plan of the local community. This should enable the planners to foresee its impact on the other components of the ecosystem like the marine areas, forest, mangroves, and others (Fig. 3) in order to mitigate its negative effects. Similarly, the constraints and opportunities present in the immediate ecosystem are to be taken as considerations in the process of planning, developing, and managing ecotourism destinations and activities.

In order to ensure the sustainability of econtourism, regular monitoring is required (White, Ross and Flores 2000: 226). Carter (1993: 85) and McKercher (1993: 133), emphasize that an ecotourism development must adopt sustainability as an ideology in the strictest sense and protect the environment. It must always be understood that ecotourism is a resource-dependent industry (McKecher 1993: 131) and its future relies so much on the high quality of the natural resources that lure tourists. Indiscriminate development activities related to tourism and other industries must be regulated to prevent the permanent restructuring of the environment and its displacement in the future.



Fig. 3. Tourism System- Ecosystem Interaction in Ecotourism Development (after Miller and Auyong 1998)

Modifying Involvement in Ecotourism

Ecotourism as a strategy for promoting sustainable resource management will work positively only if the brokers, locals, and tourists behave in a tolerable level that does not create damage to the local ecosystem. To achieve this end, brokers, locals, and individual tourists are expected to have a fuller understanding of their respective roles as they interact in a certain touristic setting. The theoretical basis of this view is derived from the implications of the typology of involvement model in relation to leisure and work introduced by Miller (2001) who combined the concepts of the *sacred* by sociologist Emile Durkheim and *serious leisure* by sociologist Roht Stebbins with his concept of *expressive work*. Miller argues that although two individuals may be engaged in identical activity which may be categorized as leisure or work, the quality of their respective experiences may vary because of the subjective meaning they attached to this particular activity (Fig. 4).



Fig. 4. Typology of Involvement in Ecotourism (adapted from Miller 2001)

The kind of experiences derived from leisure and work are expected to differ because they require different modes of expertise and types of reward. Any activity that gives pleasure is leisure while that which provides monetary reward is work. To some, however, a single activity could also be a source of pleasure and money reward at the same time. For the purpose of this paper, the travels and activities of tourists are seen as geared toward the realization of leisure while the work brokers perform, along with their expected role of making tourists achieve the maximum satisfaction, will be seen primarily as a source of monetary reward. The same is true with the work locals do for a living in the community which serves as a tourist destination.

Tourists who consider their travel as a sacred activity are said to have internalized the behaviors expected of them in a particular tourist destination in order to maximize the appropriate kind of pleasure associated with the activity. However, studies warn that not all tourists are automatically environmentally sensitive breed (Cater 1993: 88). It has been observed that many of them consider a touristic activity casually and are not concerned with its outcome. They do not manifest conscious effort to demonstrate appropriate behavior and become indiscriminately destructive in the end. Since they pay for such experience, they might even assume that it is their right to use whatever resources available for their satisfaction. Besides, they are only visiting a destination for a few days without any plan of returning. In effect, they demonstrate destructive leisure and not serious leisure in its real sense.

Meanwhile, brokers who consider their work as sacred exercise equal efforts to satisfy the craving of tourists for excitement as well as as to safeguard the local culture and environment which they are bound to protect and preserve as one major ethical consideration of an ecotourism program. They consider it an achievement if they are able to realize the ideals of their work which they highly value. In contrast, brokers who consider their work as an instrument for more material gain may sacrifice the

integrity of the local culture and environment for their selfish interest to maximize material reward. Similarly, locals who consider their work as sacred find achievement in producing food for their respective families as well as for the market in the immediate environment and at the same time aim to sustain its productivity. For them, the resource base is important not only for its inherent value as a source of livelihood but also for its beauty and bounty which they as well as the tourists can enjoy. Since they consider fishing as sacred and their lives as connected to that of the sea, they treat the sea as sacred which has to be protected and nurtured. This kind of behavior contrasts to that of locals who exploit their resource base to the point of exhausting and destroying it. For example, local fishers who exploit the marine environment by using blast and poison such as cyanide as methods of extracting fish consider the sea as only an instrument for economic gain in terms of a bountiful catch. They do not appreciate the fact that the kind of work they do depends so much on the diversity and sustainability of the marine environment.

The preceding discussion shows that leisure and work activities demonstrated by two or more individuals in any tourist destination could well complement each other as long as they consider what they do as sacred. The two activities have to be exercised within the principle of sustainability which suggests that the use and benefits derived in a particular resource setting should be within its carrying capacity relative to present needs and those of the future generation. Ecotourism program depends so much on the natural characteristics of a tourist destination. If these natural features are damaged by the exploitative nature of touristic activities promoted by brokers as well as by the technology the locals used to extract food resources, then tourists, brokers, and locals alike will experience the same loss, although the most negatively affected by this loss will always be the locals. The private brokers could move out their capital and relocate their business to other tourist destinations while

tourists could choose to spend their money and time elsewhere. This is the sort of unethical conduct that must be discouraged.

It is therefore the role of the public brokers, represented by the government and environmental non-government organizations, to coordinate their efforts and resources to develop mechanisms that will influence private brokers, locals, and tourists to prioritize environmental welfare above material or psychological gains. However, this does not exempt them from demonstrating first and foremost their expressive relationship with their work and its ideals.

Power Dynamics for Sustainable Ecotourism

Under the tourism system model, power is seen as circulating and this dynamics may be used to design a sustainable ecotourism program. This is anchored on the assumption that since all the elements of the tourism system has relative power, each could be mobilized toward a negotiated goal that satisfies their corresponding interest. The Foucauldian analysis of power dynamics as applied on tourism by Cheong and Miller (2000) points out specific instances by which the behavior among the actors of the tourism system can be influenced by each other relative to certain condition. The insights derived here could be used in realizing the objectives of ecotourism as an alternative to mass tourism in its truest nature.

While it is recognized that tourists make decisions during their travel, brokers could also create the demand on which tourists base their choices. According to Miller and Auyong, this is so because the effective presentation of a touristic product actually generates preferences (1998: 11, 13). It is well known that various marketing strategies and media can influence tourists before they even reach their destination. Meanwhile, tourists become helpless because they are already physically detached from their usual social networks when they travel, and in order to survive in

a relatively strange social construct, they are compelled to adjust in a way that is acceptable to on-site brokers and locals in control of the destination they want to visit (Cheong and Miller 2000: 380). This is particularly the case in packaged and guided tours. Nevertheless, even tourists in self-guided tours, such as the backpackers, find their movements limited and structured by the guidebook, the map, or the signpost which are still the creation of brokers and locals.

Obviously, when tourists are in strange places, they are vulnerable to be compelled by brokers, both private and public, to behave and function in certain way for self-protection. The brokers, on the other hand, try to give them the impression that they are in good hands. For example, the recent political turmoil in the Philippines that led to the ouster of former President Joseph Estrada and the installation of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as President, sent alarming signals to foreign tourists to cancel their trips to the country. Moreover, the incidence of kidnappings of foreign tourists and attacks on tourists destinations in the south of the Philippines further intensified tourists' apprehension about their safety. As a reaction, the tourism officials of the country issued an advisory to other countries that travel to the Philippines continues to be safe and orderly, tourism activities are on normal operations (*Filipino-American Bulletin*, May 1-31, 2001, p. 6), and that tourist kidnappings and attacks in southern Philippines are only isolated incidents. Compelled to create an image that everything is under control, both public and private brokers "embarked on an aggressive media and promotion blitz to preserve the confidence of international and domestic tourists and deflect *the* negative image *of the country*" (Nawal 2001, www.inq7.net/nat/may/26, underscoring mine).

The above observations show that brokers know the condition of a tourist destination better than the tourists. This knowledge put brokers in a better position to control unacceptable behaviors and demands of tourists which may imperil the operation of the ecotourism ventures they manage. At the same time, brokers also have the responsibility to ensure the security of tourists not just for the sake of making money. Cheong and Miller (2000: 381) argue that brokers have enormous influence in maintaining the integrity of tourist destinations. They particularly relate the fact that:

> Because of their proximity, park guards watch over tourists to see if they litter; guides protect, oversee and educate them about how to act properly, and offer them interpretations of historic sites, cultures, and customs; restaurant employees instruct them in what and how to eat. Subsequently, brokers as agents in a variety of guises constrain their movements, behaviors, and even thoughts, and act as a powerful force in the system.... Off-site brokers—those who are not in direct contact with tourists- also manage tours and contribute to tourism plans and strategies.

On the other hand, although the locals are not directly involved in catering to tourists they could still express how they feel about them during their brief and occasional encounters through their actions, gestures, and other forms of communication (Cheong and Miller 2000: 385). This becomes more intense when they are in groups by which they could manifest collectively their attitudes of disfavor or liking toward tourists. The tourists and their attending guides may be able to catch the message which can lead them to quickly understand where they might go and what they might do. This is an illustration of an informal mechanism by which locals could influence tourists to display behaviors that are not detrimental to local culture and the environment. They could also form organized coalitions to prohibit certain touristic activities in the community if they found them to have negative consequences.

It has been observed that conservation movements in developed countries that have adopted a more bio-centric approach to environmental preservation are unlikely to support the sustainability of any type of tourism activities (McKercher 1993). It is believed that in favor of environmental protection and preser-

vation without any human interference, developed countries encourage the development of ecotourism ventures in developing countries, shifting the responsibilities upon these countries of balancing the cost and benefits of environmental protection and development ventures, like ecotourism. As the case of the Philippines, which has already staged two non-violent revolutions, exemplifies, people in developing countries are no longer passive and are more willing to publicly express their resentment against political or ecological issues and conditions which affect their lives. Studies indicate that with the institutionalization of environmental non-government and people's organizations in the country, people are now in a much better position to manage the negative impacts of ecotourism.

The Case of Apo Island, Philippines

In order to provide proper context for the preceding discussions, this paper will examine the case of Apo Island using the tourism system model and assess its applicability in the gathering of basic information, planning, developing, and managing ecotourism in order to deconstruct the prevailing biased guest-host image of the tourism industry. Ecotourism activities in Apo Island are believed to have been an offshoot of the success of its community-based coastal resource management (CB-CRM) program. Although ecotourism is not its immediate objective (Alan T. White, pers. comm. May 28, 2001), the significant contribution of the community-based coastal resource management program to the economy of the local as well as regional government could not be underestimated. At present, plans are underway to regulate tourism activities to ensure sustainability and to minimize their impact on the ecological integrity.

Marine attractions. Measuring only about 74 hectares, Apo Island is located in the south of Negros Island, Central Visayas, Philippines, about 25 kilometers from the mainland. It is of volca-

nic origin, has five sandy white beaches, two lagoons, patches of mangroves, steep cliffs immediately overlooking the sea, and extensive fringing reefs of bio-diverse marine species. It is accessible by motorized outrigger operated by local fishers or resort owners in the mainland and other nearby island of Negros. Apo Island is inhabited by 129 households or a total population of 684 (as of May 2000 census by NCSO) with an annual growth rate of 7.17 percent since 1970. Owing to unfavorable soil condition and limited arable space of the island for agriculture, the major source of livelihood of more than 95 percent of the households is fishing. Other occupations engaged by households and individuals include running small business known as *sari-sari* store which sell household needs, fish trading to the mainland, vending of souvenir items to tourist; and paid work at the local resorts as carpenters, cook, or food servers.

Overfishing as well as destructive fishing with the use of blast and poison were common practice in the island before the 1980s. At that time, island residents considered this type of fishing as the fastest way to accumulate, albeit short-term, benefits from the marine environment. During the next two decades, the concerted efforts of the local government unit and the *barangay* government of Apo Island, Silliman University, and the island residents to end destructive fishing and work for the protection and conservation of the island environment have already yielded positive results. Presently, local fishers do not only enjoy abundant and sustained fish catch, but have also started to realize the benefits from ecotourism as tourists started visiting the island. Yet, this development was not part of the plan when scientists from Silliman University first initiated the development of the marine areas surrounding the island as a marine reserve to establish a fish sanctuary whose main purpose was to ensure the sustainability of fish catch for the subsistence fishing households of Apo Island. Nonetheless, as tourists started coming into the island, residents have been encouraged to collect donations from them for activities such as snorkeling and diving (Alan T. White, pers. comm.,

May 28, 2001). This additional benefit has reinforced the economic value of their conservation efforts.

Yet the establishment of the marine conservation program in the island was not easy. Fishing households initially resisted the creation of a reserve because this limited their access to favored fishing grounds. A compromise was reached when the *barangay* council passed a resolution designating a portion of the fishing grounds as fish sanctuary and closing this to fishing activities. The resolution provided the legal basis for the establishment of the marine reserve and the fish sanctuary. Outside the sanctuary fishing is permitted but regulated to include only the use of approved fishing gears like hook and line, spear fishing with out scuba, fish traps, and others. Only when the local fishers have internalized fishing as an expressive work were they able to contribute to the sustainability of the bio-diversity of the island resources.

Institutional recognition and protection. Today, Apo Island serves as a model and a learning site for community-based coastal resource management program in the Philippines. The economic gains the residents derive from sustainable fishing activities and ecotourism are enough evidence to convince other islands and coastal communities to duplicate this program in their respective areas. Moreover, it has become a learning site for community leaders elsewhere to learn about coastal resource management project from the local leaders and residents. In 1997, Apo island received national recognition as the best community-managed coral reef project from a scientific organization in the country.

Because of its success, the Apo Island project has gained international recognition and is now part of the academic curriculum of a number of local and international universities, such as Silliman University in the Philippines, the School of Marine Affairs of the University of Washington, and the University of Rhode Island in the United States, respectively. The textbook authored by Kay and Alder (1999) entitled *Coastal Planning and Management* used in the Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) course

at the University of Washington contains a section featuring Apo Island. Other international journals on coastal management and websites dealing with environmental issues and concerns have popularized the island not only among the scientific community but among tourists as well. The lesson it particularly imparts is the importance of a community network and empowerment to the success and sustainability of a coastal resource management program.

To further protect the ecological integrity of the island and its sustainability, an eight-member Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) was organized in 1996. This Board is responsible for drafting policies and regulations and monitoring any development activities in the island. Its membership includes three representatives from the island in addition to representatives coming from the national, regional, and provincial governments, and the academe (i.e. Silliman University). The creation of the board was a result of the declaration under Presidential Proclamation No. 438 in 1994 of Apo Island as a nationally recognized protected landscape and seascape. A total area of 691.45 hectares is now placed within the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS).

Economic opportunities. Earlier, Vogt (1997) has examined the economic benefits of tourism in the marine reserve of Apo Island. A recent study by Cadiz and Calumpong (2000) of the Marine Laboratory of Silliman University gives a more recent and detailed analysis of these economic benefits. Their study shows that a total of 14,361 tourists came to Apo Island from April 1999 to March 2000, or an average of 1,196.75 per month. The number daily ranged from 26 to 54 during the study period with April as the peak month. September registered the smallest number of visitors given the fact that this month falls within the rainy season in the Philippines. The report shows that majority (62 per cent) of the tourists were foreigners while only 38 per cent were Filipinos. Among the foreigners, the Japanese dominated followed

by the Germans, Americans, and other nationalities. Pleasure diving has been reported as the major activity engaged in by the tourists followed by snorkeling, diving lessons, and ordinary picnic. The study also reports that research and educational fieldtrips were likewise significant activities of others visitors to the island.

According to a previous study conducted by Murphy, Ablong, and White, the growing number of tourists visiting Apo Island brought over three times the benefits attributed to improved fishing (1999: 7). However, this claim appears to have been based on gross estimate of tourism income and did not consider the social distribution of such income. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the coming of tourists, both local and foreign, to Apo Island has provided the locals, particularly women, an opportunity to earn additional income through peddling souvenir items such as T-shirts, locally woven mats, *malongs,* and *sarongs* to visitors. Besides the additional income, these souvenir items serve to advertise the island to other tourists.

Income data from the study of Cadiz and Calumpong (2000) point out that businesses catering to tourists in Apo Island earned PhP 11,565,021 (US$ 289,125 at $1 to PhP40) in 1999. Of this amount, as much as 53 percent went directly to the island brokers. Boat operators, who also include fishers, earned a total of PhP 4,106,600 (US$ 102,665) for that year in ferrying tourists to and from the island. Twenty-five (25) percent of these boat owners are from the island while the rest were from the neighboring islands of Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Siquijor and northern Mindanao. Meanwhile, the diving business also grossed PhP 5,755,000 (US$ 143,871) from tanks and gear rental with the diving shops located right in Apo Island cornering 76 percent of the market. According to the study, brokers of this type of business reportedly earned that much because 45 percent of the tourists of the island were divers.

Meanwhile, when the PAMB increased the rates for tourist entry fees to Apo Island, the Marine Management Committee (MMC) of the island, composed of local residents, also reported

an increase in its revenue. The study of Cadiz and Calumpong (2000) shows that after only four months, PAMB was able to collect more than PhP 509,573 (US$ 12,739) compared to only about PhP 29,916 (US$ 748) in eight months before its operation. Seventy-five (75) percent of the amount collected is retained in Apo Island for the development and maintenance of the Protected Landscape and Seascape projects in the island. The remaining 25 percent goes to the National Integrated Protected Area Fund. Meanwhile, 15 percent of the revenues derived from tourist fees is set aside by the MMC for livelihood projects of island residents. Since the island gets only a total of PhP 380,000 (US$ 9,500) in Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) during that same period from the local government (Pal 2001), this additional income is immensely useful for the island's development and environmental projects .

Democratizing the benefits. Needless to mention, the thousands of dollars derived from ecotourism in Apo Island contributes considerable revenues to the government. At the same time, it suggests its profitability to brokers, either off- or on-site, who invest far larger capital than the local women, boat-operators, small store owners, and households who provide accommodations to tourists in the island. However, while it is reasonable to expect that those who invest more capital would profit more from the ecotourism business in the island, it is a fact that it is the locals who are ultimately responsible for attracting the tourists because of the beautiful marine reserve and fish sanctuary that they maintain. As such, they have the inherent right to claim part of the profit from tourism in the island, perhaps indirectly from revenues invested in livelihood and infrastructure projects and in the maintenance and monitoring of the island's fragile marine environment.

Unfortunately, up to March 2001 Apo Island has still to receive its share of the money PAMB collected because all the income from tourist fees had been remitted to the national office where bureaucratic structures and protocols delay its release. As

a result, the *bantay dagat* (sea watch or guard) members, garbage collectors, and those in charge of the Apo Protected Landscape and Seascape (APLS) assistance center who collect entry fees and provide instructions to tourists while they are in the island have yet to be paid their honoraria.

Livelihood projects for Apo Island residents and some infrastructure projects in the island have likewise been stalled because of the absence of necessary funds. The gains from these projects are expected to be the social benefits of ecotourism on the locals of Apo Island who are not directly doing business with tourists. As the tourism income report showed, only the private brokers, rather than the local fishing households, derived great benefits from tourism activities in the island.

Ecological threats. In view of the growing number of tourists visiting the island, the members of the community have expressed apprehensions that mass tourism may soon characterize Apo Island as it has destroyed Boracay Island. They fear that mass tourism will have adverse effects such as water pollution and overcrowding on the island as well as sociocultural stresses and strains on the local people (Smith 1992). According to them, tourist divers, especially the amateurs, have caused harm to the reefs by trampling on fragile coral beds, touching, or even plucking off parts of corals to bring höme as souvenirs. These forms of irresponsible behavior show ignorance of the importance of fragile marine resources as well as indifference toward the efforts to preserve these resources. Furthermore, the continuous and unregulated number of divers in the reserve area at the same time are also believed to scare fish away and locals fear that there will be no more fish to catch if this continues (Oracion 1998: 49).

Garbage, especially the non-biodegradable kind, has also started to pose an ecological threat in the island not only in the terrestrial areas but as well as in the marine areas especially the coral reefs. Common garbage noticed are plastic containers of mineral water and food items which are indiscriminately thrown

by careless tourists. Local residents have noticed a worsening garbage problem even in places which are not inhabited (Pal 2001). A study on the sociocultural impact of the marine reserve in the island by graduate students of Environmental Science and Coastal Resource Management of Silliman University considered garbage to be a serious problem as a consequence of more tourist landing. This is aggravated by the absence of a solid waste management system in the island. Meanwhile, oil spill, irresponsible anchoring, and the vibrating sounds of pumpboat engine within the marine reserve have also been identified as factors disturbing the fragile marine organisms in the area.

Regulatory measures. Off-site business brokers and tourists may find their movements in Apo Island more controlled now than in the past with the establishment of the PAMB. Board Resolution No. 1, series of 1999 authorizes PAMB to regulate tourist landing and activities in Apo Island order to prevent further damage to the island fragile ecosystem. The collection of entry fee as resource user's fee has been introduced as a necessary mechanism to raise funds to mitigate or off-set any ecological damage that may take place in the island. Tourist entry fee is PhP 20.00 or 50 cents for foreign tourists and PhP 10.00 or 25 cents for Filipino tourists. Fees are also charged for specific tourist activities like scuba diving, snorkeling, camping, filming, lodging at cottages, using the picnic shed, mooring, and anchoring. The amount varies in terms of the types and the extent of the exercise of these activities. Meanwhile, PAMB has also limited the number of divers and snorkelers per day to the island. The board resolution specifically indicates that only a maximum of 15 divers are allowed each day and no more than eight snorkelers are permitted at any one time in order to minimize the cumulative impact of human activities in the reserve area.

Tourists are also advised to use the designated entry and exit points in the fish sanctuary. Sports spear fishing with scuba is strictly prohibited and divers are explicitly disallowed from wear-

ing gloves during diving to prevent them from touching or pricking the corals. Similarly, swimming and bathing are not allowed in the area. All tourists including their carriers or boats are required to register at the APLS assistance center where they are assigned to guides and watchers who are specifically instructed to monitor their activities. Furthermore, in order that the fishing activity of island fishers will not be disturbed, divers are not allowed to dive or approach within 100 meters of the designated fishing area in the island or where the fishers are stationed. Anchoring is likewise regulated corresponding to the weight of the boats and the areas in the marine reserve where these boats are situated. For this purpose, certain areas have been designated with buoys for anchoring and mooring to guide boat operators when they dock. Violations of these regulations are to be reported by the sea watch or the local fishers to the *barangay* captain for appropriate actions.

Finally, in order to prevent further congestion, given the limited space in the island for infrastructure development, the building of additional resort is no longer permitted. The existing two resorts are owned by foreigners who were former tourists to the island but later married locals and eventually engaged in the tourism business. Meanwhile, resorts owned mainly by foreigners in partnership with some Filipinos are mushrooming along the coastline on the mainland directly facing Apo Island. Moreover, existing though implicit regulations also discourage migration of mainland people into the island except those who marry a local. Although this particular regulation has no legal basis yet because this is not included in PAMB regulations, it has become a norm mutually recognized by the community in consideration of the limited space in the island and the significant population growth by marriage and natural process over the past two decades.

Tasks ahead. The state of ecotourism in Apo Island shows the dynamic interaction of public brokers (local government and PAMB) and the private brokers (resort and dive operators, travel

agencies, boat operators, small business operators, academe, environmental organizations and others), either off- or on-site, the foreign and local tourists, and the local fishing households. Each plays important roles in making ecotourism in Apo Island work and eventually maintaining its sustainability. But the present condition of the island is critically threatened by indiscriminate productive and touristic abuse and unless mitigating actions are taken, irreversible damage is inevitable. Given the pro-environment attitudes upheld by the locals in the island, it is obvious then that the present threats come from the outside. It is equally imperative that those who have interests over the bio-diversity of the island, both the public and private brokers, engage in expressive work within their domains in order to sustain the benefits derived from ecotourism in the island.

Moreover, there is a need to re-educate visitors about the island's fragile coral reefs so that they will take more responsibility in maintaining the island's present improved environmental status. Resort owners are also expected to exemplify environmentally friendly practices in their dealings with their guests and educate them about the existing PAMB regulations for Apo Island tourists.

Meanwhile, it is the task of the MMC officials and residents of Apo Island to constantly remind island tourists and visitors upon their arrival to engage in responsible leisure to help protect their environment. They have to be more vigilant in monitoring and apprehending anyone who violates any environmental regulations while in the island. The women's organization in the island takes greater responsibility for this task through some of its members who, in selling souvenirs to visitors, have more contact with tourists and are therefore in a better position to monitor the latter's behavior. Likewise, it is important for MMC to develop an interpretive center showing the relief map of the island in which restricted as well as accessible landscape and seascape are clearly marked. As well, MMC must emphasize the value of protecting the whole island ecosystem not only for tourism purposes but for

its survival and for the welfare of the locals who depend on them. Thus, ecotourism in Apo Island scan erve as a forum for educating tourists, brokers, as well as the locals to appreciate the aesthetic and productive values of healthy coral reefs.

Research agenda. The influence of urban based tourist establishments and businesses on Apo Island's ecotourism needs to be examined (Marc L. Miller, pers. comm., May 31, 2001). This should include not only those in the mainland of southern Negros but as well as those in other parts of the region that bring tourists to the island. Equally worthy of investigation is the connection between the economic opportunities brought about by ecotourism and the productivity of women and the subsequent effect on gender relationships in households.

Furthermore, there is a need to assess the sociopsychological and cultural changes among the local fishing household for evidence of social awareness, improved self-esteem, increased aspirations for their children, and the replacement or loss of traditional knowledge and tools as a result of their interaction with foreigners. Of similar importance to researchers should be the evaluation of informal educational programs aimed at changing the environmental attitudes of off-site business brokers and tourists to the island in order. Finally, the biophysical conditions of the coral reefs, fish quantity, water quality and level of garbage pollution in the island need to be regularly monitored for purposes of mitigation.

Conclusions

Tourism is a social construction and its ups and downs are the results of how the actors involved interact with each other and the natural environment. Its social and economic values which resulted from the negotiation among various stakeholders have tremendously affected its development and present status. The growing recognition of ecotourism as a sustainable alternative to

mass tourism is a product of such negotiation. Studies have shown that the development of tourism as an activity and as an industry is very much a result of chaotic display of colorful and ugly images that represent its good and bad times, respectively. The present tourism discourse has more or less successfully constructed in our minds that ecotourism is good while mass tourism is bad. But the battle continues because the proponents of the contrary discourse remain skeptical over the future of ecotourism, seeing it as another type of mass tourism.

It is a fact that ecotourism, if not regulated and and its damage mitigated, could cause irreversible environmental destruction. This explains why bio-centric environmental movements resist any type of tourism development in protected areas. However, this paper tries to argue that the success of ecotourism depends on how the actors (i.e. brokers, locals, and tourists) involved in the industry work to achieve its main objective which is the care for the environment. The case of Apo Island shows that this is possible when appropiate mechanisms are in place and all actors involved are aware of their respective rights as well as responsibilities.

For example, the presence of PAMB to check the increasing threats to the ecological integrity of Apo Island demonstrates the dominant role of a public broker because of its legal mandate. The PAMB has thus become a pool of influence and power in which different sorts of brokers from the national, provincial, and local governments, community organizations, academic organizations, and the local residents interact. This favorable development has institutionalized the mechanism of resource management in the island while further strengthening the capacity of the community to enforce any management measures developed in order to sustain the ecological and economic viability of the island's fishing and ecotourism as interlocking industries.

It is time for all those involved in the environmental, tourism, and development programs in Apo Island to come together again and finally draw a schema defining how the tourism system and

the marine ecosystem should behave and interact. (Alan T. White, pers. comm., May 28, 2001). This activity must be guided by the vision and mission of development Apo Island has that is anchored on the ideology of environmental and social (i.e. cultural and gender) sensitivity and sustainability.

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ASPECTS OF BIOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF THE PHILIPPINE COCKATOO *CACATUA HAEMATUROPYGIA* ON RASA ISLAND, PALAWAN, PHILIPPINES

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ABSTRACT

The Philippine cockatoo, (Cacatua haematuropygia), is a highly endangered bird species. Since three years ago, the Philippine Cockatoo Conservation Program has been carrying out a project in southern Palawan to save this species from extinction. The project area comprises the small coral island of Rasa (8.3 km^2) in the Sulu Sea, which belongs to the municipality of Narra in southern Palawan. The vegetation of the island consists of predominantly old growth mangrove and coastal forest, with a fair presence of suitable nesting and feeding trees.

One of the activities of this program is gathering information on the conservation status, population dynamics, feeding, and breeding biology of the species. As of 2000, the density of cockatoo breeding pairs was 1.6 breeding pairs per km^2. At the end of the breeding season in 2000 the minimum density was 6.7 individuals per km^2 which reflects the high proportion of non-breeding birds.

Following an ecosystematic, rather than a purely species conservation approach, with the cockatoo serving as flagship species, the project activities on Rasa consequently include all terrestrial and marine ecosystems of the island. Basic inventories of woody plants, fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammals have been conducted.

The project also follows a strongly community-based approach to management which involves all stakeholders in the design of the project from the beginning. Aside from the conservation work, other components of the project include information-education-communication campaigns, alternative livelihood and community organizing.

Introduction

The Philippine or Red-vented cockatoo (*Cacatua haematuropygia*) is endemic to the Philippines. Its former distribution comprises all major islands of the archipelago and

many of their satellite islands. Only the northern part of Luzon lacks records of the species in the past (Dickinson et al., 1991; Kennedy et al., 2000). Mainly due to habitat destruction and extensive predation by humans, cockatoo populations dwindled in the past forty years all over the Philippines. Today the strongholds of the species are Palawan and outlying islands, and the Sulu-Archipelago, particularly Tawi-Tawi, with an estimated overall population of 1,000 to 4,000 individuals (Lambert, 1994).

The remaining scattered pairs in southern Luzon, Patnanungan, Mindoro, Masbate, Bohol, Siquijor, Siargao, Dinagat, and Mindanao may no longer manifest viable populations (Collar et al., 1994; Collar et al., 1999).

Because of this drastic decline of bird population, the species was listed as 'Critically Endangered' by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (SSC/IUCN, 2000).

The Philippine Cockatoo Conservation Program (PCCP) aims to save the species from extinction by applying ex-situ as well as in-situ measures. Ex-situ conservation involves captive breeding through coordination of private breeders and zoos (Boussekey, 2000).

This paper describes only the in-situ component of the program which is focused on Rasa Island in Palawan. The procedure and the results of the blood and feather sampling of nestlings conducted within this program are described in more detail in Rebong et al. (this volume).

STUDY AREA

The project is implemented mainly on Rasa Island, a small coral island of 8.34 km^2 area situated in the Sulu Sea, just offshore of the municipality of Narra, Palawan, Philippines (Fig. 1). Coastal forest consisting mainly of mangrove covers about 1.75 km^2, while circa 5.6 km^2 are associated terrestrial herbaceous and shrubby beach vegetation. About 0.39 km^2 of the area is cultivated and

planted predominantly with coconut. The rest of the area (ca. 0.60 km^2) is either barren or sparsely vegetated sand and coral outcrops.



Fig. 1 Location of Rasa Island

The marine ecosystems of Rasa comprise sandy beaches, rocky shores, tidal flats, seagrass and algal beds, soft bottom areas, coral reefs, and open water. The tidal zone is dominated by dense stands of mangroves. Nine species of true mangroves of the genera *Rhizophora*, *Sonneratia*, *Avicennia*, *Bruguiera*, and *Ceriops* have been recorded. The beach vegetation typically consists of

herbs, like Goat-foot-vine (*Ipomoea pes-caprae*) and small patches of grass, shrubs, or trees like Pemphis *acidula*, *Erythrina orientalis, Pongamia pinnata,* and *Hibiscus tiliaceus*. The coastal forest holds approximately 120-150 shrub and tree species (Lang, 1999). Emergent species include *Melia dubia*, *Garuga floribunda*, *Pometia pinnata*, *Intsia bijuga* and *Pterocymbium taluto*. All of these are of importance to the cockatoos as food source or nesting trees.

Less than five percent of the area is claimed by local people and cultivated predominantly with coconut. Only three permanent households live on the island because of lack of drinking water. However, Tagbanua people frequently visit the island to harvest copra or collect wild honey, shells, sea cucumbers, crabs, and eggs of megapodes. In the last decade logging of timber trees was rampant, with the consequence that hardly any mature trees of valuable timber species, like *Intsia bijuga*, are left. Illegal mangrove cutting still occurs, but is in decline. The waters and tidal flats surrounding Rasa are intensively used for fishing and gleaning.

Rasa is included in a zoning system for the Man-and-Biosphere (MAB) Reserve which comprises the whole of Palawan. It is demarcated as a fish and bird sanctuary at the municipal level. Applications for inclusion in the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) and for upgrading as MAB Zone 1 (strictest conservation) have been submitted.

BIOLOGY OF THE PHILIPPINE COCKATOO

Information on the feeding biology of the cockatoo was gathered by direct observation. On Rasa movements of the cockatoos were observed from a boat, from beaches, or coral outcrops. Feeding sources were then tracked down on foot. Movements of cockatoos on the mainland were observed from

higher vantage points.

Monitoring of the population trend on Rasa was done from a boat by counting individuals at a traditional roosting site situated in a mangrove area. Since July 1998, counts have been conducted before sunset once a month. Occasionally, counts were also conducted at dawn before birds left the roosting site. Whenever possible, counts were conducted under similar weather and light conditions.

A detailed map of vegetation formations of the island was prepared with the help of topographic maps, aerial pictures, and through ground-truthing with Geographic Positioning System (GPS) and transit.

Ten wardens who were guarding the island inspected the nesting trees starting end of September 2000. During the breeding season (February-July 2000), the nesting trees were under permanent watch. Trees were climbed and nest holes controlled once a week during that time. For safety reasons, dead or damaged trees were not climbed. Nesting trees were characterized by species identification, tree height, diameter at breast height (DBH), height of nesting hole, exposition of nesting hole, diameter of hole, diameter at base, and depth of cavity. The geographic location of each nesting tree was taken using a GPS and marked in a map.

The presence or absence of birds, eggs, nestlings, or nest predators were noted. Nestlings were ringed with aluminum rings bearing the inscription of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), year, and number (e.g. DENR 00 0012)

Roosting. A traditional roosting site exists on Rasa where the cockatoos gather during dusk and spend the night. It is situated in the mangrove, close to the outer edge facing the sea. It is used year-round, except when storms approached from northern directions, thus directly affecting the roosting site.

During the period of study, the first birds arrived about twenty minutes before sunset, later in the evening when strong

winds prevailed. The birds moved between emergent Pagatpat (*Sonneratia alba*) before settling on a single one. The roosting site was also regularly frequented by Slender-billed crows (*Corvus enca*) and occasionally by Pied and Grey imperial pigeons (*Ducula bicolor, D. pickeringii*), and White-breasted wood-swallows (*Artamus leucorynchus*).

The number of birds changed seasonally, with more birds outside the breeding season, and fewer in the breeding season. Absolute number of birds in the almost three-year observation period varied between 12 and 56 birds (Fig. 2).

Feeding. The Philippine cockatoo feeds on seeds and to a lesser extent on fruits, flowers, buds, and soft bark. The species is very adaptable and even forages on crops, particularly rice in dough (half-ripe) stage and corn. For this reason, cockatoos used to be regarded as pest. In the 1960s flocks of 300 to 400 birds reportedly swarmed rice fields in the municipality of Narra (Lascon, pers. comm., 1996). Up to now similar behavior can be observed during the end of the breeding season from July onwards but involves flocks not exceeding 20 birds. Raiding of fields by this species has been reported repeatedly from other places in the Philippines (e.g. Lambert, 1994; Tabaranza, 1992).

Most feeding observations included two or more birds inside as well outside of the breeding season. Feeding parties usually stayed long in a particular source tree if not disturbed. Observations ranged from six minutes to one hour or longer. In one incident it was observed that cockatoos carried the fruits of *Melia dubia* out of the source tree and consumed them on an adjacent tree about 30m away. In these rare occasions cockatoos could act as active seed dispersers by accidentally dropping fruits with intact seeds.

Sometimes cockatoos associate with Blue-naped parrots (*Tanygnathus lucionensis*), Grey imperial pigeons (*Ducula pickeringii*), Green imperial pigeons, (*Ducula aenea*), Slender-billed crows (*Corvus enca*), and Asian Glossy starlings (*Aplonis*

panayensis) while feeding.

Seventeen different plant taxa have been found to serve as food sources for cockatoos. Leguminosae were the most important, with five species belonging to this family. Seven species were widely cultivated in Palawan and elsewhere in the Philippines. An overview on food plant species recorded from Rasa and the nearby mainland is given in Table 1.

Breeding. In 2000 an attempt was made to clarify the complete sequence of reproduction of the Philippine cockatoo in the wild. It was observed that pair bonds started to get closer in October. Birds were traveling pair-wise and grooming of partners was observed more frequently at the roosting site. Nest holes were selected starting from end of December. However, since birds were not marked individually, it was not clear if the same pair occupied the same nesting holes in subsequent years.

Manipulation of nesting holes and in the direct nest vicinity included widening of cavities by chipping wood from the entrance and the interior of the holes, and cutting of twigs and leaves which hampered free access and visibility. The cut-off twigs on the ground on the bottom of trees indicated occupancy of nesting holes. Both sexes were involved in these preparatory nesting activities.

On Rasa, sixteen nesting trees have been reported comprising five tree species: Malugai (*Pometia pinnata*), Bogo (*Garuga floribunda*), Taluto (*Pterocymbium tinctorium*), Magtalisay (*Terminalia cf. foetidissima*) and Pagatpat (*Sonneratia alba*). One cavity in a dead Taluto was destroyed because of decay, so that only fifteen holes were recorded in 2000.

Almost all nesting trees were emerging above the canopy and ranged from ca. 15 to 48 m in height. The height of the nest holes varied between 12 to 35 m. No preference of a distinct exposition of the nest hole was observed.

Diameters of the nesting hole varied between 10 and 25 cm. The cavities were between 1.1 to 2.0 m deep and the diameter at the base ranged between 0.2 to 0.4 m.

Ten nesting trees were situated in coastal forest. Three out of five nesting trees in the mangrove had been occupied. The effective breeding population within the coastal forest therefore accounts for 5.7 pairs per km^2, and 0.53 pairs per km^2 in the mangroves.

Other tree-hole nesting bird species on Rasa are the Blue-headed racquet-tail (*Prioniturus platenae*), Mantanani scops owl (*Otus mantananensis*), Dollarbird (*Eurystomus orientalis*), Greater flameback (*Chrysocolaptes lucidus*) and Asian Glossy starling (*Aplonis panayensis*). The two larger woodpecker species of the Palawan archipelago, namely the Great slaty woodpecker (*Mulleripicus pulverulentus*) and the White-bellied woodpecker (*Dryocopus javensis*) were absent on Rasa.

Laying of eggs was recorded from the second February decade to the first April decade, but usually peaking between end of February and beginning of March. Full clutches contained two or three eggs. Noteworthy was the record of one clutch with four eggs, all of which survived. The exact duration of hatching can not be given because nests were not climbed daily for conservation reasons. First hatchlings were present in the second March decade. The nestling fledged in about eight weeks. In 2000, 18 chicks originating from eight pairs fledged successfully. Altogether five breeding attempts were unsuccessful. The outcome of two breeding efforts in the mangrove is unclear.

Two clutches only contained rotten eggs. One batch with three chicks showed massive infestation by mites and lice. Two chicks died in the nest. The last surviving chick of this batch jumped out of the nest cavity. It was recovered by the wardens and brought to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Narra where it was repeatedly treated with insecticide soap normally used for fighting cocks. However, the chick died three days later. Two mummified chicks examined from a nest hole at the end of the 1998 breeding season also showed signs of ectoparasite infestation (dead lice, possible bites on the underwings and abdomen).

Another three chicks and three eggs fell victim to common monitor lizards Varanus salvator. Other incidents of nest predation could not be observed. Noteworthy is the fact that from all observed breeding attempts all hatchlings either fledged or were lost. After fledging, parents and offspring were observed near the nesting site for about one week.

Population dynamics. Population density and trends were estimated with the help of monthly counts at a traditional roosting site. The breeding population could be recorded directly by identifying nesting trees. It is quite likely that all nesting trees within the coastal forests had been found due to extensive search. However, large areas of the mangrove were inaccessible so that some additional nesting trees might occur there.

In 2000, 30 birds on Rasa formed the breeding population that accounted for a density of 1.8 pairs per km^2. Breeding pairs as well as unsuccessful pairs were observed to stay in the vicinity of the nesting trees during nighttime. Numbers of individuals counted at the roosting site during the breeding season ranged between 20 and 28 birds. These are assumed non-breeders since the breeding pairs tend to stay in the vicinity of the nest during night time. Eighteen hatchlings fledged during the breeding season.

The maximum count of birds at the roosting site was 56 birds in August at the end of the breeding season. These also included the fledglings and most likely the parent birds.

With 30 birds forming breeding pairs, 20 birds being non-breeders (the minimum number of birds observed at the roosting site during the breeding season), and 18 fledged in this year, the minimum population number in August 2000 was 68 birds.

After August numbers of birds decreased again due to dispersal to the mainland. From August to October cockatoos were recorded on the mainland in the vicinity of Rasa. Birds were observed in coconut plantations, coastal vegetation, and rice fields. Numbers ranged from 2 to 32 birds, with an average of 8.7 per flock. The cockatoos frequently fed on seeds of Horseradish trees,

Moringa oleifera. One snare with fruits of this tree as bait was confiscated and destroyed. One flock of ca. 15 birds feeding on half-ripe rice plants was reported by a farmer.

After October no records from the mainland near Rasa Island were made despite regular monitoring in December.

CONSERVATION OF THE PHILIPPINE COCKATOO AND RASA ISLAND

Potential natural habitat of the Philippine cockatoo. The density of Philippine cockatoos on Rasa Island is the highest known in the wild. Density of breeding pairs in the coastal forest is considerably higher in coastal forest than in the mangrove. This is likely due to the fact that the availability of suitable nesting tree is higher in the former habitat. Only *Sonneratia alba* is known as a nesting tree in the mangrove and at the same time the only source of food recorded in this ecosystem. Although the claim of Lambert (1994) that mangrove is crucial for survival might be true, our observations suggest that it may not represent the optimal habitat for the species.

Coastal forests, and possibly also swamp and riverine forests, are not well-defined vegetation formations in the Philippines. They have disappeared almost completely from the Sulu Sea floodplain of Palawan, mostly due to the conversion of land areas into ricefields or coconut plantations (Widmann, 1998). Aside from Rasa, remnants can be found in coastal areas of Narra and Aborlan, in Iwahig, in the Cabayugan area, and probably in some larger satellite islands of Palawan. These forest formations hold relatively high numbers of suitable nesting and feeding tree species.

These observations indicate that despite the fact that the cockatoo shows certain plasticity in habitat selection, particularly outside the breeding season, tall trees in the original lowland forest are crucial for its survival. The species is not specialized in the choice of food as it feeds on a wide variety of readily available

cultivated plants. It is therefore assumed that suitable nesting trees in an undisturbed surrounding are the limiting factor for the species. The high number of non-breeders, those birds counted on the roosting site, may also be a reflection of the scarcity of natural nest holes.

Lambert (1994) noted that lowland forest on steeper slopes seems to be avoided by the species. This is in line with observations of other authors (Collar et al., 1999) and also with the findings during the surveys on the Palawan mainland (Widmann, unpubl. data). The scarcity of cockatoos in forests of medium and high elevations cannot be explained by lack of nesting and feeding trees alone. However, potential competition of nesting holes in these forest ecosystems is higher with additional species like Blue-naped parrot (*Tanygnathus lucionensis*), Spotted wood owl (*Strix seloputo*), Palawan hornbill (*Anthracoceros marchei*) and Hill myna (*Gracula religiosa*) occurring in these forest habitats. On the other hand, observations on the cockatoo's aggressiveness from Rasa indicate that cockatoos are themselves quite competitive occupants of nest holes.

A limiting factor for the breeding distribution might be high rainfall during the breeding season. Losses of clutches have been observed on Rasa due to flooded nest holes. Cockatoos are not choosy in the selection of rainproof nesting situations. In one instance the nesting hole opens skywards which resulted in a loss of clutches in the 2000 and 2001 breeding season due to complete flooding during thunderstorms.

Precipitation increases markedly from the Sulu Sea over the alluvial plains to the high Victoria Range. The mountain ridges are frequently covered with clouds even during the dry season, whereas dry spells of four to six weeks often occur over the open sea and offshore islands. This precipitation pattern is very typical for landscapes with only narrow coastal plains and steeply rising mountain ranges (Walsh, 1996) which are prevalent in the Philippines.

Most cockatoo species occur in arid or semiarid conditions.

Rain during the breeding season is an unlikely event. Even species of the inner tropics seem to thrive best in conditions of pronounced dry seasons during the breeding season, like the Philippine cockatoo on Palawan or the Yellow-crested cockatoo, *Cacatua sulphurea* on the Lesser Sundas and Sulawesi (PHPA, LIPI, BirdLife International IP, 1998). Low precipitation may be a prerequisite for the successful nesting of most *Cacatua* species and may naturally exclude them from permanently wet forest habitats like montane forests in the Philippines.

Implementation of biological findings. Suitable nesting trees seem to be the limiting factor for the cockatoo population on Rasa. All suitable nesting holes were occupied during the breeding seasons in 1999 and 2000. It is therefore likely that the population could be further increased by providing nest boxes. The project has so far refrained from resorting to this measure because the island is still frequently visited by people collecting sea cucumbers or wild honey, and by claimants harvesting copra. For this reason, artificial nests were feared to be too conspicuous and could invite poaching. The same is true with the use of devices to protect nesting trees in the mangrove against predation by monitor lizards.

However, activities of people on the island are better known and can be better monitored in future breeding seasons due to improved communication. Presently, preparatory steps are taken to test nest boxes on Rasa and other well protected areas. This would include strict enforcement of the already existing regulation that only claimants are allowed to enter the island during the breeding season. Designs for nest boxes for different species of parrots are readily available and can be modified for the Philippine cockatoo based on the data gathered from the natural nest holes.

A long-term strategy for providing nesting and food trees is the enrichment planting of larger areas with suitable tree species, such as being undertaken by the program on Rasa. However, this measure will lead to results earliest in about twenty years for the

fastest growing species like Taluto (*Pterocymbium tinctorium*), and much longer for hardwood species, like e.g. Apitong, (*Dipterocarpus grandiflorus*).

People-related conservation activities. Given the major threats for the species such as poaching and habitat destruction, people-related conservation forms the main focus of conservation activities. The program follows a community-based approach in order to make management decisions transparent and facilitate the handing over of responsibility and knowledge in managing and protecting Rasa Island after the termination of the program. The most important components of this approach are briefly described in the following.

Sagip Katala Movement - Narra Chapter, Inc. and its activities

As an initial step of project planning, the Sagip Katala Movement-Narra Chapter, Inc. (SKM-NC, Inc.) was founded with 43 member-incorporators. These main stakeholders include claimants of coconut plantations on Rasa, former poachers, inhabitants of the neighboring barangay, and representatives of relevant agencies and local government units. During the planning workshop, the movement outlined three priority actions, namely; (1) increasing information dissemination and education campaigns; (2) enforcing laws and ordinances applicable to Rasa and its wildlife; and (3) initiating livelihood activities for its members.

The rationale behind the third priority action is to build confidence in the program and enhance active participation in it. Hog fattening was the priority livelihood project identified by the members and facilitated by the program. Wardens are also given incentives by the office for discoveries of new nesting trees of the Philippine cockatoo and other wildlife in Rasa, particularly other parrot species. Additional sources of income are derived from bird enthusiasts visiting Rasa Island, visiting foreign and local researchers, and labor services for the maintenance and operation

of the nursery.

Another confidence building measure is the mapping of coconut plantations on Rasa which provided occupants for the first time with proof of their claims. The positive effect of this measure was that the occupants realized that the program is not aiming to drive them out of the island. On the other hand, baseline data are now available to prove any illegal extension of coconut plantations.

Deputized wardens

PCCP has 10 volunteer wardens, most of them former poachers, whom the Department of Environment and Natural Resources has deputized. Charged with responsibilities as Special Deputy Environment and Natural Resources Officer (SDENRO), these wardens have been trained to perform observations in the field such as taking down notes and identifying wildlife. During the two years of project implementation, the wardens demonstrated their commitment to guard Rasa Island from illegal activities and performed their duties such as monitoring nesting sites of the cockatoo and other wildlife on and around Rasa Island with dedication. In cooperation with the CENRO and LGU, these wardens took action against common violations notably illegal cutting of mangroves and harvesting of forest products from the island. Part of their responsibility is the submission of monthly accomplishment reports to the DENR, the Municipal Mayor, and the Provincial Governor.

During breeding season (February-July), the wardens take a 24-hour duty at Rasa Island. Divided in three teams, they patrol around the island and particularly guard and monitor the eggs and hatchlings in nesting trees. In addition, they observe other wildlife encountered while on duty. Outside the breeding season, their concentration shift to patrolling the mainland coasts of the Barangays Panacan, Antipuluan, and Malinao in Narra where the cockatoos are frequently sighted in coconut plantations and in small forest patches on the mainland. Due to their knowledge of

the cockatoo and of the island which they acquired as former poachers, the wardens proved efficient in the task of monitoring wildlife. Consequently, poaching of birds was not observed during the breeding seasons of 1999 and 2000.

Narra Youth Organization For Environmental Conservation (NYOFEC)

The PCCP sees in the young people a potent force in strengthening its IEC component. Consequently, a seminar-workshop on environmental awareness was conducted involving high school student leaders and officers of youth groups in town. The objectives of the seminar-workshop were: (1) to equip the youth with knowledge on environmental issues and concerns, and (2) to develop in them the vigilance to help combat environmental threats and problems. The main purpose of organizing the youth in Narra was to develop the young people to become effective environmental educators and catalysts for change.

A major output of the group in 2000 was the publication of an activity book intended for elementary school pupils in Narra. Other activities during the youth encounter were field exposures, garbage collection and cleanliness campaign in Narra market, tree planting, and ecosystems assessment.

Lobbying for the legal protection of the Philippine cockatoo and Rasa Island

The program collects data which are relevant for the legal protection of Rasa and its biodiversity. Surveys therefore do not only focus on the cockatoo, but all other vertebrates, tree cover, and coral reef condition. The data are made available for local government units, DENR, and the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development.

Media coverage

A broad media coverage of the program is intended mainly to provide information to potential buyers of poached cockatoos

that it is illegal to possess poached birds and that the status of the species is critical.

Acknowledgments

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Hon. Serafin Esperancilla, Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Panacan, Narra and his council supported the program and cooperated with many of its endeavors. We would like to thank the residents of Brgys. Panacan, Malinao, and Narra, Palawan for their interest and help, and the claimants and members of the Sagip Katala Movement-Narra Chapter, Inc. for their enthusiasm and assistance.

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Table 1. Overview over food plants of the Philippine cockatoo

Species	Family	Common name	Part cons.
Garuga floribunda	Burseraceae	Bogo	seed
Carica papaya	Caricaceae	Papaya	seed, pulp
Erythrina variegata	Leguminosae	Dapdap	flower, nectar?
Pithecellobium dulce	Leguminosae	Kamachile	seed
Leucaena leucocephala	Leguminosae	Ipil-ipil	seed
Gliricidia sepium	Leguminosae	Kakawate	seed, bark
Pterocarpus indicus	Leguminosae	Narra	seed
Melia dubia	Meliaceae	Bagalunga	seed?
Ficus sp.	Moraceae	'Balete'	'fruit'
Moringa oleifera	Moringaceae	Malunggai	seed
Pometia pinnata	Sapindaceae	Malugai	fruit, seed
Sonneratia alba	Sonneratiaceae	Pedada	fruit
Pterocymbium taluto	Sterculiaceae	Taluto	flower, seed
Trema orientalis	Ulmaceae	Anabiong	fruit, seed
Cocos nucifera	Palmae	Coconut	flowers
Oryza sativa	Gramineae	Rice	unripe seed
Zea mays	Gramineae	Corn	seed

Figure 2. Monthly counts of individual numbers of Philippine cockatoo on the traditional roosting site on Rasa Island. Numbers showed a slight increase in almost three years of recording. The numbers fluctuate seasonally and are lowest during, and highest after, the breeding season.



Figure 3: A clutch of Philippine cockatoos after ringing and feather sampling



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PSITTACINE FEATHER AND BEAK DISEASE TESTING AND DNA SEXING OF WILD RED-VENTED COCKATOO CHICKS AT RASA ISLAND, PALAWAN

Glenn Rebong, Marc Boussekey, Peter Widmann, Indira Lacerna, and Siegfred Diaz

ABSTRACT

The Philippine Cockatoo or Red-vented Cockatoo (Cacatua haematuropygia) is a critically endangered bird endemic to the country. Habitat destruction, extermination, poaching for the pet market, and potential diseases caused by the introduction of captive birds in wild populations were cited as the reasons for the decline.

One of projects of the Philippine Cockatoo Conservation Program is to determine if the wild population in Rasa Island carries the Psittacine Beak and Feather Disease (PBFD) virus. Blood and feather samples were collected and sent to a laboratory for the PBFD test and DNA sexing. Sixteen birds were ringed. Fifteen feather samples and six blood samples were collected and sent to France for PBFD test and DNA sexing. Among the 15 birds, eight cockatoo chicks were male and four were females. Two cockatoos were not tested due to insufficient samples and one had no result. Physical examination and blood testing showed that most of the cockatoo chicks sampled were apparently healthy and did not carry the PBFD virus.

Introduction

The Philippine Cockatoo or Red-vented Cockatoo (Cacatua *haematuropygia*) is a critically endangered bird endemic to the country (WCSP, 1997). The species was once found throughout the archipelago. However, a rapid decline in population has been observed in the past decades. Habitat destruction, extermination as crop pest, poaching for the pet market, and potential diseases caused by the introduction of captive birds in wild populations were cited as the reasons for the decline (EEP, 1999).

With the species being pushed to the brink of extinction, the Philippine Cockatoo Conservation Program (PCCP) was

established to help save the remaining bird populations. The PCCP embarked on various coordinated projects. One of these is to determine if the wild population on Rasa Island carries the Psittacine Beak and Feather Disease (PBFD) virus.

In 1996, Dr. med. vet. Nicolas Richer conducted a study on wild as well as captive Philippine Cockatoos to determine the occurrence of the PBFD virus, blood parasites, and to check their blood cell counts. Nineteen (19) feather pulp samples and eight (8) blood smears were submitted to VETGEN Laboratory (U.K.) for testing and examination.

Results showed that all samples were found to be PBFD – free. All blood smears had normal blood values and were negative for any blood parasites.

SAMPLING SITE

Located offshore of the municipality of Narra, Palawan is the island of Rasa. This small coral island supports what is believed to be the highest density of wild Philippine Cockatoo. The latest count on the roosting site during this year's breeding season revealed that there are at least 60 birds on the island. Considering that these are still nestlings and breeding pairs guarding the nests, the number of birds could be higher.

A trip to Rasa was organized on May 22, 2000. Ringing and sampling were carried out from May 23-25, 2000 with the help of PCCP staff and wardens. A volunteer photographer documented the activities and was later joined by a TV crew from ABS-CBN in covering the sampling activity.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Before the sampling was done, the wardens, who are expert tree climbers, had to climb the trees to reach the nests.

Weighing. A vertical, spring-mounted weighing scale was used. After weighing the chick contained in the cloth sack, the weight of the empty cloth sack was recorded.

The weight of the empty sack was then subtracted from the gross weight of the bird and the sack.

Ringing. Open aluminum bird rings were placed on the left leg of each cockatoo chick. Each ring was marked with DENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources) initials, year 00 (yr. 2000), and a serial number. For example, DENR 00 0001.

Blood Collection. After applying a swab with alcohol, blood was collected from the brachial vein. Approximately 0.5 ml of blood was collected from each bird. After withdrawing the syringe from the vein, pressure was applied to the vein with a small piece of cotton wool soaked in liquid trexaminic acid. This effectively minimized the bleeding and hematomata from the collection site. After collection, the blood was transferred to a vial with anti-coagulant (EDTA). Gentle rolling of the vial on the hand facilitated a thorough mixing of the blood and anti-coagulant without damaging the blood cells.

Feather Sampling. Samples of blood quill feathers were taken either from the wing or tail. After taking the sample, the feather was air-dried for a while before putting it inside a clean plastic zip-lock bag. To avoid contamination of the feathers during collection, clean examination latex gloves were used and changed with each chick being sampled.

All samples (blood and feather) were properly labeled. After collecting the samples, a short clinical examination of each chick was done to assess its general health condition. The blood and feather samples were sent to the VETFRANCE Laboratory for the PBFD test and DNA sexing.

Nesting PBFD Test Tree No.	Number of Hatchlings	Sample Taken	Ring No.	Weight (grams)	Date Ringed	Remarks	DNA Testing
negative		feather	DENR 00-0097	303	May 10	- do -	male
7-Bugo negative	1	feather & blood	DENR 00-0001	275	May 23	ready to fledge	male
5-Bugo negative	3	feather & blood	DENR 00-0002	349	May 24	>50 days old	male
negative		feather & blood	DENR 00-0003	333	May 24	- do -	female
negative		feather & blood	DENR 00-0004	357	May 24	- do -	male
8-Pagatpat sample	1	none	DENR 00-0005	90	May 25	Appox. 2 weeks old too young for sampling, with few mites on skin	no sample
10-Pagatpat negative	2	feather & blood	DENR 00-0006	318	May 25	ready to fledge complete feathers	male
negative		feather & blood	DENR 00-0007	328	May 25	- do -	male
TOTAL NUMBER OF HATCHLINGS RINGED	16						

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References

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